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     ABSTRACT                            
In classical international law, States alone were the makers and subjects of the law. Times 
have changed. Contemporary international law admits, not only States as its subjects but also 
individuals and international organisations; it controls not just the needs of States but also 
the needs of individuals as it continues to venture into areas which, in the classical era, were 
exclusively reserved to domestic law.  The fact that international law now applies to entities 
other than States is no longer a subject of controversy both in theory and practice.  
On the contrary, the question relating to whether international law could originate from a 
source other than through the consent of States in the positivist sense of the law has remained 
a question of controversy. The question has been made more complex by the multiplicity of 
international institutions created by States and vested with authority to perform the functions 
entrusted to them under international law. The functions they perform influence the 
behaviours and expectations of both States and individuals; but the powers they exercise 
belong to the States which delegated the powers. Since the powers are delegated by States, it 
should follow that the powers be confined by the very fact of delegation to the functions for 
which the powers had been granted. Such powers cannot be used for any other purpose, 
perhaps.  
With this in mind, the question sought to be answered in this work is whether the powers 
granted to International Court of Justice to “decide disputes” – article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the Court) – implicates the power of judicial lawmaking. In other words, whether rules and 
principles arising from the decisions of the Court can be properly referred to as rules and 
principles of international law. The question becomes quite intriguing when placed within the 
context of article 38(1)(d) and article 59 of the Statute of the Court on the one hand, and the 
practice of the Court and of the States appearing before it on the other hand.  
Articles 38(1)(d) provides: “subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.” By article 59: “The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”. 
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Notwithstanding the language of the above provisions, it is shown in this work that like 
judges in municipal law, judges in the ICJ lay down rules and principles having legal 
implications for the decisions in subsequent cases as well as for the conduct of States, in 
general, regarding areas within the degrees of the settled case-law of the Court. It is 
accordingly argued that to the extent that rules and principles in the decisions of the Court 
are relevant as rules and principles of international law (in subsequent decisions of the 
Court) to the determination of international law rights and obligations of States, judicial 
decisions in article 38(1)(d) are a source of international law. This is notwithstanding the 
unhelpful language of paragraph (d) and the influence of article 59. Concerning article 59, 
the writer argues that the article has no bearing on the authority of judicial decisions in 
article 38(1)(d); its real function being to protect the legal rights and interests of States from 
a decision given in a case to which they were not parties.    
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        Chapter One 
        Introduction  
These changes have underlined the importance of the Court's second 
function. For it now happens with greater frequency than formerly that, on 
a given topic, no applicable precepts are to be found, or that those which do 
exist present lacunae or appear to be obsolete, that is to say, they no longer 
correspond to the new conditions of the life of peoples. In all such cases, the 
Court must develop the law of nations, that is to say, it must remedy its 
shortcomings, adapt existing principles to these new conditions and, even if 
no principles exist, create principles in conformity with such conditions. 
The Court has already very successfully undertaken the creation of law in a 
case which will remain famous in the annals of international law (Advisory 
Opinion ..."Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United 
Nations").
1
 
The ICJ is a permanent international court with power of adjudication over claims submitted 
to it by States accepting its jurisdiction. Articles 7 and 92 of the Charter of the United Nations 
established the Court as its principal judicial organ. The Charter is supplemented by the 
Statute of the Court which is annexed to the Charter as an integral part thereof.
2
 It is the 
successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) established under the League 
of Nations Covenant, except that the Statute of the ICJ, unlike that of the PCIJ, is annexed to 
the Charter of the United Nations.
3
  The functions and procedures of the two Courts are the 
same. 
By its Statute, the Court performs two main functions: the first is to settle legal disputes 
submitted to it by States; the second is to answer legal questions submitted to it by organs 
permitted to do so. In addition to these functions expressly granted by its Statute, the Court 
performs a general lawmaking function as an incidence of its law-application function. In a 
                                                             
1 Separate Opinion of Judge Alvarez in Fisheries case (United Kingdom and Norway), ICJ Rep 1951, 116, 146. Judge 
Alvarez was alluding to ―the rapid and profound changes in international life‖, which followed the end of the Second World 
War. These changes, no doubt, include the liberalisation of the domain of international law in the areas of human rights; the 
emergence of powerful international organisations and the supranational application of international law. The Judge thought  
these changes ―greatly affected the law of nations‖.     
2 Article 92 of the Charter 
3 Ibid  
  
2 
very significant way, this lawmaking function assists the Court in the performance of the 
aforementioned dual functions bestowed on it by its Statute. This, as explained in the body of 
this work, is because the Statute mandates the Court to perform its functions in accordance 
with international law (as contained in its article 38(1)), within a legal sphere that lacks a 
central legislature, resulting in inadequate legislative interventions. This necessarily results in 
gaps in the law the Court shall apply.  
The lawmaking function of the Court finds some formal expression in article 38(1)(d) of its 
Statute. This article allows the Court to use judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. Notwithstanding, it appears from a large portion of the 
literature on article 38(1) and, on the face of article 38(1) itself (particularly its paragraph 
(d)), that judicial decisions, though mentioned in the article are not a source of international 
law in accordance to which the Court is expected to perform its functions.  
In stark contrast to this conventional approach to the issue of sources of international law, this 
thesis is clearly advancing the opposite claim: the judgments of the ICJ are indeed a source of 
international law. The thesis will substantiate this argument by a careful analysis of the case 
law of the ICJ in the following chapters of this work.  
This chapter, however, shall aim to shed light on the more theoretical aspects which surround 
this novel claim of the thesis. Even if we ultimately accept that the judgments of the ICJ are a 
source of international law, the question remains as to why we should accept that the case law 
of the ICJ performs such a function. How are we to account for the conventional approach of 
the sources of international law, besides the purely grammatical interpretation of Article 
38(1) (which will be elucidated in Chapter three), can the claim that this thesis is advancing 
be reconciled with our current understanding of international law theory? 
  
3 
The thesis will argue that the conventional approach to the sources of international law is, by 
and large, the product of an outdated conception of international law, which was influenced 
by notions of sovereignty and positivism that held sway during the early 20th century and 
have found their expression in Article 38(1). However, much more importantly, this largely 
historical account of international law coheres with neither our current understanding of 
international law nor the evolution of the role of the ICJ within international law.  
In the following sections of this chapter, these issues will be elaborated in greater detail. 
Sections 1-3 will analyse the theoretical underpinning of the conventional account that the 
judgments of the ICJ are not a source of international law: these are sovereignty, positivism 
and the corresponding place of the judge in positivist accounts of the law. Similarly, section  
4  will discuss the limitations imposed on the ICJ. The remaining sections 5-7 will shift the 
focus of the analysis to the ICJ itself. Section 5 highlights the fact that the ICJ straddles the 
divide between common law and civil law, as an international court of justice. Section 6 
stresses that the ICJ also occupies a unique position in the international community of 
proliferated dispute resolution mechanisms. For these reasons, section 7 concludes that the 
ICJ should be an integral part of international lawmaking process. Section 8 briefly details 
the signposting of the following chapters.  
1.1 Sovereignty  
The traditional conception of sovereignty in international law presupposes that States, being 
sovereign, were independent of other States, and of the totality of the international 
community. As sovereigns, they were subject to no other being, but to their own will alone. 
This voluntarism is the direct consequence of State sovereignty reflected in the rule of 
consent which is inherent in the nature of international law. Such rules as international law 
reflect the will and consent of States; no State can be compelled to submit its dispute to 
  
4 
judicial settlement without its consent,
4
 are part of the bundle of rights contained in the notion 
of State sovereignty.  
In his discussion of the limitations on the judicial settlement of international disputes, 
Lauterpacht placed the concept of sovereignty at the centre of the limitations. He asserted that 
sovereignty manifests itself in two major ways: (a) the right of a State to determine the future 
of international law by which it will be bound; and (b) the right to determine the content of 
existing international law in a given case. He located the theoretical foundation of the former 
in the positivist doctrine, which is more fundamental in international legislation;
5
  he thought 
the second included the rule that a State is not bound to submit to judicial settlement without 
its consent.
6
 A practical application of the latter rule is manifest in the general voluntary 
nature of the jurisdiction of international courts; and as it implicates the nature of the Court‘s 
jurisdiction, it is one that has followed the Court from its inception.    
The real consequence of this conception of sovereignty lies in the rule that no State can be 
bound by a law without its consent.
7
 Beyond the State, therefore, there was no other entity 
with lawmaking capacity under the traditional international setting. This was reflected in the 
reasoning of the PCIJ in S.S. Lotus
8
 that the ―rules of law binding upon States ... emanate 
from their free will ... and established in order to regulate the relations between those co-
existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims‖.9 This 
reasoning did not only affirm the consent-based nature of international law, it also clearly 
took cognisance of the traditional international law setting where States alone were the 
subjects of the law and the only actors on the international plane. The rule that States as equal 
                                                             
4 Under international law, ―no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States to either 
mediation or arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement‖ – the Status of Eastern Carelia, Series B No. 5, p. 27. 
Patrick Kelly, ―The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation‖, 12 Yale J Int‘l L, 342, 343, (1987) (stating that 
―the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction requires the surrender of an element of sovereignty‖)  
5 Hersch Lauterpacht,  Function of Law in the International Community,  p. B2 (Connecticut: Archon Books 1966)  
6 Ibid,  p. 4 
7 See Sovereignty and Federation in International Law in International Law Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, 7 (Vol. 
3, E. Lauterpacht ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)   
8 Series A, No. 10 (1927), Judgment of September 7, 1927,  
9 Ibid, p. 18   
  
5 
sovereigns were the only subjects of the law foreclosed the possibility of the recognition of 
another entity capable of creating international law.
10
 
States exercise their sovereignty in the creation of international law by way of consent. The 
rule that no State is bound without its consent naturally makes consent the yardstick for 
measuring the validity of a rule as a rule of international law. It would follow that the rule of 
State consent is a major obstacle to the acceptance as a rule of law, a rule that did not directly 
emanate from States. This invariably questions the competence of the ICJ to make or develop 
international law within a legal space dominated by States when States are readily ascribed 
the function of the sole makers of the law. This poses a theoretical barrier to the acceptance 
of the decisions of the ICJ as a source of international law.  
It is, however, no longer a safe ground of argument to continue to rely on the era of the 
prevalence of absolute sovereignty to judge the progress of international law in an era in 
which the statists approach to the creation of international law has been weakened. This 
weakness arose, not only from the fact that the concept of sovereignty has been liberalised to 
such an extent that the relations of States inter se are no longer solely regulated by the rules 
they have agreed upon in advance, but also by the roles international organisations now play 
as important actors in the international sphere. This new trend is also evident in the entities 
that are now able to carry international law rights and obligations. The contemporary reality 
of the liberalised international space to cover entities other than States is that the behaviours 
of States are now readily influenced and sometimes controlled by rules emanating from 
entities other than States – examples are international organisations and international 
Courts.
11 
   
                                                             
10 See Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, ―Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation 
of International Humanitarian Law‖  37(1) the Yale Journal of Int‘l L. 108, 112 (2012)   
11 Patrick Tangney, ―The New Internationalism: The Cession of Sovereign Competences to Supranational Organizations and 
Constitutional Change in the United States and Germany.‖ 21 Yale J. Int‘l L. 395, 402, 404 – 406 (1996) (stating that States 
which joined the IMF agreed to cede some control over monetary policies and exchange rates by agreeing to be bound by the 
rules specified by IMF) There also are the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Civil Aviation 
  
6 
In making the foregoing point, the writer is aware that the fact that there is no express State 
consent to rules made by an international organisation or court is not conclusive of lack of 
consent. So long as international organisations and international courts are established 
through state consent, the organisations remain the creation of States in exercise of their 
sovereignty. By that initial consent, international organisations and courts exercise, not their 
own powers, but the powers of States that established them, even in the instances that they 
exercise incidental powers which are not expressly granted by States. As a corollary, the rules 
and regulations made by an international organisation bind the States that have consented to 
membership of that organisation. Accordingly, consent may well be blurred to the extent to 
which organs of a particular organisation are allowed to make rules, take decisions and 
enforce them against States, but at the root, and indeed the real source of the legitimacy of 
such organisations and the rules they make is the consent of State parties to the establishment 
of the organisation.
12
  
To understand the intricate operation of consent in modern international law, the highlight of 
the modern view of consent should be on the fact that international organisations and courts 
now readily exercise implied or incidental powers that appear, sometimes, to overshadow the 
powers expressly granted; and that to this exercise of implied powers, States generally 
acquiescence.  Any theory of international law that concludes from an obscurity of state 
consent in the exercise of powers by international organisation or courts to argue that the rule 
of state consent no longer controls can only be self-destructive.      
It is, therefore, important to bear in mind that though the relevance of sovereignty and state 
consent to the creation of international law has been tampered by signs and events of 
modernity, sovereignty still remains the bedrock of international law, and the rule of state 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Organisation (ICAO), the various regional organisations now existing, among others.  
12 Oren Perez, ―Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New Transnational Legal Body‖, 33(1) Brook. J. Int‘l L 1, 6 (2007) 
(reminding us that such acts as ratification, acceptance, approval and accession are all manifestations of consent).  
  
7 
consent the fountain from which international law springs to life.
13
 In the realm of 
international lawmaking, therefore, state consent as encapsulated in the notion of sovereignty, 
still controls. The writer has been quite conscious of this in his argument that decisions of the 
ICJ are a source of law.  Hence, as shall be seen in chapter two, the writer sought to base his 
argument on the implied consent of States. The writer argued that implied consent is 
deducible from the consent to the Statute of the Court and from the habitual practice by 
which States rely on the decisions of the Court as authoritative.        
1.2 Positivism  
The strict positivist doctrine which prevailed in the 19
th
 – early 20th Centuries saw law only 
through the lens of the formal will of a sovereign. A rule is not a rule of law if it does not 
proceed from a sovereign being through a formal lawmaking procedure. The strict positivist 
understanding of law feeds on the concept of sovereign equality as a basis of distinguishing 
between legal and non legal rules. Their argument followed the traditional statists nature of 
international law, where absolute sovereignty reigned supreme, and where States where the 
only subject of international law. States being sovereign equals and the only subjects of the 
law, it must be States alone that are capable of creating the law that govern their conducts. 
This view excluded all rules that emanated from sources, other than treaties and customary 
law, from the purview of international law.
14
 According to John Henry Merryman, ―...state 
                                                             
13Cesare P.R. Romano, ―The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements 
for a Theory of Consent‖, 39 International Law and Politics, 791, 793 and 795 (2007) (agreeing that the principle of consent 
constitutes the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations) 
14  Hersch Lauterpacht, ―Westlake and Present Day International Law‖, in International Law Collected Papers of Hersch 
Lauterpacht 385, 393 (Vol. 2, E. Lauterpacht ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) (stating that under the rigid 
positivist formula only customs and treaties are sources of international law); Lauterpacht, Function of Law”, note 5,  57, 
(stating that ―the rigid positivist believes that nothing short of a rule of conduct expressly accepted by States possesses the 
authority of a rule of international law‖.) 
  
8 
positivism, as expressed in the dogma of the absolute external and internal sovereignty of the 
state, led to a state monopoly on lawmaking‖.15 
In view of what has been said above about sovereignty, the tenability of the strict positivist 
understanding of international law in contemporary international law remains to be seen. 
Indeed the concept of sovereignty, as now understood, does not make it impossible for States 
to accept rules of law emanating from international institutions in furtherance of the specific 
activities for which States have themselves created the institution. As aptly argued by 
Lauterpacht: 
As there is nothing in the current doctrine of sovereignty which should lead 
us to adopt the rule that states only are the subjects of international law, so 
there is nothing in it which should compel us to adopt the purely positivist 
view in the controversy touching the sources of international law.
16
   
 
It is, therefore, safe to assert that the collapse of the traditional stricture of sovereignty now 
questions the tenacity of the strict positivist view on the sources of international law. This in 
turn would question any argument that seeks to disapprove judicial legislation on the basis of 
positivism.   
1.3 The Office of the Judge is to Interpret and not to Make Law    
Article 38(1) expressly requires the ICJ to ―decide‖ disputes. This formulation is in line with 
the office of the judge in other systems of law: judges are to decide and not to make law.
17
 
The desire to keep the lawmaking and law-application functions separate creates abhorrence 
towards judicial legislation. This, perhaps, explains the caution which every system exercises 
                                                             
15 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, 22 (2d ed. 1994) cited in Ryan McGonigle, ―The Role of Precedents in 
Mixed Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis of Louisiana and the Philippines‖, 6(2) EJCL, July 2003, (available at 
http://www.ejcl.org/62/art62-1.html)  
16  Hersch Lauterpacht, ―Westlake and Present Day International Law‖, note 14, p. 393; Quincy Wright, ―Legal Positivist and 
the Nuremberg Judgment‖, 42 Am. J. Int‘l L 405, 407 (1948) (arguing that due to lack of a workable legislature, it is not 
practicable under international law to leave the adaptation of the law to the legislation and require the courts to be 
positivists.)  
17 Martin Shapiro, ―Judges as Liars‖ 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol‘y 155, 155 (1994) (arguing that ―courts, by their very nature, 
are institutions designed to resolve conflicts between parties‖)   
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towards the recognition of judicial decisions as a formal source of law. It is believed that 
judicial legislation is a dangerous usurpation of legislative powers, and one that provides 
incentives for the tyranny of the judiciary. Accordingly, judicial legislation is seen as 
―...derogatory to the sovereignty of the people to subject the citizen, not to the law of the 
State, but to the magistrate‘s personal judgment as to what is right‖.18 Judicial lawmaking 
also had to labour under the influence of Baron de Montesquieu. Under his teachings the 
judicial role was underpinned by two important ideas. The first idea was that the judge was 
nothing more than the mouth of the law; she is forbidden from adding anything to the law. 
The judge was only to expound what was already inside the statute.
19
 The second idea was 
that the judge‘s function was to be that of a legislative referee; this was to the effect that only 
the legislature can resolve legal questions and when the judiciary decides a case it does so 
through the will of the legislature.
20
 These, perhaps, account for the observation that the 
criticisms against judicial innovation is delivered with ―a pejorative overtone which implies 
that judges who ‗create‘ rather than find the law somehow usurp the legislator‘s function and 
profane their own‖. 21 
Judges, national or international, understand this sentiment. Hence they tread cautiously and 
would not admit the role they play in lawmaking, albeit, obvious. According to Robert 
Jennings, the most important requirement of the judicial function is to be seen to be applying 
existing, recognized rules, or principles of law even when he creates a new law.
22
 This may 
explain why judges often make such statements as ―Undoubtedly a court of law declares what 
                                                             
18Hersch Lauterpacht, ―The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought in International Law‖, 12 Brit 
Y.B Int‘l. L, 31, 56 (1931) 
19 Mario Ascheri, ―A Turning Point in the Civil-Law Tradition: From Ius Commune to Code Napoleon‖, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 
1041, 1042 (1995-1996)    
20 Ibid  
21 Jack G Day, ―Why Judges Must Make Law‖ 26(3) Case Western Reserve Law Review, 258, 258 (1975-1976)  
22 Robert Jennings, ―The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in International Relations‖, in International Law at the Time 
of Codification, Essays in Honour of Roberto Ago, 4 vols. (Milan, 1987), III, pp 141-142, cited in Mohamed Shahabuddeen , 
Precedent in the World Court,  232 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)    
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is the law, but does not legislate‖. 23 No wonder, John Austin spoke of ―the childish fiction 
employed by ... judges that ...common law is not made by them‖.24 And he supposed that the 
common law ―is a miraculous something made by nobody, existing ... from eternity and 
merely declared from time to time by judges‖. 25 In his brief but blunt article, Martin Shapiro 
argued that judges generally make law and lie about it.
26
  Frederick Schauer appears 
unconvinced by the negative theoretical arguments and denials as he argued that it is far too 
late in the day to deny that judges are often engaged in the process of lawmaking both in the 
context of pure common law decision-making or in
 
the context of the supposed interpretation 
of capacious language in statutes.
27
   
While it is convenient to deny judicial lawmaking, the intricate relationship between judicial 
lawmaking and law-application and the fine line that divides the two make it impossible to 
completely separate them.
28
 According to Brierly, the complete separation of the legislative 
and the judicial functions is something that exists in the imagination of constitution makers, 
                                                             
23 Judge Tanaka, dissenting, South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Rep, 1966, 6, 277. (The Judge was quick to point 
out that there is a very delicate bother-line between judicial legislation and judicial declaration).  
24 John Austin, 2 Lectures on Jurisprudence 634 (Murray, 5th Edn. 1885, Robert Cambell, ed) cited in Frederick Schauer ―Do 
Cases Make Bad Law?‖ 73 University of Chicago Law Rev. 883, 885 (2006)   
25John Austin, ibid. Brierly agreed with Austin‘s observation, but he disagreed with, ―the lesson that he drew from it ...that 
judges should not only drop the fiction but abandon the legislative side of their function altogether‖ – Hersch Lauterpacht 
and C.H.M Waldock, The Basis of Obligation in International law and Other Papers of late James Leslie Brierly 98 
(Oxford, 1958). 
26 Martin Shapiro, note 17, p.155    
27Frederick Schauer, note 24, p., 888. Also see DPO Connell, International Law, 12 1965 cited in Cherif Bassiouni, ―A 
Functional Approach to ―General Principles of International Law‖, 11 Mich. J. Int‘l L. 768, 777 (1980-1990) (arguing that, 
―if international law is ... an organic growth reflecting more the life of the international community ... then the creative role 
of the judiciary is important, and its pronouncement upon emanations from basic principles significant‖.)        
28 Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke ―Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers‖, 12 German L.J, 
979, 985 (2011) (arguing that ―the discretionary and creative elements in the application of the law make the law‖. The 
authors further argued (in p. 994) that the ―quintessential lessons of modern constitutionalism, which is worth recalling, is 
that legislation and judicial adjudication are two phenomena that should be kept apart and at the same time be understood in 
their intricate interaction‖.); Robert B. Brandom ―Some Pragmatic Themes in Hegel‘s Idealism: Negotiation and 
Administration in Hegel‘s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms‖, 7 (2) European Journal of 
Philosophy, 164, 180 (1999) (arguing that "there is nothing more to the content of the legal concepts being applied that the 
content they acquire through a tradition of such decisions, that the principles that emerge from this process are appropriately 
thought of as 'judge-made law"); Marc Jacob ―Precedents: Lawmaking through International Adjudication‖ 12 German L.J 
1005, 1054 (2011) (arguing that though it ―is accepted that a system of law expressly sanctioning judicial legislation would 
be a contradiction in terms, judicial law-making in this sense is a permanent feature of the administration of justice in every 
society‖); Manley O. Hudson, ―The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century‖, 10(4) Cornell L.Q, 419,  437 
(1925) (noting that the PCIJ offered a promise that the judge-made part of international law will not be neglected in future) 
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but not in the nature of things.
29
 The present writer cannot but agree with the admonition of 
von Bogdandy and Venzke, that insisting, in doctrinal terms, that judges should only apply 
and not make law does not make the phenomenon go away, as judicial lawmaking is an 
integral element of almost every adjudicatory practice.
30
 According to the authors:  
It seems that, as a matter of fact, many decisions not only aim at settling the 
case at hand, but also at influencing the general legal discourse by 
establishing abstract and categorical statements as authoritative reference 
points for later legal practice. This aspect of the phenomenon ... also clearly 
transcends the limits of the particular dispute and impacts the general 
development of the legal order....
31
 
 
The fact that the observations made above are of a general character and more conducive to 
municipal law where courts have clear constitutional mandate within a system in which 
judgments of courts are habitually obeyed, may merit some level of circumspection when the 
discussion relates to an international court. On the other hand, it is not enough to conclude 
from the fact of the differences between municipal courts and international courts that 
lawmaking is not incidental to law-application by international courts. What must be 
appreciated is that decisions of courts are always reference points for the courts; for potential 
litigants and for researchers who want to understand the working of a particular law. As 
judgments are preserved and made readily accessible through law reporting, it becomes 
impossible for the legal rules adopted by the court in the course of deciding a particular case 
to pass unnoticed. The bottom-line, therefore, is not whether such judgments are habitually 
obeyed, it is whether the judgments are binding and valid; it is whether the litigants, 
themselves, understand that the law to be applied to them is not perfect and that in resolving 
the controversy between them, the court will have to choose a reason, which will invariably 
                                                             
29 Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M Waldock, note 25, p. 98 (further stating that in any system of law, the function of the judge 
is not merely to apply a rule, but also to formulate a rule which he may apply). Mack E. Barham, ―A Renaissance of the 
Civilian Tradition in Louisiana‖, 33 Louisiana Law Review. 357, 364 (1972-1973) (arguing that if the judiciary was to 
function in a purely mechanistic role, there would have been no need for a judiciary, as sovereignty could have functioned 
only with a legislator to make the law and an enforcer to put the law into effect).    
30 von Bogdandy and Venzke, note 28, p 982-983. 
31 Ibid, p. 988  
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deny the interpretation placed on the applicable law by either or both of the litigating States. 
As shown in chapter seven, the lawmaking activities of the ICJ lie in the supply of the minute 
details in the written law which the facts of the controversy between the parties bring to light. 
This sufficiently explains why, irrespective of the nature of the jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
―[State] actors tend to develop their normative expectations in accordance with past 
judgments. They will at least expect a court [the ICJ] to rule consistently if a similar case 
arises‖.32  
It is, therefore, conducive to observe that any approach to the role of the international judge 
that insists on the strict positivist view that judicial decisions do not make law is clearly no 
longer sufficient to explain the role of judges in international law. 
It is useful to remark at this point (as later argued in this work) that articles 36 and 38 place a 
premium on the ability of the Court to decide every case for which it has been properly 
seised. As the Court is the authoritative interpreter of international law, the decision of which 
is regarded as stating the correct position of the law, any potential litigant before the Court, 
holding the position that the Court only declares and not state the law, does so at its peril.  
According to Cesare Romano, ―when a dispute settlement organ has been empowered to 
interpret authoritatively a legal regime and when its judgments become an integral part of that 
regime ... then its judgments necessarily have an effect erga omnes partes contractantes‖.33 
1. 4 Limitations to the Functions of the ICJ 
Before proceeding to further explain why these theoretical foundations of the conventional 
approach are no longer sufficient to accurately describe the position and role of the ICJ in 
contemporary international law, a further important point must be made: judicial lawmaking 
can arise only within the context of deciding concrete disputes, and that the Court can only 
                                                             
32 Ibid, p 987. The practical manifestation of this expectation is discussed in some details in chapter four.     
33 Cesare Romano, ―The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: Pieces of the Puzzle‖, 31 N.Y.U.J.Int‘l L. & Pol. 709, 
737, (1998-1999)  
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decide disputes within the area of its competence. It follows that the Court cannot make or 
develop the law in areas to which its competence does not extend. The importance of the 
patronage the Court receives becomes more germane to its lawmaking functions when 
viewed against the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis is inoperative in the Court. The 
implication will be that when fewer cases are decided by the Court, the development of 
international law by the Court and the ability for self-correction and the possible refinement 
of the rough edges of a rule/principle adopted in a particular case will be lacking. This will 
further hinder the opportunity for the Court to define the scope of operation of such 
rules/principles. Nothing more can cause this hindrance than the absence of an analogical 
factual situation to the case in which the rule/principle was first stated.  Accordingly, a 
discussion of the role of the ICJ cannot omit references to the limitations placed upon its 
jurisdiction, knowing that such limitations on its judicial functions may significantly impact 
on its case-law, particularly in view of the absence of stare decisis.  The writer shall now 
briefly discuss the limitations.  
1.4.1 Absence of Stare Decisis/Article 59         
The notion that article 59 of the Statute of the Court excludes the rule of stare decisis is the 
most damaging to the acceptance of decisions of the ICJ as a source of international law. The 
most famous assertion here is the one that equates article 59 with the exclusion of the rule of 
stare decisis from the practice of the Court. Based on this assertion, it is simply concluded 
that absent stare decisis, judicial decisions are not a source of international law. This was the 
argument clearly made by Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. They 
contended that most scholars agree that the doctrine of stare decisis would not be applied in 
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international law; and that by virtue of article 59 the ICJ is forbidden from formally 
introducing jurisprudential continuity by invoking its previous decisions.
34
      
As will be seen later in chapter four, the present view does not dispute the absence of stare 
decisis in the ICJ, but it disputes any argument that seeks to place that result on article 59. 
Besides, the writer is convinced from the discussion of the common law and civil law 
approaches below, that judicial lawmaking is not synonymous with stare decisis, as the 
absence of the rule has not made it impossible for some level of judicial lawmaking at civil 
law; neither has it made it impossible for the ICJ to engage in some forms of lawmaking in 
the course of its activities. That said, article 59 needs not delay us here, as it has been 
discussed in detail in chapters two and six. As shown in these chapters, other than referencing 
it in article 38(1)(d), article 59 has no real bearing on the authority of the decisions of  the ICJ 
as a source of international law. 
1.4.2 The Voluntary Nature of the Jurisdiction of the Court 
A major obstacle that limits the use of the Court is the voluntary nature of its jurisdiction as 
prescribed in Articles 35 and 36 of its Statute. During the making of the Statute of the PCIJ, 
in order to resolve the disagreements between States in favour of compulsory jurisdiction and 
States
35
 against it, a compromise
36
 was found in the adoption of the optional clause system.
37
 
It was hoped that as States adhere to the optional clause system, in addition to compromissory 
                                                             
34 Emilia Justyna Powell and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, ―The International Court of Justice and the World‘s Three Legal 
Systems‖ 69 (2) The Journal of Politics, 397, 401 (2007).  
35 These were mainly the great powers. See B.C.J. Loder, ―The Permanent Court of International Justice and Compulsory 
Jurisdiction‖, 2 Brit Y.B Int‘l L 6, 20 and 23 (1921-1922) (stating that the League Council was goaded to reject automatic 
compulsory jurisdiction by England‘s opposition to automatic compulsory jurisdiction). Unfortunately, this situation did not 
change during the making of the Statute of the ICJ. See C.H.M Waldock, ―Decline of the Optional Clause‖ 32 Brit Y.B Int‘l 
L 244, 245 (1955-1956), (explaining that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was at the time of making the 
Statute of the ICJ prepared to accept automatic compulsory jurisdiction for legal disputes.)    
36 Thomas J. Pax, ―Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just 
Compulsion?‖, 8(2) Boston College Int‘l & Comparative Law Review, 471, 475-476 (1985) (stating that ―the basis for the 
jurisdiction of PCIJ resulted from a compromise between the desire for compulsory jurisdiction and the desire to see the 
Court gain the necessary support among nations to exists as an international entity‖). The same view was expressed in Loder 
ibid p. 24;  Ruth Lawson, ―The Problem of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court‖, 46, Am. J. Int‘l L, 219, 219 
37 Report of the Third Committee, Annex 16, in Documents Concerning Actions Taken by the Council of the League of 
Nations Under Article 14 of the Covenant, p. 172 (online: http://www.icj.org/homepage/index.php last visited 10.08.12).   
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clauses
38
 in treaties in force, the jurisdiction of the Court will gradually become compulsory.  
This has been a shattered hope,
 39
 not just because only 67 of the 193 members of the UN and 
parties to the Statute of the Court are currently parties to the optional clause system, but also 
because some States, which had adhered to the optional clause, are no longer part of the 
system. Of the five permanent and veto wielding members of the UN Security Council, the 
United Kingdom is the only member still adhering to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
under the optional clause system. Russia and China have never adhered thereto, while the 
United States of America and France which once adhered are no longer part of the system. 
40
 
This in addition to the limitations placed on the jurisdiction of the court by the various 
reservations contained in the optional clause declarations by which States accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
41
 These come with the negative consequence of limiting 
the role of the Court by removing from the purview of the court‘s jurisdiction, important 
subjects of international law.  
                                                             
38 Gary L. Scott and Craig L. Carr, ―The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: The Case for Closing the Clause‖, 81 Am. J. Int‘l 
L 57, 57.   
39 J. Patrick Kelly, ―The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the World Court‖, 11 Mich. J. Int‘l L, 129, 
139 (1989-1990) (arguing that ―the inchoate hope is that the greater participation in the compulsory jurisdiction system will 
increase utilization of the court and thereby expand international legal doctrine and respect for international law‖.) 
Historically, the Optional Clause System was conceived as a sort of compulsory jurisdiction device that was hoped would 
result in the ascription of universal automatic jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the optional clause system has being in crisis from 
when it was adopted. See Richards Erle, ―The Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice‖, 2 Brit Y.B, Int‘l 
L, 1, 4 (1921-1922) (Arguing that any agreement to refer dispute compulsorily to a tribunal with a fixed rota of judges was 
premature). Cf. Loder, note 35, p. 8, (holding the contrary view and expressing the hope that the future of the Optional 
Clause System would be compulsory jurisdiction.); Shigeru Oda, ―The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice: A Myth? 49 Int‘l & Comp. L.Q, 251 (2000) (highlighting the numerous problems associated with compulsory 
jurisdiction to include withdrawal by respondents, preliminary objections and non-compliance with judgments); Stephen 
Schwebel, ―Reflections on the Role of the International Court of Justice‖, 61 Wash. L. Rev 1061, 1063 (1986), (asserting that 
the optional and consensual nature of the jurisdiction of the Court is its critical weakness); Eric Posner and John Yoo, 
―Judicial Independence in International Tribunals‖, 93, Cal. L. Rev. 1, 34-41 (2005) (Finding that the fewest number of 
enforced judgments are those instituted under the Optional Clause System).  Aloysius Llamzon, appears to dispute these 
findings – Aloysius Llamzon, ―Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice‖, 18(5) 
EJIL 815, 845, 846 (2007).  It should be said, though, that problems the optional clause system faces in practice, albeit huge, 
they do not discount the value of the optional clause system as one of the most important device in the Statute.       
40 Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs 113 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) (observing that 
France and the United States terminated their respective acceptances in 1974 and 1985, respectively). For the list of States 
currently adhering to the optional clause system see www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index. (Accessed August 10, 2012)      
41 Despite both parties being parties to the optional clause system the Court may yet not have jurisdiction in as a result of 
reservations in their optional clause declarations. See Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Rep 1957, 9. It has for this reason been 
argued that the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is not truly compulsory – Stanimir A. Alexandrov, ―The Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How Compulsory is It? 5(1) Chinese Journal of Int‘l Law, 29 (2006)  
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For instance, the non adherence by Soviet Union and Hungary to the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the ICJ in any form made it impossible for the United States to unilaterally summon them 
before the Court respecting a novel and interesting question raised in the application filed by 
the United States. The Court would have had the opportunity of enriching the corpus of 
international law (perhaps, by analogy from the law of trespass) on the effect of mistake on 
the violation by a State of the territory of another State in time of peace.
42
 
On the other hand, the shortcomings of compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause 
system are sometimes compensated for by compromissory or jurisdictional clauses in treaties 
in force.
43
 The ICJ website lists a total of 296 of both bilateral and multilateral treaties which 
confer jurisdiction on the ICJ.
44
 Unfortunately, this has also witnessed a steady decline since 
the 1960s. In short, between 2003 till date the website does not have a record of the 
notification of any such treaty to the registry of the Court.    
It may be argued, though, that the fact that some matters are outside the purview of the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Court is not decisive of the exclusion of the role of the Court in 
developing international law in that area. This is because it is possible to dress up a real 
litigation between States in the garb of a request for an advisory opinion. Indeed, as once 
stated by the UN Secretary General concerning situations where States may fail to refer 
certain matters of general concern to the Court, ―the process of achieving a fair and 
objectively commendable settlement and thus defusing an international crisis situation would 
be facilitated by obtaining the Court's advisory opinion‖.45 To this, the President of the ICJ 
added that to have the ICJ more often employed with respect to the legal components of 
                                                             
42 See Aerial Incident of September 4th 1954 (United States of America v Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, ICJ Rep 1958, 
158; Treatment in Hungary of the Aircraft of the United States of America, ICJ Rep 1954, 99  
43 Jonathan I. Charney, ―Compromissory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice‖, 81 Am. J. Int‘l L. 
855, 855 (1987) (observing that jurisdictional clauses appears to be a more important source of the Court‘s jurisdiction) 
44  www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=4 (accessed November 10, 2012) 
45 Robert Y. Jennings, ―The Role of the International Court of Justice‖  68(1)  Brit Y. B of Int‘l L , 1, 3 (1997) 
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situations with which the United Nations is concerned would, quite apart from its possible 
contribution to solving a dispute or situation, also do immense good for international law.
46
 
This is important because, as argued later in chapters six and seven, lawmaking by the Court 
is not limited to contentious cases, but also occurs in its advisory jurisdiction. In 
consequence, where disputant States are unwilling to refer certain disputes of general concern 
to the Court, the Court should yet be able to define the law concerning the matter, when its 
advisory jurisdiction is invoked in respect thereof.      
The gradual depletion of the list of States adhering to the optional clause and the decline in 
the number of treaties referring disputes to the Court are such that must affect the role of the 
Court in lawmaking; as the jurisdiction of the Court narrows down,
 47
 so are areas over which 
its decisions will cover.
48
 In addition, there will not be sufficient occasions for the complete 
development of rules/principles arising from the decisions of the court.        
1.4.3 Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction 
The voluntary nature of the jurisdiction of the Court is further manifested in the power of 
States to circumscribe the matters conducive to judicial settlement. This places restrictions on 
the role of the Court. States usually do this by way of reservations which are commonplace in 
the Declarations by which States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. This is 
done to satisfy the perception among States that certain disputes are not fitting for judicial 
settlement; such matters are either left to the internal jurisdiction of each State or they are 
simply non-legal, and thus not justiciable. This notion of matters falling within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States or their reserved domain was recognised in article 15(8) of the League 
                                                             
46 Ibid   
47  Schwebel, ―Reflections‖ note 39, p. 1064 (observing that the disputes submitted to the Court by States are too few in a 
world full of international legal disputes between States. He also saw a decline in requests for advisory opinions in 
comparison with the PCIJ) 
48 Thomas Buergenthal ―Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International Courts‖, I03 Am Soc‘y Int‘l L. Proc. 403,  404 
(2009),  (Arguing that ―as the number of cases grows, so does the international law the Court is called upon to interpret and 
apply. In the process, it clarifies existing law and of necessity makes new law, not with the broad brush strokes generally 
employed by legislatures, but by what might be called normative accretion‖.)   
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of Nations Charter and replicated in article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. By these 
articles, no State can be compelled to submit matters which are ―by international law‖ or 
―essentially‖ within her domestic jurisdiction to settlement by international mechanisms. The 
exclusion of such matters from international judicial settlement was affirmed by the PCIJ in 
the case between Great Britain and France as to the Tunis and Morocco Nationality 
Decrees.
49
 In the case, the PCIJ opined that as regards matters within the reserved domain, 
each State is solely the judge.
50
          
The problems this notion causes to international law, and by extension the jurisdiction of its 
courts, were of great concern to J.L Brierly.
51
 Brierly thought the establishment of the rule of 
law between nations may be hindered by the definition of matters of domestic jurisdiction. 
This, he believed, would have the effect of relegating international law to the position of a 
convenient means of settling disputes of minor importance or of facilitating the routine of 
international business.
52
 He lamented that ―every state still shrinks from committing its most 
important interests to the arbitration of international law‖.53  
This limitation also caught the attention of Lauterpacht in his reflection on the limitation of 
the judicial function. Lauterpacht also lamented the perchance of States to draw a distinction 
between legal and non-legal disputes to the effect that, while the former is fitting for 
settlement according to law, the latter is not.  He argued that following this distinction, 
certain matters of vital interest to the international community, as a whole, must be excluded 
from the purview of judicial settlement.
54
 He opined that:  
                                                             
49 Advisory Opinion No. 4 Series A. PCIJ 1923 (here, nationality was held to be within the reserved domain of States) 
50 Ibid,  p. 23-24  
51 J.L Brierly, ―The Shortcomings of International Law‖ 5 Brit. Y.B Int‘l L. 4,  (1924); also see J.L. Brierly, ―Matters of 
Domestic Jurisdiction‖, 6 Brit. Y.B. Int‘l L. 8, 9-10 (1925); C.H.M. Waldock, ―The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before 
International Legal Tribunals‖ 32 Brit. Y.B. Int‘l L. 96, 111 (1954)   
52Brierly, ―The Shortcomings‖ ibid, p. 7  
53 Ibid 
54  Lauterpacht, ―Function of Law”, note 5, p. 38. He trenchantly argued that the doctrine of non-justiciable dispute was the 
doctrine of the inherent limitation of the international judicial process.   
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By giving currency to the doctrine of non-justiciable disputes, states not only 
give expression to their desire not to accept without limitations the jurisdiction 
of international tribunals in disputes which may arise between them. They 
adopt at the same time a theoretical classification of disputes; they set up a 
legal construction.
55
      
As per the effect of the doctrine, he argued that it gives expression to the idea that 
international disputes are by the very nature of their content divided into two categories that 
exist so clearly as the basis of international obligations.
 56
 In particular reference to article 36 
of the Statute of the ICJ, he argued that the classification makes it possible for a party to 
refuse to submit a case to the Court on the ground that, although, the dispute is covered by 
one of the four grounds in article 36, the dispute is, nevertheless, a political and not a legal 
dispute.
57
    
The concern of Lauterpacht was mainly that States use this distinction to relegate the 
functions of international courts to issues of minor importance to the exclusion of issues of 
major importance in international law. Also, that it gives States the latitude to specify the 
matters that they are willing to submit to judicial settlement.   
Jennings appears to disagree with Brierly and Lauterpacht on this point. In Jennings‘ view the 
adjudication process is a thing on its own; it is in many respects different in kind from the 
other ways of dispute settlement, such as, for example, the other modes listed in Article 33 of 
the UN Charter. He opined that judicial settlement can only be applied to certain kinds of 
disputes. He noted that the effect of the limitation in article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court – 
―The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it‖ – is that the dispute to be submitted to the Court must be a legal dispute in 
the sense that it must be a dispute about law.
 58
  He further argued that the simplistic ideas 
about the judicial function in international relations are very harmful to the public perception 
                                                             
55Ibid,  p. 45 
56 Ibid, p. 43  
57 Ibid  
58 Jennings, ―The Role of the International Court‖, note 45, p. 50 
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of the role of the International Court of Justice and that the general public expects too much 
of the Court, and is then disappointed that there is so much violence in the world which the 
Court does not seem to be effective to control.
59
  
 
While not following the view that the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable 
dispute is harmful to the role of the ICJ, he thought that what is important is the habit of 
States living under the law and not of hoping that all disputes must receive the sanction of the 
Court. For: 
it is the habit of living daily under the law, and with habitual and normal 
recourse to the agencies of the law, that will make violence and aggression in 
defiance of the law more difficult. What we need is not just a crisis law but a 
law for normal existence...The lay-person cannot but gather from the notion 
of the 'peaceful settlement' of disputes, that international law is concerned 
essentially, if not solely, with an attempt, possibly a vain attempt, to control 
catastrophic State behaviour, and the threat to peace. It is so concerned, of 
course. But it cannot perform that task unless it is an on-going system in 
ordinary, normal, everyday international relations. And indeed, so it is. Let us 
not obscure that fact by the use of modes of expression which the law, 
happily, has long outgrown.
60
  
 
Indeed the point made by either side cannot be ignored. In line with the view of Jennings, it 
should not be expected that all matters that arise between States are matters befitting of 
judicial examination in the open court. If that was so, for what purpose was the Security 
Council and the General Assembly created? Is it not to play the role of political arbiters in the 
maintenance of peaceful coexistence? As in even the most advanced system of municipal 
law, certain matters there must be, that are not for judicial scrutiny – political question 
doctrine – not just for the sake of the nature of the matter but for the protection of the sanctity 
and integrity of courts.   
On the other hand, a system that allows every of its member to determine the state of the law 
and when its actions can be called in question before a court can hardly meet the qualities of a 
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society governed by law. The necessary balance must be struck and that balance is still 
missing in contemporary international law, particularly in matters relating to the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ. 
1.5 The ICJ: An International Court of Justice Straddling between the Common Law 
and Civil Law Divide 
The ICJ is by conception and birth of a mixed common law and civil law heritage; it is 
established upon two doctrinally different legal systems – civil law and common law. Given 
the exerting influence the legal traditions lawyers trained have on their perception of legal 
arguments, ideological divisions along the ideals of the common law and civil law can hardly 
be avoided in an area of international law dealing with concepts over which both systems 
appear to disagree. It cannot be avoided in our subject of study insomuch as it deals with the 
authority of judicial decisions: an area in which both systems share some differences – 
differences which have been very well highlighted in the debate surrounding our theme of 
study. John Gardner gave insight to this fact when he noted that ―one of the disturbing, and 
perhaps also retarding, elements in the development of public international law is the conflict 
between the English and Continental methods of legal thought.
61
 
The relevant argument here is that which argues that by providing in its article 59 that 
decisions have no ―binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case‖, the Statute of the Court reflects the civil law tradition that ―judicial decisions are not a 
source of law‖. 62 It is from this argument that the view that ―…supranational decisions will 
have binding force as judgments, not as precedents‖,63 takes its root.  
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The argument that article 59 is modelled along the civil law system as a means of rejecting 
the common law rule of stare decisis has a strong influence when considered in the light of 
the judicial abuse of power that culminated in the French revolution and the eventual 
proscription of judge-made law in France. As shown in the next chapter, the fear of trusting 
judges with lawmaking powers did operate in the minds of those who crafted the Statute of 
the PCIJ; hence is it generally believed that article 59 is a necessary safeguard against the 
fears expressed over the realisation that the judgements of the court will ultimately establish 
rules of international law. This, perhaps, explains why some of the interpretations that are 
placed on article 59, as did the PCIJ in the Certain German Interest Polish Upper Selasia,
64
 
reflect the language of Article 5 of the Code Napoléon, 1804. In proscribing the use of 
precedents by judges in France as a result of judicial abuse of power, the Code forbade judges 
when deciding cases brought before them, from ―lay[ing] down general rules of conduct or 
decide a case by holding it was governed by a previous decision‖.65 The influence of this 
traditional disapproval of judicial legislation on the theoretical foundation of judicial 
legislation by the ICJ cannot be discounted.   
It is gratifying to note, however, that the ICJ is not the only court that suffers this conflict of 
identity arising from a dual legal heritage. There are municipal legal systems (Louisiana, for 
example) which also suffer from this mixed legal heritage. In the case of Louisiana, the 
counter academic arguments
66
 on the influence of stare decisis or otherwise on the civil law 
character of the Louisiana legal system highlights how difficult it is for a court open to the 
influence of both common law and civil law to totally renounce judicial lawmaking, even 
where the system is formally modelled after civil law.  The lesson from Louisiana is that the 
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practice of judicial lawmaking in such a system does not cease by a mere theoretical denial 
that it does exists. According to Mack Barham, a former Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana:  
Under our Code and through the historical civilian tradition, jurisprudence is 
not a major source of law, yet it has been and it remains such in reality. 
Possibly the belief in jurisprudence as a primary source of law is so strongly 
embedded in the minds of many of the judiciary and the practicing bar of 
Louisiana because our civil law system coexists in a nation with states which 
because of their common law heritage so regard jurisprudence. Even if our bar 
really believes that legislation is the primary source of law, it practices under 
the principle that jurisprudence is a major source of law. Lawyers often only 
perfunctorily examine legislative expression before they turn for final authority 
to the jurisprudence to resolve the legal question posed by their clients‘ 
cases.... As a result of the pressure under which we perform our various roles 
in our legal system, there has been a tendency to stray from strict civilian 
methods and concepts.
67
 
 
Having made this point, the writer shall now briefly discuss the approach of the civil law and 
the common law to judicial lawmaking.   
1.5.1 The Common Law Approach  
The common law concept of judge-made law – the doctrine of judicial precedent – is 
encapsulated in the principle of stare rationibus decidendi, usually referred to as stare decisis 
[let the decision stand].  Common law judges decide cases on the basis of previous decisions, 
where the material facts are similar enough to fall within the ratio decidendi of previous 
cases, except the circumstances of the present case warrant the court to distinguish the earlier 
decision and exclude its applicability. Through this device, the common law judge set down 
rules that will aid future judges in the resolution of otherwise difficult cases for which no 
legislation had been made in advance; or create new principles of law in construing 
legislations. 
Apart from being a compass for future courts, through adherence to precedent, common law 
courts maintain consistency and the unity of the legal system, as judges of lower courts are 
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bound to follow a precedent set by the apex court. The apex court is also bound by its 
precedent, but with the important proviso that the apex court has the power to overrule its 
own precedent.  As noted by Ernest Young:
68 
precedent includes both the ―vertical‖ force of decisions issued by a court 
with power of appellate review over a second court, and the ―horizontal‖ 
force of decisions issued by the same court (which that court can overrule) 
or by courts outside the line of appellate hierarchy.  
Conscious of her role in rule formulation and the promotion of the rule of law, the common 
law judge, deciding a first impression case for which there existed no precedent or statutory 
authority, considers not only the narrow conflict before her, but also consciously decides the 
case within the larger context of possible eventualities that may fall within the principle the 
judge is set to establish in the case, should the principle fall to be applied to future litigants.  
As a corollary, the judge deciding a similar case in the future is careful not to upset the law 
by failing to follow precedent without good cause. Although the duty to follow precedent is 
not mandatory on the highest court within the common law system as it is on lower courts 
(given that the highest court is at liberty to revise decisions and indeed precedents of lower 
courts, it is also at liberty to overrule its earlier precedents), there is still the reluctance to 
depart from its precedent except it is in the interest of justice to do so. As a result, precedents 
create a legitimate expectation in the minds of future litigants that the court would take a 
similar view in analogous situations.   
1.5.2 The Civil Law Approach  
The civil law system thrives on written codes. The civilian Codes are general statements of 
the law, statements of broad policy, statements of direction, statements of law which are 
meant to have a long continuity of existence.
69
  The Code is seen as a complete and self-
sufficient text, as a body of law in which it was always possible to find the rule for a new 
case. The system of codification follows the belief that one could find the law without 
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referring to the previous law or to other sources, like natural law or jurisprudence or judicial 
decisions.
70
 The fundamental tenet of all civil law systems is that legislative expression is the 
primary source of law, and common to all civil law systems is the comprehensive written and 
integrated basic text of that legislative expression.
71
 As Robert Henry observes, civil law 
judges function under the rule that they should not formulate rules of law in their own words, 
as that has been authoritatively done by the codes. Also that judges should not be influenced 
in their decisions by what other judges had held upon similar facts. The result is that the 
application of law does not give rise itself to new rules of law.
72
    
In consequence, in a pure civilian theory, judicial precedents are not considered to be a 
source of law because the ―legislative function is entrusted to the legislature and the people 
exclusively‖.73 The existence of a Code is therefore central at civil law.  
The foregoing, notwithstanding, judge made law still features at civil law. It is only that civil 
law begins with the rule that precedent is not binding and the makes exception when the 
matter is jurisprudence constante.
74
 The system recognises that a long line of decisions on a 
certain subject may establish rules of law – Jurisprudence constante.75  This doctrine holds 
that judicial precedent must be predicated upon a series of adjudications all to the same 
effect, rather than upon a single case.
76
 Jurisprudence constante is, according to Dainow, 
considered binding in future cases.
 77
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1.5.3 Some Differences between Both Systems 
As seen above, judicial lawmaking features in both systems of law. The essential difference 
between both systems regarding judicial legislation is mainly methodological; what Tucker 
referred to as ―the generating force of authority‖.78  As John Gardner observed, while a rule 
may be established by a single case at common law, jurisprudence only becomes fixed at civil 
law if the result of the cases shows that a rule, heretofore tentatively applied is a desirable 
one.
79
 This view is supported by Daggett et al, who located the two most important 
differences between the two systems on: ―(a) a single case affords a sufficient foundation for 
... [stare decisis], while a series of adjudicated cases all in accord forms the predicate of the 
[jurisprudence constante]; and (b) case law in civilian jurisdictions is merely law de facto, 
while under the common law technique it is law de jure‖.80 
Insofar as the acclaimed differences between the two systems lie in the concept of judicial 
lawmaking, any argument based on it ultimately leads to the conclusion that judges do 
actually legislate as judicial decisions begin to generate rules/principles of law in both 
systems. This is because both systems operate a line of judicial precedent that eventually 
concretise into lawmaking.
81
  The systems may approach judicial lawmaking differently but 
not to the extent that it can rightly be said that they are diametrically opposed to each other.
82
 
According to Loussouarn:  
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The authority of judicial precedent in a codified system can be summed up in 
two propositions. The first is that in theory judicial precedent is not a source 
of law. The second proposition is that in practice the situation is very different 
and in fact precedent is a source of law.
83
  
 It is apparent from a number of writings on the point that the so-called differences are more 
apparent than real. According to Maurice Amos: 
the impression which prevails in England to the effect that in interpreting the 
code the French Courts do not recognise the doctrine of stare decisis, and are 
not influenced by the authority of precedent, is greatly exaggerated, if indeed 
it is not truer to say that it is simply mistaken. In the point of fact great 
respect is paid in France to the authority of decided cases; indeed it is 
sometimes said that things have come to such a pass nowadays, that counsel 
no longer need display any knowledge of legal principles, since all the judges 
will listen to is an exposition of the jurisprudence, as it is called.
84
    
This view was also echoed by Lauterpacht, who submitted that:  
...this view as to the fundamentally different function of judicial precedent 
under the two systems of law is based more on a consideration of 
appearances and of legal formulae than of the substance of legal life. It 
disregards the fact that, on the one hand, no formal provision of the law 
and no form of judicial organisation can prevent judicial precedent from 
constituting a powerful factor of positive law, and that, on the other hand, 
the power of judicial precedent is in the long run not greater than the 
inherent value of the legal substance embodied in it. No legal doctrine and 
no express legal provision can do away with the fact that judges actually 
do, within their spheres, make law....
85
   
 
The bottom-line is that judicial decisions do eventually become law at civil law, 
notwithstanding the existence of a detailed code. In making this point, Lauterpacht noted:   
In spite of the fact that French courts are not bound either by their own 
decisions or by decisions of superior courts, it is hardly possible to doubt the 
actual authority and influence of judicial precedent in France. The volume of 
law reporting in France, the scope of annotations and comment upon them, 
and the weight attached to jurisprudence in daily practice make it impossible 
to eliminate judicial precedent from any accurate account of forces actually 
operating in the shaping of French law.  
The same applies to Germany, where a whole series of provisions of the civil 
code has been interpreted out of existence in consequence of the activity of 
                                                             
83 Yvon Loussouarn, ―The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine and Precedent in French Law‖, 18 
Louisiana L. Rev, 235, 255 (1958) 
84 Maurice Amos, ―The Code Napoleon and the Modern World‖, Journal of Comparative Legislation, 3rd ser. X 225 (1928) 
cited in Lauterpacht, ―The So-Called Anglo-American‖,  note 18, p. 54-55. 
85 Ibid. Also see Hersch Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the International Court, 127-129, (London 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1958)  
  
28 
courts. In the decisions of the Reichsgericht ... one finds elaborate references 
to previous judgments of the Court; not infrequently, this enumeration 
concludes with the word ... (this must be adhered to).
86
  
Whether viewed from the common law or from the civil law perspective, therefore, the 
inevitable conclusion is that judicial decisions become relevant at some point as a source of 
law. This affirms the observation earlier made that judicial lawmaking is, in one way or the 
other, a feature of every system of law, whether formally recognised or not.
87
 
1.5.4 Should Stare Decisis become the Method of the ICJ? 
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to deal here with an argument that was earlier 
made by Goodhart. Goodhart had argued that the English method of precedent was more 
conducive to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Court. According to him: 
As international law is still so vague and uncertain … it is important that it 
should be given a more rigid and determinate character. No method could 
be more advantageous in accomplishing this purpose than the common law 
doctrine of precedent. But, on the other hand, this fixation of international 
law must be undertaken in a cautious manner for, as there is no legislative 
body which can amend the law, it is essential that a certain freedom of 
action shall be left to the judges. 
88
 
 
 Recently, this argument was more forcefully made by Vern Clemons, who argued that the 
Court‘s practice of following precedent should be clarified by its Statute to make stare decisis 
formally binding on the Court.
89
  He further argued that this will bestow great credence upon 
the decisions of the Court and simply allow the Court to say that what is written is actually 
what is done.
90
 On the other hand, John Gardner thinks otherwise. He did not see any 
prospect of the English method of precedent and the English doctrine of stare decisis 
becoming the method of the PCIJ.
91
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Whatever advantages there are in the argument that stare decisis should be formally 
recognised, there are disadvantages that will result to the Court in corresponding, if not in 
greater degrees. The argument appears to ignore the ―fragile structure of international 
adjudication‖, 92 particular the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court – the fact that the Court 
is consensual in nature, and the fact that it operates within a rather loose legal system. To 
amend the Statute in the manner suggested by Vern Clemons will further diminish the 
confidence of States to use the Court. No State will be pleased to relate with the Court as a 
sort of an international legislature which, by the single stroke of the gavel establishes a rule 
of law that becomes fixed. This will not go well with States, given that States are not pleased 
to be dictated to in that manner.
93
 The danger in such a cause of action should remind us of 
the caution Brierly sounded long ago that ―only to a small extent, and hardly at all in 
international law, can a society be confined within a legal mould that does not meet its needs, 
or what the prevailing opinion perceives to be its needs‖.94 Given that it can hardly be said 
that the express adaptation of stare decisis will meet the needs of States and of the 
international legal system as a whole, such an enterprise will indeed be a dangerous, if not a 
self-destructive one.    
Besides, there is no real reason for the formal adoption of the English style, which the Court 
already appears to follow in several details except for the absence of stare decisis. It will be 
more rewarding for the Court and for States for the Court to copy the useful parts of the 
common law while yet bearing a mark of the civil law jurisprudence constante that develops 
the law through the process of judicial incremental accumulation. The court is in no position 
to strictly stick with either of the systems, it must remained entangled in the ―the complexity 
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of its legal inheritance to exercise selectivity or eclecticism‖.95 The advantage of this 
approach was aptly pointed out by Ryan McGonigle, when he wrote: ―The flexibility of 
mixed jurisdictions is found in their ability to act as a ‗doctrinal sieve,‘ straining out the 
inherent weaknesses of both parent traditions‖.96        
1.6 The Influence of the Decisions of the ICJ in the International Community of 
Proliferated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms  
Once there was that the ICJ was the only permanent international court with jurisdiction over 
States.  That state of affairs is so different from the situation today, where the international 
judicial space is now occupied by various courts/tribunals with different forms of jurisdiction 
over diverse subjects of international law. Some of these courts/tribunals are expressly 
permitted to apply international law as defined in article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. This is 
in addition to the general agreement that article 38 is the most important statement of the 
sources of international law. This makes it imperative for a brief discussion of how the 
approach of the ICJ towards its case-law, in the face of the theoretical arguments that its 
decisions are not a source of international law, may affect those courts/tribunals, which are 
required to apply article 38. This is more intriguing as these other courts/tribunals lack an 
article similar in terms to article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ; a fact which strongly suggests 
that article 59 is redundant to article 38(1)(d).   
It is refreshing to note that decisions of the ICJ still play a crucial role in the development of 
international law with considerable influence in other international courts/tribunals. The 
reason for this may be seen from three angles: first, the ICJ is a principal organ of the United 
Nations; second, the ICJ has a potentially general jurisdiction both in relation to subject-
matter and parties in matters of general international law; the third is the growing tendency of 
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States to direct international courts/tribunals to apply article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. By 
so doing, the enabling instruments of the courts/tribunals do not only incorporate article 
38(1), they also (arguably) incorporate decisions of the Court in matters of international law 
insofar as the decisions of the Court are a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
international law in article 38(1)(d). Examples of this approach are in the Supplementary 
Protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Community Court 
of Justice
97
 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
98
 It is 
provided in article 19 of the Protocol of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice that ―the 
court shall also apply, as necessary, the body of laws as contained in article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice‖.  Similarly, articles 73(1) and 83(1) of the UNCLOS 
direct the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in cases involving the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts, to be ―international law, as referred to in article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice‖. These provisions are also applied by tribunals 
constituted pursuant to article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS.  
In discussing the relationship between the ICJ and other international/courts and tribunals, it 
cannot be stressed enough that the role the ICJ can play in the activities of these other 
courts/tribunals cannot be totally excluded by the lack of a hierarchical structure in which 
decisions of the ICJ are binding on these other courts/tribunal.  Its role emerges from the 
general influence of its precedents. Indeed, as pointed out by Judge Jessup, "the influence of 
the Court's decisions is wider than their binding force".
99
  
                                                             
97 The Protocol of the Community Court of Justice (Protocol A/P1/7/91) was signed on July 6, 1991, and entered into force 
on November 5, 1996. The Protocol was amended by Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/11/04.  
98 December 10, 1982 
99Separate Opinion, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase)  ICJ Rep 
1970, 3, 163, para 9   
  
32 
The present writer, however, acknowledges that there are no easy answers to the proper 
influence of the decisions of ICJ in the contemporary international judicial space.
100
 This is in 
view of the absence of a hierarchical structure and the lack of a clear definition of the 
relationship between the ICJ and other international courts/tribunals. The principal question is 
whether ―ICJ decisions have a special normative effect on the international plane as a result 
of its status [as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations], even though Article 38 
speaks of judicial decisions in general and does not confer on decisions of the ICJ a 
hierarchic supremacy vis-a-vis judgments of other international courts?‖ 101  
The crucial problem that clear definition of the relationship between the ICJ and other 
courts/tribunals (in at least matters of general international law) will resolve is that of 
inconsistency of case-law, which invariably carries the larger implication of the 
fragmentation of rules/principles of international law. Commenting on this situation, Jennings 
noted that the proliferation of international courts/tribunals comes with the danger of the 
conflict of jurisdiction or contradiction in decisions, increasing the in-determination rather 
than the determination of law through the exercise of the judicial function.
102
 He argued: 
In a developed system of tribunals, such as is to be found in most States, there 
are legally defined relationships between tribunals, whether in terms of 
legally defined subordination or legally determined independence. And there 
is usually one court at the top of a hierarchy, whether of appeal or of 
cassation. The ICJ, being the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, 
and moreover having a general jurisdiction over all questions of international 
law, would seem apt to fill this role. But there is the difficulty of Article 34(1) 
of the Statute, the problems arising from the separate histories of the 
specialized tribunals, and not least the regional character of several of them; 
and of course many problems of legal policy.
103
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 Sharing a similar thought, Gilbert Guillaume noted that the increase in the number of courts 
and arbitral institutions introduces the question whether precedents from one dispute 
settlement institution are relevant to others. He observed that the question arises when two 
courts or tribunals apply treaty and when they apply general international law.
104
  
On a general note, given the problems that may arise from incoherency of case-law from 
various international courts/tribunals on a particular question of law, there are good reasons 
to worry about the approach of these courts/tribunals towards their own case-law and those of 
other courts.
105
 It should, for instance, be worrisome to note the conflict of opinions between 
the ICJ and the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the test for 
determining the international responsibility of States for the use of force against another State 
by private actors: while the ICJ hinged its ―control test‖ on the complete dependence of 
private actors on the State aiding them,
106
 the ICTY played down the requirement of 
complete dependence. It held that the control test could be fulfilled even where the private 
actors had autonomous choices of means and tactics while participating in a common strategy 
along with the controlling State.
107
 The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic
108
 was 
clearly of the view that the ―effective control‖ test enunciated by the ICJ was not persuasive, 
for the following reasons: (a) the Nicaragua ―effective control‖ test did not seem to be in 
consonance with the ―very logic of the entire system of international law on State 
                                                             
104 Gilbert Guillaume, ―The Use of Precedent‖, note 81, 5  
105 Guillaume, Ibid, p.7 (arguing that the increase in the number of courts/tribunals has led to increased attention to the issue 
of precedent in international law. This, he noted involved investigating the extent to which each court/tribunal make use of 
its own precedent and those created by other courts/tribunals. The first, he argued implicates legal certainty in a given field 
and the second, the coherence of international law in its entirety.)     
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States) Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 
63, para 111; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
Herzegovina v. Serbia Montenegro), ICJ Rep 2007, 43, 141, para 393-394.  
107See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, ICTY Appeals Chambers, 20 February 2001, para 47, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, with 
approval.  see A.O. Enabulele, Use of Force by International/Regional Non-State Actors: No Armed Attack, No Self 
Defence 12 (3-4) European Journal of Law Reform, 209 (2010), A.O. Enabulele, Prohibition of the Use of Force, the Rising 
Activities of Militias and the Dilemma of the ICJ: Are Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter in Need of 
Reconsideration? 4(2) Journal of Africa and International Law, 287 (2011), and Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, ―Attacks by 
Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence‖, 10(3) J.C & S.L 289, (2005), for a further discussion of these tests.  
108 Judgment of January 26, 2000.  See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, ibid, para 16-25 for the analyses of the view of the Tadic 
Court and the case-law of ICTY in general, as it relates to the Nicaragua case. 
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responsibility‖, which is ―not based on rigid and uniform criteria‖; and (b) that the Nicaragua 
test is at variance with judicial and State practice. 
Aside the general uncertainty that may pervade certain questions of international law, another 
serious problem that may arise from incoherent case-law is forum shopping. States which 
have access to two or more international courts/tribunals, having overlapping jurisdictions, 
will each want to go before the court/tribunal that  its case-law favours her course on the 
contentious issues, where the different courts hold contrary views.
109
 This would in turn lead 
to conflicting judgments and unhealthy rivalries between the courts/tribunals involved, and 
indeed fragmentation of the law and uncertainty. There already are instances where each of 
two contending States expressed interest in bringing a case before different tribunals. The 
following instances where recorded by Gilbert Guillaume:  
the case for interstate relations in the swordfish dispute between the European 
Union and Chile, which the former wished to bring before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the latter before the World Trade 
Organization. It was also the case in the arbitration between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom concerning the Mox Plant where the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea ... and the European Court of Justice were involved. 
We frequently see this in disputes over investment that could be submitted to 
either ICSID tribunals or to the dispute settlement bodies provided for in the 
contracts.
110
  
Though Guillaume gave no indication that this situation was brought about by conflicting 
case-law, it goes without saying that no State would want to go before a court whose case-
law is adverse to her case, when the case-law of an equally competent court supports her 
case. This is particularly against the lack of a hierarchical structure between the courts, as a 
result of which each court claims autonomy in their various sphere of competence: a 
                                                             
109 For instance, Article 287 of UNCLOS gives State parties to the Convention the right to choose one or more of the 
following means for settlement of disputes: (a) ITLOS; (b) ICJ; (c) arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex 
VII; (b) a special arbitral constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified 
therein.    
110 Gilbert Guillaume, ―The Use of Precedent‖, note 81, p. 18. 
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competence sometimes shared with another court/tribunal equally operating a sense of 
autonomy.
111
    
It is important to state that it will be vain to hope for, and unrewarding to achieve a complete 
coherence of opinions by all the multiple international courts/tribunals existing today. We can 
only hope for coherence at different jurisdictional layers of international courts/tribunals: 
these are inter-state layer, human rights‘ layer and the layer of international criminal law. It is 
possible and perfectly in order for supranational courts operating at the layer of human rights 
to take a different view from that taken by an international court operating at the inter-state 
layer. It is well possible that the individuality element of the case may require the former 
court to apply a rule differently from the way it would be applied in inter-state claims, in 
order to do justice respecting the peculiarity of the instrument it is established to apply.  
This, perhaps, was the consideration in Loizidou v Turkey
112
 where the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) would not follow the practice of the ICJ on the rules governing 
reservations to the jurisdiction of the ECHR. The ECHR accepted that article 46 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was modelled after 
article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ and that States can attach restrictions to the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ. Nonetheless, it held that it did not follow that restrictions to its jurisdiction must also 
be permissible under the European Convention.
113
 The ECHR based its view on the fact that 
―the context in which the Court [ICJ] operates is quite distinct from that of Conventions 
instructions‖.114 In a similar vein, the argument that ―the ICTY's competence is limited to 
                                                             
111 This was the point clearly made by ICTY, when urged to hold that decisions of ICJ was binding on it. According to the 
Tribunal, ―the tribunal is an autonomous international judicial body, and although the ICJ is a ‗principal judicial organ‘ 
within the United Nations system to which the tribunal belongs, there is no hierarchical relationship between the two courts‖ 
–  Prosecutor v. Delalic, note 111, para 24 
112 Preliminary Objections (Application no. 15318/89), Judgment of March 23, 1995 
113 Ibid, p. 24, para 84 
114 Ibid, p. 24, para 85 
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establishing individual criminal responsibility‖ was the basis on which the conflict of 
opinions between the ICJ and the ICTR on the ―control test‖ has been rationalised.115  
Even the ICJ had in effect indicated that the specificity of the instrument establishing a 
court/tribunal may make it impossible for their decisions to give rise to generalisation. 
According to the Court:     
The parties have relied also on the general arbitral jurisprudence which has 
accumulated in the last half a century. However, in most cases the decisions 
cited rested upon the terms of instruments establishing the jurisdiction of the 
tribunals ....and determining what rights might enjoy protection; they cannot 
therefore give rise to generalization going beyond the special circumstances of 
each case.
116
    
This is not to wish away the fact that there are certain concepts of law and justice that require 
the same application, irrespective of the jurisdictional layer of international adjudication 
applying them. In relation to such instances, it is expected that international courts maintain 
coherency in order to sustain the integrity of the law. Nonetheless, it cannot be stressed 
enough that international courts need not maintain coherency at the expense of applying fresh 
insights to erroneous precedents.
117
 It should be obvious from academic literatures and even 
from dissenting opinions that the ICJ has not always been right. The ICJ is fallible and all 
other international courts/tribunals should see themselves at liberty to take a different view 
when a rule/principle adopted by the ICJ has lost legal credibility, no matter how established 
a particular view is in the case-law of the ICJ.       
What should be hoped for, therefore, is coherence at the different layers of international 
adjudications. The following are a few examples:  the European Court of Human Rights; the 
                                                             
115 Ruys & Verhoeven, note 107, p. 301. The ICTY Appeal Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic, note 107, para 36, clearly 
affirmed the ground for which the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v.Tadic, Trial Judgment, para 230, refused to rely on 
Nicaragua. The Tadic Trial Chamber had noted that, although ―this [Nicaragua] decision by the ICJ constitutes an important 
source of jurisprudence on various issues of international law,‘ the ICJ is ‗a very different judicial body concerned with 
rather different circumstances from the case in hand‖.      
116 Barcelona Traction case, note 99, p. 40 para 63 
117 For legal precedent in international dispute settlement is neither to be worshipped nor ignored – Gilbert Guillaume, ―The 
Use of Precedent‖, note 81, p. 5 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 
should maintain coherence on the application of the general concept of human rights; the 
International Criminal Court (ICC); the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR);  
and the ICTY, should all maintain coherence on the general ingredients of individual criminal 
responsibility; while the ICJ and all other Courts and tribunals exercising inter-state 
jurisdiction should maintain coherence on general questions of international law.  There 
could, however, be a vertical coherence in matters of general international law, drawing from 
the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.  
It is apposite to observe that the inconsistency of case-law between the ICJ and international 
courts/tribunals occupying a different layer of international law does not dampen the role of 
the precedent of the ICJ in those other courts in matters of general international law. This is 
more so when considered against the fact that supranational courts equally have inter-state 
jurisdiction, which makes their application of general international law to disputes inevitable. 
It should be expected that a supranational court dealing with matters of general international 
law will readily be influenced by the precedent of the ICJ. This will particularly be expected 
with the ECOWAS Community Court, which applies the law specified in article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the ICJ. On this, Thomas Buergenthal is equally confident. According to him: 
The international judicial system in existence today is not hierarchically 
integrated in that no court in the system is formally superior to any of the 
others. I am not sure that this is necessarily detrimental to the development 
of international law. For, to the extent that it permits greater lawmaking 
creativity within the international judicial system and by courts comprising 
that system, it is likely to strengthen international law. At the same time, let 
us not forget that there exists an informal hierarchy which comes into play 
when one or the other of these international courts finds it necessary to 
apply general international law in the exercise of its functions. In such 
situations, it will in general look first to the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
118
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The view of Thomas Buergenthal has great appeal when considered in the light of the 
stabilising role the decisions of the ICJ play in decisions of other international 
courts/tribunals (within the layer of inter-state conflicts) when deciding a matter similar to the 
one decided in a precedent of the ICJ. The cases decided by the ITLOS and other tribunals 
constituted pursuant to article 287, and in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS testify 
to this role.   
In the Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (IJZERN RIJN) Railway,
119
 the Arbitrators relied 
on (Kasikili/Sedudu Island
120
 and Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan,
121
  to 
hold that articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflected pre-
existing customary international law, and are generally applicable to treaties concluded 
before the entering into force of the Convention. Also, following articles 73(1) and 83(1) of 
its Statute, the ITLOS held, in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, that the decisions of international courts and 
tribunals referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ are also of particular importance in 
determining the content of the law applicable to maritime delimitations under articles 74 and 
83 of the Convention.
 122
 Accordingly, the Tribunal declared:  
In examining this issue, the Tribunal notes ―the principle that the land 
dominates the sea through the projection of the coasts or the coastal fronts‖ 
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61, at p. 89, para. 77). As stated by the ICJ in the North 
Sea cases, ―the land is the legal source of the power which a State may 
exercise over territorial extensions to seaward‖ (North Sea Continental Shelf, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, at p. 51, paragraph 96).
123
  
The tribunal practically relied on decisions of the ICJ in various aspects of the case.  
                                                             
119 The Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Netherlands, Award of May 24, 2005.  
120 (Botswana v. Namibia), ICJ Rep 1999, 1045  
121 (Indonesia v. Malaysia, ICJ Reps 2002, 625  
122 (Bangladesh v. Myanmar), Award of March 12, 2012, p. 61 para 184    
123 Ibid, pp 61-62, para 185 
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The same approach was manifests in the Award of Arbitral Tribunal between Barbados v. the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.
124
 Here, the Arbitral Tribunal cited articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
of UNCLOS
125
 as its empowerment for copious reliance on decisions of the ICJ in maritime 
delimitation cases. Same was the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname.
126
 
Here, the Tribunal relied on articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS to admit that it had ―to be 
guided by the case-law as developed by international courts and tribunals in this matter‖.127  
In doing this, the Court called in aid, ―The case law of the International Court of Justice and 
arbitral jurisprudence as well as State practice ...‖. 128 Again the Tribunal copiously relied on 
the decisions of the ICJ.
129
 
The present view, therefore, believes time beckons on us all to focus on the immediate 
problems confronting modern international law as a result of the proliferations of 
international court/tribunals. The focus of scholars should not continue to labour under the 
question of whether judicial decisions are a source of international law; our focus should now 
be on the identification of the factors that should operate to guide the courts in their use of 
precedent. Scholars should worry over the fact that the lack of a formal hierarchical structure 
would unavoidably create a problem of incoherent international case-law in some areas, and 
unhealthy rivalries between some courts/tribunals in future. But in all, our worries should 
seek comfort in the fact that international law can actually converge at different layers; 
scholars and judges should pursue this as the solution to the problems arising from 
proliferation of international courts/tribunals. One way of doing is to recognise what 
international courts actually do with their ardent commitment to consistency of approach – 
they make law.    
                                                             
124 Decision of April 11, 2006, RIAA, Vol XXVII  
125 Ibid, para 221 
126 Award of September 17, 2007. This Tribunal was constituted pursuant to article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS.  
127 Ibid, p. 108 para 334 
128 Ibid, p. 110, para 342  
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In concluding this section, it could be said that though the role of the ICJ in law application in 
contemporary international law is not quite as robust as it should be due to the limitations 
discussed above, the proliferation of international court/tribunals comes with the advantage 
(albeit unnoticeable) of the court playing an indirect but crucial role in the maintenance of 
coherency in area of general international law through its precedents. It also allows for a 
comparative approach that reveals the manner by which other international courts/tribunals 
(particularly those applying article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ) relate with their precedents.  
1.7 Should the ICJ be involved in Law Making? 
When speaking of the ICJ and of international law, in general, it is commonplace to start by 
using municipal courts and municipal law analogies, if for nothing else, for the purpose of 
elucidation and comparison. In no other field of international law is it more apposite to view 
progress through the prism of municipal law than in the area of judicial settlement of 
disputes. This is because the shared aims of judicial settlement of disputes in both systems is 
the entrenchment of the rule of law and the achievement of peaceful co-existence as a viable 
alternative to anarchy in the resolution of conflicting claims and interests.  As discussed 
above, though, theoretically speaking, the civil law system differs from the common law in 
regards to judicial lawmaking, both systems ultimately accept, if not tolerate judicial 
lawmaking.  
The question relating to the propriety of judicial legislation is expectedly much more 
complex in international law, where the first lesson students commit to heart is that States are 
the makers of international law. If States are the makers of international law, how then can it 
be admitted that judges also make international law? But if international judicial legislation 
was traditionally unthinkable, or perhaps, rare; it became firmly established with the creation 
of the PCIJ and its continued existence through the ICJ. Though the traditional view is now 
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being seriously challenged as international law progresses, it is still largely the case that 
international lawmaking other than those made by States exist only as exception to the 
general rule that States are the only makers of international law through conventions and 
customs. This, together with the unhelpful language of article 38(1)(d), has created a huge 
challenge for any possibility of there being a general concurrence on the juridical relevance 
of the case-law of the ICJ in relation to article 38(1)(d) of its Statute. 
The above, notwithstanding, it must equally be acknowledged that the international 
community of today has grown in ways that may not have been imagined when the Statute of 
the ICJ was crafted in 1920 (PCIJ) and 1945. Under that dispensation, it could not have been 
expected that the Court be granted capacities which it could not realistically exercise. How 
unthinkable was it in 1920 for individuals and international organisations to have direct 
access to an international court/tribunal; how unrealistic was it for international law and 
municipal law to mutually regulate areas that once were the exclusive preserve of municipal 
law.  The international law of today and the community in which it operates are different; 
there has been a progressive movement from the old era to one that now admits the capacity 
of individuals and international organisations to bring international claims; one that accepts 
the convergence of municipal law and international law in many respects; one in which States 
are more willing to commit to the creation of specialised courts/tribunals and empower them 
with compulsory jurisdiction; one in which States allow international organisations to make 
binding rules of international law. The liberalisation of the international sphere in the 
manners just mentioned (and when viewed against the point made later in this work about the 
reliance States place on the decisions of the ICJ), questions the continued relevance of the 
argument that States alone are the makers of international law.   
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The point should be made, though, that it is not the liberal approach of contemporary 
international law that accounts for lawmaking in the ICJ in that as way back as the time of the 
PCIJ, when the statists approach still held sway, judicial lawmaking was already a feature of 
the Court. The reality of contemporary international law has only made judicial lawmaking 
more acceptable. The main reason for the inevitability of lawmaking through the Court is the 
very fact that there is no international legislation to refine rules of international law, which as 
at the time of the making of the court were mostly vague and indeterminate. Though rules of 
international law cannot be said to be in the state they were in 1920, it yet cannot be disputed 
that modern international law rules (rules of custom in particular) still suffer the problems of 
vagueness, indeterminacy and contradiction,
130
 especially in areas where State practice has 
been sparse, vague and contradictory.
131
 
This explains why it was envisaged from the start that it will be the function of the Court to 
ripen custom and bring about a more complete definition of international law which the 
framers of the Statute agreed was badly defined, prior to the emergence of the PCIJ.
132
 Under 
these circumstances, and as envisioned by the framers of the Statute of the Court, it is 
inevitable that judgments of the Court crystallise hitherto uncertain, vague or contradictory 
rules into concrete rules of law. This point was also made by John Gardner, who argued that 
with the vagueness of international law, it was almost inevitable that judgments and opinions 
of the international ICJ are forming and would continually form precedents.
133
  
If the theoretical standing that decisions of the Court were not a source of law was the 
prevailing view in practice, the Court would have been hampered in the performance of its 
duty of ‗decide disputes‘. This is even so in areas covered by treaties, as no written law can 
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fully contemplate all eventualities that may arise as the subjects of the law begin to interact 
with the written law. Indeed the incompleteness of international law as is also the situation in 
municipal law, reveals itself in the inability of the law to cater for all factual unforeseen 
eventualities that may arise in the application of the law to concrete facts. It is always the 
province of the judge to supply the minute but vital links between the written law and the 
facts of the case at hand. It is only the elasticity of legal rules by judicial reasoning that 
guarantees the complete application of the written law, when confronted with unforeseen 
eventualities.
 134
  
As noted by Robert Jennings, it is, however, incumbent on judges of the ICJ to be conscious 
of the fact that their primary duty is to decide dispute – article 38(1) – and not to make law. 
The temptation she must resist is to strive to use every case to expand the law in the direction 
she thinks the law should go. In his thoughtful reflections, Jennings noted that the source of 
judicial authority is the law and that judges are by their appointment given a remit to interpret 
the law and apply it to the settlement of cases that come before them.
135
 In his words: 
Thus, the good judge will remember that the distinction between jus dicere 
and jus dare remains crucial to the authority of the tribunal even though the 
boundary between them is not always a clear one, and may shift from one 
context to another. It is well, therefore, for the judge constantly to have in 
mind certain imperatives that should be observed, and which provide a kind 
of frame within which a court should operate. The first is the proper 
observance of the principle that the primary task of a court of justice is not to 
'develop' the law, but to dispose, in accordance with the law, of that particular 
dispute between the particular parties before it. This is not to say that 
development is not frequently a secondary part of the judge's task to develop 
the law. And it is to say that any 'development' should be integral and 
incidental to the disposal according to law of the actual issues before the 
court. For the strength of 'case law' is precisely that it arises from actual 
situations rather than being conceived a priori. Any idea that an international 
court, in dealing with a dispute brought and argued before it, ought to labour 
under an assumption that it has a primary duty to take the opportunity to 
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'develop and clarify' the law, is hardly one calculated to encourage the 
submission of disputes to such a procedure; especially so since the 
jurisdiction of an international court in contentious cases depends in principle 
upon a consensual acceptance by the parties to its exercise.
136
 
 
This should, however, not be understood to mean that the cautious judge is one who is too 
shy or timid to introduce innovations to the law in the course of adjudication. Experience 
shows that it may sometimes serve the law worse to interpret it in its literal terms when that 
may defeat the purpose and spirit of the law, than to apply the law with certain degree of 
innovation, notwithstanding that the innovation may tend to obliterate the differences 
between law-application and lawmaking in any particular case.  
The approach of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case
137
 and the Reservations to the Convention 
on Genocide
138
 will buttress this point. In the former, the Court relied on what it called the 
―elementary consideration of humanity‖ as the legal consideration for holding Albania liable 
for a minefield within its territorial waters.
139
 In the Reservations advisory opinion, the Court 
held that the consequence of the intention which informed the origin of the Genocide 
Convention to condemn and punish genocide as ‗a crime under international law‘ involving a 
denial of the right of  existence  of entire  human  groups;  a  denial  which shocked  the  
conscience  of  mankind  and  which is contrary  to moral law, was that the  principles 
underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as 
binding on States, even without any conventional obligation.
140
 In other words, the principles 
underlying the crime of genocide are binding on States outside the positivists modes of 
lawmaking, because genocide ‗shocks the conscience of mankind‘. If the Court was timid in 
these cases, Albania would have escaped liability for her wrongful act, as would other States, 
regarding international responsibility for acts of genocide. Whether all States actually accept 
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the basis of liability contained in these decisions is another question entirely, but the question, 
however answered, does not prevent the rule contained in the cases from passing into general 
international law.   
 Be that as it may, the point cannot be stressed enough that when developing the law, the 
Court should not consider itself at liberty to develop the law in the direction that neither 
corresponds with the expectations of States, nor befits the circumstances of the case and the 
needs of society. For this observation, the Nuclear Test cases
141
 provide a useful example. In 
the case, the seeming adaptation of the English rule of unilateral contract, in a manner 
reminiscent of (though not completely identical to) the approach of the English court in 
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company,
142
 did not quite work well. The ICJ had ascribed 
obligations of a legal nature to unilateral statements made by France. The reasoning of the 
Court in the cases could hardly be said to correspond with the expectations of Australia and 
New-Zealand and the general expectations in international law at the time.
143
      
Another factor that favours the incidental lawmaking power of the Court is the argument 
strongly made in chapters two and seven that there is no room for non-liquet in the Statute of 
the Court. This follows the argument in chapters two and seven, that rather than declare non-
liquet, the Court is enabled by article 38(1)(c) to find solutions from general principles of law 
and adapt them to international law. There are academic and judicial opinions to the effect 
that whenever the Court adapts private law principles to suit international law, the Court 
makes a new law. It could be implied from this observation (in support of the point made in 
chapter two) that the framers of the Statute did give the Court some lawmaking powers 
through article 38(1)(d). On the other hand, if non liquet was a feature of the court, the 
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situation would have been different. The court would have been compelled to refuse to decide 
any case for which there are no pre-existing rules of law for the resolution of the questions 
raised in it, as the court is widely believed to have done in the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons.
144
 
This is in addition to the very fact that the ICJ is a permanent international court of justice as 
distinct from an arbitral tribunal.
145
 Unlike arbitral tribunals, where the parties have control 
over the appointment of the arbitrators and of the proceedings, the Judges of the ICJ have a 
fixed tenure. This makes them less susceptible to the influence and control of litigating 
States. The character of permanence of the Court and of the fixed tenure of office for its 
judges
146
 is important to the scheme of this work. It allows the judges to perpetuate the case-
law of the Court in an unbroken manner by maintaining that consistency that will eventually 
settle the rules/principles adopted by the Court. 
What is even more telling is the general agreement that article 38(1)(d) encompasses the 
decisions of both municipal courts and other international courts. As stated later in this work, 
this questions the rationale for arguing that the ICJ judgments cannot be a source of law even 
for the court, when it is generally agreed that decisions of other courts are a source of law.    
Having made these necessary preliminary points, it is apposite to emphasise that the core 
argument of this study is that the ICJ plays a vital role in the enunciation, development and 
refinement of principles and rules of international law. It is argued that this purpose was 
envisaged in the preparatory work of its Statute; it is accepted by States, and also that the 
purpose is continuously fulfilled in the practice of the Court. It is also shown that the benefit 
of the Court sitting on the shoulders of both the common law and civil law systems of law is 
constantly revealed in its liberty (absent the formal prescription of the common law and 
                                                             
144 ICJ Rep 1996,  226. The seeming non liquet aspect of this case is exhaustively discussed in p. 305-309 of this work.  
145 For an exhaustive discussion of the differences between the ICJ and arbitral tribunals, see Jennings, ―The Role of the 
International Court‖ note 45, p 5-9   
146 By article 13 of the Statute of the Court, judges are elected for nine years tenure at the first instance. 
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absent the formal prohibition of the civil law) to enjoy the best of both systems by accepting 
that while it should be consistent in its decisions, it should not regard the rules/principles 
arising from its decisions as settled by a single judgment. The conclusion reached is primarily 
obtained from the case-law of the Court, which reveals the application of principles 
enunciated in judicial decisions to concrete cases.  
In order to position the present view correctly, this work is not confined by the argument that 
equates judicial lawmaking with the common law doctrine of stare decisis.  While drawing 
the necessary analogy between the practice of the Court and the common law doctrine of 
precedent, this work seeks to understand what the Court tries to achieve by following its 
previous decisions in the manner that largely replicates the approach of common law courts. 
While acknowledging the distinction between consistency and the doctrine of precedent, it is 
argued that the Court follows its precedent, not for the purpose of adopting stare decisis, or 
just for the maintenance of consistency, but because it has identified judicial decisions as the 
repository of rules/principles which it wants to follow.
147
 Though (and this is regrettable) the 
Court is unable to do this in all the cases due to other intervening elements which could be 
political as was in the South West Africa cases, or which could be the desire of the Court to 
uphold or promote the enforcement of certain fundamental aspects of international law, as 
exemplified in the line of cases trailing the status of the former Yugoslavia in the United 
Nations as they pertained to the enforcement of the Genocide Convention.
148 
Nonetheless, the 
practice of relying on its precedent is substantially maintained. Such cases, which are few and 
far apart, notwithstanding, the writer strongly argues that to the extent that decisions of the 
                                                             
147 The writer has been vitally assisted in shaping his view by Dworkin‘s analysis of legal rules and principles in Ronald 
Dworkin, ―The Model of Rules‖, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14 (1967-1968).  The writer is aware of the controversy surrounding 
Dworkin‘s thesis, nonetheless, the writer finds his comprehensive discussion of rules and principles instructive to the 
approach adopted in this thesis. One remarkable thing, though, is that the controversy does not appear to challenge the fact 
that the terms legal rules and legal principles are ultimately laws through the activities of courts. – see Joseph Raz, ―Legal 
Principles and the Limits of Law‖, 81 Yale L.J 823, 843 (1972) (arguing that ―many legal systems recognize that both rules 
and principles can be made into law or lose their status as law through precedent‖.)      
148 These cases are discussed in pages 166-168 and 158-163 of this work. 
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Court become synonymous with the emergence of rules/principles of international law, they 
are a source of law; their supplementary character of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) of 
the Statute of the Court, notwithstanding. 
1.8 Preview of Chapters 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one and eight are the introductory and 
concluding chapters respectively.  
Chapter two examines the preparatory work of articles 38(1)(d) and 59 of the Statute of the 
Court. It comes to the conclusion, contrary to the view of some writers, that there are no clear 
indications that the Drafters did not envisage the use of judicial decisions as a source of 
international law. Chapters three, four and five discuss article 38(1). Chapter three examines 
the text of the provision; chapter four discusses the practice of the Court relating to the 
provision while chapter five looks into the relationship between judicial decisions and 
customary international law. In all, it is the writer‘s view that the text of the provision and the 
uses of judicial decisions in the decision making process of the Court confirm the conclusion 
reached in the thesis that judicial decisions are a source of international law.   
Chapter Six discusses article 59 through the case-law of the Court. It shows that neither the 
Court nor States have ever invoked article 59 in relation to judicial decisions. Rather, that 
article 59 has been mostly used in relation to the right of intervention and the protection of 
third party rights. Accordingly, it was argued that the article does not possess the effect 
generally ascribed to it by text writers. Chapter Seven focuses on instances of judicial 
legislation by the ICJ. It discussed non liquet and the various guises employed by the Court to 
make judicial legislation less conspicuous.    
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                  Chapter Two 
             History and Original Intent: Articles 38(1)(d) and 59 Considered.  
2.1 Introduction  
The question concerning the power of a court to create a new rule of law of relevant content, 
in the event of a court being presented by a claim which is not covered by a rule of positive 
law is directly related to the question of the authority of judicial decisions within a particular 
legal order. The question goes beyond the intrinsic merit of the substantive content of a rule 
created by a court; it challenges the very source; its foundation and of course the legality of 
the exercise of judicial power on such occasions. For the exercise of judicial power and 
indeed the rule that emerged from that exercise to be valid, it must draw its force from a 
recognised source of law within a given system. In the words of Hans Kelsen:  
The assumption that the law-applying organs are authorised to fill such 
gaps, by applying to the particular case norms other than those of existing 
conventional or customary international law, implies that the law-applying 
organs have the power to create new law for a concrete case if they consider 
the application of existing law as unsatisfactory. From the point of view of 
legal positivism, such a law-creating power must be based on a rule of 
positive international law.
1
   
It follows, therefore, that the question whether a court can create a rule of relevant content to 
fill a gap in positive law is, in essence, a question of the sources of law.  
This explains why the question relating to the power of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) to modify or create rules of international law implicates begins and ends in article 38(1) 
of its Statute. Article 38(1) prescribes the sources from which the international law to be 
applied by the Court shall emerge. It provides: 
                                                             
1 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 439 (2nd edn., Robert W Tucker ed., 1966 Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.) 
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1. The Court, whose functions is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
(b) International customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) Subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
Given that the Court has been expressly obligated to apply only the rules proceeding from the 
sources contained in article 38(1), it has to be seen that judicial decisions in its paragraph (d) 
are a source of law for there to be legal justifications for decisions rendered by the Court 
outside the provisions of positive law.  
Although article 38(1) expressly mentioned judicial decisions in its paragraph (d), the 
difficult language of that paragraph has created more controversies than consensus. In 
particular, the reference to judicial decisions ―as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law‖, and the incorporation of article 59 into article 38(1) by reference, foreclosed all 
possibilities of easy answers to the controversies. Article 59 provides: ―[t]he decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case‖. 
The ambiguous wording of the provisions has made it impossible to understand its true 
import in the natural and ordinary sense. This is particularly against the backdrop that the 
direction of the practice of the Court is far removed from what a majority of Scholars 
subscribe to as the natural and ordinary meaning of the provision. The majority view is that 
judicial decision as a source of law is not tenable on the wording of the provision. This 
argument is always reinforced by reliance on article 59.
 2
  
                                                             
2 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law,  21 (7th ed. Oxford University Press, 2008); Godefridus J. H 
Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law, 169 (Kluwer: the Netherlands 1983); Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and 
Practice of the International Court,  611 (Vol. 2 A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden 1965); Antonio Cassese,  International Law, 159 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), to mention a few.  
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2.2 Adherence to Natural and Ordinary Meaning of Words except Good Cause to do 
Otherwise  
It is a sound approach to the interpretation of a treaty to begin with the natural and ordinary 
meaning of the wording of the treaty.
3
 This is a cardinal rule of interpretation; it proceeds on 
the understanding that words must be interpreted in good faith in the sense which they would 
normally have in their context.
4
 If so read they make sense, the natural meaning of the words 
would prevail.
5
 If, on the other hand, the words are ambiguous or lead to an unreasonable 
result, the Court would resort to other methods of interpretation to seek to ascertain what the 
parties really meant when they used the words under consideration.
 6
 It would, therefore, be 
self-evident that it is equally sound and most essential, to go beyond the language of an 
instrument where language continuously yields itself to ambiguous results. In such a case, the 
history of the provision and how the provision has evolved in practice are alternative means 
of discovering the true meaning of the instrument. This is in tandem with article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides:  
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of [its ordinary 
meaning in] article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
This approach was emphasised by Judge Percy Spender in his Separate Opinion in Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations,
7
 where he acknowledged that the first task of the Court is to 
look, not at the preparatory work or the practice which hitherto had been followed, but at the 
                                                             
3 In S.S Lotus, Series A, No. 10, 1927, 16 the PCIJ held that ―there is no occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the 
text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself‖.   
4 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969; Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ., Series B, No. 
11 p. 39  
5 Competence of the General Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations, ICJ Reps 1950, 4, 8    
6 Ibid    
7 Advisory Opinion: ICJ Rep 1962, 151, 185 
  
52 
terms of a treaty itself. The Judge was emphatic on the point that if the meaning of any 
particular provision, read in its context, is sufficiently clear to satisfy the Court as to the 
interpretation to be given to it, there will be neither legal justification nor logical reason to 
have recourse to either the preparatory work or practice.
8
 The corollary of this view is that 
recourse to practice and preparatory work becomes logically viable where a provision is not 
sufficiently clear when read in its ordinary and natural sense.
9
 
2.3 Does Article 38(1) Call for an Examination of Preparatory Work?  
Recourse to preparatory work is of particular importance to the present study, not only 
because the provisions in focus are not sufficiently clear, but also because some respected 
Commentators have relied on the preparatory work of article 38(1) to arrive at conflicting 
interpretations of the provisions. To mention a few:  Brownlie
10
 and Hoof
11
 based themselves 
on the preparatory work of the Statute to justify their view that judicial decisions are not a 
source of international law. On the other hand, Lauterpacht
12
 and J.H.W. Verzijl
13
 argued to 
the contrary. They argued that there is nothing in the text of articles 38(1)(d) and 59 affecting 
the authority of judicial decisions. This situation presents an added imperative for the present 
writer to analyse the history of the provisions in order to set his work on a solid footing. 
 
  
                                                             
8 Ibid  
9 It is questionable, as observed by Lauterpacht ,whether the wording of a treaty over which each of the parties before the 
Court contend for diverse interpretations can actually be said to be sufficiently clear. For, if it was actually clear why would 
the parties see it differently? See Hersch Lauterpacht, ―Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of 
Treaties‖, 48 Harv. L. Rev, 549,  572 (1934-35). 
10 Note 2 
11 Note 2 
12 Hersch Lauterpacht, ―The So-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought under International Law,‖ 12 
Brit Y.B. Int‘l L 31 (1931); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1958)   
13 J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of the World Court: A Case to Case Commentary, 22 (Vol. 1 A.W. Sijthoff – Leyden 
1965) 
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2.4 The Scope of the Preparatory Work to be considered 
This discussion is largely a discussion of the history of article 38 of the PCIJ Statute. Save for 
minor alterations in 1945, that article is the same as article 38(1) of the Statute of the present 
Court. The only difference in the provisions is the inclusion of the term, ―[t]he Court whose 
function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to 
it, shall apply....‖, in the opening sentence of article 38 of the present Court. Similarly, and 
without any difference, article 59 is common to the Statutes of both Courts.  
On a general note, the ICJ is a continuation of the PCIJ. This continuation is reflected in its 
Statute, jurisdiction and case-law; the jurisdiction
14
 and the case-law of the PCIJ are 
assimilated to those of the ICJ.
15
 The substantial similarities of the two Courts have been 
variously affirmed in the case-law of the ICJ. In Military and Paramilitary activities in and 
against Nicaragua, it was the view of the Court that the primary concern of the Drafters of 
the Statute of the ICJ was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the 
PCIJ.
 16
 The intention of the Drafters also extended to the continuity in case-law.
17
 In a sort of 
summing up, Judge Tanaka declared: 
... there is no doubt that not only in their fundamental purpose but in 
every detail, namely from the viewpoint of organization, composition 
and procedure, the old and the new Court are identical with each other; 
the latter being the exact counterpart or copy of the former. They do not 
differ except in name.
18
  
On the above premise, it is safe to proceed (as done in this work) on the footing that the 
history of the Statute of the PCIJ is substantially the same as that of the ICJ.  
                                                             
14 By article 37 of the Statute of the Court, whenever a treaty or Convention in force provides for reference of a matter to the  
PCIJ, the matter shall, as between the parties to the ICJ Statute, be referred to the ICJ.     
15 Shabtai Rosenne, note 2, p., 65. 
16(Nicaragua v. USA) Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Rep 1984, 392,  407 para 32. 
17 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties between Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania, Second Phase, ICJ Rep 1950, 65, 232-233.   
18 Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka in Barcelona Traction  Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) (Preliminary 
Objections), ICJ Rep., 6, 73. 
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2.5  The Value of Preparatory Work 
As earlier stated, recourse to preparatory work is conducive when the meaning to be ascribed 
to terms used in an instrument cannot be ascertained on the plain text of that instrument. 
Though preparatory work may help illuminate the grey areas and make the real meaning of a 
provision more pronounced, it calls for caution when dealing with the preparatory work of a 
multilateral instrument in which preparation were involved a great many nations and several 
committees. This is so even with instruments adopted by a vote. How, for instance, can one 
tell even from the most profound study of the preparatory work of an instrument, that all the 
nations that voted for particular provisions were driven by a similar object? How could it be 
ascertained from the preparatory work that they all had the same understanding when voting 
for the provisions? These are perhaps why Judge Jessup counselled that:  
one cannot understand or analyse the proceedings of a great international 
conference like those at Paris or San Francisco if one regards it as essentially 
the same as a meeting between John Doe and Richard Roe for the purpose of 
signing a contract for the sale of bricks.
19
  
The foregoing explains the desire of the present writer to proceed knowing that due to a 
multiplicity of factors: language; the age of the instrument; the influx of new members
20
 (the 
list is not exhaustive),
21
 there is always the danger of misrepresenting the intention of the 
drafters of an instrument (particularly multilateral instruments), when examining its 
preparatory work. Of the numerous factors affecting the value of preparatory work, the writer 
shall discuss only two – language and lapse of time.  
                                                             
19 Dissenting, South West Africa cases, (2nd Phase), ICJ Rep 1966, 6, 353-354; Separate Opinion of Judge De Visscher, 
International Status of South West Africa CIJ Rep 1950, 128, 189. (Reminding us that individualistic concepts are generally 
inadequate in the interpretation of a constitutional instrument like the UN Charter.)  Also see the view of Judge Cordova in 
the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants, ICJ Rep. 1958, 55, 143. (Stating that the 
common interpretation of the two contending states cannot be conclusive in the interpretation of a multilateral convention)  
20 Separate Opinion of Judge Percy Spender in Certain Expenses, note 7,  p. 184-185 (Reasoning that unlike in treaties 
where the parties are fixed and constant, the original intention of the framers of a multilateral instrument like the UN Charter 
may become diluted by the influx of new members)  
21 For example, Judge Alverez identified three other factors that may affect the value of preparatory work: (a) the possibility 
of States or Committees abandoning a view they had put forward; (b) States signing a treaty are not influenced by the 
preparatory work with which they may even be unacquainted; (c) the increasing dynamism of international life – Dissenting 
in the Competence of the General Assembly, note 5, p., 18   
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2.5.1 Language  
Multilateral instruments are products of series of compromises, which must be captured in a 
language that satisfies or, at least, pacifies all the parties. When, as is always the case, all the 
parties do not speak the same language, words can only convey the compromises as far as 
translations can go.
22
 This is even more so when an instrument such as the Statute of the 
Court was drafted and deliberated upon in a particular language (French) and then translated 
into other languages (such as English). This creates a tendency for the translated version to 
lose the essence of the words actually used in the original language. A common example is 
the different meanings French Courts and English Courts would ascribe to the word 
―jurisprudence‖ when construing the text of the same instrument.   
Courts, both municipal and international, confront this problem when faced with a translated 
term in a treaty or different language versions of the same treaty.   In the Dispute Regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights,
23
 the ICJ was requested to construe the Spanish term ―con 
objetos de comercio‖ in article VI of the 1858 Treaty of Limits (drafted in Spanish). The 
correct English interpretation of this term was the crust of the case. Nicaragua argued that the 
English translation was as, ―with articles of trade‖. For Costa Rica, the English translation 
was, ―for the purposes of commerce‖. To resolve the issue, the Court declared that the term 
must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the Treaty is to 
be applied, and not necessarily their original meanings.
24
  
The crucial thing was that each of the meaning contended for impacted on the scope of the 
Treaty. The interpretation adopted by Nicaragua would limit the scope of the treaty only to 
                                                             
22 The writer is not oblivious of the provisions of article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
presumes the terms of a treaty to have the same meanings in each authentic text when the treaty is in different authentic 
languages. This provision does not resolve the problem in practice; it leaves more questions than answers. How can ―the 
same meaning‖ be achieved when the authentic texts all disagree on the meaning of the term? It is thus for the Court to 
decide on the meaning that best suits the object and purpose of the text. The writer also bears in mind that, by article 111 of 
the Charter of the United Nations English and French are authentic texts of the Charter, and by extension, the Statute of the 
Court which is an integral part of the Charter.   
23 (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) ICJ Rep 2009, 213 
24 Ibid, p. 241 para 60; p. 244 paras 70, and  71 
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the transport of goods intended to be sold in a commercial exchange. In Costa Rica‘s 
interpretation, the treaty would have the broadest possible scope encompassing not only the 
transport of goods but also the transport of passengers, including tourists.
25
 On its part, the 
Court held that, on a progressive interpretation of the article, the treaty covered all activities 
carried out for a price on the river. This included the transport of persons (including tourists) 
and of goods. How far any of these interpretations truly reflected the intention of the parties 
was a matter for speculation.  
Directly on the point is the LaGrand case.
26
 Here, the court was called upon to determine the 
binding nature of provisional measures made under article 41 of its Statute. The Court had to 
construe both the English and French versions of article 41. The United States had argued 
that ―the use in the English version of "indicate" instead of "order", of "ought" instead of 
"must" or "shall", and of "suggested" instead of "ordered", is to be understood as implying 
that decisions under Article 41 lack mandatory effect‖.27 The Court acknowledged that the 
two texts (which are the authentic texts of the provisions by virtue of article 111 of the 
Charter of the UN) were not in total harmony. It was the further view of the Court that it 
might be argued, having regard to the fact that, in 1920, the French text was the original 
version, that such terms as "indicate" and "ought" have a meaning equivalent to "order" and 
"must" or "shall".
28
 The Court relied on the French version to hold that provisional orders 
were binding under article 41.
29
 
A slightly different situation presented before the United States Supreme Court in the cases of 
Foster v. Neilson,
30
 and United States v. Percheman.
31
 These cases involved the same Treaty 
                                                             
25 Ibid,  p. 235-236, para 43-44 
26 (Germany v. United States), ICJ Rep 2001, 466 
27 Ibid, p. 502, para 100 
28 Ibid  
29 Ibid, p. 506, para 109;  Rosenne thought it was regrettable that the Court did not explain why it relied on the French text. 
He argued that the English was the authentic text of the judgment given that the proceedings were conducted in English – 
Shabtai Rosenne, Provisional Measures in International Law,  37 (Oxford University Press, 2005)   
30 27 U.S (2 Pet) 253, 314 (1829) 
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written in the different languages of the parties (Spanish and English). The case was presided 
over by the same Judge (Marshall, C.J), yet the Court ascribed different intentions to the 
framers. In the former, the Court held that the English version of the treaty which used the 
term "shall be ratified and confirmed" was not self-executing in the United States. Applying 
the Spanish version of the treaty four years later, the Court found the version which 
interpreted as the grants shall remain ―ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of 
them‖, to be self-executing. In rationalising the conflict, the Court explained that the Spanish 
part of the treaty was not brought into view in foster v Neilson and that it was then supposed 
there was no variance between them. Furthermore, the Court stated:  
We did not suppose, that there was even a formal difference of expression in 
the same instrument, drawn up in the language of each party. Had this 
circumstance been known ... it would have produced the construction which 
we now give to the article
32
  
 
What is being said equally applies to an academic researcher. Just as with the cases 
mentioned above, a researcher can understand the intention of the drafters of a particular 
instrument only to the extent that her language of study (where the instrument is in different 
languages) expresses that intention. It is thus possible for Researchers of the preparatory 
work of an instrument in their different languages of study to disagree on the intention of the 
drafters of the instrument. Though each of them may ascribe a different (if not opposite) 
intention to the same provision, they may yet be right in the light of the meanings their 
respective language conveys.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
31 32 U.S (7 Pet) 51, 52, (1833) 
32  Ibid, p. 89 
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2.5.2 Age-Long Continuing Duration 
It may be possible with some treaties to unambiguously capture the exact meaning ascribed to 
a term as at the time the treaty was made. This seeming clarity of meaning may become 
eroded in the evolution of the meaning of the term, when all circumstances relating to the 
length of time that had elapsed since the treaty was made and the changes that had occurred 
within the entire legal landscape, in general, and within the particular area regulated by the 
treaty, are considered. This is particularly true in relation to instruments which have 
continuously existed for a long duration of time, without revision or amendment to its 
provisions.  Though these factors are extrinsic to the term being construed, they bear heavily 
on the value a court would ascribe to preparatory work.  
The ICJ had variously held that the meaning ascribed to a term in preparatory work, may yet 
not control if the passage of time and the evolution of the words render the original meaning 
so absurd that it would impede the effective application of the instrument when interpreted in 
the light of the meaning of the term as at when the treaty was made. This is, perhaps, why the 
ICJ does not consider its reasoning to be hampered by the circumstances that prevailed at the 
time a treaty was made, when with the passage of time, the term being construed no longer 
falls into the right context. As the Court noted about article 22 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations: 
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in 
accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, 
the Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied 
in Article 22 of the Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of the modern 
world" and "the well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-
were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was 
the concept of the "sacred trust". The parties to the Covenant must 
consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why, 
viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the 
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its 
interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of 
law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary 
law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied 
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within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation. In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the 
last fifty years, as indicated above, have brought important developments. 
These developments leave little doubt that the ultimate objective of the 
sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of the peoples 
concerned.
33
 
Also, reasoning in this direction, and with particular reference to article 38(1) of the Statute, 
Judge Padilla Nervo stated:   
[t]he world of today is far removed and different from the one of the First 
World War. New interests, new needs and new laws, customs, norms, and 
standards of international behaviour are being created by the relentless forces 
of public opinion, in search of recognition by the legislative and judicial 
bodies all over the world; and are today proclaimed or enacted by peaceful 
and normal procedures, or put into force by the sheer strength of peoples and 
States.  The statesmen, the jurists, legislators, and the courts of justice, they 
all have to recognize the realities of today, for the sake of freedom, justice 
and peace. The Court is well aware of such realities and shall consider, in its 
interpretation of the relevant international instruments and obligations, the 
prevailing ideas and circumstances of today ... as well as regarding the actual 
meaning and universal recognition embodied now in the concepts "material 
and moral well-being and social progress", which is a dynamic concept. The 
Court, in my opinion, is not limited by the strict enumeration of Article 38, 
whose prescriptions it is free to interpret in accordance with the constant 
evolution of the concepts of justice, principles of law and teachings of 
publicists.
34
  
It has also been observed that the Court cannot ignore the prevailing moral and legal 
conscience of the world, and the acts, decisions and attitudes of the organized international 
community, which have created principles, from which may have evolved rules – such as a 
jus cogens rule – which were not so developed, or did not have such strong claims to 
recognition, as at the time a treaty was made
35
 and which now impacts on the meaning of 
terms used in the treaty. 
                                                             
33 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Rep 1971, 16, 31 para 53 
34 Dissenting, South West Africa cases, note 19, p., 463-464  
35 Ibid, p.,467. This view was also echoed in the Separate Opinion of Fouad Ammon in the Barcelona Traction Light and 
Power Company Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase), ICJ Rep 1970, 3, 287-288 (holding that ―the radical transformations 
which have occurred ... in the last half-century, the constantly increasing expansion which has marked the recent decades ... 
and the new problems which these changes have given rise, call for a corresponding development of juridical structures. The 
law, a rigid conservative kind of law, cannot adapt the emerging reality to sacrosanct rules rooted in the remote past...‖.)   
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True to this approach, the Court does not allow the meaning ascribed to a term by the drafters 
to override the meaning the term has taken on in its evolution as an instrument perpetuates. In 
the Aegean Sea case,
36
 the Court held that the meaning of generic terms when used in a 
treaty, are intended to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning 
attached to the expression by the law in force at any given time. Accordingly, the Court held 
that the term "territorial status" used in the reservation of Greece to the 1928 General Act for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was liable to evolve in accordance with the 
development of international relations.
37
 
The above factors are some of the many dangers of interpreting a treaty primarily on 
preparatory works. For its best value, preparatory work confirms one of several conclusions, 
the ordinary meaning of an ambiguous term suggests.     
2.6 The Preparatory Work of the Statute of the ICJ   
With reference to the preparatory work of the Statute of the Court, the present writer shall 
proceed with some degree of circumspection, considering the length of time the Statute has 
survived. All other facts mentioned above, considered, the fact that the provisions have lived 
through almost a century (an eventful century that changed the shape and complexion of 
international law and the international community under which the provisions were 
formulated), cannot but affect the construction of the provisions.
38
 A major change, which of 
                                                             
36 (Greece v. Turkey) ICJ Rep 1978, 3, 32, para 77 
37 Ibid, p. 33, para 78 
38 Reasoning with a similar conviction, Judge Alvarez, dissenting, Status of South-West Africa, note 19, p 175-177, wrote of 
the ―great transformations‖ in the life of nations brought about by the two wars, and which transformation had organised the 
hitherto anarchical community of States.  The Judge further opined that the transformation has influenced international law 
for three reasons – (a) it led to the emergence of new questions of international law; (b) it rests on the basic reconstruction of 
fundamental principles of classical international law and brings them into harmony with the new conditions of peoples; (c) it 
is based on the new social regime of interdependence which is taking the place of individualistic regime, which hitherto 
provided the basis of both national and international life. The Judge was convinced that the law must yield to these changing 
necessities in order to achieve its purposes. The writer does not ignore the humble beginning of the Statute of the Court and 
the circumstances under which it was negotiated; the world had just emerged from an unforgettable world war at a period 
where there was no real foundation for the entrenchment, albeit in principle, of sovereign equality. Nations were great or 
small according to their military prowess. This was even reflected during deliberations in the various Committees which 
discussed the Statute as constant references were made to ―Great Powers‖. It was also reflected with regards to compulsory 
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course, impacts significantly on this study, is the new conception of sovereignty
39
 which has 
given rise to the willingness of States to submit to international judicial settlement in an 
ordered society than it was in the era in which article 38(1) came into being. This has 
naturally led to the amassment of a formidable body of case-law, which no judge or jurists 
can safely ignore in the search for rules of international law. A body of law that is not merely 
searched as a repository of the law, but as a body of law from which new rules/principles 
have emerged and by which obscure rules have been crystallised.  
The writer recognises the need to approach preparatory work with some degree of 
circumspection, given that the true intent behind the words of a treaty may be lost, not only in 
the flurry of compromises, but also in the insufficiency of translation, where the treaty is in 
different languages (like the Statute of the ICJ). The writer also recognises the problem 
arising from the continuous evolution of words or subject matter of an instrument. The writer 
is, nonetheless, equally compelled to remark that the history of the Statute of the Court 
should yield greater value and bring much more certainty than the history of treaties that 
serve the national interests of its framers as against the interest of the international 
community as a whole which the ICJ serves. The denationalised deliberations of the Jurists 
show that the members were not holding brief for their respective governments; neither were 
they driven by their respective national interests. They were passionate; their passion was to 
defeat the odds that plagued the 1907 attempt to create a permanent court of international 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction, with the small powers lacking in guns and economic powers, preferring an international Court with automatic 
compulsory jurisdiction where they could be victorious over the ‗great powers‘ without firing a shot. See Lorna Lloyd, ―A 
Springboard for the Future‘: A Historical Examination of Britain‘s Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice,‖ 79 Am. J. Int‘l L, 28, 40, (1985). Accordingly, the fear which marred the 1907 attempt to 
create a permanent independent court with jurisdiction to hold a great power accountable at the suit of a small power was 
still a factor of considerable importance. The great powers were more comfortable with arbitration over which they could 
exert much more influence than a court with permanence both in the tenure of judges and its existence.  These were bound to 
fractionise legislative intent. See James Brown Scott, ―The Codification of International Law‖, 18 AM.J. Int‘l L, 260, 271 
(1924) (affirming that the great powers which had the power of the sword were ―willing to renounce it in favour of judicial 
settlement only if assured in advance that the rules of law to be applied are satisfactory if not a better method to secure their 
interests‖).      
39 The creation of law through the activities of non-state actors is generally regarded as the most patent example of the new 
order. See Oren Perez, ―Purity Lost: The Paradoxical Face of the New Transnational Legal Body‖, 33(1) Brook. J. Int‘l L 1, 
7 (2007)  
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justice;
40
 they were passionate about passing unto future generations an international justice 
system of which the ICJ (through the PCIJ) is the enduring legacy of the worthy endeavours 
of the best legal minds of that time. As a result, their deliberations and language were well 
guided and their disagreements where propelled by, and resolved on the basis of sound legal 
opinions. These qualities cannot but add some worth to the preparatory work of the Statute.  
Added to this is the fact that even if the meaning ascribed to terms in preparatory work of a 
treaty can be ignored, the overall purpose intended to be served by the treaty cannot be 
ignored in seeking to understand the treaty. In Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
41
 
Judge Spender remarked that the meaning of the text will be illuminated by the purposes it 
was set out to achieve. In seeking to understand article 38(1) through the preparatory work, 
therefore, the writer shall endeavour to understand, not only the difficult language of the 
provisions, but also their overall purpose. The writer shall seek to understand whether the 
underlying purpose of the provisions was to give the Court a complete statement of sources 
of international law with a view to adequately equipping it with tools needed for confronting 
absence or vagueness of rules of international law and preventing non liquet; or whether the 
purpose was to restrict the Court to the application only of positive law and resort to non 
liquet in any case that positive rules are lacking, notwithstanding that it was perfectly 
possible to avoid non liquet by recourse to rules emerging from non positive law sources.  
 
 
 
                                                             
40 The attempt to set up a Permanent Court at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, failed because no agreement could be 
reached ―respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the court‖. This information was obtained from the 
website of the ICJ at http://www.icj-icj.org/court/index. (Accessed 23/09/2011).     
41 Note 7, p., 187 
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2.7. Historical Background 
The history of article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ could be traced to the proceedings of the 
1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists, though some background to the provisions could be 
garnered from the different Draft Schemes submitted to the Committee by States.
42
 The 
Advisory Committee of Jurists was the first in the line of Committees that drafted the Statute. 
The Committee was set up at the second meeting of the Council of the League of Nations 
held in London in the February of 1920, pursuant to article 14 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations,
43
 which provides: 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for 
adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of 
an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court 
may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to 
it by the Council or by the Assembly.  
The Committee was made up of the following members: Mineichiro Adatci (Japan), Rafael 
Altamira (Spain), Clovis Bevilaqua (Brazil), Baron Descamps (Belgium), Francis Hagerup 
(Norway), Albert De Lapradelle (France), Arturo Ricci-Busatti (Italy), Dr. Loder 
(Netherlands), Lord Phillimore (England), Elihu Root (United States of America) and Raoul 
Fernande (Brazil), who replaced Clovis Bevilaqua.
44
 The Belgian Jurist, Baron Descamps, 
who incidentally proposed what became article 38(1), was appointed President of the 
Committee.  
The Committee was set up to consider the proposal for the establishment of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice and advise the Council on its recommendations. The 
                                                             
42 See article 2 of the Draft for the Establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for in Article 14 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Plan of the Five Neutral Powers, Annex II to the Memorandum in Documents 
presented to the Committee Relating to the Existing Plans for the Establishment of a Permanent Court of International 
Justice (available in http://www.icj.org/homepage/index.php, last accessed 02/02/ 2012), p., 90  
43 Adopted in Versailles in 1919 
44 See preface to Process-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists June 16-July 24, 1920 (available in 
http://www.icj.org/homepage/index.php last accessed 02/02/2012)    
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Committee was charged, inter alia, with the question of the limits of competence of the 
proposed Court. It sat from June 16 to July 24, 1920, to extensively discuss the Statute of the 
Court and make recommendations to the League Council. The proceedings of the Committee 
were generally conducted in French; all the members of the Committee, with the exception of 
Root, spoke in French so that a major aspect of available records is translated into the English 
language.   
The tone of the arguments concerning the role of the Court in rule formulation (which is the 
fulcrum of this discussion) was set in the opening speech of Leon Bourgeois, who was 
delegated by the League Council to open the meetings of the Advisory Committee. In the 
speech, he envisaged the creation of a Court with ―a small number of judges sitting constantly 
and receiving a mandate the duration of which will enable the establishment of a real 
jurisprudence, who will administer justice‖.45 He conveyed the idea of a Court that will fine-
tune incoherent rules and develop the law in the course of adjudicating on the conflicting 
claims and interests of States. In his words, States have towards one another, 
uncertain modes of contact, the nature of which is badly defined, the laws of 
which are still at the mercy of endless differences of opinion, or of arbitrary 
chance, just as it was between the citizens of each country in the first ages of 
civilisation. The precise object of the League of Nations is just this new and 
more complete definition of the largest possible number of relations between 
states, in such a way as to give an always increasing competence to the 
supreme power of justice.
46
 
It was thus expected, from the outset, that the Court would be the instrument for achieving a 
―new and more complete definition of the largest possible number of relations between 
States‖. 47  
                                                             
45 Ibid,  Annex No. 2, p., 7 
46 Ibid, p. 8 
47 Ibid, p. 8 
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It was, perhaps, in the spirit of this expectation that Baron Descamps proposed what became 
article 38(1) of both the Statute of the PCIJ and the ICJ. Descamps‘ proposal, in its undiluted 
form, read: 
The following rules are to be applied by the judge in the solution of international 
disputes; they will be considered by him in the under-mentioned order:  
1. Conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules 
expressly adopted by states; 
2. International customs, being practice between nations accepted by them as law; 
3. The rules of international law as recognised by the legal conscience of civilised 
nations; 
4. International jurisprudence as a means for the application and development of 
law. 
48
 
The proposal was not agreeable to members of the committee in the above form.  
2.7.1 Objections to the Proposal: Deliberations  
The first major opposition to the proposal came from the American Jurists, Elihu Root. Root 
expressed concerns that Descamps was proposing to give to the Court, more powers 
(legislative powers) than the League Council and by extension, Nations, were willing to 
concede to it. Root observed that the authors of the Covenant could only agree on a court that 
will be competent to deal with questions arising from the interpretation of treaties and 
questions of international law generally. He cautioned the Committee on the importance of 
not exceeding that mandate.
49
 He particularly opposed paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposal 
on the ground that they constituted an enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Court. He argued 
that States, like America would not accept the Court if the ―vague‖ rules in clauses 3 and 4 of 
the proposal were retained, particularly as they pertained to compulsory jurisdiction; 
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explaining that it was still too soon to go as far as Descamps wished.
50
 He insisted that the 
Court must limit itself to conventions and positive law.  
The Netherlands Jurist, Dr. Loder, disagreed with Mr. Root. Loder was particularly 
uncomfortable with Root‘s insistence that the Court must apply only positive international 
law.  Loder noted that there were rules which were not yet of the nature of positive law, but 
that it was precisely the Court‘s duty to develop the law, to ―ripen‖ customs and principles 
universally recognised, and to crystallise them into positive rules – to establish international 
jurisprudence.
51
     
The British Jurist, Lord Phillimore, partly agreed with Root. Lord Phillimore thought the 
Court should not have legislative powers, for ―legislations in matters of international law 
could only be carried out by the universal agreement of all States‖.52 He recalled the proposal 
of the Five Neutral Powers, but he agreed only with the first part, which largely conformed to 
clauses 1 and 2 of Descamps‘ proposal.  
In the Five Neutral Powers proposal, referred to by Lord Phillimore, it was proposed:   
Whenever the point of law to be decided by the Court is provided for directly 
or indirectly by any Treaty in operation between the contesting parties, such 
Treaty shall form the basis of the judgement. In the absence of such treaty 
provisions the Court shall apply the recognised rules of international law, or, 
should no rules applicable to the case exist, shall enter judgement according to 
its own opinion of what the rule of international law on the subject should be.
53
 
 
 
 
                                                             
50 Ibid  
51 Ibid p. 294 
52 Ibid p. 295 
53League Documents, note 42 
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The French Jurist, Albert De Lapradelle, thought it was desirable for the Court to administer 
justice and not deal with diplomacy. He also expressed opposition to the judge acting as a 
legislator; nonetheless, he opined that it would be too strict and even unjust to force the Court 
to consider only law. He thought the Court should be accorded some level of freedom to 
adopt and modify legal solutions according to the exigencies of justice and equity.
54
 The 
Norwegian Jurists, Francis Hagerup called to mind what he identified as the basis for the 
project of the five powers, the joint plan of Northern Countries Commissions, as well as the 
Swedish plan, which stated: ―there might be cases in which no rule of conventional or general 
law was applicable. A rule must be established to meet this eventuality, to avoid the 
possibility of the Court declaring itself incompetent (non liquet) through lack of applicable 
rules‖. 55  He noted that article 7 of the Convention establishing the International Prize Court 
took this eventuality into account through a provision that, absent applicable rules, the Court 
must render judgment according to justice and equity.
 56
 Hagerup favoured the view that the 
Court must have the power to fill gaps in positive law.
57
  He emphatically argued that if Mr. 
Root‘s view that the Court should, absent positive rules, declare non liquet, was accepted, it 
might have important consequences for the Court; as it will greatly limit the Court‘s 
competence and place it in an entirely different position from that of an ordinary Court, 
which would not declare non liquet.
58
 
Seeing the controversy generated by the proposal, Descamps sought to clarify the grey 
areas.
59
 First, Descamps sought to isolate the areas of differences of opinions. He observed 
that there was agreement on the imperative of the application of conventional and customary 
law to disputes by the Court. On the other hand, he noted that the point of disagreement was 
                                                             
54 Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists,  note 44, p., 295-296 
55 Ibid, p. 296 
56 Ibid  
57 Ibid  
58 Ibid, pp. 307-308 
59 Ibid,  Annex No. 1 Speech by Baron Descamps on the Rules of Law to be Applied,  p. 322.   
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how, absent either custom or convention, the judge would be restricted to applying objective 
justice as a complement to other conditions calculated at preventing the judge from making 
arbitrary decisions. While agreeing that it was conceivable that States would desire to be 
bound only by the engagements they had entered into, he was convinced, however, that: ―[i]t 
is absolutely impossible and supremely odious to say to the judge that, although in a given 
case a perfectly just solution is possible: ‗you must take a course amounting to refusal of 
justice‘ merely because no definite convention or custom appeared‖.60  ―What, therefore, is 
the difference between my ... opponent [Root] and myself?‖ Asked Descamps. The difference 
is that ―he [Root] leaves the judge in a state of compulsory blindness forced to rely on 
subjective opinions only; I allow him to consider the cases that come before him with both 
eyes open. In the first place, I would allow him to make use of the concurrent teaches of the 
authors whose opinions have authorities‖,61 He further argued that ―not to allow the judge to 
make use of existing international jurisprudence as a means of defining the law of nations 
...[is] to deprive him of one of his most valuable resources‖.62   
In further response to the arguments of the Jurists, particularly those of Root and Phillimore, 
Descamps laboured to dispel the misconception that his proposal gave judges a new power – 
legislative power – not conceded by States. In doing this, he argued that the application of a 
disputed rule in practice is constant in international jurisdiction; and that ―you will never see 
a judge failing to administer justice on the pretext of a lack of conventional or customary 
law‖.63 He buttressed his assertion by the 1902 California Pious Arbitration64 in which the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration affirmed its power to seek and apply just principles in 
international litigation. In the arbitration, the Arbitrators acknowledged that the controversy, 
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being between States, shall have to be determined on the basis of treaties and principles of 
international law. They, nonetheless, upheld the application of the res judicata principle on 
the reasoning that the principle is not only applicable under municipal law, but also to 
international tribunals. The arbitrations affirmed that it was for stronger reasons applicable to 
the arbitration at hand.  
2.7.2 Sources to be considered successively  
While maintaining that the Court should not be restricted to the application of positive law, 
Descamps maintained that the sources he proposed must be examined successively: the Court 
must first examine the text of a convention and apply same, if any; failing conventional rule, 
the Court should apply custom. If no rule is found in either, rather than plead non liquet, the 
Court should resort to general principles of law and the work of publicists, but the judge 
―must be saved the temptation of applying the rules as he pleased‖.65  The decision must be in 
keeping with the dictates of the legal conscience of civilised peoples. He affirmed that: 
far from giving too much liberty to the judges, his proposal would limit it ... it 
would impose on the judges a duty which would prevent them from relying too 
much on their subjective opinion; it would be incumbent on them to consider 
whether the dictates of their conscience were in agreement with the conception 
of justice of civilised nations.
66
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2.7.3 Amendments to Descamps’ Proposal: Further Deliberations   
Following Descamps‘ elucidation, opposition began to soften so much so that Root was 
willing to accept the proposal but with some amendments. Root thought the proposal could 
be amended to read: 
The following rules are to be applied by the Court within the limits of its 
competence, as described above, for the settlement of international disputes; they 
will be considered in the under-mentioned order: 
1. Conventional international law, whether general or special, being rules 
expressly adopted by the states which are parties to a dispute; 
2. International custom, being recognised practice between nations accepted by 
them as law; 
3. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
4. The authority of judicial decisions and the opinions of writers as a means for 
the application and development of law.
67
   
 Descamps agreed with the draft, except that the words ―coinciding doctrines‖ be substituted 
for ―opinions‖ in clause 4. Descamps then stated that judicial decisions and doctrines should 
be used as auxiliary and supplementary means only. This proposed amendment and 
observations were opposable only to the Italian Jurist, Ricci-Busatti. Ricci-Busatti expressed 
his agreement with the substance of the proposal, as it indicated exactly the various sources 
which the judge might use, but that his conscience objects to some of the sources and their 
order of presentation. He particularly argued that it would hardly be possible to find 
coinciding doctrines concerning points in relation to which no generally recognised rules 
existed. He denied that opinions of authors could be considered as a source of law to be 
applied by the Court. 
68
 Having so observed, he proposed an amendment.  The amendment 
read: 
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68 Ibid, p. 332 
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The rules to be applied by the Court for the settlement of any international dispute 
brought before it, arise from the following sources: 
1. International conventions, either general or special as constituting rules 
expressly  adopted by  the states which are parties to the dispute; 
2. International custom as evidence of common practice among said states, 
accepted by them as law; 
3. General principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
The Court shall take into consideration the judicial decisions rendered by it in 
analogous cases, and the opinions of the best qualified writers of the various 
countries, as means for the application and development of law.
69
 
Reacting directly to the objections of Ricci-Busatti, Descamps stated that he was astonished 
to find that Ricci-Busatti did not accept doctrine as an element of interpretation.  To 
Descamps, this element could only be of a subsidiary nature; the judge should only use it in a 
supplementary way to clarify the rules of international law. He thought doctrine and 
jurisprudence, no doubt, do not create law; but they assist in determining rules which exist. A 
judge should make use of both jurisprudence and doctrine, but they should serve only as 
elucidation. 
70
 
On his part, De Lapradelle thought jurisprudence was more important than doctrine, since 
judges pronounce sentences with a practical end in view. He noted that the principal question 
was the attitude a judge would take if in a certain case, jurisprudence failed, and there was no 
generally accepted principle applicable. He, therefore, called on the Committee to add a fifth 
point that would deal with that gap.
71
 Lapradelle thought Ricci-Busatti‘s proposal, that the 
Court should take, ―into account as much as possible judicial decisions‖, was not sufficiently 
precise.  Descamps expressed surprise that De Lapradelle did not see the value of clause 4, 
assuring him that the power of a judge to make use of the elements so mentioned is not a 
dangerous one as it would only be for elucidating and supplementary purposes. Having said 
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that, he pleaded with Lapradelle not to insist upon more radical alterations of the text, which 
he (Descamps) thought was satisfactory. Clause 4 was, however, reworded thus: ―the 
authority of judicial decisions and the doctrines of the best qualified writers of the various 
Nations‖.72 Also, the Committee accepted the suggestion of Lapradelle that the word ―the 
rules of law to be applied‖ be included in the draft. 
Having obtained compromises from members, the proposal was sent to the Drafting 
Committee. The Committee came out with the following draft: 
The Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction, as defined in article 29, apply 
in the order following: 
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice, which is accepted by 
them as law; 
3. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
4. Rules of law derived from judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations.
73
 
When the draft came up for discussion, Descamps proposed an amendment to clause 4 
inserting, ―as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law‖. Phillimore still had 
objections to the wording of the clause, arguing that judicial decisions state and do not create 
law. De Lapradelle wanted the entire clause 4 deleted as the source of law it contained could 
not be clearly defined. He argued that laws, customs, and general principles of law could not 
be applied without reference to jurisprudence and teachings.
74
 He thus proposed: 
[t]he general principles of law recognised by civilised nations as interpreted 
by judicial decisions and by the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various countries.  
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In the course of further deliberations, Lord Phillimore suggested that the expression, ―the 
rules of law derived from‖, be deleted.75 As a compromise, Descamps proposed the following 
amendment:  
The Court shall take into consideration judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.
76
  
Ricci-Busatti‘s proposal to substitute ―juridical interpretation‖ for ―determination of the rules 
of law‖, was rejected and the draft provision adopted without a consensus. De Lapradelle and 
Hagerup abstained from voting because their opinions were not shared by their Colleagues. 
Ricci-Busatti out rightly voted against the provision.
77
    
The final draft forwarded to the League Council read: 
The Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction, as defined in article 29, apply in the 
order following: 
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice, which is accepted as 
law; 
3. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
4. Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
78
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2.7.4 Amendments to the Final Draft Scheme of the Committee of Jurists by the League 
Council 
Records show that, upon receipt of the Draft Scheme by the League Council, it considered 
that it should not regard itself as a second committee set above the first to oppose a legal 
knowledge which it did not possess.
79
 Having so considered, the Council yet adopted, in 
relation to article 35 (later article 38), a supposedly innocuous amendment, which later 
proved difficult and far-reaching. The Council decided to insert the text, ―subject to article 
57a [now article 59]‖ in the then article 35 to read: 
Within the limits of its competence, as determined by article 34, the Court shall 
apply in the following order: 
1. International conventions, either general or special, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the disputing states; 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice, which is accepted as 
law; 
3. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
4. Subject to the provisions of article 57(bis), judicial decisions and the doctrine 
of the most qualified publicists, as an additional means of determining the rules 
of law.
80
  
The League Council also inserted an article 57(bis) which was not in the Draft Scheme 
submitted by the Committee of Jurists. The article states: ―[t]he decision of the Court shall 
only be binding upon the parties in the dispute and in the case decided‖.81 The Council 
reformulated paragraph (4) to read: ―subject to the provisions of article 57a judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary 
means for the determination of the rules of law‖.82   Thereafter, the League Council referred 
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further deliberations on the provisions to the Third Committee of the Assembly. This 
Committee examined the Draft Scheme of the Committee of Jurists and in turn referred same 
to its Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee was made up of ten members, five of which were 
members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists.
83
  
2.7.5 Further Deliberations: The Sub-Committee  
The Sub-Committee, like the League Council, thought, article 38 as drafted by the Committee 
of Jurists should substantially be retained. It considered the words ―within the limits of its 
jurisdiction as defined above‖, and the words ―in the order following‖, to be unnecessary and 
deleted them from article 38. It inserted a new clause permitting the Court to, if necessary and 
with the consent of the parties, make an award ex aequo et bono. This, in the view of the Sub-
Committee, was to give more flexible character to the provision.
84
  
2.7.6 The Final Draft 
The final draft adopted by the Assembly of the League on December 13, 1920, was: 
The Court shall apply: 
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
3. General principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
4. Subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law. 
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This provision shall not prejudice the power of the court to decide a case ex aequo 
et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
85
 
2.8 From the PCIJ to the ICJ 
To these provisions which are now article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, no remarkable 
amendment was made in 1945, when the Statute of the ICJ was considered. The amendments 
effected were mainly structural (renumbering). The only substantive but negligible 
amendment that made was, ―[t]he Court whose function it is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply....‖, proposed by Chile at 
San Francisco.
 86
  
The Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee captured the reason for retaining the 
provision without any major alteration.  It was reported that: 
The wording of this provision [article 38] is open to criticism and it would not 
be difficult to make suggestions for improving it; but on the whole the 
difficulties resulting from it ... do not seem to be of a sufficiently serious 
character to necessitate any change. It seems to have worked well in practice 
and we consider that any attempt to alter it would cause more difficulties than 
it would solve.
87
  
This position was not altered by the Washington Committee of Jurists.
88
 Also, article 59 was 
retained without an amendment. 
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87 ―Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice,‖ 10th 
February 1944 39 Am. J, Int‘l L. Supp. 1, 1, 20 (1945) 
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2.9 Original Intent  
Further to the observations made at the beginning of this chapter, ascertaining the intention of 
the drafters of these provisions is bound to prove difficult considering the manner in which 
what became articles 38 and 59 were pieced together by different set of people and at 
different Committees.  
Despite the apparent difficulty of understanding the intention behind the ultimate wording of 
paragraph (d), it is easy to gather from the trend of discussions during the deliberations of the 
different Committees that the intention of a majority of members was for the Court to have 
available to it all the means germane to the fulfilment of its purpose and maintaining its 
character as a court of justice. These were the means that will enable the Court fill gaps in 
positive law and avoid a fundamental inhibition of its judicial powers – non liquet. The 
actualisation of this eternal purpose is the whole essence of the exhaustiveness of the sources 
in article 38(1).        
It is obvious from the Jurists‘ deliberations that they never doubted that judicial decisions 
could serve as a source of law to compensate for gaps in positive law. Hence at various stages 
of deliberations, the Jurists variously proposed the use of such words as, ―international 
jurisprudence as a means for the application and development of law‖; ―rules of law derived 
from judicial decisions‖. One amendment even considered, decisions rendered in ―analogous 
cases‖ as means for the application and development of law. Yet another proposal spoke of 
―the authority of judicial decisions‖.89  
At the risk of contradicting the flow of available literature, there is nothing in the 
deliberations of the Jurists to suggest that the wording of the provisions was intended to deny 
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judicial decision its Anglo-American character. What the Jurists – incidentally Root90 and 
Phillimore, whom were trained in the common law tradition – were initially worried about 
was a situation where Judges would take advantage of the legislative deficiencies of the 
international system to apply rules that are dictated by their subjective notions of right and 
wrong and or from the notion of law prevailing in their individual States. This concern was 
mainly fuelled by the fact that, unlike in arbitrations, the great powers were not to be in 
control of the appointment of judges, and thus not in control of court processes. The Jurists 
were concerned about how to ensure that judges enunciated rules that are not incongruent to 
the legal conscience of civilised nations.  
This point was clearly made by the British Jurist, Cecil Hurst, during the deliberations of the 
Sub-Committee of the Third Committee of the League Council. He informed the Committee 
that what was feared in England, given that the decisions of the Court would be regarded as 
precedents building up the law, was ―that the decisions of the Court might establish rules of 
law incompatible‖91 with one or either of the Anglo-Saxon or continental systems of law.  
Very early in the deliberations of the Jurists, Descamps spotted this fear; hence it was 
important for him to emphasise that he did not intend to give legislative powers to judges. 
While agreeing with Mr. Root that it would be dangerous to allow Judges to apply the law of 
right and wrong exclusively according to their own personal understanding of it,
92
 Descamps 
                                                             
90 Despite their vehement objection to paragraph (d), the eminent Jurists understood the inevitability of judicial law-making 
by the Court, given that international law is largely not codified. Root had the conviction that ―the hopes of the world rested 
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become accustomed to act according to law‖ – Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, note 44, p. 230. On his 
part, Lord Phillimore considered the common law as ―having the same character as any written law‖ – Proceedings of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists, p., 316. Hagerup agreed with Phillimore, declaring that he ―would be pleased to see the 
Judges of the Permanent Court judge according to the same principles as English Judges, and judges generally. They must 
give judgment according to rule of law but they must not declare that it is impossible for them to decide because of the 
absence of rules. There must be no possibility of a denial of justice.‖ – Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists.  
Even Loder had questioned: ―did the Committee think it would be possible to create a court which might at any given 
moment refuse to pronounce judgment because no applicable [positive] rule existed?‖ Proceedings of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, p. 311      
91 League Documents, note 42, p., 138 
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stated that it was exactly for this reason that he was indicating the lines which the judge must 
follow and compel them to conform to the dictates of the legal conscience of civilised 
nations. Accordingly, he stated that when a certain solution is approved by universal public 
opinion, the judge is justified in applying it.
93
 He affirmed that the power to administer 
justice must not be taken away from judges but that a formula defining and guiding this 
power can and must discovered.  He further explained that his proposal requires that: 
...the various sources of law should be examined successively. The first rule 
was that if there were a text, a conventional rule, it must be applied. Failing a 
rule of this kind, international custom must be applied. If neither law nor 
custom existed ... the judge must then apply general principles of law. But he 
must be saved from the temptation of applying these principles as he pleased. 
For that reason ... the judge must render decisions in keeping with the dictates 
of the legal conscience of civilised peoples and for this same purpose make use 
of the doctrines of publicists carrying authority.
94
 
Barely three years after the Court gave its first ruling, did Cecil Hurst expressly adopt the 
predominant view of the Jurists on the question of the authority of judicial decisions. 
Advising the British government on the debate concerning the accession of the United States 
to the Statute of the PCIJ, he predicated his advice on the precedential force of the Status of 
Eastern Carelia case.
95
 Cecil Hurst stated: 
How far the rule embodied in this decision of the court extends is a question 
which at the present time it is impossible to answer. All that is possible to do ... 
is to refer to the Eastern Carelia case. The court will gradually build up a rule of 
law on this point... as no doubt such successive decisions will constitute 
precedents in the same way that the successive decisions of the English courts in 
earlier times have built up the common law of England. It would be unwise to 
attempt to fetter the power of the court to build up the rule in this way.
96
 
This clearly shows that the fears in England as expressed by Cecil Hurst at the drafting stage 
of the provisions had defused even before the case-law of the Court became the robust 
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embodiment of rules/principles of international law as it is today. On the whole, the above 
analyses do show that the predominant opinion at the time of drafting the Statute held judicial 
decisions to be a source of law. They analyses also show that the Jurists well understood that 
it was idea to keep judicial and legislative powers separate, as much as they understood that 
attaining such an idea was not possible; more so, under international law, which has too many 
vague and indeterminate rules.        
2.10 Some Contradictions in Descamps Views 
In what appears a contradiction of the view that Descamps saw Judicial decisions as a source 
of law, Descamps had remarked, while addressing objections raised to paragraphs 3 and 4, 
that: 
Doctrine and jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in 
determining rules which exist. A judge should make use of both jurisprudence 
and doctrine, but they should serve only as elucidation.
97
 
It must however be admitted that Descamps did contradict himself in the views he expressed 
during Committee deliberations. Clearly, the above quotation appears to support the view that 
Descamps did not intend judicial decisions to be a source of international law.  
No doubt, it was on the strength of this quotation that Godefridus J.H. Hoof
98
 trenchantly 
argued that Descamps‘ original intention was to preclude the use of judicial precedent in the 
Court. Hoof had argued that the views expressed by Descamps ―left no room for doubt as to 
his opinion on the role to be assigned to judicial decisions in the draft of the rules to be 
applied by the Court‖.99 Hoof affirmed that: 
the words ―subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law‖, 
therefore, would seem to reflect the intention of the drafters of article 38 
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that judicial decisions cannot be accorded the status of source in the former 
sense of that term, that is in the same sense as treaties, customs and general 
principles were meant to be sources of international law.
100
 
However, Hoof‘s, and all other such views, seem to ignore the general context of the 
deliberations, during which the statement was made. In order to have a full grasp of 
Descamps‘ arguments, it is important that the quotation is not lifted out of the entire context 
of Descamps thoughts.  
It is equally important to note that this was not Descamps‘ approach from the beginning. As 
could be seen above, his initial proposal did not reflect this view. All items listed in the first 
draft were rules to be applied by the Court successively. Otherwise, why did it generate so 
much argument from members of the Committee about the draft giving to the Court 
legislative powers? From the outset, the Jurists were all convinced that the inclusion of 
judicial decisions in the Statute, under any guise, whatsoever, would empower the Court to 
apply its decisions as a source of law. Even if it was not so intended, they knew it would 
eventually become a veritable embodiment of legal rules for the application of the Court. It 
was foretold by Mr Balfour in 1920 that ―the decisions of the Permanent Court cannot but 
have the effect of gradually moulding and modifying international law‖.101 This is a prophecy 
that the Court has been fulfilling. Indeed, as shown in subsequent chapters, the fact that 
Descamps was goaded by the arguments of some of the Jurists to neutralize the text relating 
to judicial decisions through the term, ―as subsidiary means for the determination of the rule 
of law‖, (as an assurance that judicial decisions ―state‖ and do not ―create‖ law), 102 has not 
affected authority of judicial decisions as a source of international law. It does not also 
derogate from the fact that lawmaking and law application go hand in hand.   
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As argued in chapter three, the term ―subsidiary‖ (and its synonym, ―auxiliary‖,103  originally 
used by Descamps) was intended towards making paragraph (d) additional or supplementary 
provisions to the items mentioned in article 38(1)(a-c). Hence his initial draft proposed the 
application of the sources, including judicial decisions, ―in the order following‖. As a result, 
he maintained throughout the deliberations, that the sources should be considered in the order 
of presentation. The rationale was that the Court is permitted to resort to judicial decisions as 
a last resort and only as subsidiary to treaties and customs. It is worth noting, also, that 
Descamps included the term ―subsidiary means‖ at an advanced stage of deliberations on the 
draft article, perhaps, as a compromise to the argument of Ricci-Busatti that it was wrong to 
place conventions and customs on the same level with doctrine and judicial decisions.  
It must not be forgotten that Descamps was the President of the Committee upon whose 
shoulders the responsibility to steer the Committee to success rested. The weight of this duty 
and the thought of the failure of the 1907 Conference on Pacific Settlement of International 
Dispute must have weighed heavily on his mind and influenced his flexibility. It is 
convenient to assume that he knew that failure to reach a compromise on the law to be 
applied by the proposed Court would once again mar the hope for the creation of a permanent 
international court. He must have understood that their efforts would be futile if the Court is 
encumbered by non liquet. Having been exasperated by the difficulty of the Committee to 
reach an agreement after several amendments had been proposed, it is on record that he even 
had to plead with his Colleagues not to demand a radical alteration of the proposal when they 
still failed to reach a consensus after he had conceded to repeated alterations.   This may well 
account for his conflicting remarks on the subject. How can we reconcile the view that 
doctrines and jurisprudence can only serve the purpose of elucidation with his subsequent 
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view that the Court must, for the purpose of avoiding non liquet, make use of the doctrines of 
publicists carrying authority?  If doctrine could be used for that purpose what about judicial 
decisions?  
It could, therefore, rightly be concluded that the circumstances in which that clause was 
adopted by the Jurists and the arguments that preceded it sufficiently explain the apparent 
discrepancies in the arguments of Descamps, as much as they explain the use of the word 
―subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law‖.  
2.11 Intention to be Commonly Shared Across Committees  
Even if it was true that Descamps and indeed the Advisory Committee of Jurists intended that 
judicial decisions should not be regarded as a source of international law, that intention 
would have to be commonly shared by the Committees that reviewed the Draft Scheme 
submitted by the Jurists for that intention to govern.  It should be recalled that the Jurists only 
had an advisory and not a confirmatory mandate. It discussed the proposed Statute and passed 
its recommendations to a higher body – the League Council –which referred the Scheme to 
the Third Committee of the Assembly, which in turn referred it to its Sub-Committee for 
further scrutiny. Under these circumstances, the effect of the intention of the Jurists becomes 
attenuated regarding any provision, such as article 38, which was further amended by those 
subsequent Committees. The prevailing intention, if known, should be the intention of the last 
Committee in the chain of Committees that considered the proposal, and that is the Third 
Committee through its Sub-Committee.  
It is on record that the Third Committee unmistakably accepted the view that judicial 
decisions should be retained in article 38(1)(d) as a source of international law. This is 
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obvious from the reasons given by its Sub-Committee for rejecting an amendment proposed 
by Argentina. The proposal was that: 
The Court shall, within the limits of its jurisdiction as defined in article 34, apply in 
the order following: 
1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
2. The rules drawn up by the Assembly of the League of Nations in the 
performance of its duty of codifying international law. 
3. International custom, as evidence of a practice founded on principles of justice 
and humanity, and accepted as law; 
4. The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
5. Judicial decisions, as against the state in which they have been delivered, if it is 
a party to the dispute; and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules and 
law.
104
 
Rejecting the proposal, the Sub-Committee gave two reasons: (i) the Committee thought ―it 
[the amendment] tended to give the Assembly of the League the power to codify international 
law‖, affirming that ―the stage of development where this would be possible had not been 
reached‖; (ii) the Sub-Committee thought it would ―have the effect of excluding every 
possibility of considering the judgments as precedents building up the law‖.105  Also 
commenting on the issue, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee and member of the Committee 
of Jurists, Hagerup, stated that being that the Argentine proposal intended to limit the power 
of the Court to attribute the character of precedents to judicial decisions, the Sub-Committee 
did not adopt it because, it considered that it would be one of the Court‘s important tasks to 
contribute, through its jurisprudence, to the development of international law.
106
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It is worth mentioning that the Draft Schemes presented by some States expressly empowered 
the Court, in the absence of positive law, to apply what the Court considered to be 
international law on the point in controversy.
107
 It is also of particular interest here that clause 
4 of the Argentine draft, as rejected by the sub-committee, reflects what appears to be the 
dominant view in the literature regarding article 38(1)(d) and article 59. Having rejected that 
view, it remains to be seen how article 59 can be used to reinvent the view. To buttress this 
point, the writer shall now consider the effect of a rejected proposal during the drafting of an 
instrument.     
2.12 The Effect of a Rejected Proposal at the Drafting Stage of a Treaty  
What is the effect of the refusal of a proposal at the preparatory stage of a convention? The 
rejection of a proposal during the preparation of a convention puts an end to the rule such a 
proposal sought to introduce, whenever the wording of the convention falls to be construed. 
This effect could be garnered from the reasoning of the Court in the Locus case.
108
 In the 
case, the Court was called upon to determine whether Turkey had rightly exercised 
jurisdiction over French citizens in respect of an accident that occurred on the high sea. This 
followed the collision between S.S. Lotus, flying the French flag and S.S. Boz-Kourt, flying 
the Turkish flag, on which eight Turkish nationals were killed. The Court had to construe 
article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business 
and Jurisdiction, which provided that ―all questions of jurisdiction between Turkey and the 
other contracting powers, be decided in accordance with the principles of international law‖. 
France argued that the Drafters‘ preference for the term ―principles of international law‖ was 
to make the exercise of jurisdiction under the article to be in conformity with the principles of 
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international law. France further argued that for Turkey to have jurisdiction, it must point to 
some title to jurisdiction recognised by international law in her favour. France based her 
argument on the fact that during the preparation of the Convention, a proposed draft 
introduced by Turkey, in which she sought to extend her jurisdiction to crimes committed in 
the territory of a third State, if the crimes were punishable within the jurisdiction of Turkey, 
was opposed and consequently rejected by the Drafting Committee.  
Holding that the words must be interpreted to mean international law as applicable between 
all Nations belonging to the community of States,
109
 the Court categorically stressed the fact 
that the Turkish draft was discarded by the Committee. According to the Court:  
The two opposing proposals designed to determine definitely the area of 
application of Turkish criminal law having thus been discarded, the wording 
ultimately adopted by common consent for article 15 can only refer to the 
principles of general international law relating to jurisdiction.
110
 
The Court concluded that its view that the provisions must be read to mean international law 
as applicable between all nations cannot be faulted, and that the records of the preparation of 
the Convention furnished nothing calculated to overrule the construction indicated by the 
actual terms of the provisions.
111
 
It is thus out of place to construe article 38(1) to coincide with a view, reflecting a proposal 
that was rejected by the Drafters of the provision. If anything, it should rightly be concluded 
from the view expressed by the Third Committee that it considered judicial decisions to be a 
source of international law.  
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2.1.3 Non Liquet in the Preparatory Work of the Statute 
A further evidence to show that the Committee proceeded with the understanding that judicial 
decisions will play a law-creating role, though not in doubt that law-creation and law-
application were to be kept separate, are the views expressed concerning the question of non 
liquet. It is clear from the deliberations of the eminent Jurists that the Court should fill gaps in 
positive law through the windows created in article 38(1)(c) and (d) of its Statute.  
During deliberations, the American Delegate, Root had indicated his disagreement with the 
rules now contained in paragraphs (c) and (d) of article 38(1). He thought they were vague 
and would enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court to an extent unacceptable to States. He would 
rather the Court was limited to conventions and positive international law.
112
 Root found 
companionship in the British delegate, Lord Phillimore.  In support of Root‘s argument, Lord 
Phillimore drew the attention of the Committee to the Plan of the Five Powers. The Plan 
proposed that: 
Whenever the point of law to be decided by the Court is provided for directly 
or indirectly by any Treaty in operation between the contesting parties, such 
Treaty shall form the basis of the judgment. In the absence of such treaty 
provisions the Court shall apply the recognised rules of international law, or, 
should no rules applicable to the case exist, shall enter judgement according to 
its own opinion of what the rule of international law on the subject should 
be.
113
 
 
Lord Phillimore rejected, in its entirety, the part of the Five Power Plans that gave the Court 
power to fill gaps in international law. He argued that this gave the Court legislative power, 
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when legislation in matters of international law could only be carried out by the universal 
agreement of all States.
114
 
Root and Philimore‘s views were opposed by a majority of members of the Committee, who 
argued in favour of the power of the Court to fill gaps in positive law. In this light, Loder 
questioned the formula proposed by Root that the Court should limit itself to rules contained 
in conventions and rules of positive law. Loder described the rule in paragraph (c) as rules 
recognised and respected by the whole world, which are not yet of the nature of positive law. 
He affirmed that it was the Court‘s duty to develop law, to ―ripen‖ customs and principles 
universally recognised and to crystallise them into positive rules.
115
 On his part, Descamps 
agreed that it was conceivable that States would love to be bound only by the engagements 
they had accepted. Nonetheless, he argued that: ―[i]t is absolutely impossible and supremely 
odious to say to the judge that, although in a given case a perfectly just solution is possible: 
‗you must take a course amounting to refusal of justice‘ merely because no definite 
convention or custom appeared‖.116 Descamps would allow the judge to make use of the 
concurrent teachings of authors whose opinions have authority; he will also allow the Court 
to rely on the legal conscience of civilised nations.
117
 He remarked that ―you will never see a 
judge failing to administer justice on the pretext of a lack of conventional or customary 
law‖.118 Furthermore, he affirmed that if, after considering treaties and customs, no rule is 
found in either, rather than plead non liquet, the Court should resort to general principles of 
law and the work of publicists.
119
 The Norwegian Jurists, Francis Hagerup, reminded his 
Colleagues that the basis of the provision in the Five Powers Plan was the realisation by the 
Powers that:  
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there might be cases in which no rule of conventional or general law was 
applicable. A rule must be established to meet this eventuality, to avoid the 
possibility of the Court declaring itself incompetent (non liquet) through lack 
of applicable rules.
 120
   
He noted that article 7 of the Convention establishing the International Prize Court took this 
eventuality into account by the provision that in such a case the Court must render judgments 
according to justice and equity.
 121
 Hagerup favoured the view that the Court must have the 
power to fill gaps in positive law.
122
 He insisted that ―it must be impossible for the Court to 
abstain from giving a decision, alleging that no positive applicable rule exists‖.  123 Hegerup 
called Mr. Root‘s sustained argument to mind. He thought that if Mr. Root‘s view that the 
Court should declare non liquet in the absence of rules of positive law was accepted, it might 
have important consequences for the Court. This he thought, will limit appreciably, the 
Court‘s competence and place it in an entirely different position from that of an ordinary 
court, which would not declare non liquet.
124
 Hagerup stated that inasmuch as he would be 
pleased for it to be compulsory for judges of the PCIJ to decide according to rules of law, the 
judges must not declare that it is impossible for them to decide because of the absence of 
rules, as there must be no possibility of denial of justice.
125
 In categorical terms, Hagerup 
recommended the adoption of the English principle of judge-made law by empowering the 
judge to seek precedents and analogies as an alternative to refusing a claim.
126
 
De Lapradelle supported the view. He noted that the Court must have the power to apply 
principles to fill gaps in positive law.
 127
  He agreed that it was necessary to assure States that 
the Court would concern itself with application of law, to administer justice and not succumb 
to a temptation to deal with diplomacy.  He was, nonetheless, categorical in pointing out that 
                                                             
120 Ibid, p  296 
121 Ibid  
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid, p. 307-308 
125 Ibid,  p. 318 
126 Ibid, p. 318 
127 Ibid 
  
90 
it would be too strict and even unjust to force the Court to consider only law. He thought 
there would be no danger in allowing the Court to consider whether any particular legal 
solution was just and equitable, and if necessary, to modify the legal solution according to the 
exigencies of justice and equity. He specifically argued that confidence must be put in the 
judges, who should be allowed to consider these different elements for themselves.
128
 
The arguments in favour of the Court filling gaps in positive law, as against the declaration of 
non liquet, found acceptance with the majority of members of the Committee. This is 
evidenced by the retention of paragraphs (c) and (d) which were the main targets of those in 
favour of non liquet. There can be no better proof of the fact that article 38(1)(c) and (d) were 
accepted in the Statute of the Court as a sign of the absolute rejection of non liquet.  
It is interesting to note here that the arguments in favour of non liquet (the antithesis of the 
power of the Court to make international law) were championed by Committee members 
from the United States and the United Kingdom, where the common law prevails. This is in 
contrast with the fact that those who favoured the view that the Court could fill gaps were not 
from common law jurisdictions. This goes to show that the argument is not a tussle between 
the common law and continental law as it may appear on the face of it. It is more of a 
coincidence that international law has mostly developed in a similar way as the common law. 
It seems quite obvious, therefore, that the Committee Members were driven, not by tradition, 
but the realisation that the restriction of the Court by non liquet would practically render it 
useless and stultify the much needed growth and development of international law. 
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It would be safe to conclude, in the light of the points made above, that the Committee 
actually considered non-liquet, but rejected it as an option for the Court in the performance of 
its judicial activities.      
2.14 The Framers of the Statute Ascribed the Same Authority to Judicial Decisions and 
Writings of Publicists. 
On the face of it, the conclusion that the Framers of the Statute intended judicial decisions to 
be used as a source of law, may give rise to some difficulties that may question the logicality 
of the conclusion. It may be argued that it is illogical to conclude that judicial decisions were 
intended as a source of law without reaching a similar conclusion concerning ―teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists‖, which is also contained in article 38(1)(d).  
The present view finds nothing in the preparatory work of article 38(1) that placed teachings 
on a different scale from judicial decisions. Indeed as seen above, during the drafting of the 
Statute, Descamps had indicated that, in the absence of treaties or custom, the Court should 
rely on the works of publicists to avoid the blind alley of non liquet.
129
 Descamps cited 
Chancellor Kent for the view that when the greater part of jurisconsults agree upon a certain 
rule, the presumption in favour of that rule becomes so strong that only a person who makes a 
mock of justice would gainsay it.
130
 Though objecting to the inclusion of writings of 
Publicists in paragraph (d), Ricci-Busatti accepted that all the items were being proposed as 
sources of international law to be applied by the Court.
131
 Phillimore stated that teachings of 
publicists are generally recognised as a source of international law.
132
 In a direct answer to 
the question put to him by Ricci-Busatti, Phillimore affirmed that it was possible for England 
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to accept a sentence based, not on a rule of law accepted as such, but upon the doctrine of 
legal writers. 
Though the Jurists placed judicial decisions and teachings on the same footing,
133
 practice 
does not. It is practice that has elevated judicial decisions high and above teachings. The 
writer rest this view on the practical realities of which Gerald Fitzmaurice reminded us, when 
he said: 
When an advocate before an international tribunal cites juridical opinion, he 
does so because it supports his argument, or for illustrative value, or because 
it contains a particularly felicitous or apposite statement of the point 
involved.... when he cites arbitral or judicial decision he does so for the 
reasons also, but there is a difference – for additionally, he cites it as 
something which the tribunal cannot ignore, which it is bound to take into 
consideration and (by implication) which it ought to follow unless the 
decision can be shown to have been clearly wrong, or distinguished from the 
extant case, or in some way, legally or factually inapplicable.  Equally, the 
tribunal ... will not usually feel free to ignore a relevant judicial decision, and 
will normally feel obliged to treat it as something that must be accepted, or 
else – for good reason – rejected, but must in any event be taken fully into 
account.
 134
   
It is thus inconceivable that international lawyers and the ICJ would place greater emphasis 
on teachings in an era where the case-law of the Court is so robust when compared with the 
era that the Statute was drafted. In view of the rarity of a consistent case-law of an 
independent court and the poverty of international law in many areas in 1920, the Drafters 
needed to include additional guarantees, should no answer be found in positive law, so that 
the Court would not be hampered by non liquet. The inclusion of writings of publicists was, 
perhaps, one of such guarantees.  Besides, writings of publicists being an influential source of 
international law at that time, the sources of international law for the Court would not have 
been complete if writings of publicists were omitted.   
                                                             
133 R.Y Jennings, ―The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law‖ 45 Int‘l & Comp. 
L.Q, 1, 9 (1996) (agreeing that it is an error to place judicial decisions on the same footing as the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists)  
134 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ―Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of Law,‖ Symbolae Verzijl 153, 172 reproduced in 
Martti Koskenniemi Ed. Sources of International Law, 57 (Ashgate, Dartmouth 2000) 
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An indication that writings were once an influential source of law is obvious from older 
literatures and decisions of Courts. In the 1876 Franconia case, involving British jurisdiction 
three miles seaward beyond low-water mark, Lord Chief Justice Coleridge based the 
applicable law on ―a consensus of writers‖. The Judge held that the consensus of writers on 
the point "established as solidly as, by the very nature of the case, any proposition of 
international law can be".
135
 In the same vein, McNair noted that the general expansion of the 
case-law of the Court, has ―completely transformed the international corpus juris from a 
system that rested very largely upon textbooks and diplomatic dispatches into a body of hard 
law, resembling the common law ...‖.136 The consequence of this is that the ―more the field is 
covered by decided cases the less becomes the authority of commentators and jurists‖.137  
It should, therefore, be borne in mind that the Statute does not place judicial decisions on a 
higher rank than teachings of publicists, though they do not carry the same authority in 
practice.     
2.15 Original Intent: The Impact of Article 59 on Article 38(1)(d) 
So far the writer has analysed the preparatory work of articles 38(1) and 59 to show that these 
provisions do not as much have the same origin. The main finding so far is that the drafters of 
article 38(1) in 1920 and the experts that considered and retained it in 1945 did not evince an 
intention to create a different category, other than a source of law for judicial decisions. 
Having so found, it now remains to determine whether this view is negated by the legislative 
intent regarding article 59. As already indicated, neither the clause, ―subject to the provisions 
of article 59‖ nor article 59, was in the Draft Scheme of the Jurists. The provisions were, 
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137 Lord Sumner in Kronprincessan Margareta [1921] AC 486, 495  
  
94 
therefore, not subjected to debate during Committee proceedings. There are also no records to 
show that the provisions were discussed by the Sub-Committee, which was also made up of 
distinguished Jurists. As a consequence, the raison d’ etre for the provision has so far 
remained within the sphere of speculations.  
A number of Commentators contend that the original intent of article 59 was to prohibit the 
authority of judicial decisions as precedent in the Court. Brownlie‘s view is of particular 
interest to this writer. He had argued that the Committee of Jurists which considered the 
Statute clearly indicated that ―article 59 was not merely to express the principle of res 
judicata but to rule out a system of binding precedent‖.138 From what has been said above, 
Brownlie appears to have overlooked the fact that article 59 was not discussed by the 
Committee of Jurists. This fact weakens his argument.    
2.16 Third party Intervention as the Real Purpose of Article 59 
 The preponderance of the view that article 59 affects the status to be ascribed to judicial 
decisions in article 38(1)(d), notwithstanding, it could rightly be garnered from available 
records that article 59 is historically connected to articles 62 and 63 of the Statute. These 
articles deal with third party intervention.  
By article 62, a State which considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be 
affected by the decision in the case, may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to 
intervene. Article 63 grants a right to intervene to State parties to a Convention being 
construed by the Court in a matter to which they are not parties. It specifically provides that if 
a State party, ―uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding 
upon it‖.  
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Historically, the provisions in articles 59 and 63 were joined together in article 84 of the 1907 
Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Dispute (Hague I),
 139 
as follows: 
The Award is not binding except on the parties in dispute. 
 When it concerns the interpretation of a Convention to which Powers other 
than those in dispute are parties, they shall inform all the Signatory Powers 
in good time. Each of these Powers is entitled to intervene in the case. If one 
or more avail themselves of this right, the interpretation contained in the 
Award is equally binding on them.
 
 
Lauterpacht found that the ―close connexion between articles 59 and 63 – indeed the fact that 
the former is supplementary to the latter – appears clearly from the fact that in article 84 of 
the Hague Convention 1 of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (and the 
corresponding article 56 of the Convention of 1899), the two provisions were placed side by 
side‖. 140 Lauterpacht further observed that the very phrase now used in article 59 of the 
Statute was proposed at one of the Committees of the Second Hague Conference in 
connexion with the question of interpretation of multilateral treaties.
 141
 
 Lauterpacht‘s views 
are largely corroborated by J.H.W. Verzijl. Verzijl compared article 59 with the Hague 
Convention of 1907 to the effect that what is distributed over two unrelated articles – 59 and 
63 of the Statute of the Court – was regulated by a single article 84 in the Hague Convention, 
which did not contain ―et dans le cas, qui a ete decide‖.142  
Apart from article 84 of the Hague Convention, article 59 and article 63 provisions were also 
combined in article 53 of the Five Neutral Power Project, which was presented to the 
Committee of Jurists for consideration. Article 53 of the Five Neutral Power Project proposed 
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that ―...sentence shall only apply to the contesting parties, including any intervening parties, 
and to the particular case upon which judgment has been delivered‖.143   
There is a clear indication that the article must have been inserted by the League Council to 
protect the interest of third States from being affected by a judgment in which they had not 
intervened, but certainly not to prohibit rules/principles flowing from such cases from being 
applied in another case. This indication was given in the Report presented to the League 
Council by Leon Bourgeois. For its importance, the relevant part of the report is reproduced 
below: 
The observation in the draft project of The Hague by one of our colleagues 
draw attention to the following case; it might happen that a case appearing 
unimportant in itself might be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and 
that the court might take a decision on this case, laying down certain 
principles of international law which if they were applied to other countries, 
would completely modify the principles of the traditional law of this country, 
and which might therefore have serious consequences. The question has been 
raised whether, in view of such an alternative, the States not involved in the 
dispute should not be given the right of intervening in the case in the interest 
of the harmonious development of the law, and otherwise after the closure of 
the case, to exercise, in the same interest, influence on the future development 
of law. Such action on the part of a non-litigant State would moreover have 
the advantage of drawing attention to the difficulty of making certain States 
accept such and such a new development of jurisprudence. These 
considerations undoubtedly contain elements of great value. The Hague 
Jurists have not moreover disregarded the necessity of bearing in mind 
considerations which, if not exactly identical, are at least in the same order of 
ideas. They have, indeed, given to non-litigant states the right to intervene in 
a case where any interest of a judicial nature which may concern them is 
involved. Moreover, article 61 of the Draft lays down that: ―Whenever the 
construction of a convention in which states other than those concerned in the 
case, are parties, is in question .... Every state so notified has the right to 
intervene in the proceedings: but if it uses the right, the construction given by 
the judgement will be as binding upon it as upon the original parties to the 
dispute. The last stipulation establishes, in the contrary case, that if a State 
has not intervened in the case the interpretation cannot be enforced against it.  
No possible disadvantage could ensue from stating directly what article 61 
indirectly admits. The addition of an article drawn up as follows can thus be 
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proposed to the assembly: The decision of the court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.
144
    
An intervener under article 62 is in the same position in relation to the decision of the Court 
as an intervener under 63. The only difference is that an article 62 intervener could intervene, 
other than as a party within the contemplation of article 59 of the Statue and article 94
145
 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. The connection between articles 62 and 63 on one side and 
article 59, on the other, is that an intervener, which intervenes as a party removes herself 
from the protection of article 59 to become bound by the decision in same way that the 
original parties to the case are bound. On the other hand, a party which does not intervene is 
protected by article 59 from being affected by the decision.  
The language of article 63(2) is, however, worthy of some attention. The language suggests, 
on the face of it, that the article concerns the ―construction‖ given in the judgment. It would 
thus appear that article 63(2) creates an exception to what is seen by some writers as the 
general object of article 59, that a construction adopted in one case is not binding in another 
case. This is yet one of the many imperfections of the Statute which have been rejected in 
practice. The use of the word ―construction‖ leaves one with the impression that, in the 
application of a treaty to concrete factual situations, a rule adopted in the interpretation of the 
instrument is inapplicable to third parties – a sort of a corollary of a strained interpretation of 
article 59. This is particularly confusing because the provision appears to maintain the 
distinction between principles arising from interpretation and the actual decision of the Court. 
Hence, ―the construction given by the judgment‖, it envisaged. If that was the case, it would 
have meant that the rule of construction adopted in a case can be applicable only to future 
cases in which all the parties had intervened in the earlier case.  
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This absurd formulation could not have been intended by the Drafters, neither has it been 
followed in practice. To use one example; in Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria,
146
 the rule of construction of article 36(4) of the Statute of the Court 
adopted in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
147
 was held to be applicable to 
Nigeria, even as the Court affirmed the distinction between ―construction‖ and ―judgment,‖. 
According to the Court, “there can be no question of holding ...[a State] to decisions 
[judgment] reached by the Court in previous cases‖, as  ―the real question is whether, in this 
case, there is cause not to follow the reasoning [construction] and conclusions of earlier 
cases‖.148 In the same vein, the International Law Commission considered that the ―general 
rule clearly is that the act of deposit by itself establishes the legal nexus‖ adopted by the 
Court in the Right of Passage case, appears to have well settled the question.
 149
  The only 
logical understanding this can bring is that constructions in a treaty are not limited only to the 
original and intervening parties in the case. 
The whole purpose of article 63, as could be garnered from the Leon Bourgeois report, was to 
give State parties to a convention the opportunity to intervene with a view to guiding the 
Court towards a proper construction of the Convention. In Leon Bourgeois‘ words: 
The right of intervention in its various aspects, and in particular the question 
whether the fact that the principle implied in a judgment may affect the 
development of international law in a way which appears undesirable to any 
particular state may constitute for it a sufficient basis for any kind of 
intervention in order to impose the contrary views held by it with regards to 
this principle.
 150
  
 
The fact which should remain indisputable is that the construction adopted by the Court 
becomes part of the convention: that construction (unless overruled) is binding on the Court, 
and by logical implications, binding on States which shall litigate the same instrument in the 
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future. This fact is not diminished by the language of article 63. Otherwise, the Court exposes 
itself to an accusation of bias and negation of the rule of law. This, perhaps, is what makes it 
necessary for States, to which a rule adopted in the interpretation of a convention may be 
applied in future, to intervene to guide the court to adopting a construction that truly reflects 
the spirit and object of the convention.     
In view of the above, the present writer cannot but conclude that article 59 was not intended 
to affect the status of judicial decisions as a source of law in article 38(1)(d) of the Statute. 
2.1.7 Judicial Decisions and Rule of State Consent 
Beyond the provisions of the Statute of the Court, there is the general question arising from 
the requirement of State consent. It could thus be argued that it needs not be explicitly stated 
that judicial decisions are not a source of international law and that the intention is 
discoverable from the rule of State consent.
 
The rule of State consent generally makes rules 
of international law binding only on consenting States. It is a rule of international law that ―if 
the States were to be subject to law,  that law must emanate from the States themselves. Since 
States were sovereign and independent they could be bound only through their consent‖.151 In 
the often quoted dictum of the PCIJ in the Lotus case, it was stated: 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
co-existing independent communities.
152
  
The ICJ expressed the same view in Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943,
 153
 where it 
remarked that international law is generally the product of the consent of States expressed in 
treaties or customary international law. The Court equally affirmed that the rule of consent is 
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―a well-established principle of international law embodied in the Court's Statute‖.154  This 
rule is embodied in articles 36 and 38 of the Statute and article 92 of the UN Charter. 
Indeed, rules emanating from judicial decisions are not directly made by States in the manner 
of treaties, or directly inferable from their practices in the manner of customary international 
law. Rather, rules in judicial decisions are handed down by a body of judges who lack 
legislative powers and who should be independent of any State. In consequence, it could be 
argued that the ascription of lawmaking authority to judicial decisions violates this 
fundamental rule of international law, except State consent could be furnished one way or the 
other.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the supposed absence of State consent has been one of the 
grounds upon which the authority of judicial decisions has been challenged. The Editor of 
Hersch Lauterpacht‘s International Law contended that because tribunals do not occupy the 
same position in the international sphere as within the State, namely as organs normally 
endowed with compulsory jurisdiction, as against the voluntary character of international 
jurisdiction, the doctrine of judicial precedent as an independent source of law has no place in 
the international sphere. The Editor further argued that if States were to concede the authority 
of a source of law to the decisions of international tribunals, they would be endowing them 
with a competence approaching that of the legislature within the State; observing that States 
have so far been unwilling to acquiesce in such a limitation of sovereignty.
 155
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2.18 Consent Furnished in Variety of Ways 
It is the present writer‘s view that the argument that judicial decisions could not be a source 
of law in the absence of State consent overlooks the fact that State consent could be furnished 
in different ways. Though a survey of the different means of furnishing consent by States is 
outside the purview of this work, it suffices for the present purpose to state that consent could 
be expressed or implied. Of the main sources of international law contained in article 
38(1)(a)-(c), express consent pertains only to the source of international law in article 
38(1)(a) – treaties. As regards the other sources, consent is inferred one way or the other from 
State practice. 
2.18.1 Consent to the Statute Furnishes Consent to Principles Adopted by the Court  
The perception that judicial decisions lack State consent is more apparent than real. This is 
because any real problem of lack of State consent that would have arisen was cured by the 
inclusion of article 38(1)(c) and (d) in the Statute of the Court. Just like other provisions of 
the Statute, article 38(1), together with all its paragraphs, became binding on States by reason 
of their consent to the Statute. For this view, reliance could be placed on the view of Judge 
Armand-Ugon, that: 
If international law is based on the agreement of States, either express or 
tacit, in the case of Article 30 of the Statute a new creative source has 
arisen. The Permanent Court and the International Court, which were 
created by States, have the capacity to lay down mandatory rules of law in 
the same way as any national legislature.
156
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1990). (Arguing that, ―since international law is the positive creation of sovereign states ... the role of the Wor ld Court ... in 
developing international law is severely constrained. ... The articulation of new norms or expansion of existing norms by a 
Court violates the consensus foundations of international law‖.) 
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Though it appears on the face of it that the Judge was generally equating judicial lawmaking 
with a purely legislative activity, one would find the Judge to be right when the statement is 
viewed only in the light of article 30, which actually empowers the Court to make rules of 
procedure. That is, however, not the focus of this writer in the statement. This writer is 
concerned with showing through the statement that the consent to the Statute supplies consent 
to every residual lawmaking power exercised by the Court, provided the power was not 
expressly prohibited. This point was more particularly made in the Status of Eastern Carelia, 
where the PCIJ opined that ―consent can be given once and for all in the form of an 
obligation freely undertaken‖.157 Accordingly, the obligation to abide by the decisions of the 
Court has the effect of clothing the Court with authority to make international law 
rules/principles, even if just as between the immediate parties before the Court.   
It is the wholesale consent of States to the Statute that supplies particular consent to each 
rule/principle adopted by the Court. This is irrespective of whether the new rule/principle 
resulted from corollaries of existing rules of international law or whether the rule/principle 
resulted from the modification of analogous private law principles. It is, therefore, 
unnecessary to seek to find the consent of each State to the application of judicial decisions as 
a source of law. Judges do not create obligations for the parties; they administer justice in the 
course of which they make rules to elucidate and sometimes govern the obligations already 
freely entered by States. Though such obligations may require the direct consent of individual 
State, the rules/principles made by the Court are not in the nature of such obligations to 
require such consent. 
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2.18.2 Consent to Jurisdiction of the Court Furnishes Consent only in Respect to the 
Particular State.  
There is the argument that consent to the application of rules/principles in judicial decisions 
could be anchored on the general consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by parties before it. 
Proposing this argument, Hoof posited that decisions of the Court may be said to be indirect 
source of international law with respect to the parties to the dispute concerned, if seen in 
relation to their consent to, or acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court. He reasoned that, 
through their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to a given case, the 
parties consent to, and accept in advance, rules of law which might flow for them from the 
judgment of the Court. He argued that such consent is confined to the particular case 
concerned and does not apply to other cases.
158
 As for all other States, Hoof furthered argued 
that the decision of the Court is neither binding nor has an indirect effect.
159
 Though agreeing 
that decisions of the Court may have effects which go far beyond the parties and the 
particular case, he argued that such binding effects arise from the manifestation of consent or 
acceptance by such States and not, strictly speaking, from the Court‘s decision.160  
Care must be taken not to conflate the foregoing with the general power conferred on the 
Court by the consent of States to the Statute of the Court. Both may appear similar on the 
face of it, but this apparent similarity disappears when it is realised that each approach 
provides solutions to different aspects of the same problem, and are at best complimentary. 
As explained above, consent to the Statute of the Court supplies consent to article 38(1)(d) 
and gives legal force to the use of judicial decisions as a source of law. Whereas, particular 
consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in individual cases reinforces the authority already 
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conferred on the Court (without which the Court would be incompetent in the first place). 
The jurisdiction of the Court being voluntary, without particular consent to the jurisdiction of 
the Court the raw materials for judicial legislation will be missing. Of course, States are not 
obliged to submit their disputes for judicial settlement, even after consenting to the Statute of 
the Court. Without States submitting their disputes to the Court, there will be no occasion for 
judicial lawmaking by the Court. This naturally flows from the fact that the Court is a judicial 
and not a legislative body; judicial lawmaking is only the incidence of the resolution of 
conflicts through the application of rules/principles to concrete facts.  
In relation to the view that consent given in relation to a particular case does not permit the 
application of rules/principles adopted in other cases, the present writer disagrees.  There is 
no direct correlation between the consent of States to the jurisdiction of the Court in a 
particular case and the application of rules/principles espoused in previous cases. Consent can 
only have implications for the actual decision between the parties. This is where articles 59 
and 63 of the Statute and article 94 of the Charter come into play. By these articles, it is the 
parties and no other State that are bound by decisions of the Court.
161
 Accordingly, consent to 
the jurisdiction of the Court in a particular case, has no real connection with the previous 
cases of the Court other than providing the platform for the Court to apply the rule/principles 
in those cases. The present view is supported by Fitzmaurice. In relation to the decision of the 
Court in the Norwegian Fisheries case, Fitzmaurice argued that though the law established by 
the Court in the case could be said to apply only to the parties, in theory, no State can 
successfully contest the general principles laid down in the case. In his words:  
Theoretically, the United Kingdom is only bound by this decision to accept 
the Norwegian baseline-system, as approved by the court. It is not 
(formally) bound to accept a similar system instituted by any other country. 
Furthermore, no country other than the United Kingdom is (formally) bound 
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to accept even the Norwegian delimitation. In practice, it is obvious that 
neither the United Kingdom nor any other country could now successfully 
contest the general principles of straight baselines, at any rate in any legal 
proceedings, even (in all probability) before a tribunal other than the 
international Court.
162
        
This view was later confirmed by the Court in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in 
the Gulf of Maine Area,
163
 where the Court acknowledged that the "actual rules of law ... 
which govern the delimitation of adjacent continental shelves - that is to say, rules binding 
upon States for all delimitations", was given by the Court in its 1969 Judgment in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases‖.164  In effect, though the actual judgment in the foregoing cases 
required particular consent to jurisdiction to bind a State, the ―actual rules‖ emanating from 
the cases, do not.  
This can further be elaborated by the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. Advisory jurisdiction 
does not require the consent of States as parties. Nonetheless, States have habitually regarded 
general principles handed down in advisory opinions as authoritative. The Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
165
(which established procedural 
capacity of international organisation in international law) and Reservations to the 
Convention on Genocide,
166
 (which established the modern international law relating to 
reservations), are obvious examples of this practice. 
In essence, the application of rules/principles previously adopted does not flow from the 
consent of States to the jurisdiction of the Court. That consent is only to the live issues 
between the parties presently before the Court and in respect of which the Court gives a 
binding decision in line with articles 59 of its Statute and 92 of the UN Charter.  
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164 Ibid, p. 299 para 112 
165 ICJ Rep 1949, 174   
166 ICJ Reports 1951, 51 
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It is also the present view that, by that consent, States submit themselves to the application of 
rules/principles in decided case to their cause.   
 
2.18.3 Consent through Acquiescence 
This occurs when States, as is usually the case, request the Court to apply rules/principles 
adopted in a previous decision to their case. Such a rule/principle may have arisen from the 
interpretation of a treaty or from the use of one of the several guises of judicial lawmaking, 
discussed in chapter seven.   
When States argue on the basis of such rules/principles and sometimes even base their entire 
case on them, the only logical explanation would be that such States are expressing consent to 
the said rule/principles, albeit ex post facto.  By so doing, States acquiesce in rulemaking by 
the ICJ and naturally expect, when espousing their cause before the Court, that their case 
would be treated similar to an analogous precedent.  
As we shall see later, there exist several rules/principles of international law, whose source lie 
nowhere, but within the case-law of the Court. This is in addition to the fact that both the 
Court and States, in practice, attach juridical character to the case-law of the Court, 
notwithstanding that the rules/principles are not traceable to a treaty or customary rules.  
States are not in the habit of disputing the normative value of rules/principles in judicial 
decisions. The common feature in the decided cases of the Court is that States accept the 
existence of the rules/principles in previous cases and endeavour to distinguish their cases if 
that rule/principle does not favour their cause. In Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Question between Qatar and Bahrain,
167
 Bahrain sought to rely on the decision of the PCIJ in 
                                                             
167 Merits, ICJ Reps 2001, 40, 76, para 112 
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the case of the Sociéte Commerciale de Belgique;
168
 and the ICJ cases in Arbitral Award 
made by King of Spain on 23 December 1906
169
 and Maritime Delimitation between Guineu-
Bissau and Senegal
170
 to support her case. Qatar on her part denied the relevance of the 
judgments cited by Bahrain, contending that ―None of them are in the slightest degree 
relevant to the issue which the Court has to determine in the present case ...‖.171 Had Qatar 
not recognised the authority of the rules/principles in the cases sought to be relied upon by 
Bahrain, it would have simply based its argument on this point. Qatar‘s approach is replicated 
in all cases in which the decision of the Court depended on rules/principles established in its 
precedent.  
There has been no situation where a State argued that a rule/principle established, or a 
construction adopted in a previous case is not applicable due to want of consent. At worst, the 
adverse party would ask the Court to change the law by overruling its earlier position.  This 
was the approach of Nigeria in Cameroon v. Nigeria.
172
 Here, Nigeria requested the Court to 
overrule the principle of interpretation adopted in the Right of Passage case.
173
  In the latter 
case, the Court had held that the provision of article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court 
requiring transmission of the declaration of a State accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Court to all parties to the optional clause system was merely permissive. In consequence, 
a declaration of acceptance was valid against a party to which it had not been transmitted by 
the Secretary General of United Nations. This ruling was in response to the preliminary 
objection raised by India against the case instituted by Portugal while its declaration was yet 
to be transmitted to India. When Cameroon brought proceedings against Nigeria in analogous 
circumstances and Nigeria raised a preliminary objection proffering a similar argument as 
                                                             
168 P.C.I.J Series A/B, No. 78, p. 160  
169 (Honduras v. Nicaragua) ICJ Reps 1960, 192 
170 ICJ Reps 1991,  53 
171 Ibid   
172 Note 146   
173 Note 147 
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that used by India, the ratio of the Right of Passage case became a fundamental part of the 
proceedings. Nigeria categorically urged the Court to overrule the Right of Passage case 
because it was a first impression case and that the judgment given was outdated. The Court 
refused to overrule the case, and did apply the precedent to dismiss the objection of Nigeria.  
States do not only rely on the rules/principles adopted in decided cases; they sometimes 
attempt to expound the principles to new factual situations. In Fisheries Jurisdiction,
174
 Spain 
sought to rely on the Right of Passage case for the proposition that reservations contained in 
declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are to be interpreted 
consistently with legality and that any interpretation which is inconsistent with the Statute of 
the Court, the Charter of the United Nations or with general international law, is 
inadmissible. This argument followed the reasoning of the Court in the Right of Passage case 
that "[i]t is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in 
principle, be interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with 
existing law and not in violation of it".
175
 Rejecting the proposition, the Court held that the 
decision in the Right of Passage case cannot admit of such interpretation in that: ―Nowhere in 
the Court's case-law has it been suggested that interpretation in accordance with the legality 
under international law of the matters exempted from the jurisdiction of the Court is a rule 
that governs the interpretation of such reservations‖. 176  
Can it, in the light of the frequent engagement by States of rules/principles established by the 
Court, be said that States do not confer, even if ex post facto, juridical force on the 
rules/principles by their subsequent conduct? It can surely be argued that the frequent 
reliance on rules/principles adopted by the Court, confirms the authority of rule/principles in 
judicial decisions. This view finds support in the reasoning of the Court that: 
                                                             
174 (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Rep, 1998, 432 ,455, para 53 
175 Ibid, p. 455, para 53 
176 Ibid, para 54  
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If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained 
within the rule itself...the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than 
to weaken the rule.
177
  
 
Accordingly, the reliance placed by States upon rules/principles adopted in other cases, 
strengthens the view that States accept judicial decisions as a legal source from which 
binding rules/principles of international law may emerge. Therefore, so long as States appeal 
to rules/principles in judicial decisions and seek justifications from such rules/principles for 
their conducts makes the argument that such rules/principles are rules/principles of 
international law, difficult to be discredited by any argument predicated upon the lack of 
express State consent. 
2.19 Customary Practice of Regarding Judicial Decisions as a Source of International 
Law   
Further to the above, a rule of customary international law could be constructed upon the 
persistent reliance by States of rules/principles in judicial decisions.  For this to be, it must be 
shown that judicial decisions as a source of law is supported in the practice and opinio juris 
of States. The cases cited above show that the practice of States relying on previous decisions 
of the Court is fully entrenched.  Opinio juris can be gauged from the weight States attach to 
rules/principles in decided cases, both within and outside the processes of litigation. States 
would not base their cases on rules/principles adopted by the Court if it is not believed that 
the rules/principles are rules/principles of international law.  
Indeed it is often the case that States refer to rules in judicial decisions as rules of 
international law. In Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, Ukraine contended that the 
Court is obliged to decide disputes in accordance with international law as laid down in 
                                                             
177 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States), Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14,   
98 para 186 
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Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Statute. In defining the relevant principles of international law, 
Ukraine specifically referred to ―a body of rules of international law comprising ... rules 
which have become well established in the jurisprudence of the Court‖.178  
Further evidence of opinio juris is in the fact that States generally look up to the Court to 
settle, with certainty, controversial issues of law. In the era before the ICJ affirmed the 
obligatory nature of provisional measures, the Law of the Foreign Relations of the United 
States stated as follows: 
The Court has not ruled on whether an order ‗indicating‘ provisional 
measures is mandatory on the parties. It is not clear what effect the failure 
of a State to comply with provisional measures has on the decision in the 
principal case.
179
  
It was admitted that: 
as the Statute of the Court uses the ambiguous word ‗indicate‘ rather than 
‗order‘ or ‗determine‘ there has been uncertainty as to whether the Court‘s 
orders indicating provisional measures are binding.
180
     
This was the same approach taken by Cecil Hurst in his advice to the British government in 
the controversy surrounding the accession of the United States to the Protocol of Signature to 
the Statute of the PCIJ.  Cecil Hurst had based his advice on the decision of the PCIJ in 
Eastern Carelia case,
181
 with the hope that the Court would ―gradually build up a rule of law 
on this point‖.182 
The International Law Commission is not left out of the general endorsement of the authority 
of rules/principles in judicial decisions. In the commentary on its provisional draft on the 
exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, approval, ratification and accession, the 
                                                             
178( Romania v. Ukraine), ICJ Rep 2009, 61, 77,  para 36 
179 The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law Third, Restatement of the Law of the Foreign Relations of the 
United States Vol II s. 903, Comment,  p 358(St Paul Minnesota: 1987)      
180 Ibid., Reporters‘ note 6, p. 368   
181 Note 95 
182 Note 96 
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Commission considered that the question relating to the moment at which the consent to be 
bound is established and in operation with respect to other contracting States, in the case of 
the deposit of an instrument with a depositary, appears well-settled by the ICJ in the Right of 
Passage case.
183
 
Based on the foregoing, it is arguable that States have created a customary rule by which they 
accept rules/principles emanating from the decisions of the Court as rules/principles of law 
by which some of their conducts are regulated. This, in effect, would mean that even if 
consent to judicial lawmaking cannot be founded in the Statute of the Court, it could be 
founded in customary international law emanating from the practice and opinio juris of States 
in relation to the case-law of the Court. 
2.20 Development Independent of Consent  
Another way of looking at rules/principles in judicial decisions is to see them as seamless 
rational deductions from the very concept of international justice, which could form without 
the consent of States to their existence.  This view was canvassed by Quincy Wright, who 
argued that the Jurists who adopted  judicial decisions as subsidiary means for determining 
rules of law, in 1920, 
repudiated jural positivism and accepted the Grotian thesis that international 
law rests not only upon the practice of states, but also upon rational deduction 
from the principles of justice to which they aspire. The makers of the Statute 
recognized that international law should not be limited by the positive consent 
of states, but should be capable of developing through juridical deduction 
from normative principles endorsed by prevailing world opinion.
184
 
This could be explained by the way customary international law relates to State consent. 
Though opinion juris and practice (as means of establishing consent) are germane to the 
establishment of the existence of customary international law against a State, it is yet 
common place that States are sometimes held to be bound by customs which they did not 
                                                             
183 The Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p.201, Para 3  
184 Quincy Wright, ―Legal positivist and the Nuremberg Judgment‖, 42 Am. J. Int‘l L 405, 408 (1948)  
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partake in establishing. Writing nearly a century ago, De Visscher recognised that ―it is not 
always necessary to be able to prove that ... [a] state, by its personal actions, contributed to 
the establishment of the international practice from which the rule derived...."
 185 
 This view 
finds support in the Separate Opinion of Judge Fouad Ammoun in Barcelona Traction case, 
where he drew attention to the fact that ―certain customs of wide scope became incorporated 
into positive law when in fact they were the work of five or six powers‖.186  
This is the same way rules/principles in judicial decisions may integrate into the corpus of 
what is often referred to ―as general international law‖. Its origin being neatly concealed in 
that moniker, it becomes irrelevant that a particular rule actually originated from judicial 
decisions.
187
   
In the final analysis, it is important to reiterate that the preparatory work of the Statute does 
not support the view that the framers of the Statute did not intend to ascribe the status of a 
source of law to judicial decisions. To back up this view, the writer has engaged in a detailed 
analysis of the preparatory work with particular attention on articles 38(1) and 59. The writer 
has also argued that the conclusion that the Drafters did not evince that intention is not 
negated by the general rule of State consent.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
185 De Visscher, La Codification du driot international, 6 Recueil Des Cours, 225, 261-262 cited in Prosper Weil, ―Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law?‖ 77 AM. J. Int‘l L 413, 434(1983) 
186 Note 35, p. 308 
187 This is discussed in chapter five  
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                                                    Chapter Three 
Relevance of Judicial Decisions in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the Court 
Since June 28, 1923, when the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) gave its first 
ruling in S.S. Wimbledon, the contribution of the Court to modern international law has been 
profound. Notwithstanding, the recurrent question of the status of judicial decisions in article 
38(1)(d) has remained shrouded in the classical abhorrence for judicial legislation. The 
question is as old as the institution of a permanent international court itself; it came up in the 
deliberations of the 1920 Committee of Jurists that drafted the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, and resonated in both judicial and scholarly literatures throughout the 
lifespan of that Court. The question has been carried through to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ),
1
 without a generally agreed answer. 
This question has been partly discussed in chapter two. In that chapter, the writer examined 
the preparatory work of articles 38(1) and 59 of the Statute of the ICJ with a view to 
discovering whether the provisions were intended to exclude judicial decisions from the 
sources of international law. The writer found nothing in the preparatory work suggesting or 
affirming that judicial decisions were not relevant as a source of law. If anything, the 
preparatory work strongly suggested that judicial decisions were intended to be a source of 
law. The problem, however, is that this intention was not unequivocally communicated in the 
Statute in view of the language of article 38(1)(d) and the supervening provisions of article 
59, which has added nothing, but confusion and obscurity to article 38(1)(d).    
 
                                                             
1 Though no significant alteration was made, available record shows that the question was discussed in the course of 
considering the ICJ Statute. See the ―Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice,‖ 10th February 1944 39 Am. J, Int‘l L. Supp. 1, 1, 20 (1945)     
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In this chapter, the writer shall seek to show that judicial decisions are a source of law even 
upon a literary construction of article 38(1) of the Statute. In doing this, the writer shall 
concentrate on the provisions of article 38(1) and endeavour to discuss article 38(1)(d) as if 
there were never an article 59. This approach is being adopted because the sources of 
international law are prescribed in article 38(1) and not article 59. The latter is a supervening 
or intervening provision, without which the former could stand on its own, free from 
ambiguities. This is fundamentally so because the reference to article 59 in article 38(1)(d) 
and article 59 itself were not in the original draft of the Statute, when the sources of the law 
to be applied by the Court were deliberated upon by the Committee of Jurists.  
Also, the writer is convinced that it is the general approach of discussing articles 38(1)(d) 
through article 59 (though that approach is justified by the words ―subject to article 59‖) that 
is responsible for the view that judicial decisions are not a source of international law on the 
terms of the Statute.  Scholars often conclude on the basis of article 59, without first 
discovering article 38(1)(d) for what it actually is. For instance, Brownlie‘s view that judicial 
decisions are not a source of law is based on the argument that article 59 does ―not merely 
express the principle of res judicata but to rule out a system of binding precedent‖.2 
Likewise, Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk and Anthony D‘ Amato  argued that by virtue of 
article 59, judicial decisions have no binding force except in respect of particular cases.
3
 It 
would, therefore, be useful to first ascertain whether the provisions of article 38(1)(d), 
                                                             
2 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 21 (7th ed. Oxford University Press, 2008) 
3 Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, Anthony D‘ Amato, International Law and the World Order, 130 (2nd ed. West 
Publishing Company, Minnesota 1990). Also see Maurice Mendelson, ―The International Court of Justice and the Sources of 
International Law‖ in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice ed. Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice 63, 81 
(Cambridge University Press 1996). (stating that ―the direction in article 38(1)(d)of the Statute to apply ‗judicial decisions 
...as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law‘, is subject to article 59, the effect of which is that there is  no 
doctrine of binding precedent in the ICJ‖); D.W Greig, International Law, 39 (Second ed. Butterworths: London 1976) 
(stating that article 59 of the Statute poses a barrier to the adoption of a general doctrine of precedent.). J. Patrick Kelly, ―The 
Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the World Court‖ 11 Mich. J. Int‘l L. 129, 144 (1989-1990). (Arguing 
that the ICJ lacks the authority to perform a major law-creating function.... judicial decisions are only a subsidiary means for 
determining rules of law. Even this modest recognition is limited by article 59. There is no doctrine of stare decisis at the 
Court‖) 
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standing alone, provide justification for the view that judicial decisions are a source of law. 
Thereafter, article 59 and its relationship with article 38(1)(d) shall be discussed. 
 3.1 Decisions of the International Court of Justice as a Source of International Law  
The exact meaning of the term ―sources‖, when used in relation to law, appears to be 
controversial. This is because ―sources‖ could mean different things depending on the context 
of its use. The common trend is for authors to distinguish between formal and material 
sources. On the precise meaning to be ascribed to the terms ―formal‖ and ―material‖ sources, 
there are also no agreement.  Richard K. Gardener posited that formal sources are the actual 
historical and factual origin of the laws while material sources are those supported by the 
rules of recognition within the legal system; the criteria for identifying what the law is.
4
 J.W 
Salmond argued that a formal source is that from which a rule of law derives its force and 
validity while material sources are those from which is derived the matter, not the validity, of 
the law. He argued that material source supplies the substance of the rule to which formal 
source gives the force and nature of law.
5
 On the contrary, Ian Brownlie dismissed the use of 
the term ―formal source‖ as awkward and misleading because there is no constitutional 
machinery of law-making in the creation of rules of international law.
6
 This, perhaps, 
explains why a number of authors, such as Herbert Briggs
7
 and Colbert
8
 have noted that 
―sources‖ is being confused with various other things.  
                                                             
4 Richard K. Gardiner, International Law, 25 (Pearson Education Ltd, England, 2003)  
5 J.W Salmond, Jurisprudence, 24 (7th Ed. 1924 ) 
6 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1 (7th  ed. 2008) 
7 Herbert Briggs, The Law of Nations, 44 (2nd ed. NY 1952), cited in Vladimir Duro Degan, Sources of International Law, 1 
(The Hague: Kluwer Intl Ltd 1997) (Briggs observed that ―sources‖ is often confused with, basis of international law; causes 
of international law and evidence.) On his part, Vladimir Duro Degan (Ibid) noted that ―many different, and even opposite, 
meanings are ascribed to this term [sources]‖.        
8 P.E. Corbett, ―The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations,‖ 6 Brit Y.B Int‘l L, 20, 20, 30 (1925) (Noting 
that sources is used by different writers, sometimes even by the same writer at different times, to express concept of cause, 
origin, basis and evidence, and that the fluctuation in terms has regrettable consequences. He further contended, ―that the 
origin of the rules of international law which may also be called ‗the sources‘ of that law – though the word ‗sources‘ has 
such a history of confusion behind it that it might well be abandoned – are the opinions, decisions or acts constituting the 
starting-point from which their more or less gradual establishment can be traced‖.)   
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Away from the controversies surrounding the term, it suffices, for the purpose of this study, 
to adopt the definition of Herbert Briggs. Briggs simply defined sources of international law 
as ―the methods and procedures by which international law is created‖.9 This definition best 
explains the core of this thesis, which generally concerns the methods of creation of 
international law, though specifically focusing on one of the methods or means specified in 
38(1) of the Statute of the Court. Article 38(1) provides:
  
1. The court, whose functions is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
(b) International customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) Subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.
10
 
 
It is conducive to reasoning to posit that these provisions have, in view of the duration of time 
in which they have been accepted as a statement of the sources of international law and the 
number of States that have expressly subscribed to it, become a rule of customary 
international law.
 11
 In consequence, the provisions are equally applicable as a statement of 
customary international law even to States which are not bound by the Statute of the Court.  
This is so because, a State does not necessarily need to be a party to a convention which 
terms have been assimilated into customary law, to be bound by the terms of the Convention. 
In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
12
 the Court held that the 
                                                             
9 Herbert Briggs, note 7, p. 44      
10Christopher C. Joyner, ―U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary 
Dynamics of Norm Creation‖ 11 Cal. W. Int‘l L.J 445, 454 (1981),  (stating that article 38 is ―[t]he most convenient and 
concise statement regarding the sources of international law.‖); Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of 
International Law, 188 (London, Stevens & Sons 1964), (stating that article 38 is an authoritative formulation of the sources 
of international law in general, inside or outside the International Court of Justice)   
11 Dinah Shelton, ―Normative Hierarchy in International Law‖,  100(2) Am. J. Int‘l L 291, 294-295 (2006) (Stating that 
―although the ICJ Statute is directed at the Court, it remains today the only general text in which States have acknowledged 
the authoritative procedures by which they agree to be legally bound to an international norm.‖) 
12 (Djibouti v. France) ICJ Rep 2008, 177, 219, para. 112  
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provisions of article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, were 
applicable to both Djibouti and France (which were not parties to the Convention) because 
the provision codified customary international law. This position is not altered by the 
subsequent assimilation of a conventional provision into customary law.  
The erga omnes status of article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court could also result from the 
fact that the Statute is an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.
13
 Being so, it is a 
treaty in force, arising from the agreement of parties to the Charter of the United Nations, to 
which 193 States are parties. As a consequence, it is generally agreed that article 38(1) is an 
expression of the sources of law, not only for the Court, but for the international community 
at large. What is not easily conceded is the relevance of the items in paragraph (d) to the 
formation of international law.  
3.2 Judicial Decisions and the Language of Article 38(1)(d)    
So far, the writer has followed the view that the sources of international law are expressed in 
article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court. Judicial decisions having been included in article 
38(1) to which, at least, the signatory States to the Charter of the United Nations have 
consented, makes it highly probable that judicial decisions are, by reason of that consent, a 
source of international law. It is at this point only probable because it has to been seen that 
the States did consent to that provision with the belief that judicial decisions are a source of 
law. This is particularly so because judicial decisions, in the language of article 38(1)(d), are 
―subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law‖, and are subject to article 59, by 
which decisions of the Court are binding only on the actual parties to a case. 
 
                                                             
13 Article 92 annexed the Statute of the Court as ―an integral part of this Charter.‖ By article 93(1) ―All members of the 
United Nations are facto parties to the International Court of Justice‖.  
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3.3.1 As Subsidiary Means 
The major problem which has arisen from the provisions of article 38(1) is the reference to 
judicial decisions as ―subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law‖. This term 
has been variously interpreted to mean different things within different contexts. Some have 
argued that the term is used to denote judicial decisions because the rules/principles they 
contain are derived from other sources.  In this wise, Hugh Thirlway argued that the reason 
for the distinction introduced into article 38(1) by the term, ―as subsidiary means for 
determination of the rules of law‖, is that a rule of law stated in judicial decisions is stated as 
deriving from either treaty, custom or general principles of law.
14
 Also in Oppenheim’s 
International Law, the Editors argued that decisions of courts and tribunals are a subsidiary 
and indirect source of international law. They opined that since judges do not, in principle, 
make law but apply existing law, their role is inevitably secondary given that the law they 
propound has some antecedent source.
15
  
There is also the view that construes the term to mean that judicial decisions are a subordinate 
– a gap-filling – source to be resorted to when there are no rules of treaty or custom 
governing the issue before the Court. In Hudson‘s view, what is meant by ―subsidiary‖ is not 
clear; it may mean that the sources mentioned in paragraph (d) are to be subordinate to other 
sources mentioned in the article, i.e. to be regarded only when sufficient guidance cannot be 
found in international conventions, international customs and general principles of law.
16
  
 
                                                             
14 Hugh Thirlway, ―Sources of International Law‖ in Malcolm D. Evans ed. International Law, 115, 129 (2nd ed. Oxford 
University Press 2006) 
15 Jennings Robert and Sir Watts Arthur (ed.) Oppenheim’s International Law, 41 (9th ed. Vol. 1, Longman 1922)  
16 Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942. A Treatise, 612 (Louis B Sohn ed., New 
York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1972)    
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This seems to be the light in which the term was understood by the Informal Inter-Allied 
Committee on the Future of the PCIJ. In its Report:  
The provision in question [article 59] in no way prevents the Court from 
treating its judgments as precedents, and indeed, it follows from article 38 ... 
that the court‘s decisions are themselves ‗subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.‘ 17  
If, following the language of the Report, the Court is entitled to treat its decisions as 
precedents,
 18
 it would mean that the Committee regarded the term ―subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law‖, as connoting something of a secondary nature to something 
else, apparently, the items mentioned in paragraphs (a)-(c).  This view was confirmed by 
Judge Fouad Ammoun in his separate opinion in Barcelona Traction Light and Power 
Company Ltd,
19
 where he affirmed that ―international case-law is itself only an auxiliary 
source of law and does not take the place of the principal sources, which are treaties and 
customs‖. 
On a different note, there are some other authors who believe that the phrase does not truly 
capture the essence of judicial decisions as a source of law. With this belief, Patricia Birnie, 
Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell argued that the reference in the Statute to judicial 
decisions as ―subsidiary means...‖ is apt to mislead, given that, in reality, the Court has an 
important and often an innovative role in pronouncing on matters of international law. They 
affirmed that, in the process of identifying and applying the law, the Court can ―exercise a 
formative influence on the law, giving substance to new norms and principles‖.20  Also, 
Rosalyn Higgins observed that far from being treated as a subsidiary source of international 
law, the judgments and opinions of the Court are treated as authoritative pronouncements 
                                                             
17 Note 1, para 63    
18 ―...experience shows that the effect of judicial precedent – even if not formally recognised as a source of law – cannot 
always be distinguished from a source of law‖ – Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: Collected Papers, Vol. 1 The 
General Works, 78-79, (E. Lauterpacht ed. Cambridge University Press 1970)  
19 (Belgium v. Spain) (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1970,  3, 315, para 21 
20 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 28-29 (Oxford University 
Press 3rd ed.).  
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upon the current state of international law.
21 
In seeming agreement with these views, Rosenne 
argued that the decisions of the ICJ cannot be relegated to any subsidiary position. He argued 
that the expansion of a body of international case-law is leading to a judicial codification or at 
least restatement of the law through application to concrete circumstances.
22
 It is, perhaps, for 
this reason that Wolfgang Friedmann said that, ―treaties, customs and judicial decisions are in 
fact the three principal sources of legal authority in the international community‖;23 and 
Kelsen agreed that ―in addition to customs and treaties, decisions of international agencies, 
especially judgments of the international tribunals, are sources of international law‖.24 
It should follow from the foregoing that the status of judicial decisions, within the context of 
article 38(1), largely depends on the construction of the phrase, ―as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of law‖. If the phrase is construed to mean that rules emanating 
from judicial decisions, are by reason of that phrase, not authoritative for the Court and States 
to whose cases they are applied, it would follow that judicial decisions cannot be a source of 
law on the terms of the Statute. But if subsidiary means is construed to mean something 
secondary, it would mean a term that separates paragraph (d) of article 38(1) from the first 
three paragraphs in a sort of hierarchy in which paragraph (d) occupies a secondary position.   
The first impression one gets from article 38(1) is that, by virtue of judicial decisions being a 
subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law, they do not create rules of law but 
only serve as a means for determining rules of law. To avoid sticking with this superficial 
impression of the provision, it would be useful to separate for a moment, the words, 
―subsidiary means‖ from the ―determination of rules of law‖. Aside giving a deeper 
                                                             
21Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, 202 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994)  
22 Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 612 (Vol. 2 A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden 1965). 
23 Wolfgang Friedmann, note 10, p.  188 
24 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 506 (2nd ed., Robert W Tucker Ed., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1966) 
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understanding of the provision, it would enable us apply them within the context of the entire 
provisions of article 38(1).  
3.3.2 Article 38(1) Requires a Unity of Interpretation 
Taken on its own; ―subsidiary means‖ could conveniently be interpreted to mean ―residuary 
means.‖ This ordinarily tallies with the definition of the term ―subsidiary‖, which means: 
―added‖, ―extra‖; and the opposite of ―chief‖, ―main‖ or ―principal.‖ Merriam-Webster‘s 
Online Dictionary defines ―subsidiary‖ as referring to something ―of secondary importance‖, 
something of an auxiliary character. It thus follows that the existence of a ―subsidiary means‖ 
presupposes the existence of a ―principal means‖. This easily fits into the context of article 
38(1), which already enumerated what was undoubtedly regarded as main or principal 
sources in paragraphs (a)-(c) before ―subsidiary‖ was used to classify the items in paragraph 
(d). Christopher C. Joyner appears to support this view by asserting that article 38(1) placed 
the principal sources of international law hierarchically, ―as treaty law, customary law, and 
general principles of law, with judicial decisions and the works of publicists relegated to a 
secondary position‖.25 
In this light, when ―subsidiary means‖ is construed together with the term ―for the 
determination of the rules of law‖, there is the problem of upsetting the entire context of 
article 38(1). This is because, such an approach would suggests the existence in article 38(1) 
or in anywhere else, a ―main or principal means‖ for the determination of the rules of law and 
thus give the impression that article 38(1) is concerned with merely stating the means for the 
determination of the rules of law. This is all the more confounding in view of the fact that the 
said phrase – ―determination of the rules ...‖ – was first ever mentioned in paragraph (d), 
where the term subsidiary was also used. To add meaning and purpose to article 38(1), there 
                                                             
25 Christopher C. Joyner, note 10, p., 455 (1981)    
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must be a unity of interpretation, which would either mean that all the items mentioned in 
article 38(1) are means for the determination of the rules of law or that the items are actually 
sources of law.  
In view of the opening paragraph of the article and the uses to which it has firmly been put 
over time by both judges and jurists, it is not difficult to dismiss the first interpretation. But 
upholding the second interpretation may not be any less controversial than dismissing the 
first. This is because the second interpretation requires that ―subsidiary‖ be read within the 
context of that unity to mean ―residuary‖ or ―auxiliary‖, which would in turn mean that 
―subsidiary‖ is used to divide the article into ―main‖ and ―residuary‖ or ―primary and 
secondary‖ sources of international law –  a view which not many writers have accepted. It 
would follow from above, that if judicial decisions are auxiliary or supplementary to the other 
items in the article, it could either be auxiliary or supplementary source of law while those 
items are the main or principal; or judicial decisions would be auxiliary or supplementary 
means for determination of the rules of law while the former would be the principal means of 
determination of the rules of law.
26
  
The veracity of the view that judicial decisions are a secondary or supplementary source of 
law while the items in paragraphs (a) –(c) are the main or principal sources of law, is obvious 
from the deliberations of the Committee of Jurists.
27
  In the original draft of article 38, 
Descamps had used the word ―auxiliary‖ to explain the role being ascribed to judicial 
decisions in the Statute.
28
 Judicial decisions were to be an auxiliary or supplementary source 
of law to be applied by the Court, failing the main sources mentioned in the preceding 
paragraphs of the article. It is equally correct to affirm from the deliberations of the Jurists, 
                                                             
26 See the history of the provision in chapter two above 
27 Some Writers treat only treaties and customary law as the main sources of international law. See Dinah Shelton, note 11, 
p., 319 
28 See chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the view of the Committee of Jurists on this. 
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that this was the light in which ―auxiliary‖ or ―subsidiary‖ was understood by the Jurists. This 
understanding is borne out of the arguments of the Jurists and the various amendments that 
were sought to be made to the provision at different stages of deliberations. It is on records 
that a number of the Jurists, including Descamps, were in agreement with Root‘s amendment, 
which used the ―authority of judicial decisions‖.29 So was the further amendment of ―rules of 
law derived from judicial decisions‖, proposed by Lapradelle.30   
The expression ―subsidiary means‖ was proposed by Descamps only after Phillimore 
proposed that the words ―rules of law derived from judicial decisions‖ be deleted. 
―Subsidiary means‖ may therefore have been adopted to satisfy dissenting Committee 
Members – Ricci-Busatti and Lapradelle, especially – who wanted to see the entire paragraph 
(d) expunged from the draft Statute. The need for the distinction between paragraphs (a) –(c) 
and (d) may also have been engineered by the argument of Ricci-Busatti that it was wrong to 
place judicial decisions and doctrines on the same level with treaties and customs. 
31
  
Furthermore, the original proposal of Descamps did not contain any classification of the five 
items mentioned in the article. He had simply proposed that the sources be applied in the 
―under-mentioned order‖. The Judges of the Court were to consider the sources in their order 
of enumeration.  In addition to this, the original draft of the provision had judicial decisions 
as a means for ―...the application and development of law‖ 32 – a term which, more or less, 
reflects the practical uses of judicial decisions by the Court.  In his Separate Opinion in 
                                                             
29 See p. 70 above 
30 See p. 72 above 
31 Process-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists June 16-July 24, 1920,  p. 334 
32 Hoof argued that the choice of the words; ―application‖ and ―development‖ of law which featured in Descamps proposal 
was ―not entirely free from ambiguity because the ‗former entails reference to already existing law, while the latter entailed 
at least some elements of newness and, therefore, suggests that judicial decisions create new law and in that sense are 
sources of international law‖. – Godefridus J. H Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law, 169 (Kluwer: the 
Netherlands 1983). One is left wondering whether the words eventually used in the Statute do not import far more ambiguity 
than the ambiguity Hoof associates with the original proposal.    
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Barcelona Traction case,
33
 Judge Fitzmaurice referred to judicial pronouncements as the 
principal method by which the law can find some concrete measure of clarification and 
development, absent specific legislative action with direct binding effect in the international 
legal field.  In Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Judge 
Alvarez recognized the Court as possessing the power to develop international law and to 
contribute to its creation in the face of new situations.
34
 This was affirmed by the Court in 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Question between Qatar and Bahrain, when it referred 
to rules ―developed since 1958 in case-law‖ and State practice with regard to the delimitation 
of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
 35 
 
If what we were presented with was ―judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for the 
application and development of law‖, this perhaps, would have fitted into the context of the 
provision. This is because there is no real difference between law-making and law-
development; they are both processes of formulating and expanding the law.
36
 Since this is 
not the case, this writer is of the view that, given the ambiguity that results from construing 
judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, the better view, 
and indeed the one that conforms to the practice of the ICJ; one in which States habitually 
acquiesce, is that judicial decisions are a subsidiary source of law while the items in 
paragraphs (a)-(c) are the main sources of law.  This view appears in tandem with the view of 
Rosalyn Higgins, who after stating that the function of the Court is to decide in accordance 
with international law, such disputes as are submitted to it, affirmed that article 38(1), ―goes 
on to say exactly what the Court would apply in fulfilling this task: the well-known sources 
                                                             
33  Note 19, p. 64, para 2 
34ICJ Rep 1949, 174, 190,  (Separate Opinion) 
35 Merit, ICJ Reps 2001, 40, 112, para 231  
36As stated by Judge Alvarez in the Reparations case, note 36, ―in many cases it is quite impossible to say where the 
development of law ends and where its creation begins‖. Also see Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court, 
68 (Cambridge University Press, 1996) (arguing that ―the inquiry mind would encounter difficulty in accepting that … 
development … can fail to eventuate in creation of law at some point‖.)  
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of international law – namely, custom ... judicial decisions ...‖.37 This view is also supported 
by the bold statement of R.Y. Jennings that: 
Perhaps this is the point where, having spoken of judicial decisions as a 
direct source of international law, I should explain that I have not forgotten 
that article 38 of the Hague Statute speaks of judicial decisions as a 
―subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law‖. This 
provision, I understand as a necessary recognition that judges, whether 
national or international, are not empowered to make laws. Of course, we 
all know that interpretation does, and indeed should, have a creative 
element in adapting rules to new situations and needs, and therefore also in 
developing it even to an extent that might be regarded as changing it. 
Nevertheless, the principle that judges are not empowered to make new 
law is a basic principle of the process of adjudication. Any modification 
and development must be seen to be within the parameters of permissible 
interpretation.... accordingly, I see the language of article 38 as essential in 
principle and see no difficulty in seeing a subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law as being a source of law, not merely by 
analogy but directly.
38
         
It is obvious from the above that paragraph (d) suffers from a problem of language; a 
language that was goaded by the fear that article 38 would not be accepted by States if 
paragraph (d) was not crafted in a very cautious language to defuse the notion that the Court 
was being expressly granted the power to formulate international law – a function which 
judges do not formally enjoy in the municipal legal systems. This is in view of the fact that 
article 38(1) was formulated by the Jurists alongside the rule of automatic compulsory 
jurisdiction adopted by the jurists. It would have been easier for the head of a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle than for States to accept automatic compulsory jurisdiction 
alongside resting the power judicial legislation upon the Court.
 39 
     
                                                             
37 Rosalyn Higgins, note 21, p. 187  
38 R.Y Jennings, ―The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law‖, 45, Int‘l & Comp. 
L.Q 1, 3-4 (1996) 
39Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 22 (Cambridge: Grotius 
Publications Ltd, 1987) (observing that article 38 involves a juridical problem which confronts all systems of law, and being 
so universal a problem, the theories and practice developed in municipal law in this connection have exerted their influence 
upon the minds of those called upon to deal with it in the international sphere).  
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In doing this, though, it seems the Drafters of the provisions, envious of the wisdom of the 
common law and foreseeing that the system of codification that sustains the continental 
system was not readily achievable, knew that it would be unwise to completely expunge 
judicial decisions from article 38(1). Hence the Committee steered the middle course by 
adopting a language which though appears to neutralise the authority of judicial decisions in 
theory, yet allows the Court to make the most authoritative use of it in practice as well as 
make the greatest contribution possible to the development of international law. This was no 
doubt the light in which the Inter-Allied Committee on the future of the PCIJ, saw article 
38(1)(d). The Committee accepted that the language was problematic. It nonetheless, did not 
recommend its amendment because, ―it seems to have worked well in practice‖.40 It could be 
garnered from the Report that the Inter-Allied Committee firmly supported the practice of 
judicial law-making, which obviously was what the Committee considered to ―have worked 
well in practice‖, though article 38(1)(d) suffers from the problem of language.    
In this part the writer has argued that ―subsidiary means‖ plays a crucial role in the 
controversies surrounding the status of judicial decision in article 38(1). This, 
notwithstanding, the writer argued that the provision would be more logically construed by 
seeking a unity of all the provisions in the article. This unity the writer found in using 
―subsidiary means‖ to divide the items in the article into main and secondary sources of 
international law. The writer has been emphatic in arguing that, ―subsidiary means‖ did not 
remove paragraph (d) from the sequence of consideration of the sources in article 38(1), 
though prescribing for judicial decisions, a different status – subsidiary status – to show that 
rules/principles in judicial decisions are not of equivalent status as any of the rules in the 
preceding paragraphs. It is worth restating, also, that this interpretation is at this point 
                                                             
40 Note 1, p. 20  
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independent of article 59 for the reason already explained above. It remains tentative until the 
impact of article 59 in practice is fully accessed subsequently.   
3.4 The Question of Hierarchy 
 Due to the chances of the points made above about the hierarchical representation between 
judicial decisions in paragraph (d) and the preceding paragraphs being seen within the 
context of the general controversy surrounding the question of the hierarchy of sources in 
article 38(1), it is important to briefly discuss the question relating to the general hierarchy of 
all the sources in article 38(1).  
This is another controversial aspect of article 38(1) on which there are also conflicting 
opinions. A view holds that article 38(1) did not create a hierarchy of sources in view of the 
sovereign equality of States and the equivalence of the sources of international law. The 
contrary view holds that the article did create a hierarchy which should be followed in the 
order in which the sources appear in the article. In support of the first view, Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, argued that on the basis of the Statute of the Court and the sovereign equality of 
States, there is no hierarchy and none can logically exist because, international rules are 
equivalent, sources are equivalent, and procedures are equivalent, all deriving from the will 
of States.
41
 The author further remarked that the texts of article 38(1) made no reference to 
hierarchy, except by listing doctrine and judicial decisions as "subsidiary" and evidentiary 
sources of law.
 42
 Gerald Fizmaurice observed that, save for the classification of judicial 
decisions and teachings of publicists, as ―subsidiary means‖ article 38(1) does not establish 
any system of priority of application.
43
 Also Bin Cheng, argued that the order of enumeration 
in the article is not intended to reflect a juridical hierarchy but merely to indicate the order in 
                                                             
41 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public, 14-16 (1995) cited in Dinah Shelton, note 11, p.  291  
42 Ibid, p. 294-295 
43 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ―Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of Law,‖ Symbolae Verzijl 173, 174 reproduced in 
Martti Koskenniemi Ed. Sources of International Law, 57 (Ashgate, Dartmouth 2000) 
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which they would normally present themselves to the mind of an international judge when 
called upon to decide a dispute in accordance with international law.
44
  
Judge Koroma appears to take the opposite view in reasoning that: 
Article 38 of the Statute provides that the Court in deciding disputes should 
do so in accordance with international law, and should apply: "(a) 
international conventions  ... (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions ... as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law." In other words the Article establishes a hierarchy as to the application 
of the law, and the Court is called upon to determine - to find out - what the 
existing law is in respect of the dispute before it and to apply that law.
45
 
Although Judge Koroma spoke of a hierarchy here, it is unclear from the passage whether he 
was speaking about a general hierarchy of the provisions or the hierarchy between the main 
and subsidiary sources.  
On his part, Schwarzenberger steered the middle course; observing that article 38(1), being 
silent on the question of hierarchy, it would be possible but hardly convincing to attempt to 
draw any conclusion from the enumerative sequence of the article.
46
 
Following the approach of the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
47
 it is clear 
that the article is presented in an order that places the first three paragraphs on the same plane 
to be considered sequentially. In the case, the Court stated that:  
the first question to be considered is whether the 1958 Geneva convention on 
the Continental Shelf is binding for all the Parties ....Clearly, if this is so, then 
the provisions of the Convention will prevail in the relations between the 
Parties, and would take precedence of any rules having a more general 
character, or derived from another source.
 48 
 
                                                             
44 Bin Cheng, note 39, p. 22  
45 Dissenting, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria,) Preliminary Objections, 
ICJ Rep 1998, 275, 380  
46 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, 54 (vol. 1 3rd ed. Stevens and Sons: London, 1957) 
47 ICJ Rep 1969, 3, 24 para 25 
48 Ibid,  p. 24, para 25 
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Accordingly, it was after the Court had determined that the said Convention was inapplicable 
between the parties to the cases that it resorted to finding whether there was a rule of 
customary international law applicable to the parties.  
This approach conforms to the views expressed during the deliberations of the Committee of 
Jurists. During Committee deliberations, members were agreeing that the first duty of the 
judge is to the items mentioned in paragraph (a) – (c), which the judge must consider 
successively before having recourse to paragraph (d), absent applicable principles in the 
paragraph (a) – (c). Stating the order in which the Court must proceed, Descamps had 
explained that the Court must first examine the text of a convention and apply same, if any; 
failing conventional rule, the Court will apply custom. If no rule is found in either, rather than 
plead non liquet, the Court should resort to general principles of law and the work of 
publicists.
49
 To these it must invariably be added, judicial decisions.  
That this non hierarchical sequential consideration was the intention of the Committee, is 
borne out of the fact that in the original draft of article 38, which did not have the words 
―subsidiary means‖, the sources were to be considered ―in the under-mentioned order‖.50 It is 
germane to state that the above remark by Descamps was made before the article was 
redrafted to reflect its present language.  
 
It may therefore be useful to consider that article 38(1) is structured for a sequential 
consideration that does not necessarily create hierarchical superiority, in a sense suggestive of 
the notion of a basic or constitutional norm.
51
 Although it is mandatory for the Court to 
                                                             
49 Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists, note 31, p., 318 
50 Ibid, Annex 3, p. 306 and 344 
51 Notwithstanding, it is worth noting the view of Kelsen that, given the fact that the binding force of a treaty is due to a rule 
of customary international law – pacta sunt servanda – ―the reason for the validity of treaties, and hence the ‗source‘ of all 
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consider the provisions of treaty law, should any exists between the parties, it by no means 
follows that the existence of a treaty automatically invalidates analogous customary law; 
though this may be strong evidence that the parties intended to modify or abrogate the 
application of a contrary customary rule between them. But nothing stops a rule of custom 
similar to a treaty (even if they are not exactly of the same content) from contemporaneously 
existing with that treaty provision. As a corollary, the ICJ has shown that the existence of a 
treaty rule does not preclude the consideration of a parallel customary law.  
In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
52
 the Court considered that 
even if a treaty norm and a customary norm relevant to a dispute were to have exactly the 
same content, this would not mean that the operation of the treaty must necessarily deprive 
the customary norm of its separate applicability.
 53
 The judgment of the Court further shows 
that such a parallel custom becomes paramount, whenever the application of an analogous 
treaty between the parties is excluded, say by way of reservation, as such a reservation would 
not affect the operation of the custom.
 54
     
It thus follows that the only order of superiority there may be, is that prescribed by article 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that, ―a treaty is void if, at 
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law‖ – 
jus cogens. For the avoidance of doubt, the same provision defines jus cogens as: 
a peremptory norm of general international law [which] is a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the laws created by treaties‖, customary international law is superior to treaties.  (note 24, p 446) This necessarily conforms 
with his proposition that ―the norm which regulates the creation of other norms is ‗superior‘ to the norms which are created 
according to the former‖. Hans Kelsen, note 24, p. 437. This is however a more profound question to which the scope of this 
work does not extend.  
52 (Nicaragua v. the United States) Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14  
53 Ibid, p. 94, para 175  
54Ibid  
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This consideration may have influenced Sorensen's distinction between a hierarchy of rules 
and a hierarchy of sources.
55
 The sources may share equivalent hierarchy but certain of their 
rules may carry greater efficacy.  It is for these reasons difficult to lay down a general rule of 
hierarchical supremacy between the main sources – particularly treaties and customs –given 
that jus cogens could as much arise from either of them, so that the question of supremacy 
works in both directions.
56
 As a consequence, whenever the question of supremacy arises 
between the main sources, there cannot be a blanket ascription of superiority to the rules from 
a particular source; the rules in question must be treated on their merit on a case by case 
basis. Nonetheless, a particular rule (usually in a treaty) existing between the parties (as les 
specialis) takes precedence over any general rule that may be found to exist respecting a 
subject-matter. 
The implication of this is that while a subsequent treaty may modify or abrogate a prior 
custom and vice visa, rules in judicial decisions would generally not have such effect until 
such a rule becomes applicable as a rule of custom or as what the Court sometimes vaguely 
refers to as rules/principles of general international law. However, the Reparation case
57
 
seems to challenge this assertion. The Reparation case is famous for the rule that 
international organisations are competent to bring international claim to espouse a right of 
diplomatic protection before the ICJ, contrary to the pre-existing rule of customary 
                                                             
55 Sorensen, Principles de Droit International Public, Recueil des Cours, 1960-III, 5-245 cited in Maarten Bos ―The 
Hierarchy among the Recognised Manifestations (Sources) of International Law‖ 25(3) Netherlands International Law Rev. 
334,340 (1978).  
56 In Nicaragua case note 52, p. 100, para 190, the Court affirmed the view of the International Law Commission  that the 
law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force was a conspicuous example of a jus cogens rule of 
international law. This was shortly after the Court affirmed the analogous customary rule as a cardinal principle of law.  
57 Note 38  
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international law encapsulated in article 34 of the Statute of the Court and Chapter XIV of the 
Charter of the United Nations.
58
 The pre-existing rule was that only States could do so.  
Although this may be rationalised by claiming that the pronouncement of the Court was the 
necessary incidence of the Charter of the United Nations, on a closer scrutiny it was just 
another judicial legislation in disguise. According to Judge Alverez::   
The fact of recognizing the United Nations as possessing the right to bring 
international claims constitutes a derogation from the precepts of the 
international law now in force, for that law only attributes this right to States.
59
 
Despite this obvious conflict the rule contained in the case has gained currency in both 
academic and judicial literatures. Hence we were reminded in a completely different case of 
the duty on the Court to create the new international law by modifying outdated concepts; 
and of the fact that the ―Court already exercised this faculty‖ in the Reparations case.60 It 
must still be borne in mind in spite of the foregoing that it is not open to questioning that 
article 38(1) did not place judicial decisions on equal footing with treaties and customs.   
3.5 The Inevitability of Judicial Legislation in an Un-codified System of Law   
In addition to the above, it should be appreciated that judicial law-making is an inescapable 
product of the existence of a permanent court,
61
 which functions within a largely un-codified 
system of law. If the Court must truly function as a court, it cannot but make rules/principles 
if it must achieve its goals. Under the present system, article 38(1)(a)-(c) require the Court to 
                                                             
58 It is clear from the Charter that it created a Court open only to States.  The pre-existing rule was previously affirmed by 
both the PCIJ and the ICJ. In Mavrommatis Palestine Concession, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 81, where Judge de 
Bustamante, dissenting, reiterated the prevailing rule that the League of Nations was prevented from appearing before the 
Court as a party by the restrictive terms of article 34 of the Statute of the Court. In South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 
ICJ Rep, 6, 277, 493, Judge Mbanefo, dissenting,  remarked: ―as by article 34 of the Court‘s Statute, the League not being a 
State, could not itself be a party to an action in the international Court. Only States or members of the League could be 
parties in cases before the Court‖.  
59 Separate Opinion, Reparation case, note 34, p., 191. Judge Krylov, dissenting, acknowledged the conflict between the rule 
stated by the Court and existing rules of international law. (p. 218). 
60 Per Judge Alvarez, dissenting in International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1950, 28,  177 
61 R. Floyd Clarke, ―A Permanent Tribunal of International Arbitration:  Its Necessity and Value‖,  1 Am. J Int‘l L. 342, 407  
(1907). As early as 1907, Clarke had noted that ―a permanent court would ... develop an international law of precedents 
whose value, as a model of settling disputes ... would be priceless‖.    
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apply the pre-existing rules of treaty, custom or general principles of law, but absent any of 
these, the Court is entitled to invoke the subsidiary means of its case-law and teachings of 
publicists to fill a lacuna and prevent non liquet.
62 
 
Indeed, sight must not be lost of the teleology of article 38(1). It is obvious from the analysis 
of the history of the provision in chapter two, that the main thrusts of article 38(1) was the 
avoidance of non liquet. As demonstrated in the next chapter, the Court cannot and has not 
been able to do this without recourse to rules/principles in its precedents, when all other 
sources fail. The Court has robustly revealed that the fact that decisions bind only parties 
thereto does not alter the actuality that the rules/principles of international law underpinning 
specific decisions have general applicability. Therefore, judicial decisions cannot but have 
relevance as law insofar as they generate and develop rules/principles of international law, 
not just as applicable in specific cases but also with wider implication for all other cases 
bearing analogous facts.         
On the whole, the phrase, ―as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law‖, 
although seems, on the face of it to suggest that judicial decisions are not a source of law, that 
initial appearances dissolves upon a holistic consideration of article 38(1), as done above. 
The writer feels justified to conclude that the only plausible interpretation of article 38(1) is 
that judicial decisions are a source of law within the meaning of that article. Also, that the 
term ―subsidiary means‖ places judicial decisions on a different – a secondary – category 
from the main sources of treaties, customs and general principles of law.
                                                             
62 See Cherif Bassiouni, ―A Functional Approach to ―General Principles of International Law‖, 11 Mich. J. Int‘l L. 768, 777 
(1980-1990) (in support of what he called the ―evolative aspect of the law‖ through case-law and works of writers, argued 
that recourse to case-law and works of scholars injects a dynamic element into international law and prevents the application 
of archaic norms and procedures.)   
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                                          Chapter Four 
               Relevance of Judicial Decisions in the Practice of the ICJ   
In chapter two, the writer acknowledged the general rule that, if interpreted in its ordinary 
and natural sense, a treaty provision makes sense, its ordinary and natural meaning shall 
govern the application of the treaty. The writer also stated that preparatory work and practice 
could be called in aid, where a provision is ambiguous and capable of different 
interpretations. Article 38(1), particularly paragraph (d), falls within the description of 
ambiguous provisions requiring elucidation of its natural meaning through other 
interpretative aids. This explains the writer‘s reliance on the history and practice relating to 
the provision.  
Its ambiguity notwithstanding, the writer interpreted paragraph (d) in chapter three and 
arrived at the conclusion that judicial decisions are a source of international law, albeit 
supplementary or auxiliary. Given that this conclusion is not generally favoured in the 
literature, it became imperative that the interpretation draws support from either the 
preparatory work of the provision or the practice of the Court pertaining to the provision or 
both. The writer has already concluded, upon an in-depth examination of the preparatory 
work, that it supports the view that judicial decisions are a source of international law.  The 
writer shall now examine the practice of the Court to show that the conclusion to which the 
preparatory work points have not been modified in the practice of the Court. The writer 
intends to show that the practice of the Court strongly corroborates the view that judicial 
decisions are a source of international law.  
Before proceeding further, it is important to reiterate the point made in chapter one. It was 
stated that it shall be argued that the Court follows its precedent, not for the purpose of 
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adopting stare decisis, but because it has identified certain rules/principles contained in the 
precedents which it wants to follow. This argument shall come to light in this chapter, as it 
shall be argued that the common law principle of stare decisis has no real relevance to the 
question relating to lawmaking by the ICJ. This is particularly in view of the point made in 
chapter that judicial lawmaking is a feature of both the common law and civil law, despite the 
absence of the rule of stare decisis at civil law. While not totally ignoring the possible 
influence of the common law on the approach of the Court, the writer shall emphasise the 
indisputable fact that rules/principles of law do arise from judicial decisions, irrespective of 
the absence of stare decisis.  
 4.1 The Importance of the Practice of the Court 
The fundamental role of the practice of the Court to an inquiry of this nature cannot be over-
emphasised. This was extensively discussed by Judge Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion in 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, thus:  
...no one would deny that practice must be a very relevant factor. According 
to what has become known as the "principle of subsequent practice", the 
interpretation in fact given to an international instrument by the parties to it, 
as a matter of settled practice, is good presumptive (and may in certain cases 
be virtually conclusive) evidence of what the correct legal interpretation is – 
a principle applied by the Court on several occasions....
 1
 
In application to an institution created and regulated by treaty (as the ICJ), it would equally 
be tenable that the correct interpretation of a provision in the enabling treaty could be inferred 
from the consistent practice of the institution – particularly when the practice is not opposed 
by parties to the treaty. This is particularly so because article 38(1) was formulated for the 
use of ―the Court, whose functions is to decide in accordance with international law‖ – a 
faculty the Court has successfully exercised for nearly a century in which it has resolved 
                                                             
1 ICJ Rep 1962, 151, 201 
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serious and, sometimes, recondite questions of international law in adjudicating disputes 
between States. It is, therefore, inevitable that the Court would have built up a clear practice 
regarding the authority of judicial decisions, as reliance on its precedent has been a major 
feature of its practice. As is the case with many provisions, the ultimate direction of 
provisions in an instrument is dictated by how the provisions operate in practice. A provision 
may operate in a fundamentally different sense from what could be collected from a 
theoretical examination of the provisions. It is practice that best illuminates a difficult 
provision. In the words of Judge Spender:     
It is of course a general principle of international law that the subsequent 
conduct of the parties to a bilateral-or a multilateral instrument may throw 
light on the intention of the parties at the time the instrument was entered 
into and thus may provide a legitimate criterion of interpretation.
2
  
For practice to be decisive, however, it must reflect the generality of the parties. Where the 
practice is by a few, it rests on the same footing as unilateral conducts and has less probative 
value.
3
  
The practice of following precedent is not only that of the Court but also of the States that 
appear before it. More often than not, States ask the Court to apply precedent; they base their 
arguments on rules/principles in precedent and ask the Court to follow suit. This has been the 
established practice of all the States appearing before the Court. In the second Genocide case, 
the Court observed: 
... Parties are not merely citing previous decisions of the Court which might be 
regarded as precedents to be followed in comparable cases. The previous decisions 
cited here referred to the question of the status of ... FRY, in relation to the United 
Nations and to the Statute of the Court; and it is that same question in relation to that 
same State that requires to be examined in the present proceedings at the instance, this 
time, of Croatia. It would require compelling reasons for the Court to depart from the 
conclusions reached in those previous decisions.
 4 
 
                                                             
2 Separate Opinion in Certain Expenses, ibid, p. 189 
3  Ibid, p. 191 
4 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary 
Objections, ICJ Rep 2008,  412, 429, Para 54. 
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As will soon be seen, the practice of the Court cannot be divorced from those of the States 
appearing before it as the practice of the Court is encapsulated in the application of 
international law to conflicts between States. Accordingly, the practice of the Court 
concerning the application of rules/principles adopted in a case to another, commands great 
relevance as it also reflects the practice of States appearing before it.   
4.2 The Relevance of the Common Law Rule of Binding Judicial Precedent to the 
Authority of the Decisions of the ICJ   
It is essential to discuss the rule of binding precedent and define its scope in relation to the 
practice of the ICJ. It is equally essential not to sacrifice an objective analysis of paragraph 
(d) and the obvious practice of the Court for the popular view that in the event of the absence 
of the common law rule of binding precedent, judicial decisions in paragraph (d) are not a 
source of international law.  The topic must be approached free from the bias towards or 
against the English doctrine of precedent; it is one thing for the decisions of a Court to be a 
source of law and another thing for that result to be achieved through the common law 
doctrine of stare decisis. Whether it is viewed from the continental perspective of 
jurisprudence constante (requiring the court to constantly act on a rule to be law) or the 
common law case law approach (which does not require so long a practice); in none of the 
systems can it rightly be disputed that decisions of courts are sources from which legal 
rules/principles are constantly distilled.
 5
   
The question whether the English rule of binding precedent is applicable in the ICJ ought to 
be tangential and not central to the question whether judicial decisions in paragraph (d) are a 
source of law. The fact is often overlooked that paragraph (d) is a provision in the Statute of a 
                                                             
5Hersch Lauterpacht, ―The So-called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought under International Law,‖ 12 Brit 
Y.B. Int‘l L 31, 54 (1931) (observing that ―there exists in France and in Germany a judge-made case law, and the authority of 
judicial precedent is not alien to those countries. It is not, however, the authority of single cases and precedents which is 
decisive, but their cumulative and growing weight‖.)  
  
138 
Court created for a system that is entitled to develop in its own peculiarities. The first duty is 
to understand the relevance of judicial decisions within the context of the Statute as 
elucidated in the practice of the Court. The crucial question is whether judicial decisions 
constitute sources from which rules/principles of international law could originate; it is 
rules/principles that give juridical expressions to judicial precedents.
6
 Accordingly, judicial 
decisions would invariably be a source of law once they are repository of rules/principles 
having the quality of law.  
However, it does not follow that a comparison of the approach of the Court with the common 
law rule of stare decisis cannot be made. Such an exercise provides an analogical platform 
for ascertaining the authority of judicial decisions in a Court that appears to display, towards 
its precedents, all the attributes of a common law court. Just like common law courts, the ICJ 
reasons by analogy: it treats like cases alike; and employs the distinguishing technique. An 
understanding of the operation of stare decisis under the common law would, no doubt, 
illuminate the approach of the Court, without necessarily assimilating it with the common 
law. Accordingly, and without affirming that the Court operates the stare decisis rule, the 
writer finds it important to discuss some features of the common law system which are 
similar to the approach of the ICJ. 
It is true that the Court does not operate the strict rule of stare decisis. This is not because the 
rule is prohibited by its Statute or excluded in its practice; it may be due to other reasons such 
as the absence of the structural hierarchy for such a system to thrive in its strict sense within 
the legal system in which the Court operates. It may also be the result of the fact that the 
judges of the Court are selected from diverse legal backgrounds: the judges neither share a 
                                                             
6 On this view, writers are agreeing. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It. 203 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) (stating that though on the formal level State Z is not be bound by the judgment in a case to 
which it was not a party, State Z is however bound by relevant rule of international law articulated by the Court in that case.)    
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common legal system or a common legal tradition. So that, by relieving the Court from 
dictates of a particularly system, judges of the Court retain freedom to operate unhindered by 
any particular legal system or legal tradition.  Nonetheless, the fact that the common law 
system has a great influence on the practice of the Court cannot be correctly disputed by any 
scholar who has achieved some depth in the study of the approach of the Court towards its 
precedents.  The similarities of the approach of the Court with the common law system seem 
to enjoy dominance over its similarities with any other system of law; but despite their 
similarities, it is the right caution to emphasise that the practice of the ICJ cannot be 
approached with the stricture of the common law system of the compulsion of vertical 
precedent.  
If we were to go by the common law doctrine of stare decisis, we would discover that judicial 
precedent does not consist of only the rule that compels a lower court to follow decisions of a 
higher court – vertical precedent. It also includes the psychological belief by a higher court 
that it has a duty to maintain certainty through consistency of its decisions, by adherence to 
its previous decisions. Also, that a precedent once set cannot be lightly overruled – horizontal 
precedent. The difference between vertical and horizontal precedents is that while the former 
requires strict adherence,
7
 the latter allows the court that set the precedent, the power to 
overrule it, should occasions call for it. For instance, while every other court below the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria is bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, there is no 
duty on the latter to strictly adhere to precedents. The Court is at liberty to overrule its 
precedents, when occasions call for it.  The same situation obtains in England. The antiquated 
rule that the House of Lords cannot reverse a precedent has since been whittled down: the 
                                                             
7 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (holding that ―if a precedent of [the Supreme Court] has 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions‖.)   
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House of Lords is now able to depart from a precedent when it is in the interests of justice to 
do so.
 8
 
Unless overruled, a precedent set by an apex court within a system of binding precedent has 
continuous applicability, not only for the lower courts within the hierarchy, but also for the 
apex court; though the latter may decide not to follow the precedent. Therefore, the concept 
of binding precedent is a relative concept in a court that has the ultimate power to set and 
overrule precedents in comparison to a lower court.   By virtue of its structure – being a court 
of first and final jurisdictions
9
 – the ICJ can only maintain a horizontal precedent, which in 
itself, does not require the strict application of stare decisis.
 
 
Generally, whether vertical or horizontal, Salmond thought the doctrine of precedent had two 
meanings: (a) it may mean that precedents may be cited, and will probably be followed by the 
court – the sense in which it is understood in the continental system;10 (b) it may mean that 
precedents, not only have great authority but must (in certain circumstances) be followed – 
the sense in which it is understood in England.
11
  The practice of the court appears to reveal a 
hybrid of both systems, while yet maintaining its peculiarities. It was, perhaps, with this in 
mind that Hersch Lauterpacht observed that:  
Without adopting the common law doctrine as to the binding force of the 
single precedent, and while disregarding formal prohibitions reminiscent of 
legal provisions in individual continental codes, the practice of the Court has 
become an instructive manifestation of the intrinsic merits – inevitably 
revealing themselves under every system of law – of judicial precedent.12 
 
                                                             
8 See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent)  (1966) 3 All E.R 77, Per Lord Gardiner LC  
9 Article 60 of its Statute makes its judgments final and without appeal. The Court sometimes enjoys appellant jurisdiction, 
when such a jurisdiction is granted by a treaty. See Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of ICAO Council, ICJ Rep 1972, p. 
46; Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Judgment of 15 December, 1933, Series 
A/B PCIJ  
10 P.J. Fitzgerald, Salmond on Jurisprudence 142 (12th ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1956)  
11 Ibid   
12 Note 5, p. 61  
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In the circumstance, and as the writer shall show later, there is a sort of judicial lawmaking 
operating in the Court in a latent and concealed manner and revealing itself in the form of 
binding rules/principles rather than in the English rule of stare decisis.  Accordingly, the 
absence of stare decisis does not by any means detract from the fact that the ICJ makes a 
habit of applying the rules/principles enunciated and applied in previous cases to future cases 
involving similar subject-matters, and between completely different parties. Neither does it 
deny the conscious and consistent efforts of the Court to maintain certain legal consequences 
(once established by it) to analogical factual situations. It is, therefore, imperative to focus on 
what the Court has identified as, ―the real question‖,13 which ―is whether ... there is cause not 
to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases‖.14 
Having laid this foundation, the writer shall now proceed to examine how the Court relates 
with its precedents, in practice. Before proceeding, it is important to reiterate the key point 
made above. The point is that stare decisis is not a pre-requisite for judicial legislation; and 
as a corollary, its absence in the ICJ not does not preclude its decisions being sources of law. 
It is also useful to recall the point set out in chapter one that though the court always tries to 
maintain consistency of rules/principles from previous cases, it is sometimes prevented from 
achieving this by political consideration and the dictates of what may be regarded as 
international public policy.   
4.3 The ICJ Follows Precedent 
The decided cases of the Court are replete with languages and patterns confirming the use of 
precedent by the Court. In the Interhandel Case,
15
 the Court said it will ―base itself‖, 16 on the 
                                                             
13 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reps 1998, 275, 292 para 28  
14 Ibid   
15 (Switzerland v. United States), ICJ Rep 1959, 6  
16 Ibid, p. 24. The Court does not only use the term ―base itself‖ in relation to its previous decisions. It also uses the term in 
relation to other instruments being relied upon by it. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, ICJ Reps 1952, 93, 103, the 
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precedent established in Nationality Decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco
17
 to the effect that 
in the event that two litigating States hold divergent views on a question of international law, 
which involves the interpretation of an international engagement, the question cannot be held 
to fall solely within the exclusive jurisdiction of a single State.  In Malaysia v. Singapore,
 18
 
an aspect of the Court‘s decision was reached in view of ―its previous jurisprudence‖. Here 
the Court relied on the precedent in Eastern Greenland case,
19
 establishing that a tribunal 
which has to adjudicate on a claim to sovereignty over a territory must take account of the 
extent to which sovereignty is also claimed by some other States. The ICJ held that if this 
principle was valid with reference to the thinly populated and unsettled territory of Eastern 
Greenland, it should also be valid in the case of Malaysia v. Singapore. This, in the reasoning 
of the Court, is because just as was the facts of the former, the latter case involved a tiny 
uninhabited and uninhabitable island, to which no claim of sovereignty had been made by 
any other Power throughout the years from the early sixteenth century until the middle of the 
nineteenth century.
20
 In the Oil Platforms case,
21
 the Court said it ―sees no reason to vary the 
conclusion it arrived in 1986 [in the Nicaragua case]‖. 22 Here the Court was interpreting 
article XX paragraph 1(d) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between the United States and Iran. The Court acknowledged that the text was open to two 
different interpretations. However, the Court decided that it would follow the interpretation 
earlier adopted by it while interpreting a similar treaty between the United States and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Court ―based itself‖ on the Iranian Declaration.  This goes to show that when the Court says that it is basing itself on a 
previous decision, it means that it is applying the authority of that decision.  In Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. DRC) 
Judgment of November 30, 2010, p. 18, para 41-42, the Court said it was ―drawing upon‖ and shall ―apply in the present 
case‖ the ―two alternative tests‖ formulated in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary 
Objections, ICJ Reps 1992, 261, on when an additional claim can be admissible     
17 Series B, No. 4 pp. 29-30. 
18Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, ICJ Rep 2008, 12, 101 Para 297.  
19 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, PCIJ Advisory Opinion, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46. 
20 Malaysia v. Singapore, note 18, p. 36, Para. 66. 
21 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ Rep, 803 
22 Ibid,  p. 811, para 20. 
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Nicaragua. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
 23
 the Court said it was 
following the threshold established in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua 
24
 for the sufficiency of control of paramilitaries by State organs.  
The view of the Court in some cases strongly suggests that it does not regard the practice of 
following precedent as an optional one. The Court had held that it, ―will not depart from its 
settled jurisprudence unless it finds a particular reason to do so‖;25  and also that ―precedents 
[are] to be followed in comparable cases‖.26 
It is worth noting also that the Court consciously perpetuates its precedents by applying them 
over and over again in analogous and deserving cases. This carries the possibility of judicial 
decisions qualifying as law through constant application even from the viewpoint of the 
continental rule of jurisprudence constante.  In Nicaragua v. Honduras
27
 the Court had 
earlier applied the Eastern Greenland case
28
 for the same principle concerning sovereignty of 
uninhabited territory, for which the case was subsequently applied in Malaysia v. 
Singapore.
29
 In Nicaragua v. Honduras,
30
 the Court had to determine which of the opposing 
evidence of effectiveness adduced by the parties, was sufficient proof of the effective 
exercise of powers appertaining to the authority of any of the States to sustain a claim to 
sovereignty over the disputed territory. The Court stated that four conditions must be fulfilled 
to sustain a claim of sovereignty on that basis. They are: (a) the intention and will to act as 
sovereign; (b) some actual exercise or display of such authority; and (c) the extent to which 
sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power.
31
 The Court expressly admitted that these 
                                                             
23 (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ Rep 2005, 168, .226 para 160. 
24 (Nicaragua v. the United States), Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14 
25 The second Genocide, note 4,  p.  17-18, para 53-54 
26 Ibid, p 17, para 54 
27 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, ICJ Rep 2007, 659  
28 Note 19 
29 Note 18 
30 Note 27 
31Ibid, p. 712, para. 172-174 
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conditions were distilled from the Eastern Greenland case,
32
 when it held that Nicaragua did 
not satisfy the criteria formulated by the PCIJ in the Eastern Greenland case.
 33 
In the application of rules/principles in a precedent, the ICJ is systematic and not arbitrary. It 
is as methodological as common law courts and applies all the techniques which govern the 
systematic application of precedents in common law courts. The Court reasons by analogy; it 
would not apply a rule/principle adopted in a decided case to another case, except the facts 
are sufficiently analogous. And when the facts are not so analogous to justify the application 
of the rule/principle, the Court employs the distinguishing technique to justify the 
inapplicability of the precedent. The writer shall now discuss these methods.  
4.3.1 Distinguishing Inapplicable Precedents 
A precedent is distinguished when the Court identifies factual dissimilarities between the 
facts for which a rule/principle was previously adopted and the facts of the case being 
decided. It could also be done on the basis of dissimilarities in applicable laws. On the basis 
of the dissimilarities identified by the Court, the applicability of the precedent to the 
dissimilar case is excluded. By distinguishing the cases, the Court affirms the authority of the 
rules/principles contained therein by showing that its inapplicability is not due to any intrinsic 
defect as a source of law but only on the factual or legal differences between the case for 
which the rule/principle was adopted and the case at hand.  In effect the Court is simply 
holding that the rule/principle applies to a different factual or legal situation.  
In Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,
34
 while urging the Court to annul the trial and 
conviction of its nationals in the United States in violation of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, Mexico analogised its case with the Arrest Warrant of April 11 2000,
35
 
and urged the Court to follow suit. In the latter, the Court ordered the cancellation of an arrest 
                                                             
32 Note 19,  pp. 45-46 
33 Note 27, p. 721, para 208 
34(Mexico v. The United States of America) ICJ Rep 2004, 12, 60 para. 123   
35 (DRC  v. Belgium), ICJ Rep 2002, 3.   
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warrant issued by a Belgian judicial official in violation of the international immunity of the 
Congo Minister for Foreign Affairs. In reaching a decision, the Court acknowledged the 
authority of the Arrest Warrant case, but held that it was inapplicable because, in the Arrest 
Warrant case, the legality of the arrest warrant was the subject-matter of the international 
dispute, hence the proper remedy for finding the warrant in violation of international law was 
its cancellation. Whereas, in the Avena case, it was not the convictions and sentencing of the 
Mexican nationals which were to be regarded as a violation of international law, but solely 
certain breaches of treaty obligations which preceded them.  
This technique was also employed in relation to the interpretative rule in Israel v. Bulgaria
36
 
in two subsequent cases in which the precedent was sought to be applied. The general rule 
which emanated from Israel v. Bulgaria was that the transitional provisions in article 36(5)
37
 
of the Statute of the Court did not preserve jurisdictional instruments made by States which 
were not original members of the United Nations. And not being an original member, the 
Court held that Bulgaria could not renew its PCIJ Declaration of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction under the Statute of the ICJ. Therefore, the Court concluded that Bulgaria had no 
access to the ICJ under the optional clause system without making a fresh declaration.  
Two years later, the Court was invited to apply this precedent in Temple of Preah Vihear.
38
 
This case equally called for the interpretation of article 36(5) of the Statute of the Court. 
Thailand constructed the general legal premise in Israel v. Bulgaria to be that: declarations 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ by States which were not original members 
of the UN lapsed on the dissolution of the PCIJ and could not be renewed under the ICJ 
Statute when such States joined the UN subsequently. Thailand urged the Court to adopt this 
precedent to the effect that her declaration equally lapsed within the intervening period 
                                                             
36Aerial Incident of July 27th 1955, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1955, 127 
37 By which PICJ Declarations which are still in force are deemed to be acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.  
38 (Cambodia v. Thailand) Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep, 1961, 17 
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between the demise of the PCIJ and when she joined the UN, as did that of Bulgaria. While 
refusing to apply the Bulgaria precedent, the Court held that the facts of the cases were not 
sufficiently analogous. The Court found the distinguishing facts in Thailand‘s subsequent 
renewal of her otherwise lapsed 1929 PCIJ Declaration, after becoming a member of the 
United Nations. The Court considered that this fact placed Thailand in a different position to 
Bulgaria, which did not take any such step.   
Subsequently, the Court was again confronted with this precedent in Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company Ltd.
39
 Here, like Thailand, Spain had based herself on the 
Bulgaria precedent to urge the Court to hold that the dissolution of the PCIJ extinguished the 
jurisdictional clause contained in the Hispano-Belgian Treaty of 1927. That as a result, the 
jurisdictional clause referring disputes to the PCIJ was not transferrable to the ICJ under 
virtue of article 37.
40
 The Court also distinguished the cases.  
The Court found that different instruments were involved in the cases; and that while Israel v. 
Bulgaria involved unilateral declaration under article 36(5), the Barcelona Traction case 
involved an instrument having a conventional form, and having the essential requirement of 
being "in force" under article 37. Based on these differences, the Court held that the rule 
adopted in Israel v. Bulgaria was inapplicable. 
Though these cases clearly show the entrenched nature of the distinguishing technique in the 
practice of the Court, it is really doubtful whether the best option was for the Court to 
distinguish the Bulgaria case in the subsequent cases, particularly in the Temple of Preah 
case. This is because the cases were not satisfactorily distinguishable. No doubt, there were 
some factual dissimilarities, these dissimilarities seemed not to justify the inapplicability of 
the Bulgaria case to the subsequent cases. The best option for the Court would have been to 
overrule the Bulgaria precedent given the fact that the existence of the precedent constrained 
                                                             
39 Preliminary Objections, 1964 ICJ Rep, .6 
40 By which the ICJ was substituted for the PCIJ for the purpose of jurisdictional clauses in treaties in force. 
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the options open to the Court. As noted by the Court, the precedent was capable of causing 
hardship and creating unintended consequences for States which, even though they were not 
original members of the UN, intended to transfer their instruments of acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ to the ICJ. According to the Court:  
any decision of the Court, relative to Article 37, must affect a considerable 
number of surviving treaties and conventions providing for recourse to the 
Permanent Court .... It is thus clear that the decision of the Court in the 
present case, whatever it might be, would be liable to have far-reaching 
effects.
 41
  
 
In the Temple of Preah case, for instance, the legal ground on which the 1950 purported 
renewal of her declaration stood is unclear. This is because following the precedent in the 
Bulgaria case, as retained by the Court, the 1929 Thailand Declaration should have been 
extinguished between the dissolution of the PCIJ and 1946, when Thailand joined the United 
Nations. That being the case, Thailand had nothing to renew. This point was strongly made in 
individual opinions of the Judges, who rejected the grounds upon which the Court 
distinguished the cases.
42
  
If the Court overruled the Bulgaria precedent, it would have been spared the lengthy but 
unsatisfactory distinguishing while trying to justify the grounds of its decision in the 
subsequent cases. Notwithstanding, the cases do show that the Court would not mechanically 
follow a precedent, though it would not lightly refuse to follow precedent. The cases do also 
emphasise the fact that the Court is regrettably swayed from following its earlier decision by 
extra-legal considerations. The reason for not following the Bulgaria precedent may not be 
related to its tenability as much as it was, on the admission of the Court, related to the fact 
that it was capable of defeating a considerable number of treaties providing for recourse to 
the Court. In other words, the Court was more concerned with the impact its decision would 
                                                             
41 Note 39, p. 29 
42 See Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka in Temple of Preah case, note 38, p. 65 and the Dissenting Opinion of Armand-
Ugon, note 38, p. 116   
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have on the instruments of pacific settlement of disputes at large than its effects on particular 
disputants.      
4.3.2 Overruling a Precedent 
The possibility of the ICJ overruling itself is of particular importance to this work because the 
fact that the Court could overrule itself is surprisingly one of the fulcrums for the argument 
that judicial decisions are not a source of law. In the opinion of Bernhandt:  
International law does not recognise a binding force of precedents or the 
principle of stare decisis, nor is a court decision, even a decision of the world 
court, a source of international law.... Decisions binding on the parties in the 
particular case could be overruled the next day by the same court in a new 
case.
43
   
 
It is true that the Court can overrule a precedent sooner than it was set. Though the Court is 
yet to do this, it must nonetheless be considered that the Court, as a first and final Court, is 
well able to do this. Even if it were to operate within a common law jurisdiction, its ability to 
overrule its precedent just after it was set would not detract from its general common law 
character; neither will it affect the authority of the precedent that has not been overruled.    
As earlier stated, the question as to whether a particular precedent is binding is a relative 
question before the court that set that precedent. Law – whether made by the legislature or the 
judge – is not static and not absolute; there is always the need for reviews so as to keep pace 
with unforeseen eventualities. This is particularly true of international law, which though it is 
in need of constant evolution, is lacking in a legislative institution that would give expression 
to the needed evolution. In the words of Judge Shahabuddeen, in his Separate Opinion in 
Certain Phosphate case, 
                                                             
43 Rudolf Bernhardt, ―Article 59‘ in the Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary‖.  Andreas 
Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-Frahm ed., the Statute of the International Court of justice: Commentary, 
1231, 1244 (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2006). This is unconvincing. It is more like saying that rules in judicial 
decisions must be iron-cast for there to be a system of judicial precedent, whereas not even the common law of England 
could afford that. It reminds us of the observation that it is ―revolting if the grounds upon which it [a precedent] was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past‖ – Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
―The Path of Law‖, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897)      
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The possibility of a court deciding differently on the same issues in differently 
constituted proceedings is not a phenomenon less known to the law than the 
general propensity of courts to be guided by their rulings in similar cases. To 
use the propensity to be guided by previous rulings to exclude the possibility of 
deciding differently in a later case would be even less right in international 
litigation than it would be in municipal.
 44
 
 
 It is therefore important that the ICJ, whose jurisdiction is international and voluntary, 
should apply much more flexibility than municipal courts. 
The ICJ thus has the prerogative to decide to follow a precedent; distinguish a precedent or 
out-rightly overrule it. Within the common law system, distinguishing is a device used by all 
courts within the hierarchy of courts. On the contrary, the power to overrule a precedent set 
by the highest court within the system is the exclusive preserve of that court. As already 
stated above, these powers are concentrated in the ICJ which is a court of first and final 
instances.  
It is within the powers of the ICJ to overrule a precedent which no longer serves the ends of 
justice; or when the grounds upon which the precedent was based have ―lost legal 
credibility‖.45 The Court‘s power in this regards was affirmed by Judge Tanaka, when he 
declared: 
...the requirement of the consistency of jurisprudence is never absolute. It 
cannot be maintained at the sacrifice of the requirements of justice and 
reason. The Court should not hesitate to overrule the precedents and 
should not be too preoccupied with the authority of its past decisions. The 
formal authority of the Court's decision must not be maintained to the 
detriment of its substantive authority.
46
 
 
An overruled precedent is akin to a repealed legislative enactment; an overruled precedent 
ceases to have any legal authority in the reasoning process of a Court. And when a precedent 
is overruled it is not the actual decision in the precedent but the rule/principle of law 
                                                             
44  (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reps 1992, 261, 298  
45Joint Declaration of Vice President Renjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and 
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formulated in reaching that decision that is overruled. The decision continues to have effect 
between the parties. As a corollary, it does not follow that all disputes touching on 
rules/principles adopted by the Court concerning a subject-matter are predetermined by virtue 
of that rule/principle. Though it could be supposed that the Court would reach a similar 
conclusion in analogical cases, no State can claim victory until the Court actually decides on 
her own case. This is because the Court may distinguish the precedent or out-rightly overrule 
the rule/principle it contains.     
What the Court should not do is to overrule or ignore a precedent which is still sound in law 
because the precedent is not conducive to prevailing political trends. The fact that a precedent 
has led to a politically undesirable result does not necessarily mean that precedent is legally 
wrong. There are a number of cases in which this has occurred but the writer shall only 
emphasise the Status of Eastern Carelia.
47
  Here, the PCIJ established the rule that the Court 
should refuse to render an advisory opinion, when: (a) the advisory opinion being sought 
directly pertained to a dispute between States; and (b) when a party to the dispute refuses to 
consent to the proceedings.  
In the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
48
 the advisory 
opinion requested from the Court was caught by the Eastern Carelia rule.  The attention of 
the Court was called not only to the rule, but also the striking similarities between both cases. 
The cases were similar on the following facts: (a) the subject-matter of both requests was the 
interpretation of a treaty and the existence of certain international obligations arising under 
that treaty; (b) in both cases, one of the parties to the dispute refused to take part in the 
debates in the international organization which subsequently requested the opinion; (c) in 
both cases, one of the parties was not a member of the requesting international Organization; 
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and (d) one of the parties to the dispute contested the right of the Court to give an opinion in 
the case without its consent.
49
  
These similarities made it logically imprudent to distinguish the cases on their facts. This 
presented the Court with the limited options to either follow or overrule Eastern Caralia. 
Technically overruling Eastern Caralia, (without explicitly stating so) the Court set a new 
rule that, advisory opinions, even if related to a legal question actually pending between 
States, did not require the consent of interested States. The Court declared that no State, 
whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an advisory 
opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment 
as to the course of action it should take, as the Court's opinion is given, not to the States, but 
to the organ which is entitled to request it.
50
 
When the issue arose again in Western Sahara,
51
 the Court leaned heavily on Peace Treaties 
while seeking to rationalise the conflict between Eastern Carelia and Peace Treaties by 
balancing the requirement of consent on judicial propriety. In the view of the Court, the 
competence to give an opinion does not depend on the consent of the interested States (even 
when the request concerns a legal dispute actually pending between States), except the 
absence of consent makes it judicially inappropriate to render the opinion.
52
 
When considered in the light of the in-excludable rule of international law that a State is not 
obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent (on 
which the PCIJ based itself), it becomes clear that Eastern Carelia best articulates the law, 
since it is from this fundamental principle of law that Eastern Carelia draws its juridical 
strength.
53
 This, perhaps, explains why despite attempting to overrule the case, it has 
                                                             
49 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Zoricic in Interpretation of Peace Treaties, ibid, p 103  
50 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, note 48, p. 71 
51 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1975, 12 
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53 See Judge Zoricic, Note 49, p., 104 (affirming that ―the principle of sovereign equality and the rule of law which follows 
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continued to be relevant. Its relevance was even affirmed, both in the Peace Treaties itself 
and Western Sahara. In both cases, the Court still distinguished Eastern Carelia. This is not 
an attitude of a Court that thought the rule in a particular precedent was wrong and should be 
overruled, no matter how subtly. Such a Court does not have any legal obligation to resurrect 
the precedent for the purpose of distinguishing the case at hand. By that singular act, the 
Court affirmed the tenacity of the Eastern Carelia.  
This, no doubt, is an instance of the Court avoiding its precedent for considerations other than 
the correctness of the rule it upholds. It may well be that the avoidance of Eastern Carelia  
was because it became a ground for urging the Court to decline rendering opinion by 
recalcitrant States seeking to shield a matter from the scrutiny of the law. For instance, Spain 
had sought to shield the legal scrutiny of the colonalisation of Western Sahara from the law 
by relying on Eastern Carelia. Same did South Africa in respect of her continued presence in 
Namibia, in the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa).
54
 These areas being matters of great moment in international 
affairs and touching on the sensitivities of newly independent States (at that time) and on a 
cardinal purpose of the UN, the Court may have acted on political expediency. Whether the 
Court should act on such expediency is another question all together. And this can by no 
means question the legal validity of the legal premise upon which Eastern Carelia was 
constructed.  
On the other hand, it is equally undesirable to allow a wrong precedent to continue by using 
the avoidance technique of distinguishing. To allow this to happen is to invite further 
litigations on the point decided by that precedent. It is, therefore, incumbent on a court, 
having the power to do so, to overrule a wrong precedent and forestall every possibility of its 
resurrection in future cases. It is indeed the failure of the Court to overrule Israel v. Bulgaria 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Caralia is ―a precedent of the highest importance‖.(p. 102)   
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rule, though it had been a major obstacle to independent reasoning in the Temple of Preah 
case and the Barcelona Traction case,
55
 that informed objections being raised concerning the 
continued relevance of that precedent in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua.
56
  
In the latter case, the Court once again sailed into the province of the rule in Israel v. 
Bulgaria, when it was argued by the United States that Nicaragua was caught by Israel v 
Bulgaria. It was argued that Nicaragua had no valid declaration accepting the jurisdiction of 
the PCIJ capable of transiting to the jurisdiction of the ICJ by virtue of article 36(5). This was 
because Nicaragua‘s PCIJ Declaration was never ratified.  The legal equation was as follows: 
if Nicaragua had a valid PCIJ Declaration, being an original member of the UN, its case 
would seamlessly fall within the principle in Bulgaria v. Israel. Since the sole reason that 
made the Bulgaria declaration non-transferable was the fact that she was not an original 
member of the UN, it would indirectly flow from that precedent that the declaration of an 
original member of the UN is automatically transferred to the ICJ.  However, absent a valid 
declaration, one of the conditions for the application of the principle in the Bulgaria case 
would not have been fulfilled.      
The Court was now sandwiched between its desire not to radically upset its earlier case-law 
on the point, and its desire not to unduly restrict its jurisdiction.  The only way out was for 
the Court to, once again, distinguish Israel v. Bulgaria.
57
 But the lengthy distinguishing 
would have been avoided had the case been overruled in the preceding cases.  
Expectedly it was Israel v. Bulgaria that furnished the impetus for the strong dissenting 
opinions of Judges Jennings and Schwebel. Judge Schwebel reasoned that the Bulgaria case 
strikingly and decisively nullified Nicaragua's Declaration in that if, as held in the Bulgaria 
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56 (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Rep 1984, 392   
57Ibid,  p. 405 
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case, the purpose of article 36, paragraph 5, is to transform acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ into an acceptance of that of the ICJ, it would exclude States like 
Nicaragua which never accepted the PCIJ compulsory jurisdiction.
58
 In the reasoning of 
Judge Schwebel,   
... today's [Nicaragua case] Judgment, while endeavouring to distinguish the 
facts at bar in the Aerial Incident case from the instant case, renews … its 
reliance upon the Judgment in the Aerial Incident case and so gives fresh 
point to this question.
59
 
 
Judge Jennings followed the same line of reasoning. In effect, his reasoning was that, if 
following Israel v. Bulgaria, a declaration which had come into effect for the PCIJ, and was 
still running, was not transferrable under Article 36(5), due to the dissolution of the PCIJ, it 
would have by similar logic occurred that a declaration which never actually created an 
obligation in respect of the PCIJ, cannot be carried over to the ICJ by Article 36(5).
60
 
It is thus not conducive to the maintenance of coherence and promotion of the rule of law for 
the Court to suppress rather than overrule an ailing precedent; or for it to refuse to follow a 
sound precedent for reasons other than its tenability.  
 
4.3.2.1 The Court does not make a Habit of Overruling its Precedent 
It is obvious from the cases that the Court does not make a habit of overruling its precedent. 
Even in cases where the Court faced strong criticisms from some of its Judges and some 
scholars, the Court maintains the precedent sought to be discredited. The precedent in the 
Right of Passage over Indian Territory
61
 provides a cogent example. Here, the Court held that 
the transmission of the declaration of a new Declarant to existing Declarants under article 
36(4) was not a pre-requisite to the right of the new Declarant to bring proceedings against an 
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existing member under the optional clause system. When the question as to whether a new 
Declarant can seise the Court with a case against an existing Declarant before her Declaration 
is transmitted, arose again in Cameroon v. Nigeria,
62
 the case became dependent on the 
application or otherwise of the Right of Passage case. Nigeria specifically invited the Court 
to overrule the case and hold that non-transmission was mandatory under article 36(4). The 
Court declined the invitation, affirming that there was no reason not to follow the reasoning 
and conclusion in the Right of Passage case.   
This judgment was criticised in the individual opinions of some of the Judges.  Judge Koroma 
criticised the failure of the ―Court ... [to] grasp the opportunity which the case presented, as 
well as the circumstances surrounding it, to carry out a juristic as well as a judicial 
reappraisal of Article 36 of the Statute‖.63 The Judge queried why the Court would refuse to 
reconsider the Right of Passage decision which, ―not only was rendered more than 40 years 
ago but has been the subject of repeated calls for reconsideration‖, 64 affirming that ―it would 
have been more than timely for the Court to undertake a reappraisal both of the provision of 
the Statute and the Judgment itself‖.65 On his part, Judge Weeramantry thought the Right of 
Passage decision was in need of a review as ―It affects too fundamental an aspect of the 
Court's jurisdiction to remain as the leading authority on this question after 40 years of 
development of international law‖.66  
This has also been the situation with the rule adopted by the Court in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
67
 concerning the scope of ―armed attack‖ 
under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Here, the Court held that military action 
by irregulars could constitute armed attack only if they were sent by a State or they were 
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acting on behalf of a State. A view which was approved and followed in the Advisory 
Opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory
68
 and DRC v. Uganda,
69
 despite calls by litigating States and even by judges of the 
Court, that the Court should reconsider the rule in the light of the development of 
international law on the subject.   
In urging the Court to review its Nicaragua precedent, Judge Kooljmans reasoned that the 
Security Council had introduced a new element which recognises that ―armed attack‖ could 
proceed from non-State actors by virtue of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001), and urged the 
Court to follow suit, notwithstanding that the Nicaragua case position had been the generally 
accepted interpretation for more than 50 years.
 70
 The Judge regretted that the Court ―by-
passed this new element ...which marks ... a new approach to the concept of self-
defence‖.71Judge Higgins also disagreed with the majority though accepting that the view of 
the majority was the law until set aside.
72
 Judge Kooljmans remarked that the Court had lost 
an opportunity to take a position with regard to the question whether the threshold set out in 
the Nicaragua judgment was still in conformity with contemporary international law in spite 
of the fact that that threshold had been subjected to increasing severe criticism ever since it 
was established, and in spite of the explicit invitation by one of the parties to do so.
73
 On his 
part, Judge Simma reasoned that the Court ought urgently to reconsider the precedent in the 
light of more recent developments not only in State practice, but also with regard to 
accompanying opinio juris.
 74 
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These cases demonstrate the unwillingness of the Court to alter its precedent once set. While 
lending credence to the fact that the Court attaches juridical relevance to its precedent, it 
equally portrays a situation capable of stultifying the development of international law.    
The last few sections above have discussed the techniques employed by the Court towards 
systematic application of precedent. It has been said that the Court uses the distinguishing 
technique and also that it has the power to overrule a precedent which it considers no longer 
tenable in law. It has also been shown that the Court is reluctant to overrule a precedent, thus 
leading to a situation where the Court repeatedly entertains arguments on the authority of a 
precedent that it should have overruled at the earliest opportunity. This has resulted in the 
Court laying down conflicting decisions on the same issue.       
4.3.3 Conflicting Decisions 
The writer has shown above that there are two conflicting rules guiding the advisory 
jurisdiction of the Court concerning a legal question bearing on a dispute between States, one 
of which is not a member of the UN and has not given its consent to the proceedings. Thus 
while Eastern Carelia established that the Court should refuse to render an opinion in the 
circumstances, the Peace Treaties case established that the consent of an interested State is 
not a pre-requisite, even if the State is not a member of the UN.    
The approach of the Court in these cases is untidy. By continuing to recognise the validity of 
the Eastern Carelia precedent
75
 while taking a completely different view in the Peace 
Treaties
76
 and Western Sahara,
77
 the Court maintained two conflicting precedents on the 
point, thus unsettling that area of the its case-law and impeding consistency and 
predictability. This was manifest in the Western Sahara case, where in summing up the 
arguments of the Parties, the Court noted: 
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In support of these propositions Spain ... has relied, in particular, on ... the 
Status of Eastern Carelia case ...  maintaining that the essential principle 
enunciated in that case is not modified by the decisions of the present Court 
in ... the Interpretation of Peace Treaties ... and the Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) .... Morocco and Mauritania, on the other hand, have maintained that 
the present case falls within the principles applied in those two decisions and 
that the ratio decidendi of the Status of Eastern Carelia case is not applicable 
to it. 
78
  
 
In consequence, it would be for a future Court to choose which of the two it prefers to follow 
until one of them is eventually overruled by the Court or excluded by treaty. Hence the 
situation where the Court refused to follow Eastern Carelia in the Peace Treaties and 
Western Sahara, while the Namibia opinion,
79
 which was rendered between Eastern Carelia 
and Peace Treaties, did not even attempt to challenge the tenacity of Eastern Carelia. In the 
latter, the Court still accepted the validity of Eastern Carelia though distinguishing it, while 
the Peace Treaties, which became authority for the decision in Western Sahara, was not even 
cited in the Namibia case.  
The first
80
 and second
81
 Genocide cases and the Use of Force case,
82
 are in the same stead. 
The issue common to these cases was the competence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY as Serbia and Montenegro) in the ICJ, following the disintegration of the former 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).  
In the decision on preliminary objections in the first Genocide case,
83
 the Court held that 
FRY was a competent Respondent, on the strength of article 35(1) of the Statute of the Court 
and article IX of the Genocide Convention. This decision was generally predicated upon an 
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earlier Ruling of the Court
84
 that FRY was a continuator of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) and thus had access to it under article 35(1) of its Statute and the 
Genocide Convention. Subsequent to the decision of the Court, events at the UN General 
Assembly and Security Council revealed that FRY was not competent to participate in the 
activities of the UN as a continuator of the former SFRY. FRY was, therefore, declared a 
non-member of the UN, and was subsequently admitted to membership of the UN on 
November 1, 2000, upon a fresh application.  
In consequence, FRY filed an Application for revision of the Judgment of July 11, 1996.
85
 
FRY contended that her admission into the UN after the 1996 Judgment negated the ground 
upon which that Judgment was based. And that not being a member of the UN, she was not a 
party to the Statute of the Court, neither was she bound by the Genocide Convention. In its 
judgment, the Court declared the application for revision inadmissible and declined 
comments on the issues concerning access to Court raised by FRY.
86
 
Before judgment on the merit was delivered in the first Genocide case, the issue of the access 
of FRY to the Court either as a member of the United Nations or as a party to the Genocide 
Convention fell to be decided again. In the Use of Force case,
87
 the Court held that, whatever 
title of jurisdiction FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) might have invoked, she did not have 
access to the Court under article 35(1) of its Statute when the application was filed because 
she was not a member of the UN. As for article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Court 
held that the Convention could not be a basis of jurisdiction because the Convention was not 
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a treaty in force within the contemplation of article 35(2) of the Statute of the Court. The 
Court reasoned that the Convention postdates the Statute of the Court and that article 35(2) 
only relates to treaties which were in force at the time the Statute came into being.    
It is obvious that the decision of the Court in this case is in conflict with its earlier decision in 
the first Genocide case on the issue of the access of Yugoslavia to the Court. It is also 
noteworthy that the Court in the Use of Force case,
 88
 had, in its ruling delivered before FRY 
was admitted into the UN in 2000,   followed the position in the first Genocide case.  To 
justify its departure from the first Genocide precedent, the Court stated that the new approach 
was informed by the vantage point from which it ―now looks at the legal situation ... in the 
light of the legal consequences of the new development since 1 November 2000‖.89 In clear 
terms, and rightly too, the Court predicated its departure from its earlier position on the 
admission of FRY into the UN.  
 
4.3.3.1 Implications for the Genocide Cases    
At this point the bases for the Court‘s jurisdiction in the first Genocide case had been 
overruled. The clear position of the law became that FRY was not competent before the Court 
either as an applicant or a respondent before it was admitted into the UN in 2000. The 
implication of this was that the first Genocide case, which was filed before that date and was 
still pending, was not competent.   Expectedly, at the merit stage of the first Genocide case,
 
Yugoslavia drew the attention of the Court to the decision in the Use of Force cases, and 
asked the Court to decline jurisdiction since it was now judicially confirmed that she did not 
have access to the Court as at March 20, 1993, when the case was filed. The Court rejected 
the objection affirming that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide 
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Convention. It was from this point that the case-law of the Court became destabilised 
concerning the competence of FRY before the Court.  
The problem which confronted the Court was how to reconcile this decision with the Use of 
Force case, which incidentally involved FRY as Applicant while a Respondent in the first 
Genocide case. The Court had the more judicially prudent choice of following the Use of 
Force case at the pains of being denied the opportunity of examining the grave allegations of 
genocide raised against FRY.
90
  Otherwise the Court could distinguish or overrule the Use of 
Force cases. Rather, the Court allowed itself to set two conflicting precedents on a question 
of law and facts involving the same State party to the two cases. What is particularly 
worrisome is the failure of the Court to address the implications of the Use of Force 
precedent with a view to justifying its excludability. The Court was content to follow res 
judicata. What could be res judicata, in an issue that intrinsically affected the competence of 
the Court (which jurisdiction is consensual) over a State that was not in the position to give 
the requisite consent? 
The implication of the manner the Court handled its precedent in the first Genocide case, was 
that FRY had competence to be brought to the Court as a Respondent at the suit of another 
State, but lacked the competence to sue as an Applicant. These inconsistent results did not 
only question the judicial propriety of the first Genocide decision, it also undermined the 
sovereign equality of FRY visa a vis other States.  
When the question arose again in the second Genocide case,
91
 the Court was faced with two 
conflicting decisions on the issue. Instead of boldly addressing this conflict, the Court chose 
another reason altogether; it simply relied on what it constantly called ―the Mavrommatis 
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doctrine”.92 This doctrine is to the effect that, any defect in the jurisdiction of the Court 
arising from the non fulfilment of a condition when the case was filed, would be 
retrospectively cured when the condition is fulfilled before the Court decides on its 
jurisdiction.
93
 It is, as rightly pointed out by Judge Skotnikov, doubtful whether the 
Mavrommatis doctrine was applicable to this case. The Judge thought, and rightly too, that 
Mavrommatis and all the other cases cited by the Court pertained to ―consent‖, as against the 
―right‖ to appear before the Court, which was in issue at the second Genocide case.94 
By necessary implication, the second Genocide Court technically agreed that there was a 
defect arising from the status of FRY, but that the defect was cured by the Mavrommatis 
doctrine.  The approach of the Court is all the more confounding because Croatia had 
expressly invited the Court to ―reconsider and modify the interpretation...‖ adopted in the Use 
of Force case, (regarding the view that the Genocide Convention was not a treaty in force for 
the purpose of article 35(2) of the Statute of the Court) and correct the error.
95
 This is even 
more so, given that the Court acknowledged the authority of its previous decisions, when 
noting that some of the facts and the legal issues dealt with in the first Genocide case and the 
Use of Force case arise also in the present case, The Court declared: 
To the extent that the decisions contain findings of law, the Court will treat 
them as it treats all previous decisions: that is to say that, while those 
decisions are in no way binding on the Court, it will not depart from its 
settled jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so.
96
 
 
However, just like in the first Genocide case, the Court was evasive. It failed to resolve the 
conflicting precedents handed down by the first Genocide case and the Use of Force case.  
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Quite rightly, the failure of the Court to effectively deal with the Use of Force precedent was 
one of the grounds on which a number of Judges based their dissents. In the joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Ranjeva, Shi and Koroma in the first Genocide case, the Judges remarked 
that the Court employed diversionary tactics by which it failed to exhaustively discuss the 
basis of its jurisdiction and provide reasoned examination as required by article 56 of its 
Statute.
97
 They further contended that it was regrettable that the Court chose to depart from 
its own jurisprudence.
98
 In his Separate Opinion, Judge Tomka was not convinced with the 
―strained reasoning‖99 of the majority in the first Genocide case. Judge Al-Khasawneh 
thought the Court in the first Genocide case was wrong for failing to address the 
contradictions between its earlier decisions and the use of Force case.
100
  
The views expressed in the dissenting opinion of the judges truly captured the essence of the 
duty of the Court to maintain coherence by either following or clearly overruling a precedent. 
Rather than allowing the two conflicting precedents on a particular issue to exist 
concurrently.  
No doubt, the upheaval in the case-law of the Court concerning advisory opinions relating to 
matters pending between States and the particular question of the competence of FRY before 
the Court could have been avoided. It was open to the Court to either follow or overrule the 
precedents, rather than allowing them to continue while reaching a contrary position without 
distinguishing or overruling the conflicting precedent. The ICJ cannot afford to reason in a 
haphazard manner.
 
It must act in a manner reflecting its judicial character, whenever it 
chooses to modify its earlier position.
101
  The Court is not entitled to pick and choose reasons 
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for its decisions, especially where the cases are inter-related. Once again, the emasculating 
effects of politics and international public policy on this problem cannot be ignored.  
It has so far been shown that the Court follows its precedent. Also, that though the Court is 
not bound by the English rule of stare decisis, it seldom departs from its precedent even in 
cases where it was strenuously urged to do so. It has been noted that the Court reasons by 
analogy, using the distinguishing technique to set cases apart when their facts are not 
analogous. The writer has also questioned the propriety of handing down conflicting 
precedents on the same issue while, at the same time not ignoring extra-legal factors that may 
account for this.  
The question the writer shall now address is the juridical relevance of the precedent of the 
Court given that stare decisis is inapplicable in the Court. In other words, of what use are the 
precedents of the Court absent stare decisis, which plays a vital role under the common law?  
4.4 Adherence to Precedent Guarantees Coherence 
The undeniable relevance of adherence to precedents by the Court is coherency. In simple 
terms the connectivity between a precedent and a case at hand is analogical reasoning. 
Through analogy the Court treats like cases alike to the effect that States in similar factual 
positions are treated alike through the application of the same legal rules/principles. This is 
irrespective of whether or not any of the litigating States was not a party to the case in which 
the rules/principles were adopted. What connects two otherwise unconnected States; 
unconnected cases; and unconnected but analogous causes of action, is the common 
rules/principles applicable to them. By analogical reasoning, a precedent, no matter how 
remote in time and space, becomes relevant if not decisive to the decision in a later case. It 
thus becomes possible to be certain about how a court that follows its precedent would decide 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
253 (1971) (stressing the essence of confidence in the‖ stability and adequacy of the law‖, and ―in the integrity and 
predictability of courts and tribunals administering justice‖.)   
  
165 
a similar factual situation to one it had previously decided. This ensures coherence, checks 
arbitrariness and promotes equality of treatment as well as the rule of law. As one writer puts 
it, respect for precedent ―serves to take the capricious element out of the law and to give 
stability to a society‖.102  
The importance of coherence in the decisions of the ICJ cannot be overemphasised in view of 
the fact that the States, which are the main litigants before the Court, operate under the 
illusion that they are equal; and legitimately expect the Court to perpetuate this notion of 
equality through consistency of reasoning and decisions, and to provide sufficiency of 
reasons for acting otherwise.
103
 For Judge Schwebel, equality of treatment can come only 
with ―... the most careful regard for its precedents‖.104 And, declaring that ―[c]onsistency is 
the essence of legal reasoning‖,105 Judge Koojamas pointed out that ―consistency in reasoning 
in the Court‘s case law is of paramount importance...‖.106  
This, perhaps, explains why the practice of following its precedent is often defended and 
rationalised in the judgments and opinions of the Court as well as in the opinions of 
individual judges. In his Separate Opinion in Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judge Schwebel was of the view that ―[w]hile the Court may be 
commended for the simplicity of its conclusion, a principled consistency with its earlier case-
law is less conspicuous‖.107 This, according to the Judge, was because the majority had 
jettisoned ―what its case-law, and the accepted customary law of the question, have 
provided‖.108 In his Dissenting Opinion in the second Genocide case, ad hoc Judge Kreca 
reasoned that ―judicial consistency is rather the result, the picture of the coherency of 
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decisions and the reasons making a logical legal union, based on the proper application of 
legal rules which should bind any court of law in its judicial activity‖. Also, that ―judicial 
consistency ―represents the intrinsic, organic quality of the judicial reasoning in the different 
phases of a case, or different cases, which regard identical or similar issues‖.109 In the 
Barcelona Traction case Judge Tanaka insisted: 
 the same kind of cases must be decided in the same way and possibly by 
the same reasoning. This limitation is inherent in the judicial activities as 
distinct from purely academic activities.
 110
 
 
Coherency of reasoning and predictability of decisions cannot be achieved unless, as 
explained by Judge Kreca, a given factual state and legal status occurring in two different 
cases receives equal treatments.
111
 This invariably means that a rule adopted for, or a 
principle applied to, a given set of facts and circumstances in a previous case should equally 
be applied to subsequent analogous cases, except there are good reasons dictating otherwise. 
The Court is not entitled to treat like cases alike as a matter of convenience but as a vital tool 
for the maintenance of its judicial character and the achievement of coherence. Knowing, as 
stated by Rosalyn Higgins,
112
 that ―coherence and consistency is the cornerstone of 
continuing respect for its jurisprudence‖, 113  and fully aware that the international community 
relies on it for the correct position of the law, the Court cannot but attach fundamental 
importance to coherency.  
An incoherent case-law would not only create inequality it would also expose the Court to a 
perception of being biased and this would in turn erode confidence and trust.  For:   
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...if like cases are not treated alike, the very essence of a normative system of 
law will be lost. Should this develop, the legitimacy of international law as a 
whole will be placed at risk.
114
  
 
Inconsistent decisions are the direct consequences of disregarding precedent. The line of 
cases concerning the South West African Mandate would buttress this point. On the question 
of the Mandate of South West Africa, the Court delivered three opinions – International 
Status of South-West Africa;
115
 South-West Africa-Voting Procedure,
116
and Admissibility of 
Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa
117
  – and two judgments – the 
preliminary judgment
118
 and the main judgment
119
 in the South West Africa Cases. In the 
three Opinions, the Court was consistent in following the view established in the 
International Status of South-West Africa, which was its first Opinion on the issue. The 
consistent view followed by the Court was that the Mandate system outlived the League of 
Nations and that the Mandate obligations can be exercised by the United Nations. This was 
contrary to the argument of South Africa that the Mandate had lapsed since the League had 
ceased to exist.  
When the contentious jurisdiction of the Court was separately seised by Ethiopia and Liberia 
in South West Africa Cases, South Africa resurrected its 1950 argument in the advisory 
opinion on International Status of South-West Africa. She argued, inter alia, that the 
dissolution of the League of Nations had extinguished the right of any member of the League 
to enforce the terms of the mandate by judicial means. 
In its judgment on preliminary objections, the Court recalled that a similar argument was 
raised by South Africa but dismissed by the Court in its 1950 Advisory Opinion. The Court 
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affirmed the continuing tenacity of the view taken in previous line of cases and made it clear 
that it had no desire to overrule it. It declared:  
The unanimous holding of the Court in 1950 on the survival and continuing 
effect of Article 7 of the Mandate, continues to reflect the Court's opinion 
today. Nothing has since occurred which would warrant the Court 
reconsidering it. All important facts were stated or referred to in the 
proceedings before the Court in 1950.
120
 
 
Following the 1950 Opinion, the Court held that the applicants had locus standi, which shall 
continue to exist and be exercisable in the ICJ for as long as the Respondent continued to 
exercise the right to administer the territory under the Mandate.
121
  
This settled view of the Court was overturned in the Second Phase of the same case. Here, the 
Court, suo motu, revised its preliminary judgment and all the other precedents on the point. It 
held that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have locus standi to bring the application, and that it 
was only the League of Nations that had the right to require the due performance of the 
Mandate. It held that the right, being exclusive to the League was exercised only through its 
competent organs.
122
 In direct conflict with its earlier view the Court held that there is ―no 
principle of law which would warrant ... a conclusion‖123 that the right previously held by an 
organisation devolves upon its members when it is dissolved. The Court expressly declared 
for the first and only time since the time of the PCIJ that its precedent was ―not well-
founded‖.124  
Needless to recall the difficulties this decision created for the Court. Starting with the Court 
itself, was its failure to reach a majority decision so that the deadlock had to be broken by the 
President‘s casting-vote. The dissenting Judges criticised the Court on several grounds. In his 
apt critique, Jessup noted thus:   
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This is the fifth time the Court has given consideration to legal matters arising 
out of the administration by the Republic of South Africa of the mandated 
territory of South West Africa. In the course of three Advisory Opinions 
rendered in 1950, 1955 and 1956, and in its Judgment of 21 December 1962, the 
Court never deviated from its conclusion that the Mandate survived the 
dissolution of the League of Nations and that South West Africa is still a 
territory subject to the Mandate. By its judgment of today, the Court in effect 
decides that Applicants have no standing to ask the Court even for a declaration 
that the territory is still subject to the Mandate.
125
 
 
The problem the Court had was that of inconsistency arising out of the disregard of its 
precedent. The 1966 judgment took a contrary view to the previous judgments without 
justifying, by cogent reasoning, its decision to overrule the previous position.  
Since consistency is important to the good administration of justice by the Court (having a 
legal duty to maintain the equality of States) it would necessarily follow that the Court has a 
duty to maintain coherent precedents.  
Coherency should, however, not be taken to the level of rigidity; it is always open to the 
Court to reconsider its earlier position when the ground it previously chose for the decision 
has lost legal credibility.
 
This was exactly the situation in the Legality of the Use of Force 
case. Finding that the ground relied upon by the first Genocide case had lost tenability, the 
Court had to reconsider the first Genocide case. The inconsistencies between the preliminary 
rulings in the first Genocide case and the Use of Force case, is not one that any Court could 
avoid (without entrenching rigidity), because it was based on a justifiable objective criterion. 
The inconsistency to be avoided is that arising from a situation where though a future Court is 
unable to fault the ground upon which a precedent is based, yet disregards the precedent to 
arrive at an irreconcilable decision on the same subject-matter. This was the problem with the 
2007 first Genocide case judgment.  
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It is, therefore, difficult to understand why some Judges of the Court blamed the Use of Force 
Court for failing to maintain consistency when, in the circumstances of the case, it was the 
2007 Genocide case judgment that threw a spanner in the works. For instance, Kooijmans, 
criticised the Use of Force Court for choosing an approach which is not in line with the 
reasoning in the Court‘s case-law in the first Genocide case.126 Similarly, Judge Al-
Khasawneh thought ―the reasoning followed by the Court ―in the Legality of Use of Force 
Judgments‖, did not ―perhaps represent the zenith of legal reasoning... in addition ... to its 
negative and regrettable impact on the broad consistency of the Court‘s jurisprudence‖.127  
 
This, in his reasoning, was because the Use of Force Court did not hesitate to reverse
 
 the 
position of the First Genocide Court, which he thought carried considerable weight and 
should not have been lightly reversed.
 128
 Vice President Renjeva, Judges Guillaume, 
Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby thought the Court was wrong 
to have ignored the definitive findings in the first Genocide case. They thought that the 
approach of the Court did ―not adequately reflect the proper role of the Court as a judicial 
institution‖, 129 because ―[t]he Judgment thus goes back on decisions previously adopted by 
the Court ...‖.130  
When viewed in relation to the cogency of facts upon which the Use of Force Court based its 
decision and the logicality of that decision, it would appear that these Judges were ultimately 
advocating rigidity; any form of consistency that would preclude the Court from overruling a 
previous position when the ground upon which the decision was based had lost legal 
credibility (as was the situation with the first genocide case) is unhealthy for the progressive 
                                                             
126 Separate Opinion in the Use of Force, note 45, p. 1369 Para 10 
127 Dissenting, first Genocide case, note 80 p. 249 para 15 
128 Ibid, p. 250  para 18 
129 Joint Declaration of Vice President Renjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and 
Elaraby in Use of Force case, note 45,  para 1357 para 13 
130 Ibid  
  
171 
development of the international law.
 131
 While it is essential to the preservation of its judicial 
character to ensure consistency of decisions, the Court should be careful not to cross the thin 
line between consistency and rigidity. As done in the Use of Force cases, the Court should 
boldly reconsider its previous position when the situation calls for it.      
On the whole, this section strengthens the point that judicial decisions are a source of 
international law: the ultimate result being that judicial coherency builds the law in the 
continental system and more so the common-law system. Through consistency of reasoning, 
points of law previously established become settled. And from its settled jurisprudence, ―the 
Court departs only if ... there are very particular reasons to do so‖.132 Hence, as stated by 
James Scott in 1934, the jurisprudence of the international Court forms a continuous body of 
law applicable to the relations of States and constitutes a repository of principles, rules and 
standards which cannot be ignored in future decisions.
133
 What has been advocated above is 
not just coherency of decisions but consistency of approach. The present writer has insisted 
that consistency does not mean that a rule/principle, once adopted, cannot be overruled; it 
requires not just that the Court be consistent in the application of precedent, but most 
importantly, that the Court should maintain a consistent approach. It must be consistent in the 
criteria by which it determines whether to maintain, distinguish or overrule a precedent.   
4.5 The Authority of Precedents in the ICJ  
It is one thing to show that a court habitually cites its precedent it is another thing for the 
precedents to be binding. A precedent could be cited for either of two reasons: (a) it may be 
to show a course once accepted by a court; or (b) it may be for the application of a 
rule/principle of law established by a court in that precedent.  These emphasise the two 
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important components of every decided case – facts and rules/principles of law. On the first 
point, a court may refer to a precedent simply to show that it was not doing anything new: it 
merely followed a course adopted previously. The bottom line is that the decision being 
reached by the court is not predicated on the authority of a rule/principle established in the 
precedent. In such cases, the court would still have followed that course even if it had not 
cited the precedent, so that the precedent is only a supplementary ground for a decision 
already well-founded on a legal rule independent of the precedent.  
On the other hand, where the reasoning and conclusion of a court draw strength from 
rules/principles established in a precedent, it becomes of less importance whether a precedent 
is generally binding or not. The crucial question must then lie on whether the rules/principles 
in the precedent are rules/principles of law for that court and for the parties in the cases the 
court is called upon to decide.      
4.5.1 Ascertaining the Weight of Precedent 
As earlier said, the fact that the ICJ is a court of first and final jurisdictions makes it possible 
for only horizontal precedent to function in the Court. As a result, it is quite difficult to 
precisely measure the weight it attaches to precedent, given that as a Court of last resort, it 
has an inherent power to decide to follow, modify or overrule its own precedent. The difficult 
question is how to tell that it followed a precedent for the rule/principle it contains and not for 
illustrative purposes. In approaching this issue, the writer shall call in aid the technique of the 
common law, which is based on two legal terminologies – ratio decidendi and obiter dicta.  
As a prelude, it is important to state that it is not being suggested that the ICJ applies the rigid 
delimitation between the terminologies. Indeed as Jennings clearly asserted: international law 
texts hardly mention the term ratio decidendi, and the authorities who command respect have 
  
173 
stated that the idea of finding the ratio decidendi has no place in the international sphere.
 134
 
This writer does not dispute this assertion.  However, like Jennings, and adopting his words, 
it is difficult to understand why a technique found essential in one system of law should be 
disqualified from assisting in the international system.
135
 In the present view, except there are 
better ways of distinguishing that part of the decision which should be regarded as law-
creating and applied to future cases as rules/principles of international law, from the part 
which are merely illustrative, the use of the substance of the common law terminologies are 
unavoidably vital to any question relating to the use of precedent by a court that heavily relies 
on its previous decisions as does the ICJ.  
The above notwithstanding, there are occasions, albeit sparing, where the terminologies have 
been adopted in the case-law of the Court. In Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
136
 
Judge Spender identified an observation in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court in 
Competence of the International Labour Organisation,
137
 as ―obiter dicta‖; explaining that 
the observation ―has little if any jurisprudential value on the matter presently being 
considered‖. In the Western Sahara case, the Court summed up the argument of the parties to 
the effect that it was ―maintained that the present case falls within the principles applied in 
those two decisions and that the ratio decidendi of the Status of Eastern Carelia case is not 
applicable to it‖.138 The use of the terminologies in these cases is consistent with their 
common law uses.  
The common law distinguishes between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Ratio decidendi is 
defined in Salmond‘s Jurisprudence ―as a rule of law applied by and acted on by the court, or 
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the rule which the court regarded as governing the case‖.139 It is the binding element in 
decided cases. Obiter dicta, on the other hand, arises when a judge, in the course of 
adjudication, makes an observation, which is not particularly relevant to the resolution of the 
live issues in a case and which is not based on the facts of the case; this is not binding but 
merely persuasive.
140
  
Accordingly, where the ICJ applies a legal rule/principle adopted in a previous case to the 
facts of a present case to reach a judgment – that is, applying the rule/principle in the cited 
case as the legal premise for the legal conclusion in the present – it would be concluded that it 
applied the rule/principle adopted in that previous case as authority for the conclusion 
reached in the case at hand. As a logical consequence, it could be argued that the Court 
applied the rule/principle because it is a rule/principle of law, binding as such on the Court 
and on the parties before it. This is particularly so, because the ICJ, being bound by its 
Statute, cannot apply a rule/principle except the rule/principle is a rule/principle of 
international law. On the contrary, where the decision of the Court does not rest on a legal 
rule/principle in a previous decision cited by the Court, in the course of reaching a decision 
presently; or where the rule/principle was applied to a hypothetical scenario, it could be said 
that the Court cited the case for mere illustrative purposes – that is, as obiter dicta. The real 
test is whether the court would have reached the decision, absent a previously determined 
rule/principle in its precedent.   
Drawing from the cases already discussed above and those to be discussed presently, this 
writer shall contend in the next section that the Court follows its precedents, not just for 
academic or illustrative purposes, but because it finds the rules/principles adopted in previous 
cases germane to the resolution of legal issues at hand. This position challenges the general 
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view that judicial decisions are not a source of international law.  In order to challenge this 
view, it must be shown that the Court does not merely apply precedents as persuasive aids but 
applies precedent because it lays down rules/principles which the Court considers itself 
bound to follow, as an essential aspect of its judicial character, whether or not the Court 
actually pronounces that it was bound by the doctrine of binding precedent. This is a different 
and a most fundamental question to the one treated in the preceding sections.  Previously the 
writer was interested in showing that the Court considers itself duty bound to maintain 
consistency of reasoning in decided cases, except where reasons dictate otherwise. What the 
writer now seeks to discover and differentiate from the real decision in a precedent is the 
rule/principle cited and applied as precedent – what has earlier been analogised with the 
common law notion of ratio decidendi. This, as was earlier stated in this chapter, is different 
from the depositif of a judgment. In other words, the writer now seeks to elucidate on what 
makes it possible for the Court to maintain coherency, despite the absence of a formal 
doctrine of judicial precedent.  
In order to deal with the issue with some level of simplicity, rather than discuss ―binding 
precedent‖, the writer shall discuss ―binding principles‖. The writer shall concentrate on 
whether the Court holds rules/principles adopted in its earlier decisions as legal 
rules/principles. If they are legal rules/principles, it would unarguably mean that they are 
binding rules/principles of international law, in accordance with which the Court must decide. 
This is essential not only to the relevance of judicial decisions but also to the entrenchment of 
equality of treatment encapsulated in the rule of law. This would help us avoid the stare 
decisis-based argument, which has so far beclouded the issue. 
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The popular view of which we are often reminded by text writers
141
 and Judges of the Court 
is that in the absence of stare decisis, the ICJ has no rule of binding precedent.
142
 Judge 
Koroma once said that the Court does not recognise the principle of stare decisis and that it is 
part of its jurisprudence that legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case are not 
binding upon other States in other disputes.
143
 And that the Court ―has shown a tendency to 
develop the law, to interpret the law and not to consider itself burdened or bound by previous 
decisions‖.144 Judge Weeremantry reminded us that: 
while in domestic jurisdictions where the doctrine of stare decisis applies, 
the other parties in transactions of an identical nature may find themselves 
bound by a principle of law laid down in a case to which they are not 
parties, in international law, third parties have the further safeguard of the 
absence of a doctrine of stare decisis.
145
 
 
Seeking after the application of the stare decisis rule as the indicator of the normative 
character of the judgments of the Court would invariably rob rules/principles in those 
judgments, their normative character for the wrong reasons. They search in vain for a concept 
that would not exists in the form that it is known at common law, those who seek the strict 
application of the rule as a prerequisite for judicial decisions to be a source of law. 
If it is true that legal rules/principles accepted by the Court in a particular case are not 
regarded as binding upon other States or in other disputes, why is the application of such 
principles frequently a fundamental aspect of the Court‘s reasoning process and the 
arguments of contending States? Why would rules/principles previously accepted ―control... 
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the outcome‖146 in a subsequent case? Why do previously adopted rules/principles become an 
―obstacle to the Court in choosing reasons‖147 in subsequent cases? Why do States usually 
argue on the basis of rules/principles adopted in previous decisions? Why is the Court 
strongly criticised whenever it fails to follow a precedent without sufficient reasons? Even 
Judge Koroma has had cause to criticise the Court for departing from its precedent without 
good reasons, when in a joint dissenting opinion, he appended to the view that ―it was 
regrettable that ... the court chose to depart from its own jurisprudence‖.148  
If what has been said above, regarding consistency and the unwillingness of the Court to 
overrule itself even in deserving cases, are anything to go by, they strengthen the view that 
the Court considers that the lack of consistency in its judgments would unsettle international 
law. It also shows that the Court considers itself bound by rules/principles in the cases. The 
approach of the Court is, however, more profound than the maintenance of consistency; it 
largely implicates adherence to the rule of law embedded in the cases.     
To the present view, the combination in the practice of the Court of all the attributes of stare 
decisis as it operates in an apex court within a common law system is not without 
consequence. To discover the consequence, it is imperative to understand, from the outset, 
that there is no way the ICJ can function like municipal courts, let alone common law courts. 
It should therefore be wrong to seek to establish a concept in the form in which it operates in 
municipal law, as much as it should be wrong to expect judicial lawmaking in the 
international system to be strictly patterned after a particular legal system.  
While it is true that the ICJ does not follow a system of binding precedent; this may well be 
as to form. In substance, there is hardly a difference between the approach of the Court and 
the substantive working of the practice of binding precedent, as it applies in a common law 
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court of last resort. Accordingly, the fact that binding precedent does not describe the practice 
of the Court does not mean that the Court does not adopt the substantive content of the 
concept. For it is hardly disputable that the Court follows a similar approach to the practice of 
binding precedent and this may explain why authors and judges alike, even while denying the 
existence of a practice of binding precedent in the Court, often fail to differentiate, in clear 
terms, how the substantive approach of the Court differs from the practice of binding 
precedent. Consciously or unconsciously, such judges and scholars often end up asserting the 
existence of the substance of the concept after denying its existence in form.
 149
 For instance, 
in Cameroon v. Nigeria, just after judge Ajibola had denied the existence of stare decisis in 
the Court, he agreed that ―in practice ... the Court, in most cases, relies upon and follows its 
previous decisions‖.150 
It is difficult to see how the substance of the practice of the Court, as admitted in many cases, 
differs from the substance of the practice of binding precedent. If the Court does not attach 
legal authority to rules/principles in its previous decisions, why is it necessary to urge the 
Court to depart from an earlier decision and why is it significant that the Court had in fact 
departed from or refused to depart from rules/principles in its previous decisions? Even if it 
was argued that this is for the maintenance of coherency, this would yet strengthen the view 
that rules/principles of law established by the Court could become settled through consistent 
application. In the Joint declaration of Vice President Renjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, 
Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, in the Use of Force case, the Judges 
were clear on the point that the Court must not only maintain consistency with its own past 
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case-law in order to provide predictability, but that it must also be mindful of the possible 
implications and consequences of its decision for other pending cases.
151
 
This is more so because it is part of the case-law of the Court that rules/principles adopted in 
judgments have continuous applicability beyond the cases in which they were adopted. 
According to the Court in the Northern Cameroons case, ―if in a declaratory judgment it 
expounds a rule of customary law or interprets a treaty which remains in force, its judgment 
has a continuing applicability‖.152  
If a rule/principle in a decided case has continuous applicability, it can be continuously 
applicable only as a rule/principle of law, having applicability to analogous cases, except it is 
distinguished or overruled. This clearly explains why the Courts feel obliged to show 
deference to rules/principles in previous judgments.  
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the fact that a concept is not formally 
recognised within a given system in the terminology in which it is recognised in another, does 
not mean that the substance of the approach or the rule described in that terminology does not 
exists in that other system. As the Court counselled in Fisheries Jurisdiction:   
It is one thing to seek to determine whether a concept is known to a system of 
law, in this case international law, whether it falls within the categories proper 
to that system and whether, within that system, a particular meaning attaches to 
it: the question of the existence and content of the concept within the system is 
a matter of definition....
153
 
 
It is one thing to say that the Court does not recognise the practice of binding precedent, it is 
certainly another to conclude from that assertion that the content of the rule is completely 
non-existent in the practice of the Court. It is moreover untenable to conclude from that 
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assertion that rules/principles in judgments cannot be binding. This point was succinctly 
made by Judge Zoricic thus: 
it is quite true that no international court is bound by precedents. But there is 
something which this Court is bound to take into account, namely the 
principles of international law. If a precedent is firmly based on such a 
principle, the Court cannot decide an analogous case in a contrary sense, so 
long as the principle retains its value.
 154
 
 
It is therefore important to seek to understand the style of the Court within the peculiarities of 
the legal environment within which it exists.  
Care must, however, be taken not to assume that the Court has adopted the common law style 
of binding precedent, as the Court appears to enjoy certain flexibility inherent in its nature as 
an international court straddling between two systems of law with different approaches to 
judicial lawmaking, as discussed in chapter one.   
To put the present writer‘s perspective of the purpose for which the Court cites its precedents 
beyond doubt, two fundamental tests are proposed, viz:  (a) do decisions of the Court 
logically flow from a legal premise contained in previous cases? (b) Do principles adopted in 
precedents constrain the reasoning and conclusion of the Court in subsequent case?  
If rules/principles adopted in a one case are a source of law for another case, the decision in 
the latter case would logically flow from the said rule/principle. In other words, the 
rules/principles would be seen to be the major legal premise on which the reasoning and 
conclusion of the Court in a subsequent case rested. Also, if rules/principles adopted in 
previous cases constrain the reasoning of the Court and limit the legal options open to it, the 
only tenable conclusion there can be is that the rule/principle were a law for the Court. 
Though both questions are differently framed, they require the same approach, which is the 
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finding of the principle (what we have earlier identified as the ratio decidendi under the 
common law system), in the previous case that was applied or which constrained the choices 
open to the Court in a subsequent case.  
4.5.1(a) Rules/Principles in Previous Decisions as Legal Premise 
Cases abound where it can indisputably be said that the rules/principles adopted in a 
precedent cited by the Court was the legal premise for the conclusion of the Court concerning 
the issue the precedent was applied to. A few cases would buttress this.  
In Benin v. Niger,
 155
 a Chamber of the Court had to determine the probative value of maps in 
a boundary dispute between Benin and Niger. Both parties had relied on maps in order to 
determine the indicative co-ordinates of precise points on their common frontier.  To 
determine the weight to be attached to the maps, the Chamber relied on Burkina Faso v. 
Mali.
156
 In the latter case, a Chamber of the Court had determined that maps cannot of 
themselves be evidence of territorial title because they merely constitute information which 
varies in accuracy from case to case. The Court laid down the rules for determining the legal 
force of maps thus: (a) for a map to possess legal force, it must fall into the category of the 
physical expressions of the will of the State or States concerned; such as when maps are 
annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part;
 157
 (b) when maps meet the 
condition in (a), they would form an irrebuttable presumption, tantamount in fact to legal 
title; (c) otherwise, the only value maps possess is as evidence of an auxiliary or confirmatory 
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kind, and this also means that they cannot be given the character of a rebuttable or juris 
tantum presumption such as to effect a reversal of the onus of proof.
 158
 
Relying on these legal requirements as its legal premise, the Chamber of the Court in Benin v. 
Niger, held that since: (a) neither of the parties claimed that the maps have any ―intrinsic 
legal force‖ in the sense that they represent the ―physical expression of the will of the States 
concerned; and (b) that none of the maps were annexes to an official text,
159
 that they 
possessed only the relative force conferred upon them by the decisions in Burkina Faso v. 
Mali.
160
 Accordingly, they did not form an irrebuttable presumption tantamount to a legal 
title.  Later in the judgment, the Court concluded that ―Certainly, maps — unless they are 
annexed to an administrative instrument, and hence form an integral part thereof, which is not 
the case here — possess only the relative force conferred upon them by the jurisprudence 
recalled above‖.161 In other words, the Benin v. Niger Court had no view on the matter aside 
that predetermined in the precedent. 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
162
 the question before the Court was whether 
Germany, which was not a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
was nonetheless bound by the rule of equidistant delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
enacted in article 6 of that Convention. The argument of Denmark and the Netherlands was 
that the said rule had, subsequent to adoption of the Convention, become a rule of customary 
international law binding on non-parties to the Convention, including Germany.  
To determine the validity of this argument, the Court had recourse to its previous decision in 
the Lotus case.
163
  The Lotus case is famous for the rule that for acts of States to become a 
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rule of custom, States must have been conscious of having a legal duty to act in that way. 
And that such a consciousness must be inferable from the facts alleged to constitute the rule 
of custom.
 164
  This view was taken by the PCIJ when, like Denmark and the Netherlands in 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, France was seeking to establish a rule of general 
international law binding on Turkey in cases of collision on the High Sea. Like Denmark and 
the Netherlands, France had also referred to instances of action which supported her 
argument.     
It was, perhaps, for these close similarities that the Court could not conceal the fact that it 
was applying the Lotus ratio to the Case. The Court expressly admitted that it was following 
the rule adopted by the PCIJ in the Lotus case, and that it was ―applying this dictum to the 
present case‖.165  Accordingly, the Court decided that the instances of actions alleged by 
Denmark and the Netherlands did not justify the emergence of a rule of custom.   
It should be appreciated that the question of the quality of a rule that becomes a rule of 
custom is not stated in article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court, which vaguely provides for 
the application ―of customs as evidence ....‖. It has therefore been for the Court to determine 
whether an alleged rule is actually a customary rule. The Court apparently had to rely on the 
Lotus case as the most authoritative statement of the quality of a rule that can be said to be a 
customary rule. The rule adopted in the Lotus case was thus authoritative for the decision 
reached by the Court. The fact that the Court cited no other authority lends credence to this 
assertion. 
In Nicaragua v. Honduras,
166
 the Court extracted the legal conditions to be fulfilled in a 
claim for territorial sovereignty from its previous decision in the Eastern Greenland case. 
Having identified the legal conditions and without pretending that they were either customary 
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law or conventional principles, the Court held that Nicaragua did not satisfy ―the criteria 
formulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland case‖. 167 
The logical connection between the rules/principles in the cases relied upon by the Court and 
the eventual decisions in the subsequent cases are clearly visible in the cases discussed above. 
More apparent still, is that the Court employed clear languages that emphasised the logical 
sequence between the rules/principles in precedent and the decision reached in subsequent 
cases. These rules/principles were not only decisive for the Court but also for the States to 
whose cases they were applied.  
4.5.1 (b) Principles in Precedents Constrain Reasoning and Determine Conclusions in 
Subsequent Cases  
The relationship between precedent and cases at hand are so intricate in the legal reasoning of 
the Court that the Court is unable to reason independent of its precedent. As a corollary, 
occasions are rife where rules/principles in precedent constrained the reasoning of the Court 
and determined the conclusion reached in subsequent cases. A few cases – Temple of Preah 
case; Barcelona Traction case; DRC v Uganda; Cameroon v. Nigeria; the first and second 
Genocide cases – would buttress this observation.  In all of these cases, which have been 
discussed above, the options open to the Court were constrained by pre-existing 
rules/principles in its precedents.  
In the first two cases, without the Israel v. Bulgaria precedent, the Court would simply have 
reached the conclusion it reached without having to dedicate much time and efforts towards 
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justifying why the interpretative rule in the Isreal v. Bulgaria case would not apply. This fact 
was acknowledged by Judge Tanaka, when he said: 
Thus the doctrine of lapse by dissolution which was incorporated in the 
Judgment in the Aerial Incident case has remained intact. It has offered a 
powerful tool to those States which were not inclined to submit to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by the application either of Article 36, 
paragraph 5, or of Article 37 of the Statute. It has become an indirect 
obstacle to the Court in choosing reasons.
168
  
There is even the strong possibility that the objection would not have arisen had the Court not 
reached the conclusion it reached in the Bulgaria case. After all, the Court acknowledged in 
the Barcelona Traction case that Spain did not raise the objection until after the lapse by 
dissolution rule was adopted in the Bulgaria case. It is worth recounting that the Bulgaria 
case held that the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ by non original 
members of the UN was not renewable in that it lapsed in the interval between the dissolution 
of the PCIJ and the creation of the ICJ.  
Also, the dissenting opinions in Cameroon v. Nigeria and DRC v. Uganda show that the 
Court, perhaps, would have reached different conclusions had the Right of Passage case and 
the Nicaragua case, respectively, not dictated the course followed by the Court. In Cameroon 
v. Nigeria, in particular, the Court stated that it had to be shown why it should not follow the 
rule in the Right of Passage case. In DRC v. Uganda, the conclusion reached by the Court on 
what constitutes armed attack was clearly dictated by the Nicaragua case.
169
  
The bottom-line of the points being made here is that if rules/principles adopted in previous 
cases have no relevance as rules/principles of international law, the Court would not bother 
justifying their exclusion in any particular case. Again, even if this practice was based on the 
maintenance of coherency, it yet leads to the same conclusion given that coherency results in 
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the formation of rules/principles of law in decided cases in both the common law and the civil 
law systems.  
Having answered both questions in the affirmative, the writer makes bold to say that the 
Court cites and follows its precedents, not just for illustrative or felicitous purposes, but for 
the value of the legal rules/principles underpinning them. 
4.5.1. (c) The Authority of Precedent: More Elucidation 
Added to the above is the fact that a rule/principle adopted by the Court on a point of law is 
not only regarded as the correct legal position, it is also regarded as the law governing the 
point with ―continuous applicability.170‖ Accordingly, the Court has shown itself obligated to 
consider and apply the rules/principles it had established in its case law regarding a question 
of law that again falls to be considered in future cases, except there are legally justifiable 
reasons for the Court to take a different view. As could be gathered from the decision of the 
PCIJ in its Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (the Chorzow Factory),
 171 
a judgment of 
the court, ―ensure[s] recognition of a situation at law‖; which once established, ―the legal 
position ... cannot again be called in question in so far as the legal effects ensuing therefrom 
are concerned‖.172  
Indeed, if the legal premise for the decision of the Court in a certain case is a rule/principle it 
adopted in a previous case, it would be contradictory to accept the decision as stating the 
correct position of the law while at the same time saying that the rule/principle applied by the 
Court was not a legally binding rule/principle. In the dissenting Opinion of Judge Owoda in 
second Genocide case, the Judge declared that if the reasoning in the previous case of the 
Legality of the Use of Force is to be respected in the absence of particular reasons to depart 
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from it, the Court must reach the same conclusion reached in that precedent.
173
 In the same 
case, Judge Ranjeva affirmed that ―Unlike ad hoc arbitral courts, it is considered imperative 
for the Court to abide by its own case-law to assure certainty in legal relationships between 
States‖.174 
This creates a sort of ambivalence, which could be resolved also by reliance on the reasoning 
of the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, where it declared: 
Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by 
definition be just.... Nevertheless, when mention is made of a court dispensing 
justice or declaring the law, what is meant is that the decision finds its 
objective justification in considerations lying not outside but within the 
rules....
175
  
 
 It thus follows that if a decision of the Court finds legal justification in a rule/principle 
adopted in previous cases, that rule/principle cannot but be regarded as a rule/principle of 
law. 
Indeed the question as to whether rules/principles in judicial decisions are applicable as 
rules/principles of law has been put beyond doubt by the Court. In the Gulf of Maine case, 
while considering the applicable rules to delimitation of maritime boundaries, the Chamber 
reasoned that it was unrewarding to seek for rules of customary law in the field of 
delimitation, which was still new and unconsolidated, for the solution of delimitation 
problems.
176
 Having so observed, the Chamber concluded its review of,  
...the rules of international law on the question to which the dispute between 
Canada and the United States relates by attempting a more complete and, in 
its opinion, more precise reformulation of the "fundamental norm" already 
mentioned. For this purpose it will, inter alia, draw also upon the definition 
of the "actual rules of law . . . which govern the delimitation of adjacent 
continental shelves - that is to Say, rules binding upon States for all 
delimitations" which was given by the Court in its 1969 Judgment in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases...
177
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This trend is also shown in cases brought to the Court by special agreements in which the 
Court is requested to decide in accordance with international law as contained in article 38(1) 
of its Statute. It is often the case that, both in the arguments of the parties and the judgments 
of the Court, copious reliance are placed on rules/principles previously adopted by the Court 
in decided cases between entirely different parties. It has never been argued in any of such 
cases that rules/principles in judicial decisions are not part of the laws in article 38(1), as 
contemplated in the special agreement.   
In Malaysia v. Singapore,
178
article 5 of the agreement stated: ―The principles and rules of 
international law applicable to the dispute shall be those recognized in the provisions of 
Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice‖. The Chamber of 
the Court resolved a number of fundamental legal issues in reliance solely on its case-law. 
The Chamber relied on the Eastern Greenland case
179
 for the rules governing a territory over 
which there had been no contrary claim. Also in order to determine whether a low tide 
elevation was susceptible of appropriation, the Chamber relied on the rule adopted by the 
Court in Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain.
180 
It is 
important to remember that the Court made it clear in Qatar v. Bahrain that it was not 
applying any pre-existing rules to the question whether low tide elevations are territories, 
because there was no applicable customary or conventional rule.
181
  In the Gulf of Maine 
case, the Chamber was requested to decide ―in accordance with the principles and rules of 
international law applicable in the matter as between the Parties...‖. 182 But the Chamber 
expressly applied ―rules binding upon States for all delimitations" which was given by the 
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Court in its 1969 Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases....‖183 Yet the parties did 
not dispute the application of the rules in the 1969 judgment as rules of international law.    
 
It is important to state at this point that judicial precedent is a technique and thus more of a 
procedural rather than a substantive matter. That the Court which is at liberty to decide issues 
of procedures, not expressly covered in its Statute, is equally at liberty to follow the 
technique that best ensures the fulfilment of its purpose.  After all, the Court is, ―at liberty to 
adopt the principle which it considers best calculated to ensure the administration of 
justice‖.184 It should therefore be appreciated that the ICJ, as a Court of justice is empowered 
to determine its procedure. Indeed, the framers of the Statute did not attempt to gag the Court 
in matters of rules and procedures. In Libya v. Malta,
185
 the Court relied on the work of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists of 1920 and its case-law for the view that:  
it was agreed not to try to resolve in the Rules of Court the various questions 
which had been raised, but to leave them to be decided as and when they 
occurred in practice and in the light of the circumstances of each particular 
case.   
In the absence of a rule in its Statute prescribing a particular technique, the Court should be at 
liberty to follow the technique or system that best suits the administration of justice, ensures 
coherency and preserves its judicial character. In the absence of codification, the best 
approach is that which prevails in the case-law of the Court: the application of 
rules/principles in precedents as rules/principles of law to similar factual situations.  This is 
consistent with one of the purposes of the Court – the development of international law. 
According to Judge Ranjeva:
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An arbitral court, unconstrained in its decisions, is responsible for its 
judgment only to the parties which have consented to its jurisdiction. A court 
of law, on the other hand, acts within the context of a concept of legal policy; 
it has a heritage to uphold embodied in its jurisprudence, which helps 
promote legal certainty and the consistency of the law... the International 
Court of Justice enjoys operational autonomy ...  Moreover, the Court is 
recognized as having a specific mission, and one which is willingly attributed 
to it: to be a catalyst for the scientific development of international law.
186
  
The fact that the ICJ is a permanent court with permanent judges and a growing compulsory 
jurisdiction; the fact that it is not constrained by the dependency on parties and the ad hoc 
nature of arbitral tribunals; and also the fact that it operates within a system of law that is 
largely not codified, makes it impossible for it to disregard a judicial technique that best 
enables it fulfil its functions of developing international law. Whether it is accepted or 
denied, the ICJ has and shall continue to enunciate rules/principles of international law. What 
the Court is unlikely to do is to regard a rule to be established by a single decision; or for an 
established rule to be immutably fixed.   
If this writer is wrong about this, it would simply mean that the Court has continuously failed 
to adhere to the provisions of its Statute which commands it to determine cases in accordance 
with international law in every case that the Court had relied on rules/principles in its earlier 
decisions in deciding subsequent cases submitted to it.    
The writer shall conclude by recapping what has been said above. So far, the writer has 
endeavoured to show the relevance of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) in the practice of 
the Court and, ultimately, to the development of international law. Due to the importance of 
this aspect to the general scheme of this thesis, it was not such that could be dismissed in a 
few words, hence this lengthy but fulfilling discussion. It is fulfilling in that through the 
different stages of the discussion, the writer has demonstrated that the Court follows its 
precedent methodologically. It has also been shown that the Court does not follow its 
precedent as a matter of style but because it sees the rules/principles contained in them as 
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rules/principles of law. It has been strongly argued not only that judicial decisions are a 
source of international law, but also that the rules/principles emanating from judicial 
decisions are binding upon the Court and upon States that appear before it, and with 
ramifications for all States, generally. In the final analysis, the writer is of the firm view that 
rules/principles in judicial decisions are rules/principles of international law, in accordance to 
which the Court must decide within the stipulation of article 38(1).  
It remains to be said, by way of a reminder, that this conclusion is tentatively reached only on 
the basis of article 38(1), which is the article that defines the sources of international law.  
The conclusion has been reached independently of article 59, which shall be discussed in 
detail subsequently, with a view to discovering if the actual practice of the Court negates the 
conclusion the writer has reached here. 
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    Chapter Five 
Judicial Decisions and International Customs as Interdependent Sources of Law 
There is the age-long theory that rather than legislate, judges merely discover a rule that is 
embedded in customary law. It was of this theory Benjamin Cardozo spoke when he 
remarked:  
The theory of the older writers was that judges did not legislate at all. A pre-
existing rule was there, imbedded, if concealed, in the body of the customary 
law. All that the judges did, was to throw off the wrappings, and expose the 
statute to our view. Since the days of Bentham and Austin, no one, it is 
believed, has accepted this theory without deduction or reserve, though even 
in modern decisions we find traces of its lingering influence.
1
  
This theory has also been carried into international law regarding the question relating to 
judicial legislation and the relationship between rules/principles in judicial decisions and 
customary international law – articles 38(1)(b) and (d) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  This theory was expressed in Oppenheim’s International Law, where 
the Editors argued that since judges do not, in principle, make law but apply existing law, 
their role is inevitably secondary given that the law they propound has some antecedent 
source.
2
   
This theory also found expression during the deliberations of the Committee of Jurists. De 
Lapradelle had asked that clause (4) – paragraph (1)(d) –  be deleted because they were 
already encapsulated in clauses (b) and (c) – customs and general principles of law.3 This 
suggestion was rejected by the Committee, insisting on the retention of the clause as an 
independent provision. If truly judicial decisions were incapable of generating 
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rules/principles of international law from sources other than international customs, the Jurists 
would have had no difficulty deleting them. It also would not have survived the scrutiny of 
the other Committees that considered the Draft of the Jurists.   
Taken to its logical conclusion, the theory would mean that judicial decisions cannot be a 
source of law. Since judges do not make law beyond giving expression to pre-existing rules 
of customs, the rules/principles of law which appear novel in decided cases would actually be 
rules/principles of customary law or of any other source. But if the cases discussed in the last 
chapter and in chapter seven are anything to go by, the approach of the Court and of States in 
those cases strongly challenge this theory.  
Indeed, the view that rules/principles propounded by the Court may have their antecedent 
sources in custom cannot be rightly disputed. However, it is the present view that this is not 
always the situation, as the Court sometimes creates new rules through deductions and 
analogies from general principles. Indeed as could be gleaned from the arbitral decision 
between Great Britain (Eastern Extension etc Tel co. Claim) v United States (United States-
Great Britain Claims Arbitration), a Court adjudicating within a largely un-codified system 
of law, would, no doubt be goaded by novel events to find and construct new rules of law by 
deducing incidences and consequences specific to a novel situation at hand from corollaries 
of general principles of law. According to the arbitrators:  
...even assuming that there was ... no treaty and no specific rule of 
international law formulated as an expression of a universally recognised 
rule governing the case ... it cannot be said that there is no principle of 
international law applicable. International law, as well as domestic law, 
may not contain, and generally does not contain, express rules decisive of 
particular cases; but the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict 
of opposing rights and interests by applying, in default of any specific 
provision of law, the corollaries of general principles, and to find – exactly 
as in the mathematical sciences – the solution of the problem. This is the 
method of jurisprudence; it is the method by which the law has gradually 
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evolved in every country resulting in the definition and settlement of legal 
relations as well between States as between private individuals.
 4
  
 
The ICJ often engages in this form of reasoning: deducting new rules of relevant content 
from general principles, when confronted with novel questions of law.  In Maritime 
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain,
5
 to determine whether 
low-tide elevations are territories susceptible to appropriation in conformity with the rules 
and principles of territorial acquisition, a Chamber of the Court admitted that: 
International treaty law is silent on the question whether low tide elevations 
can be considered to be "territory". Nor is the Court aware of a uniform and 
widespread State practice which might have given rise to a customary rule....
6
  
 
Having made it clear that neither treaty nor a rule of international custom was applicable, the 
Court had to deal with the issue by deducing from the corollaries of general principles in the 
Law of the Sea Convention to arrive at the conclusion that low tide elevations are not 
territories and therefore not subject to separate appropriation as territories. The same 
approach was brought to bear in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations.
7
 Here, the Court took cognisance of the appearance of international organisations on 
the international scene to deduce legal personality to international organisations, though 
absent the authority of any treaty or custom allowing same. The Court considered the fact 
that: 
Throughout its history, the development of international law has been 
influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive 
increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances 
                                                             
4 Nielsen‘s Report 73 cited in Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 439 (2nd edn. Robert W Tucker ed., 1966, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc.). Also see Jared Wessel, ―Judicial Policy Making at the International Criminal Court: An 
Illustrational Guide to Analysing International Adjudication.‖ 44 Colum. J. Transnat‘l  L. 377, 386  (2005-2006). (Noting 
that the unforeseen eventualities of the legislative mind unfold with practice and live litigations before an adjudicatory body, 
which as of necessity, shall have to fill gaps within a largely un-codified system of law, as international law.)  
5 Merits ICJ Rep 2001, 40 
6 Ibid, p. 101-102, para., 205  
7 ICJ Rep 1949, 174. The recondite question asked the Court related to the capacity to bring international claim. The Court 
acknowledged that this capacity belonged to States on the basis of sovereign equality. The question then was, whether an 
international organisation possessed that attribute – international legal personality?   
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of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States. 
This development culminated in the establishment in June 1945 of an 
international organization whose purposes and principles are specified in the 
Charter of the United Nations. But to achieve these ends the attribution of 
international personality is indispensable.
8
 
The Court particularly relied on the following findings: (a) that the Charter of the United 
Nations created an organisation equipped with organs with enormous decision making 
powers; (b) that the organisation is clothed with legal capacity and privileges in the territory 
of member States; (c) that the organisation is given power to conclude agreements between it 
and member States; and in particular, (d) evidence of conventions concluded between the 
organisation and States.
9
 It was in keeping with its findings that these factors were an 
indication of principle recognising the international organisations should exercise a right of 
action under international law, that the Court concluded that the organisation was clothed 
with the competence required to enable its function to be effectively performed 
notwithstanding that article 34 of the Statute expressly limits the competence to appear before 
the Court to States. Justifying this decision, Judge Alvarez proclaimed: 
[t]he decision which the Court has arrived at appears to me to be in accordance 
with the general principles of the new international law, the legal conscience of 
the peoples and the exigencies of contemporary international life – three 
essential factors which have to be taken into account in the development of 
international law.
10
 
With particular reference to custom, it is the present view that rather than complete 
dependence, judicial decisions and international customs are interdependent sources in 
practice. It is the writer‘s view that judicial decisions have been the greatest catalyst for the 
crystallisation and development of international customs. As shall be shown below, the 
question as to whether an alleged rule of custom sought to be applied by the Court satisfies 
                                                             
8 Ibid, p. 178 
9 Ibid, p. 179 
10 Separate Opinion in the Reparation case, note 7, p. 190. In the Columbia-Peruvian Asylum case, ICJ Rep 1950, 266, 300-
301 Judge Alvarez (dissenting) expressly admitted that the Court created a law to fill the gap in the law, when it recognised 
that the United Nations have a right to submit international claims; a right not bestowed by either its Charter or the Statute of 
the Court. 
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the twin requirements of state practice and opinio juris is always a question of judicial choice 
exercisable by the Court which has the power to decide whether the alleged rule is a rule of 
custom. The fact that the Court exercises such a great influence is in itself an indication of the 
role judicial decisions play in the development of customs.  
5.1 Judicial Decisions Ripen Customary Laws  
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the Court provides for ―international customs ... as evidence 
of general practice accepted as law‖. Beyond this vague stipulation, the Statute did not codify 
the individual rules that are generally referred to as international customs; neither did the 
Statute prescribe the criteria necessary for a rule to become a rule of custom. Reliance has 
been placed over time on two criteria – state practice and opinio juris – as the criteria which a 
rule must satisfy to become a rule of custom. But experience has shown through decisions of 
the Court that the Court does not put its imprimatur on an alleged rule of custom simply 
because one or more States claim that the rule exist in their practices as law,
11
 neither does it 
matter that the alleged rule of custom has been applied by a good number of States.
12
 This 
makes it practically impossible to precisely identify the individual rules that make up what is 
broadly referred to as international custom. The surest means by which rules of custom have 
been identified have been when acted upon by the Court.
13
   
Instances abound where the Court had held that a rule of custom alleged to exist by a State 
did not qualify as customary law. In S.S Lotus,
 14
 the Court had to ascertain whether there was 
a rule of custom, according to which proceedings in cases involving collision on the High Sea 
                                                             
11 See S.S Lotus, Series A, No. 10 (1927), 16, 28; Asylum Case, ibid, p., 266, and North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), ICJ Rep 1969, 3,  43 -44, para 76 
12  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ibid,  p. 43, para 74-77 
13 See Hersch Lauterpacht, ―Decisions of Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law‖ 10 Brit Y.B Int‘l L. 65, 88 
(1929), for how this relates to customary international law     
14   Note 11, p. 16 
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were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the flag State. France had urged the Court to 
affirm the existence of such a custom. The Court held that no such customary law existed.
15
   
The important role played by the Court in the determination of what qualifies as customary 
law was particularly displayed in North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
16
 Here, the Court did not 
only hold that the rule in question was not a rule of customary law between the parties, it 
determined that it was not a rule of customary law at all. This was notwithstanding the fact 
that some States (not before the Court), which were not parties to the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, had adopted the method for an exercise as important as boundary 
delimitation. According to the Court: 
 ... even if these instances of action by non-parties to the Convention were 
much more numerous than they in fact are, they would not, even in the 
aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinio juris; .... The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation.
17
  
International customs, as facts,
18
 must be proved before the Court by evidence. The onus of 
proof is on the party that asserts its existence. It is however, the province of the Court to 
determine whether an alleged custom satisfies the requisite conditions.  
Once the Court accepts that an alleged rule is founded in customary international law, no 
matter how obscure that rule had been, it becomes a rule of law, which no longer requires to 
be proved as facts, as the Court must take judicial notice of its existence and the States within 
the influence of the custom often take the finding of the Court as conclusive. The case 
                                                             
15 Ibid, p. 28. The same approach was adopted by the Court in the Asylum case, note 10, p. 266. Here the Court refused to 
uphold the argument of Columbia that there was a rule of customary international law justifying unilateral and definitive 
qualification of asylum.  
16 Note 11  
17 Ibid, p. 44, para 77. Whether or not the Court should have adopted such a far-reaching view when it had no means of 
assessing whether these States (not before the Court) actually adopted the method with the necessary opinio juris for the 
formation of customary international law, is a different question altogether. And this is outside the scope of this work.   
18 In Asylum case, note 10, p. 277 the Court expressly referred to the alleged custom ―as the facts brought to the knowledge 
of the Court‖.  
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concerning Reservations to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
19
 
testifies to this view. It was in this opinion that the Court placed its authority on the rule that 
except expressly specified, a reservation need not be accepted by all parties to a convention 
for it to be valid, provided it does not offend the object and purpose of the convention. This 
rule, which was hardly followed before the Court rendered its opinion, has since that opinion 
become a rule of customary international law. On the other hand, the more established rule: 
―the absolute integrity of the treaty rule‖, lost out of the legal equation because it was rejected 
by the Court.
20
 
This is even so because the Court does not consider itself bound by the claim of the parties 
that a particular custom exists, nor does the concurrence of the view of the parties sway the 
Court in this regard. This indication was given in the Nicaragua case, thus:  
The Court notes that there is in fact evidence, to be examined below, of a 
considerable degree of agreement between the Parties as to the content of 
the customary international law.... This concurrence of their views does 
not however dispense the Court from having itself to ascertain what rules 
of customary international law are applicable. The mere fact that States 
declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient for the Court to 
consider these as being part of customary international law, and as 
applicable as such to those States.... in the field of customary international 
law, the shared view of the Parties as to the content of what they regard as 
the rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of 
the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.
 21
 
 
The high degree of independence the Court exercises in this regards, lends itself to judicial 
lawmaking through the broad formulation of article 38(1)(b), by which the Court exercises a 
strong formative influence on the development, clarification and rejection of an alleged rule 
of custom.  
                                                             
19 ICJ Rep 1951, 15 
20 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judges Guerrero, Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, Ibid, p. 31.   
21Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua v. the United States) Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 
97-98, para 184. The same approach was followed in Maritime Delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, 
(Denmark v. Norway) ICJ Rep. 1993, 38, 288 para 110, where a Chamber of the Court stated that each of the party‘s 
reasoning was based on a false premise because each was searching general international law for a set of rules which were 
not there.  
  
199 
This is where judicial decisions and international customs interrelate and are interdependent: 
international customs rely on judicial decisions for development, clarification and recognition 
while international customs give the Court sufficient scope and leverage for rule formulation. 
Indeed the Court does not create customary law; it acts as a catalyst that ripens customs to 
maturity. By so doing, and as observed by Sir William Holdsworth's regarding the English 
method, judicial decisions make ―the custom and therefore the law certain".22 
It is, however, important to say that the role being played by the Court in the formation and 
clarification of customary international law is not peculiar to either the Court or international 
customs. Courts play the same role in national jurisdictions in which a system of customary 
law is recognised. In Nigeria, for instance, in addition to legislations and case-law, customary 
law is an enforceable source of law, which is recognised and applied by courts.
23
 Just as in 
international law, customary laws are facts before superior courts in Nigeria until proven to 
exist by evidence.  
Once proven, it becomes a law of which Courts are bound to take judicial notice. Similarly, a 
rule upon which the ICJ places its imprimatur as a rule of custom becomes assimilated into 
                                                             
22See John C. Gardner, ―Judicial Precedent in the Making of International Public Law‖ 17 J. Comp. Legis. & Int‘l L. 3d ser. 
251, 256 (1935). It is open to questioning whether the rules the Court sometimes applies as rules of customs actually fulfilled 
the requirements of state practice and opinio juris. This is particularly so when the Court can take an independent view of an 
applicable custom. In the same vein it is arguable that the Court sometimes substitutes for the view of States, its own view of 
what constitutes international custom accepted as law. The Individual Opinions in Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall, ICJ Rep 2004, 136, and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2005, 168, could 
justify this point. In these cases, the major plank of opposition to the majority judgment was that the Court ignored a new 
element in the practice of States and opinio juris as expressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 
1373 (2001). It was argued that the resolutions had modified the customary law on the definition of ―armed attack‖ which is 
required for self-defence in article 51 of the UN Charter (which was held to apply alongside the customary international law 
relating to the use of force, the Nicaragua case (note 23)). The Court has continued to maintain the Nicaragua interpretation 
despite the view, even from among its Judges, that it is at variance with state practice and opinio juris. What is more, the 
Court has even demonstrated its ability to declare a rule contrary to a prevailing customary rule, if the latter becomes 
outdated in view of the exigencies of the time. In the Reparation Opinion (note 7), the purpose and functions test enunciated 
by the Court was clearly in conflict with the rule of customary international law which recognised States as the only entity 
having the capacity to bring international claim for diplomatic protection.    
23 In Zaidan v. Mohassen, [1973] 1 All NLR (Pt.11) 8611, the Nigerian Supreme Court defined customary law as a ―system 
of law not being the common law and not being a law enacted by the legislature in Nigeria but which is enforced and binding 
within Nigeria as between the parties subject to its sway‖.  
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the body of international law as a distinct rule of customary international law to be applied by 
the Court in deserving cases.
 24  
 In consequence, the formative influence of judicial decisions on international customs cannot 
be logically disputed. This is a fact accepted by the Court and the States appearing before it. 
In the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
25
 a Chamber of the 
Court was emphatic in acknowledging that the ―Court's Judgment of 20 February 1969 in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases ... has made the greatest contribution to the formation of 
customary law in this field‖ of maritime delimitation.26 The Court also referred to ―a 
substantial contribution‖ made to international customs by judicial decisions in article 
38(1)(d).
27
  
Beyond showing that international customs rely on judicial decisions for its clarification, 
refinement and development, it does also show that some rules which may appear novel in 
judicial decisions are actually emerging rules of customs which the decision of the Court 
ripened by placing its imprimatur on them.
 28
 To that extent the present writer agrees that 
some of the rules in judicial decisions have their antecedent sources in rules of customary 
international law, which are at their embryonic stage of development.  
It is, however, still arguable that such a rule of custom may not have emerged had the Court 
not placed its imprimatur on the rule in its case law, as against the many years the rule would 
have had to be practised as a legally binding rule by States before it could have been accepted 
                                                             
24 The decision of the English House of Lords in JH Rayner Ltd v Department of Trade, [1990] 2 AC 418, 513, is to the 
effect that a rule of international law would be automatically incorporated into the common law; but that ―...it is for those 
who assert the rule to demonstrate it, if necessary before the International Court of Justice‖.    
25 (Canada v. the United States), ICJ Reps 1984, 246 
26  Ibid, p. 293, para 91 
27 Ibid, p. 291, para 83 
28 The Court has not only shown itself a developer of customary law but also a facilitator of the emergence of new rules in 
the face of changed circumstances. See Maritime Delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, (Denmark v. 
Norway) ICJ Rep. 1993 38, 61 para 51; Qatar and Bahrain, note 5. This, in the present view, is perfectly in order given that, 
―international law ... has at times ... a twilight existence which is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length 
the imprimatur of the Court attests to its jural quality‖. – Justice Cardozo, in New Jersey v. Delaware, 291, U.S 361, 54 S.Ct. 
407, 78 L.ED 847 (1934)   
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as custom. For instance, there is the strong possibility that the object and purpose rule 
governing reservations to treaties would not have been recognised as a rule of international 
custom, had the Court not accepted it as such in the Reservations case.
29 
This is, perhaps, 
why Greig contended that when there is no sufficiency of state practice and therefore no pre-
existing rule, the decision reached by the Court will serve as a direct source of international 
law for the future. He contended that to consider the new rule as the ―determination‖ of a 
customary rule would be totally unrealistic.
30
       
It is therefore not infallible to argue that a rule derived from customary law cannot have a 
distinct existence as a rule in judicial decision. Such a rule, albeit derived from a custom, is 
by virtue of such derivation a new rule of international law – they either enlarge a pre-
existing rule or ripen an emerging rule. Otherwise, there would be no derivation, as the said 
rule would have been applied as it stood before the decision of the Court. If in future the new 
element allegedly derived from the custom or treaty is cited, not with reference to the actual 
practice of States, but with reference to the particular judgment of the Court from which the 
rule/principle was derived, they err, those who contend that that judgment did not create an 
independent source of law.  
Not even in the case-law of the Court has the fact that rules of customs are distinct from 
rules/principles in decided cases been denied. In the Separate opinion of Judge Schwebel in 
Denmark v. Norway the judge referred to ―... case-law and the accepted customary law‖.31 
The same distinction is evident in the Gulf of Maine case.
32
  This is also self-evident from 
article 38(1).  
                                                             
29 Note 19 
30 D.W Greig, International Law, 39 (Second ed. Butterworths: London 1976) 
31 Note 28, p. 118 
32 Note 25 
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If it is not in doubt that the decisions of the Court have been the major vehicle that has driven 
the progressive development
33
of customary international law over time, it would be 
conducive to that established truth to also agree that the expansion of pre-existing rules and 
creation of new ones by the ICJ, without the participation of States or the political organs of 
the UN, is a form of systematic lawmaking. It is easy to brand a rule enunciated by the Court 
as a rule of international custom because the borderline between the former and the latter may 
be so thin that they could easily fuse as States begin to modify their behaviours to suit the 
decision. Thus, decisions of the Court can quickly metamorphose into a rule of international 
custom through States‘ usages,34 as could be seen in the development of the rules governing 
land and maritime delimitations. Difficult as it may seem in some cases, it is yet possible to 
tell what rule was customary to States and what rule emerged from a decision of the Court.  
The difference becomes quite obvious when it is appreciated that it is only rules/principles 
established by the Court and consciously preserved by it that are capable of being accurately 
determined through the cases. Though decisions are primarily based on treaties or customary 
international law, these are treaties or customs that existed when the cause of action arose or 
when the case was decided. The fact that the Court had applied a particular custom or treaty 
is not a guarantee that such a treaty or custom is immutable; the custom or treaty is 
susceptible to change and they do change in accordance with the needs and dictates of States. 
The extinction of the treaty or custom, notwithstanding, precedents continue to bear the mark 
of rules/principles established by the Court in the interpretation and application of the extinct 
treaty or custom. The international liability of individuals was first recognised and 
                                                             
33 This has been defined as a process by which ―the Court recognizes new legal obligations that govern previously 
unregulated behaviour‖. Jared Wessel, ―Judicial Policy Making at the International Criminal Court: An Illustrational Guide 
to Analysing International Adjudication.‖ 44 Colum. J. Transnat‘l  L. 377, 387  (2005-2006).  
34This is not peculiar to decisions of the Court. It is generally accepted that a treaty rule otherwise limited in scope may 
metamorphose into a rule of general usage through the recognition of the rule by States, which were not parties to the 
original treaty. These States become bound, not by the treaty provisions per se, but by the custom emerging from the treaty 
through usages.   
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established through the pronouncement of the Nuremberg Tribunal,
35
following the 
Nuremberg Charter. The Charter has since been extinct but the principle enunciated therein 
continues to live a life of its own and it is now part of the corpus of general international law.  
Also the recognition of the rule that treaties can directly create rights for individuals, albeit 
with the consent of parties to the treaty, was first recognised in Jurisdiction of the Courts of 
Danzig.
36
 This opinion was based on the Danzig-Polish Agreement of 1921, which had since 
ceased to exists, but the rule enunciated in the case lived on and has blossom to maturity.    
Furthermore, the argument that the Court cannot state a law independent of customs, 
presupposes that the reasoning of Judges of the Court is restricted to the application of pre-
existing rules. This argument is unpersuasive; it undermines the power of the Court to 
develop rules of international law to fill gaps and prevent non liquet.  Also, it is so far-fetched 
from the realities of what the Court has actually been doing in practice.  There are cases 
where the Court clearly declared that there is neither a treaty nor custom governing a 
particular point, yet rendered a decision on the point. In cases where the Court explicitly 
places its authority on an implicit customary rule and nurtured the rule to maturity, the rule 
will first exist nowhere else but in the authority of decided cases. It is through the case that 
the rule would often be identified.  
In conclusion, the writer has so far argued that rules/principles in judicial decisions are not an 
extension of international custom, though both share a strong bond of inter-relationship. Their 
inter-relationship notwithstanding, the writer argued that judicial rule-making does occur in 
the ICJ, not in total dependence on international customs, but in a situation of 
interdependence. Accordingly, the writer disagrees with the view that judicial decisions 
                                                             
35Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1946, 171, 
223 (1947) (the decision of the Tribunal that it is only by punishing individuals who commit international law crimes can 
international law be enforced, is often cited as the locus classicus for individual criminal liability for international law 
crimes. )  
36 Advisory Opinion, Series B, No. 15 (1928) 17 
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cannot be a source of law because the rules they propound are actually rules of international 
customs.
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                   Chapter Six  
Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in the Practice of the 
Court 
 
―[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case.‖  – Article 59 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The flow of thought from the preceding chapters has so far favoured the view that judicial 
decisions are a source of international law, when article 38(1) is read in disjunction with 
article 59.  Articles 38(1) and 59 have earlier been discussed in chapter two; that discussion 
was however not exhaustive, as it was mainly based on an analysis of their preparatory work 
with a view only to determining the object and purpose of the articles. At that point it was 
found that there was nothing in the preparatory work to justify the assertion that article 59 
forbids the use of judicial decisions as a source of international law. In chapters three and 
four, the writer progressed a bit further to discuss article 38(1)(d), in theory and in the 
practice of the Court. In these chapters, the writer discussed article 38(1)(d) independent of 
article 59. On the basis of that discussion, the writer came to the tentative conclusion that 
judicial decisions are a source of international law. This conclusion was tentative because it 
was reached independent of article 59. Of course, as indicated previously, the writer is not 
unaware that article 38(1)(d) is made subject to article 59. Accordingly, any conclusion 
reached on a disjunctive consideration of article 38(1)(d) is still subject to article 59. To that 
extent the view taken of article 59 in this chapter would invariably go to confirm or negate 
the conclusion reached in previous chapters. 
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It is also important to bear in mind that chapter four shifted the focus from binding decisions 
to binding rules/principles. It was there argued that the pivotal factor in deciding whether 
judicial decisions are a source of law – the result of judicial legislation – is whether 
rules/principles in judicial decisions are rules/principles of international law. The writer did 
argue that they were rules/principles of international law which States habitually accept. 
Being in continuation of that chapter, this chapter focuses mainly on whether article 59 has 
any bearing on rules/principles in decided cases as against the actual decisions in cases.   
 Having said that, this writer shall now discuss article 59, as espoused in the case-law of the 
Court.  
6.2 Article 59 in the Practice of the Court 
It is convenient to begin this discussion with the observation of Rudolf Bernhardt, that it must 
be borne in mind, when considering the actual practice of the ICJ, that article 59 does not 
extend to only one easily delimited issue so that no one systematic jurisprudence exists in 
respect of the article.
1
 It is also important to keep in mind that article 59 is one of the most 
misunderstood provisions of the Statute of the Court and arguably, the most controversial. 
This fact was taken into account by the Inter Allied Committee on the Future of the PCIJ, 
which observed that ―the effect of this provision [art.59] has, in our opinion, sometimes, been 
misinterpreted‖. 2  
Notwithstanding these apt observations, through a careful consideration of the decided cases 
of the ICJ, it is possible to show that article 59 has been used for four different purposes, as 
follows: 
1. Article 59 excludes principles adopted in a case from application in another; 
2. To protect third parties from a decision in a case;  
                                                             
1 Rudolf Bernhardt ―Article 59‘ in the Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary‖, Andreas Zimmermann, 
Christian Tomuschat, Karin Oellers-Frahm et al ed., 1231-1234, (Oxford University Press: Oxford  2006) 
2 ―Report of the Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice‖, reproduced in Am. J. 
Int‘l L, 39 (Suppl. 1945), 1, 20 para. 63. 
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3.  For the purpose of holding parties to a case bound by the decision in the case; 
4. To represent res judicata.    
Each of purposes shall now be elaborated upon.  
 6.2.1 Article 59 Excludes Principles Adopted in One Case from Application in Another 
There are rare instances in the case-law of the Court where it was suggested that article 59 
prohibits a principle adopted in a case from being binding in another. The most popular and 
often cited pronouncement in this regard was made in Certain German Interest in Polish 
Upper Silesia,
3
 where the PCIJ declared: 
Article 59 of the Statute ... does not exclude purely declaratory judgments. 
The object of this article is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by 
the Court in a particular case from being binding upon other States or in 
other disputes. It should also be noted that the possibility of a judgment 
having purely declaratory effect has been foreseen in article 63 of the 
statute, as well as in article 36 already mentioned. (Emphasis supplied).
4
 
 
This pronouncement seems the most far-reaching pronouncement supporting the prohibition, 
through article 59, of the application of rules/principles in the precedents of the Court in 
subsequent cases. This would be so because, the dictum could easily be misunderstood when 
read out of the context in which it was made. It is important to understand that this dictum 
was not made within the context of the application of a rule/principle adopted in a previous 
case. Rather, the Court was considering whether it had the power to render purely declaratory 
judgments. The question the Court was answering was whether: ―the abstract character of the 
decision asked for is ... compatible with article 59 of the Court‘s Statute‖.5 The paragraph 
preceding the above dictum, would perhaps throw more light on this point. The Court had 
said:  
there seems to be no reason why States should not be able to ask the Court 
to give an abstract interpretation of a treaty; rather would it appear that this 
                                                             
3 PCIJ Series A, No. 7, 19 
4 Ibid, pp 18-19 
5 Ibid, p. 16 
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is one of the most important functions which it can fulfil. It has, in fact, 
already had occasion to do so in judgment no. 3
6
 
 
This is also obvious from the second limb of the aforementioned dictum. Whatever doubt 
there may have been on the tenacity of this view was resolved by the same Court in 
Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 8.
7
 In deciding the proprietary of the application for 
interpretation of the judgments, the Court noted that judgment No. 7 was in the nature of a 
declaratory judgment.  The Court relied on the same Certain German Interest in Polish 
Upper Silesia as authority that article 59 does not prevent the Court from reaching a purely 
declaratory judgment. The Court declared that it,  
has had occasion in Judgment No.7 (p.19) [Certain German Interest in 
Polish Upper Silesia] to state its opinion upon the question whether article 
59 of the Court‘s Statute prevents it from rendering purely declaratory 
judgments; it answered this question in the negative stating that article 59 
is simply to prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular 
case from being binding upon other States or in other disputes.
8
    
 
Though citing the full statement in the Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia, the 
Court in the Interpretation of Judgment case did correctly circumscribe the statement to the 
context of declaratory judgments in which it was made. Therefore, Certain German Interest 
in Polish Upper Silesia only served as authority for the legal conclusion that the Court is able 
to make purely declaratory judgments. 
Consequently, it is erroneous to apply the statement, which was made in an entirely different 
and unrelated context in Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia to the authority of 
judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d). This is particularly in view of the further clarification 
offered by the Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 8. Perhaps it is this realisation that accounts 
for why the statement has been sparingly cited by the ICJ and has never been followed by the 
                                                             
6 Ibid,  p. 18-19 
7 The Chorzow Factory, Series A No. 13  
8 Ibid, p. 20-21 
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Court.  There is only one instance in the case-law of the ICJ where it has cited the statement. 
That was in the application of Italy to intervene in Libya v. Malta.
9
 While considering the 
application of Italy to intervene, the Court declared:   
In the first place, the rights claimed by Italy would be safeguarded by 
Article 59 of the Statute.... It is clear from the ... provision that the 
principles and rules of international law found by the Court to be applicable 
to the delimitation between Libya and Malta, and the indications given by 
the Court as to their application in practice, cannot be relied on by the 
Parties against any other State. As the Permanent Court of International 
Justice observed, "the object of Article 59 is simply to prevent legal 
principles accepted by the Court in a particular case from being binding also 
upon other States or in other disputes" ([Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 
8] P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 13, p. 21).
10
 
 
As was the case in Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia , where the statement 
was first made and the Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 8 which was being cited, the 
contentious issues in Italy‘s application to intervene did not have any bearing on the 
applicability or otherwise of a rule/principle previously adopted. Italy, and indeed Malta and 
Libya, all made it clear in their submissions that Italy‘s application was not only to insulate 
her interest from the decision of the Court but also for Italy to be made a party to the case for 
the purpose of becoming bound by the decision in accordance with article 59. In other words, 
what was in contention was whether Italy should be permitted to intervene to protect her 
interest in spite of the protection afforded by article 59. Neither Italy nor the original parties 
to the case raised the question of the application of rules/principles before the Court. It was in 
the context of the protection of third parties that article 59 came into focus in the case and not 
in the context of the prohibition of rules/principles. For the avoidance of doubt, Italy had 
stated in her application that she would submit to such decision as the Court may make with 
regard to the rights claimed by Italy, ―in full conformity with the terms of Article 59 of the 
                                                             
9 Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahirija/Malta), Application of Italy to Intervene, ICJ Rep 1984, 3 
10 Ibid, p. 26, para 42 
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Statute of the Court‖.11 It thus follows that, as in the Certain German Interest in Polish Upper 
Silesia, the Court, with due respect, had gone too far away from the issues submitted to it for 
adjudication to the extent that the pronouncement of the Courts on the prohibition of 
principles cannot merit much legal weight.  
One way of rationalising the pronouncement of the Court in Italy‘s application to intervene is 
to assume that the Court was considering principles purely within the context of delimitation. 
The general principle governing delimitation as established in North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases
12
 is that delimitation must proceed on the agreement of the parties or on the application 
of equitable principles.
13
 This general rule applies to all maritime delimitation disputes. This 
is different from the principles governing the actual delimitation between the parties. There 
are: the equidistance principle; the natural prolongation principle; the straight base line 
principle; among others. In application, each of the principle leads to different results 
depending on the geographical configuration of the maritime areas.  
Accordingly, principles of delimitation adopted by the Court are the real decisions of the 
Court in delimitation cases; the actual delimitation is nothing more than the consequence of 
application of the principles. And given that the geographical configurations of States are not 
identical, the Court has always exercised caution when dealing with equitable principles 
applicable to delimitation. In order to avoid inequitable results, the Court adopts principles to 
govern delimitation on a case by case basis depending on the geographical configuration of 
the areas in issue. This is more so that third States which share a common maritime boundary 
with the litigating States can, by agreement with one of the litigating States, apply a different 
principle from that applied by the Court.  
                                                             
11 See the Separate Opinion of Judge Keba Mbaye, ibid, p. 37 
12 Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark/Netherlands, ICJ Reps 1969, 3 
13 By equitable principles, the Court aims at a just and equitable share and not to give a decision ex aequo et bono in 
accordance to article 38(2) of its Statute. (ibid, p. 48, para 88) 
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It is, therefore, likely that it was in relation to the principle of delimitation to be adopted 
between Libya and Malta that the Court spoke of article 59. This is particularly highlighted 
by the fact that Libya and Malta had specifically requested the Court in article 1 of the special 
agreement, to determine ―the principles and rules of international law‖ applicable to the 
delimitation of the area of the continental shelf which appertains to them.
14
 They also 
requested the Court to determine ―how, in practice, such principles and rules can be applied 
by the two Parties in this particular case‖.15 It logically follows that the principles found to be 
appropriate for the parties in accordance with their special agreement, is not binding on Italy 
which was neither a party to the agreement nor to the case in Court.  
If article 59 was being applied to principles in this narrow sense, the Court should have been 
mindful of the confusion its reliance on Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 8 would create. By 
relying on the dictum in that case, the Court appeared to have endorsed the view that article 
59 prevents principles adopted in one case from application in another.   
This was the light in which Judge Robert Jennings responded to the statement of the Court.  
Jennings made it clear that he was not in agreement with the view that the object of Article 59 
is to prevent legal principles accepted by the Court in a particular case from being binding in 
other disputes. He reasoned that the idea that Article 59 protects third States' from previously 
adopted principles is at least illusory.
 16
 In his view, article 59 applies more particularly to the 
dispositif of a judgment, which are addressed only to the parties to the case. He further 
reasoned that it was in this technical sense that Italy will certainly be protected. And that it 
would be quite wrong to suggest otherwise.
17
 
As rightly pointed out by Jennings there is a clear difference between principles (reasoning) 
and the decision in decided cases. This distinction must be maintained for article 59 to be 
                                                             
14 Continental Shelf ( Libya v. Malta), Merit, ICJ Rep 1985, 13, 16 para 2  
15 Ibid  
16 Jennings, Dissenting in Libya v. Malta, note 9, p. 157, para 27 
17 Ibid  
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well understood. Article 59 protects non-parties only against the decision in a case and not 
the principles (reasoning) or rules emanating from the decision. As shown in chapter four, the 
latter is a seamless part of the Court‘s reasoning process when faced with factual similarities. 
To use the words of Judge Tanaka, it is through reasoning that the Court contributes to the 
development of international law.
18
 On the whole, the operative part is restricted by article 59 
to the actual parties to a case, the reasoning is not. It is therefore true that the Court decides 
upon claims submitted to it ―with binding force for the parties only, and no other State, in 
accordance with Article 59 of the Statute‖.19  
These views are consistent with the definition of the terms judgment and decision by the 
court in LaGrand case.
20
 Here the Court said: 
The question arises as to the meaning to be attributed to the words "the 
decision of the International Court of Justice" in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
This wording could be understood as referring not merely to the Court's 
judgments but to any decision rendered by it, thus including orders indicating 
provisional measures. It could also be interpreted to mean only judgments 
rendered by the Court as provided in paragraph 2 of Article 94.
21
  
It is therefore important to emphasise that Article 59 does not in any way prohibit principles 
previously adopted by the Court from having binding effect both on the Court and litigating 
States. Rather the article prohibits the application of the operative part of a judgment – the 
actual decisions in the case – to a third party. This view conforms to the view expressed by 
the Inter-Allied Committee on the future of the PCIJ, that: 
What it [article 59] means is not that the decisions of the Court have no 
binding effect as precedents for the court or for international law in general, 
but that they do not possess the binding force of particular decisions in the 
relations between countries who are parties to the statute. The provision in 
question in no way prevents the court from treating its own judgments as 
                                                             
18 Separate Opinion in Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v Spain), Preliminary Objections,  ICJ Rep 
1964, 6, 65-66 
19 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v The United States) Jurisdiction, ICJ Rep 
1984, 302,  431, Para 88 
20 (Germany v. United States), ICJ Rep 2001, 466 
21 Ibid, p. 506, para 108  
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precedents.... It is important to maintain the principle that countries are not 
‗bound‘ in the above sense by decisions in cases to which they were not 
parties....
22
 
 
The reasoning of the Court possesses an inherent attribute of judicial authority and is clothed 
with intrinsic authoritative characteristics which cannot be affected by article 59. This point 
was practically demonstrated by Judge Shahabuddeen in Phosphate Lands in Nauru, as 
follows:    
it might be contended that the conclusion reached in the judgment could in 
logic be extended to New Zealand and the United Kingdom; but this would be 
a matter of extending the reasoning of the Court to a case to which its 
judgment per se does not apply.... A decision in this case, if, as I think, it does 
not per se constitute a judicial determination of the responsibility of New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, can at best have only precedential value in 
any proceedings concerning their responsibility.
 23
 
 
The weight of principles previously adopted would be less obvious unless this distinction is 
acknowledged and maintained in the controversies surrounding article 59.  
The view taken in the Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia case is further 
discredited by the fact that the Court has not only persistently affirmed, but has also 
consistently applied rules/principles adopted in previous cases to a different dispute involving 
different parties. A few cases would buttress this point.  
In Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions,
24
 the Court held that, it saw no 
reason to depart from the construction adopted in its previous judgments, the reasoning of 
which was still sound.
25
  Though it may be argued that the parties in PCIJ judgments no 3 and 
5 in which the construction referred to was adopted and the one in the Mavrommatis 
Concession case were the same, the relevance of the approach of the Court in this case lies in 
the fact that the above dictum was made to resolve a contentious issue bordering on the 
                                                             
22 Note 2  
23 Separate Opinion, (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reps 1992, 261, 297-298.  
24 (jurisdiction) PCIJ Judgment No. 10, PCIJ Series A. No.11 
25 Ibid, p. 18 
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application of a precedent. Also though the parties were the same, the cases and the issues in 
contention were not the same.  
Of stronger significance in this regard, is the view of the ICJ in Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria, also within the context of deciding on a contentious question 
of whether a particular precedent was applicable. The Court held that: 
It is true that, in accordance with Article 59, the Court's judgments bind 
only the parties to and in respect of a particular case. There can be no 
question of holding Nigeria to decisions reached by the Court in previous 
cases. The real question is whether, in this case, there is cause not to follow 
the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases.
26
 
  
This position of the Court was variously cited and followed in the Second Genocide case,
27
 
wherein a crucial question also depended on the application of a precedent. The Court 
variously affirmed that the real question was whether there was a reason for it not to follow 
such previous principles. On one occasion, the Court affirmed: 
 
The two Parties further agree that the position adopted by the Court in those 
cases does not have the force of res judicata in the present case, because 
those Judgments were rendered in different cases which did not involve the 
same parties. The Parties however recognize that these findings have great 
bearing for the present case, as the Court does not depart from its settled 
jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so. 
28
 
 
In the light of the above, it seems very unlikely that if what the PCIJ was faced with in the 
Certain German Interest in Polish Upper Silesia was the application of a previously adopted 
rule/principle, the Court would simply have dismissed the rule/principle on the basis of article 
59. Of course, there is no reported case where the Court dismissed a precedent on the basis of 
article 59, without more. Rather, as has been shown in chapter four, the Court has 
continuously relied on reasons extraneous to article 59 (but intrinsic to the judicial 
                                                             
26Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reps 1998, 275, 292 para 28. 
27 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), 
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2008, 412 
28 Ibid, p. 435 Para 71 
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lawmaking) to justify why a rule/principle in a precedent is not applicable. In other words, 
the question is never whether rules/principles in precedents are legally viable; it is always 
whether they are factually applicable.
 29
  
Could it not also be correct to say, therefore, that the fact that both the Court and the States 
that appear before it make serious legal issues out of whether the Court should depart from a 
rule/principle previously adopted goes to strengthen the argument that such rule/principles 
are potentially applicable to all similar cases, rather than weaken the argument? Thus, the 
weight of rules/principles adopted by the Court could be tested by the way States relate with 
them. It is unarguable that States litigate in the Court fully aware that the Court would not 
lightly depart from its case law; neither can it be disputed that they come before the Court in 
expectation of the application of its case-law. Accordingly, such States regard rules/principles 
adopted by the Court as the law in respect to the questions in which they were adopted. To 
that extent, it could be concluded that States regard the rules/principles to be binding on 
them.  
It follows that when States argue on the basis of a precedent, they do not consider themselves 
to be engaging in a mere academic exercise. They argue on the basis of the rules/principles 
contained therein and the Court decides on the same basis, because the litigating States and 
the Court know that the cases contain rules/principles that would resolve the conflict one way 
or the other.  The Court affirmed this view in second Genocide case, where it declared: 
 
... here the Parties are not merely citing previous decisions of the Court which 
might be regarded as precedents to be followed in comparable cases. The 
previous decisions cited here referred to the question of the status of a 
particular State, the FRY, in relation to the United Nations and to the Statute of 
the Court; and it is that same question in relation to that same State that 
requires to be examined in the present proceedings at the instance, this time, of 
                                                             
29This, perhaps, is why John O‘ Brien International Law 92-93 (2001 Cavendish Publishing, Australia), argued that this 
statement in Certain German Interest case should be regarded with caution in view of the practice of the Court itself.)   
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Croatia. It would require compelling reasons for the Court to depart from the 
conclusions reached in those previous decisions.
 30
 
 
 The manner in which States relate with rules/principles adopted by the Court and adjust their 
relations to conform thereto cannot only be assessed in relation to live litigations before the 
Court.  
There have been known instances where States have modified their activities in recognition 
of the effects of a rule/principle adopted by the Court in cases to which they were not parties.  
In Cameroon v. Nigeria,
31
 it was acknowledged that States reacted to the interpretation 
adopted in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory,
32
 by modifying their declaration of 
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to expressly exclude a declarant whose declaration had 
not been transmitted to them. In the Barcelona Traction case, Judge Armand-Ugon
 33
 
demonstrated how the rule adopted in Israel v. Bulgaria
34
 would affect Spain which was not a 
party to that case but had a treaty relation (having a compromissory clause) with Bulgaria. In 
Malaysia v. Singapore,
 35
 it was admitted before the Court that the Foreign Office and 
Colonial Office in London, which were involved in a wider examination of issues relating to 
territorial waters, accepted that the Fisheries case
36
 introduced new methods of defining 
territorial waters. And that Singapore would gain very little from the application of the new 
principles. Also, in the Aegean Sea Case the Court stated: 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 Note 27, p. 429, Para 54 
31 Note 26 
32 (Portugal v. Indian), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1957, 125  
33 Dissenting, note 18, p.154-155. Also see the Separate Opinion of Judge Gros in, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co 
Ltd (Belgium v. France) Second Phase, ICJ Rep 1970, 3, 267, para 1. (Stating the ―importance of the case [at hand] from the 
point of view of its consequences on the law applicable to international economic relations‖)  
34Aerial Incident of July 27th 1955, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1955, 127 
35Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, ICJ Rep 2008, 12, 80-81, para, 225 
36 (United Kingdom v. Norway) ICJ Rep 1951, 116 
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Although under Article 59 of the Statute ‗the decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case‘, it is evident that any pronouncement of the Court as to the status of 
the 1928 [General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes], whether it were found to be a convention in force or to be no 
longer in force, may have implications in relations between States other 
than Greece and Turkey [Parties to the present proceedings].
37
  
 
It may be that rules/principles adopted by the Court are optional for States which are not in 
litigation before the Court, and thus of limited applicability. However its limitation (should 
this be so), it does not detract from the fact that it is binding as law for at least States which 
are within the Court‘s jurisdictional net and which are potential subjects of the 
rules/principles. Though there is still that possibility that the Court may overrule a particular 
rule/principle and decide differently.  
In concluding this aspect of the work, it is important to reiterate that the assertion in the cases 
mentioned above, that article 59 prohibits the application of principles adopted in one case 
from application in another case does not truly capture the essence of article 59. This is 
because, neither in the cases in which the assertion was made, nor in any other case, has the 
Court accepted and applied the proposition as the correct interpretation of article 59.   
In the next section we shall discuss how the Court applies article 59 to protect third States 
from decisions – the operative part of a case. No doubt, this discussion shall throw more light 
on the point already made above.  
6.2.2. Article 59 and Third Party Rights 
This is the manner in which article 59 has most frequently been used, and arguably, the most 
important. Here the Court employs article 59 in the opposite direction to protect States from 
decisions given in cases to which they were not parties. Its importance in this regards lies in 
the voluntary nature of the jurisdiction of the Court. In municipal systems, Courts generally 
                                                             
37 ICJ Rep 1978, 3, 17-18 para 39 
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have compulsory jurisdiction over persons and properties within the province of their 
territorial jurisdiction. The corollary of this compulsory non-consensual jurisdiction of 
municipal courts is the power to compel the joinder of persons, whose presence is necessary 
to the complete resolution of a dispute before the Court. Accordingly, municipal courts have 
the power to join a necessary party either on the court‘s own motion or on the application of a 
party to the case or on the motion of the individual to be joined. The consensual nature of the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ directly limits its power of joinder only to the permissible means of 
intervention in articles 62 and 63. These articles allow for third party intervention. It is in 
keeping with this that the ICJ acknowledges that it lacks the power, comparable with that 
exercised by national courts, which enables national courts to order, proprio motu, the joinder 
of third parties who may be affected by the decision to be rendered.
 38
  
In consequence, the ICJ cannot compel a State to appear before it; not even by way of 
intervention.
39
 In Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute,
40
 the Court declared that there 
is no process under international law ―for joinder of a new party, or parties, whether as 
applicant or respondent, by move of the Court itself‖.41 The same view was maintained in 
Nicaragua v. the United States, where the Court held that there is no trace, either in its Statute 
or in the practice of international tribunals, of an indispensable parties rule, which would only 
be conceivable in parallel to a power, which the Court does not possess, to direct that a third 
State be made a party to proceedings.
42
  
The logic of the position taken by the Court above flows from the stipulation in article 59 that 
decisions of the Court are binding only on the parties to the case. This, in effect, means that 
                                                             
38 Phosphate Lands, note 23, p. 260, para 53 
39 Ibid  
40 El Salvador/Honduras, Application to Intervene, ICJ Rep. 1990, 92   
41 Ibid, p. 134 para. 99, citing with approval the statement of the Court in the Libya v. Malta, note 9, p. 25 para 40, that there 
is, ―the absence in the Court‘s procedures of any system of compulsory intervention, whereby a third State could be cited by 
the Court as a party to proceedings‖. The Court also approved of the view expressed in Nicaragua v. the United States, note 
19, p. 431 para 88,), that the Court does not possess the power ―to direct that a third State be made a party to proceedings‖.  
42 Ibid, p. 431, para 88 
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decisions are not binding on non-parties to a case. In El Salvador v. Honduras, the Court 
reasoned that ―it should be borne in mind that it would hardly be possible, given article 59 of 
the Statute ... for a decision of the Court to ‗trench upon‘ the legal right of a third State‖.43 
Accordingly, any decision of the Court which affects the interests of a third State is of no 
effect since it is unenforceable against that State. Therefore, the Court must, as of necessity, 
ensure that its decision in any particular case does not affect a stranger to the case in which 
that decision was made.  
The unenforceability of a judgment against a third party is not peculiar to the international 
system; it arises in national jurisdictions as well. In national jurisdictions, the problem is 
solved by courts exercising the power of joinder, by which a third party is joined to the 
proceedings. Once such a third party has been joined, the judgment of the court becomes 
binding and enforceable against the third party. Since as earlier stated, the ICJ lacks this 
power, it resorts to the provisions of article 59 which prohibits the Court, by implication, 
from passing on the rights of third parties. This point was succinctly made by Judge 
Shahabuddeen in his Separate Opinion in the East Timor case,
 44
 as follows:  
Reflecting a view generally held in municipal law, Article 59 of the Statute 
of the Court provides ... But it does not follow that the Court is free to 
determine a dispute between parties in entire disregard of the implications 
of the decision for the legal position of a non-party. Under one form or 
another of an "indispensable parties" rule, the problem involved is solved in 
domestic legal systems through an appropriate exercise of the power of 
joinder. The Court lacks that power; and the right of intervention, or to 
institute separate legal proceedings where possible, is not always a 
sufficient safeguard. Hence, when situations arise in which the requested 
judgment would in fact, even though not in law, amount to a determination 
of the rights and obligations of a non-party, the Court is being asked to 
exercise jurisdiction over a State without its consent. Monetary Gold 
Removed from Rome in 1943 says it cannot do that.
45
 
 
                                                             
43Note 40, p. 130 para 90 
44 (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Rep. 1995, 90  
45 Ibid, p. 119 
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In essence, article 59 is a command to the Court not to make a decision against a third party. 
But should the Court exceed the circumference of the legal interests of the parties before it to 
make a decision that undermines the rights of a third party, that decision is unenforceable 
against the third party. This is because article 59 makes the decisions of the Court binding 
only on the parties to a case.    
To avoid handing down unenforceable decisions, the Court has severally used article 59 as a 
bulwark over the legal interests of third parties. In Libya v. Malta,
46
 Italy sought the 
permission of the Court to intervene in the case which was brought by a special agreement 
between Libya and Malta, in respect of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between the two States. Italy contended that her legal interest would be 
affected by the decision of the Court. Because Italy sought to intervene as a party to the case 
under article 62 of the Statute of the Court, she undertook to conform to the judgment of the 
Court, if granted permission to intervene. In its decision, the Court admitted that Italy had a 
legal right to protect through intervention, but that the right was already automatically 
protected by article 59 of its Statute. The Court further assured Italy that its judgement on the 
merit, between the actual parties, will not merely be limited in its effects by article 59 of the 
Statute, but that it will be expressed, upon its face, to be without prejudice to the rights and 
titles of third States.
47
 In Burkina Faso v. Mali,
48
 a Chamber of the Court had to determine, as 
a preliminary point, whether it could adjudicate concerning a part of the frontier between the 
parties without infringing the rights of Niger, which was not a party to the proceedings. This 
followed the argument of Mali that the tripoint implicating Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso 
cannot be determined between the two Parties without Niger's agreement; nor can it be 
determined by the Chamber. The Chamber held that, in accordance with Article 59 of the 
                                                             
46Note 9  
47 Ibid p. 26-27, para. 43 
48 Frontier Dispute ICJ Reps 1986, 554  
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Statute, its Judgment will not be opposable to Niger as regards the course of that country's 
frontiers.
49
 This, according to the Chamber, was because the rights of Niger were safeguarded 
by the operation of article 59 of the Statute of the Court.
 50   
The Chamber further declared 
that the safeguarding of the rights of States in cases to which they are not parties, ―is the  
whole point of ... Article 59 of the Statute‖.51 This is further buttressed by Libya v. Malta, 
where the Court declared that, by the effect of article 59, its judgment would be binding only 
upon the Parties, but would be relative and non-opposable to Italy and that she would in no 
way be bound by the operative provisions of that judgment.
52
  
This clear and practical application of article 59 in the case-law of the Court can only 
strengthen the point already made above that the essence of article 59 is to protect third 
parties from decisions and not principles. 
6.2.2.1 The Limits of Article 59 Protection  
The case-law of the Court reveals instances where article 59 is unable to effectively protect 
third party interests.
 53
 Generally, Judge Mbaye reasoned in Libya v. Malta, that depending on 
the nature of the rights at issue and the possible consequences of the Court's decision, there 
may be situations in which article 59 may offer only an imperfect protection to a third State. 
He defined the situation to be where the Court's decision might cause irreparable harm to a 
third State; such as where the decision attributes specific rights to one or the other of the 
parties.
54
 Accordingly, the protection afforded by article 59 is not without limits.  
The Court has so far developed the approach best suited to situations where third States 
would require more protections than article 59 can render. As a result, it has strived to strike a 
                                                             
49 Ibid p. 579-580 para 50 
50 Ibid p. 577, para 46 
51 Ibid, p 579 para 49 
52 Note 9, p. 16, para 22 
53In Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea Intervening, ICJ Rep 2002, 303, 421, 
para 238, the Court specifically identified maritime delimitation pertaining to the maritime areas of several States in this 
regards. The Court specifically held that article 59 may not be able to protect Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe 
from the effects of the Judgment between Cameroon and Nigeria.    
54 Separate Opinion, Libya v. Malta, note 9, p. 46-47 
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balance between the necessity not to prejudice the rights of third States and the corresponding 
necessity of adjudicating on the case between States which have voluntarily submitted to its 
jurisdiction in expectation of a decision.  In Libya v. Malta, the Court declared that it is its 
duty, in the absence in the Court's procedures of any system of compulsory intervention, to 
give the fullest decision it may give in the circumstances of each case while the legal interests 
of a third State is protected.
55
  
A rough assessment of what the Court would do to balance the protection afforded third 
parties by article 59 against the equally important right of litigating States to be heard by the 
Court, has been to identify some limits beyond which it would be judicially imprudent to 
decide on a dispute which implicates third party rights. That limit is reached where, to follow 
the language of the Court, the legal interests of the non-party would not merely be affected by 
the judgment, but would constitute its very subject-matter.
56
 In other words, that limit is 
reached when the judgment the Court is called upon to render would imply an evaluation of 
the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case.
 57
 It must be 
appreciated, though, that this balance may be very difficult to achieve in some cases without 
having to pass on the legal rights of third parties
58
 or declining to decide on some crucial 
aspects of the claim between the parties, even after the Court had considered it proper to 
assume jurisdiction over the case.
59
  
 On the whole, it is as pointed out by Judge Shahabuddeen, difficult to think of any point at 
which a balance may be struck between these competing considerations without the Court 
                                                             
55 Note 9, p. 25 para 40 
56 Phosphate Lands in Nauru, note 23, p. 312-313, para 79-80 
57 East Timor, note 44, p. 102, para 29 
58 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ Rep 2005, 168, 237 para 203; Phosphate Lands 
in Nauru, note 23 p. 261-262 para 54-55. In these cases the Court assumed jurisdiction despite finding the existence of the 
interests of third States in the claims brought before it.  
59 In Libya v. Malta, note 14, the Court tactically severed the part of the claim affecting the interest of Italy from the dispute 
between Libya and Malta. See a critique of the approach of the Court in the Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, in 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru, ibid, p. 294-295, where he reasoned that the position taken by the Court was not merely to 
protect Italy‘s interests, but was in fact refraining from adjudicating between the parties before it with respect to any areas in 
which Italy might have a claim.    
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having sometimes to assume jurisdiction notwithstanding that the interests of a non-party 
State would, to some extent, be affected. It is pertinent to state, nonetheless, that whenever 
this occurs, it becomes the province of article 59 to limit the effect of the judgment to the 
actual parties to the case. This is because the extent envisaged by Judge Shahabuddeen could 
only be the extent to which article 59 can still effectively protect third States. The Court 
accepts that it is legally impermissible for it to make a decision affecting third States without 
their consent. The Court would avoid making a vain order.    
The Court would reach the point where third party interest cannot be left to article 59, when 
the interest of the third State forms the subject-matter of the claim before the Court. 
Whenever the Court finds that the balance tilts against the protection afforded by article 59, 
and the affected State refuses to intervene, the Court would have no other choice than to 
decline jurisdiction.  This was the approach followed by the Court in Monetary Gold 
Removed from Rome in 1943,
60
 East Timor
61
 and Northern Cameroon.
62
 In Monetary Gold, 
the Court refused to adjudicate on the claim brought by Italy against France, the UK and the 
U.S (on the basis of an agreement between the three States) because, though Albania‘s share 
of the monetary gold formed the subject-matter of the case, Albania was not a party to the 
proceedings. The Court specifically held that it could not determine the case in the absence of 
Albania consenting to jurisdiction, as that ―would run counter to a well-established principle 
of international law embodied in the Court's Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise 
jurisdiction over a State with its consent‖.63 In East Timor, the Court also declined 
jurisdiction because Indonesia whose treaty rights with Australia formed the basis of the 
decision requested by Portugal was not a party to the case.  The reasoning of the Court was 
that, inasmuch as Australia's behaviour cannot be assessed without first deciding on why 
                                                             
60 Preliminary Question, ICJ Reps 1954, p. 19 
61 Note 42 
62 (Cameroon  v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1963, 15 
63 Monetary Gold case, note 60, p. 32 
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Indonesia could not have lawfully concluded the 1989 Treaty between Australia and 
Indonesia (the very subject-matter of the Court's decision), it could not make such a 
determination without the consent of Indonesia.
64
 In Northern Cameroon,
65
 the Court would 
not adjudicate on the claims of Cameroon because the subject-matter of the claim was the 
conduct of the United Nations which was not a party to the proceedings. Another reason the 
Court declined jurisdiction was that the Judgment would materially affect Nigeria, which was 
not a party to the proceedings and to which the erstwhile Northern Cameroon had been 
assimilated by a plebiscite conducted under the supervision of the United Nations. 
The point made here is that though article 59 protects the interests of third parties from 
decisions in a case, there could be instances where the protection afforded by article 59 may 
not suffice. In such instances, the Court simply declines jurisdiction. The only way the Court 
can decide such cases is when the affected State intervenes in the case.    
6.2.2.2 Article 59 and Intervention      
The point where the relationship between article 59 and the intervention provisions – articles 
62 and 63 – coincide is that point where the Court is prevented from adjudicating on a dispute 
affecting the legal rights of States that have not consented to the proceedings. As has been 
said above, the Court lacks the power to cause the joinder of a State in a pending suit, without 
her consent. The only remedy for this problem manifested in East Timor; Monetary Gold; 
and Northern Cameroon, is the intervention of the interested States in the respective 
applications. If there had been a successful application to intervene, the decision would have 
been binding upon the intervening parties. This would have plugged the gap between the 
decisions in each of the cases and the relevant third party by making them parties upon which 
decisions are binding under article 59. Where, as was the situation in those cases, a third State 
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refuses to intervene, the State remains outside the purview of article 59 and is effectively 
insulated from the decision of the Court.  
It must be borne in mind, though, that the protection afforded third States by article 59 is not 
diminished or extinguished by the failure of a State to intervene after being notified of the 
pendency of the proceedings. The consensual nature of international adjudication completely 
removes every notion of estoppel in this regard. It is, therefore, entirely within the 
prerogative of a State to decide whether it wants to participate in an ongoing proceeding in 
which the State considers its interest to be at stake. In Monetary Gold
66
 and East Timor,
67
 
each of the respective respondents – Albania and Indonesia – which must have been aware of 
a pending case in which her interests may be prejudiced, refused to intervene in the 
proceedings.  This, notwithstanding, the Court would not adjudicate on the claims in their 
absence. It was particularly argued in Monetary Gold case that the inclusion of the provisions 
for intervention indicates that the Statute contemplated that proceedings may continue, 
notwithstanding, that a third State may have an interest of a legal nature which might enable 
it to intervene. From this, the conclusion was sought to be drawn that the failure of a third 
State to exercise its choice of intervention should not make it impossible for the Court to give 
judgment on rights as between the Parties. Rejecting this contention, the Court held that, ―the 
Statute cannot be regarded, by implication, as authorizing proceedings to be continued in the 
absence of Albania [and by extension, non-intervening States]‖.68 
Indeed, the difficulty the Court had in the cases in which it had tilted the balance in favour of 
adjudicating on the claims of the litigating parties has been the failure of a third party, whose 
interest is at stake, to intervene. In Cameroon v. Nigeria, for instance, though the Court held 
that it had jurisdiction to determine the claims submitted to it, the Court yet had a problem 
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with the aspects of the claim touching on the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and 
Principe. This was owing to the fact that Equatorial Guinea only intervened as a non-party 
intervener
69
 while Sao Tome and Principe did not intervene at all.  
In the case, Nigeria had urged the Court to decline jurisdiction because the decision in the 
case would affect the interests of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The Court 
acknowledged that the interests of those States were actually at risks; but being unable to 
determine the questions raised as a preliminary question, the Court deferred it to the merit 
stage because it could not ―rule out the possibility that the impact of the judgment required by 
Cameroon on the rights and interests of the third States could be such that the Court would be 
prevented from rendering it in the absence of these States‖.70 At the merit stage, the Court 
acknowledged that, its jurisdiction being founded on the consent of the parties, it is prevented 
from deciding upon the legal rights of States which were not parties to the proceedings. The 
Court agreed that the rights of third States – Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe – 
might indeed be affected by the proceedings; and that those rights cannot be determined by a 
decision of the Court unless Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe decided to 
intervene. Consequently, the Court refused to rule on Cameroon's claims in so far as they 
might affect rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, though the Court 
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
71
  
The approach is consistent with the case-law of the Court which holds that the failure of a 
necessary third State to intervene does not preclude the Court from assuming jurisdiction 
                                                             
69 Note 53. A non-party intervener is an intervening State which does not want to become a party to the proceedings before 
the Court and as such not bound by the judgment of the Court under articles 59 and 60.  Such a State is allowed to intervene 
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Application to Intervene,  ICJ Rep. 1999, 1029, 1031, 1032, para 2 and 5. Also See El Salvador/Honduras, note 40, p. 135-
136, para. 102. (Holding that a non party intervener neither becomes a party nor acquires any rights which attaches to the 
status of a party under the Statute and Rules of Court, or the general principles of procedural law.) 
70 Dissenting, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria,) Preliminary Objections, 
ICJ Rep 1998, 275, 324, para 116 
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over a claim. Indeed such instances abound. In Phosphate Lands in Nauru,
72
 the Court held 
that the absence of a request for intervention by a relevant third State does not preclude the 
Court from adjudicating upon the claims submitted to it, provided the legal interests of a third 
State which may possibly be affected do not form the very subject-matter of the decision that 
is applied for. This is however subject to the fundamental qualification that the Court is able 
to render a decision that does not affect the right of third States. Or as seen in the Libya v. 
Malta in relation to the right of Italy; Cameroon v. Nigeria as it affected the rights of 
Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, the Court would dutifully avoid pronouncing 
on the aspect of the case affecting the rights of the non-intervening third State while generally 
assuming jurisdiction over the case.  
Accordingly, when the Court states that it can adjudicate on a case in which the interest of a 
third State may be affected, the Court could not be saying that it is acceptable to give a 
decision affecting the interest of a third State which had not intervened. What the Court is 
entitled to say (and this is obvious from the cases) is that it cannot refuse to adjudicate on a 
case because the legal interest of a third State may be affected when the effect of the decision 
on such a third State had been negated before hand by article 59. In other words, the Court 
simply holds that it is not obliged to take any additional steps in cases where article 59 
provides adequate protection.  
There is, therefore, a difference between cases where only the interest of a third State is 
affected and cases where in addition to the interests of the State being affected, the conduct of 
the State or its interest forms the very subject-matter of the case. Where the latter is the case, 
it would not be sufficient that the interests of the State is protected by article 59, the Court 
would require the consent of the third State to the proceedings. Where the State refuses to 
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the Court of misapplying the previous cases and thus deviating from its jurisprudence – dissenting, Phosphate Lands in 
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supply that consent through intervention, the jurisdiction of the Court is vitiated not only in 
relation to the third party but also in respect of the case in its entirety. The Court affirmed this 
view in the Monetary Gold case; declaring as follows:     
Where, as in the present case, the vital issue to be settled concerns the 
international responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot, without the 
consent of that third State, give a decision on that issue binding upon any 
State, either the third State, or any of the parties before it.
73
 
 
The Court further held that although Italy and the three respondent States had conferred 
jurisdiction upon the Court, that jurisdiction was not exercisable in the absence of Albania, 
whose interest formed the subject-matter of the claim.
 74
 
6.2.2.3. Intervention as Alternative to Article 59  
It is essential to mention that the extent of the power of the Court over whether to grant 
intervention or not, is dependent upon the article under which the application is brought. If 
brought under article 63, the Court is bound to grant it. But if it is brought under article 62, 
the Court is not bound to grant it as of course.
 75
 In addition to the stipulations in article 81(2) 
of its Rules, the Court takes into account article 59 in relation to the interests sought to be 
protected, in deciding whether to grant the application.
76
 The Court has been consistent in 
stating that it does not consider that article 62 of the Statute confers upon it any general 
discretion to accept or reject a request for permission to intervene for reasons simply of 
policy. Rather, the task entrusted to it by article 62 is to determine the admissibility or 
otherwise of the request by reference to the relevant provisions of the Statute.
77
 Indeed, as the 
Italian application to intervene in the Continental Shelf case shows, the fact that a State 
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75 See S.S. Wimbledom Application Instituting Proceedings of January 16, 1923, Serie A. No. 1, for the differences between 
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actually has an interest of a legal nature to protect in an ongoing case, is not a guarantee that 
its application to intervene under article 62 would be granted by the Court.  
This approach of the Court presents article 59 as a more effective alternative to intervention 
in a case in which the Court can reach a decision within the ambit of the protection afforded 
by the article. Accordingly, article 62 intervention begins where the protection afforded by 
article 59 ends. Libya v. Malta
78
 would illustrate this point. In the judgment of the Court on 
the application to intervene, the Court rejected the application of Italy to intervene because 
the interest it sought to protect was protected by article 59. While stating its judgment on the 
merit, however, the Court stated that the decision on the merit as foreshadowed in its decision 
on application to intervene was that the decision would be limited in geographical scope so as 
to leave the claims of Italy unaffected. Accordingly, the decision of the Court was confined to 
the area in which, as Italy informed the Court, she had no claims to continental shelf rights.
79
  
This could further be explained by Nicaragua v. the United States.
80
 In the case, Nicaragua 
had brought proceedings against the United States of America, in respect of a dispute 
concerning responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. 
The US challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on several grounds, including the absence of 
Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador in the proceedings. This argument was based on a 
reservation in the Declaration by which the US accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court. In its response, the Court held that the three States had the choice of either instituting 
proceedings or intervening for the protection of their interests, ―in so far as these are not 
already protected by Article 59 of the Statute‖.81 
This view was further highlighted by Judge Jennings, who though disagreeing with the 
position of the Court, maintained that he was,    
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81Ibid,  p. 425, para. 75  
  
230 
unable to accept the argument, nor indeed does the Court appear to accept, 
that this reservation is "mere surplusage", and that it does no more than 
protect the interests of absent States already protected by Article 59 of the 
Statute. No doubt both that Article and the reservation are concerned with 
States not parties to the case; but I am unable to see how an instrument which 
protects those States from being bound by the decision can be said to cover 
the same ground as one which reserves jurisdiction unless those States are 
parties.
 82 
 
The Court‘s reliance on article 59 as a ground for rejecting an application to intervene under 
article 62 was, however, not well received as a ground for rejecting the application of Italy to 
intervene in Libya v. Malta. In the case, Italy had trenchantly argued that: 
If Article 59 always provides adequate protection for third States, and if the 
protection which it affords is such as to prevent the interest of the third State 
from being genuinely affected in a pending case, then.... Article 62 no 
longer has any point whatsoever, nor any sphere of application.
83
 
In answering this contention, the Court declared that the conclusion drawn by Italy was 
unfounded. It affirmed that a State which considers that its legal interest may be affected by a 
decision has the choice – implied in the provision of Article 62, that a State "may" submit a 
request to intervene – whether to intervene or to refrain from intervening, and rely on Article 
59.
84
  
Being dissatisfied with the manner in which the Court placed article 59 over the deliberate 
choice of Italy not to rely solely on article 59, but also to intervene under article 62, Judge 
Schwebel stated that there would never be a case to which article 62 could apply, if by reason 
of article 59, a third State's legal interest never can be affected by a decision in a case. The 
Judge reasoned that article 59 cannot, by any canon of interpretation, read Article 62 out of 
the Statute.
85
 Mbaye reasoned that the preference placed by the Court on article 59 over 
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article 62 was tantamount to condemning the institution of intervention, provided for in 
article 62 of the Statute, to a ―wasting death‖.86 
Notwithstanding, the Court‘s use of article 59 and intervention in the alternative conforms to 
the view expressed in the M. Leon Bourgeois Report to the League Council, when the Statute 
of the Court was being considered. After discussing article 59 in the context of intervention, 
the Report concluded that: 
The last stipulation [in article 61 now 63] establishes, in the contrary case, 
that if a State has not intervened in the case the interpretation cannot be 
enforced against it.  No possible disadvantage could ensue from stating 
directly what article 61 indirectly admits. The addition of an article drawn 
up as follows can thus be proposed to the assembly: The decision of the 
court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case.
87
 
 
It therefore appears perfectly in order for the Court to decline an application to intervene 
under article 62 when the legal interest for which intervention is sought is already protected 
by article 59.  
The discussion in the section strongly shows that the Court takes seriously to the view that 
article 59 protects third parties from decisions – the operative part of a case. When the 
approach of the Court in the cases discussed in this section is contrasted with its approach in 
the cases in which the Court postulated that article 59 prohibits principles adopted in one case 
from application in another, it would lend credence to the point earlier made about the weight 
to be attached to the mere statements about article 59 prohibiting the application of 
principles. The differences in the approaches of the Court in these regards lie in the fact that 
in cases where it was said that article 59 prohibited principles, the application of principles 
was not in issue. The statement was not crucial to the resolution of a live question of law or 
of facts raised in the cases; it therefore lacked application. Accordingly, the utility of the 
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statement is at best academic. On the other hand, in the cases where the Court applied article 
59 to decisions, the question of application of decisions to third States were crucial in the 
cases. By the application of article 59 the Court was enabled to resolve the question one way 
or the other. This cannot but show that the correct view is that article 59 means exactly what 
it says – decisions (not principles) are binding only on parties to a case.  
The writer stated at the beginning of this section that when article 59 is for the protection of 
third States, the article is actually used in the opposite direction. This is because the rule that 
third parties cannot be bound by the decision of the Court is actually the inverse of the 
express provision of the article. The next section discusses instances where the Court relied 
on the express provision of article 59.     
6.2.3 For the Purpose of Holding Parties to a Case Bound by the Decision in the Case 
Article 59 is sometimes used to complement article 60 of the Statute. By article 59, 
judgments are binding on the parties; by article 60 judgments are final and not appealable.  
Under this head, article 59 expresses the trite law that decisions of a tribunal, be it a judicial 
or other tribunals, are binding only on the parties to the cases before it.
88
 By reading both 
articles together, the Court emphasises the finality of its judgments between the parties. In 
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, the PCIJ declared that it is incompatible 
with the character of the judgments rendered by the Court and with the binding force attached 
to them by articles 59 and 60 of its Statute, for the Court to render a judgment which either of 
the parties may render inoperative.
89
 In Northern Cameroons, the Court specifically declared 
that ―pursuant to Article 59 of the Statute, a judgment of the Court in this case would bind 
only the two Parties‖90 – Cameroon and the United Kingdom. In the Monetary Gold case, the 
                                                             
88 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hackworth in Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations  Administrative 
Tribunal, ICJ Rep 1954, 47, 81  
89 (2nd Phase) Order of December 6, 1930, 14 
90Note 60, p. 34  
  
233 
Court thought the rule in article 59 ―rests on the assumption that the Court is at least able to 
render a binding decision‖.91 
This use of article 59 is clear from its wordings that ―the judgment of the Court is binding on 
the parties‖; so that parties which approach the Court do so in expectation of a binding 
decision in respect of the dispute for which they are in Court. The decision being binding and 
final cannot be reopened except in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. 
Accordingly, it is not open to a party to a case to deny that the decision of the Court in the 
case is binding. The point was emphatically made in LaGrand case,
92
 where the Court stated 
that: 
the object and purpose of the Statute is to enable the Court to fulfil the functions 
provided for therein, and, in particular, the basic function of judicial settlement 
of international disputes by binding decisions in accordance with Article 59 of 
the Statute.
93
 
 
It seems, however, that for a decision to have a binding effect between the parties under 
article 59, it must be a final decision within the meaning of article 60. In Free Zones of Upper 
Savoy and the District of Gex, the Court held that the orders made by it under article 48 of its 
Statute in contradistinction with the judgments of the Court have no ―binding‖ force (article 
59) or final effect (article 60) in deciding the dispute brought by the parties before the 
Court.
94  
Also, in his dissenting opinion in the Interpretation of Judgments 7 and 8, Judge 
Anzilotti noted that, by articles 60 and 59, judgments of the Court on preliminary matters do 
not have the binding force of a decision for the purpose of interpretation. He maintained that 
it is,
 
clear under a generally accepted rule which is derived from the very 
conception of res judicata, [that] decisions on incidental or preliminary 
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questions which have been rendered with the sole object of adjudicating 
upon the party‘s claim ... are not binding in another case.95  
 
The rule that preliminary orders are not binding appears to have been overruled in LaGrand 
case,
96
 where the Court unequivocally affirmed the binding nature of preliminary orders. 
Notwithstanding, the two positions of the Court could be reconciled by arguing that article 59 
applies to final and not tentative orders. The difference being that though preliminary orders 
are binding, the Court could change its view in the course of a particular case.
97
 And since the 
preliminary determination is not final and, therefore, not res judicata until the case is 
determined with finality (though binding), the Court would not require a request for revision 
under article 61 before revising a preliminary decision, whereas, the revision of a final 
judgment can occur only through article 61. It thus follows that decisions on preliminary 
matters are binding as decisions under article 59 though not final under article 60. To that 
extent, it could be said that not all decisions which are binding under article 59 are final. This 
is particularly so because, article 59 does not produce finality of judgment, it only produces 
the binding effects of a decision between the parties.
98
       
What has been said above is only an aspect of the combined use of articles 59 and 60. There 
is the other half of it that makes it impossible for parties to a case which had been decided 
with finality, to re-litigate the same matter between the same party in another case. This is 
known as the principle of res judicata. This is the aspect of article 59 which shall be 
discussed in the next section.    
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6.2.4 Article 59 as Res Judicata 
Article 59 had been variously used to affirm the application of the rule of res judicata in the 
Court. The Court holds this view through a conjunctive reading of articles 59 and 60. The 
latter article provides that ―The judgment of the Court is final and of no appeal...‖. In the 
South West Africa cases,
99
 Judge Jessup affirmed, in his Separate Opinion, that the statement 
in Article 60 of the Statute that "the judgment is final and without appeal", taken in 
conjunction with the reference in article 59 to "that particular case", constitutes a practical 
adoption in the Statute of the rule of res judicata.
100
 According to Judge M. Anzilotti,  
The first object of article 60 being to ensure, by excluding every ordinary 
means of appeal against them, that the Court‘s judgment shall possess the 
formal value of res judicata, it is evident that the article is closely 
connected with article 59 which determines the material effect of res 
judicata ....we have here [in article 59] the three traditional elements for 
identification, persona, petitum, causa petendi, for it is clear that ―the 
particular case‖ ... covers both the object and the grounds of the claim. 101 
The doctrine of res judicata rests on the fundamental notion that there should be an end to 
litigation. Consequently, parties are not allowed to re-litigate issues which they failed to raise 
in a previous case: when the parties; issues; and subject matter, are the same. According to 
the ICJ in the first Genocide case: 
The fundamental character of that principle [res judicata] appears from the 
terms of the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations. The 
underlying character and purposes of the principle are reflected in the 
judicial practice of the Court. That principle signifies that the decisions of 
the Court are not only binding on the parties, but are final, in the sense that 
they cannot be reopened by the parties as regards the issues that have been 
determined, save by procedures, of an exceptional nature, specially laid 
down for that purpose. Article 59 of the Statute, notwithstanding its 
negative wording, has at its core the positive statement that the parties are 
bound by the decision of the Court in respect of the particular case. Article 
60 of the Statute provides that the judgment is final and without appeal.... 
Two purposes, one general, the other specific, underlie the principle of res 
judicata, internationally as nationally. First, the stability of legal relations 
requires that litigation come to an end. The Court‘s function, according to 
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Article 38 of its Statute, is to ―decide‖, that is, to bring to an end, ―such 
disputes as are submitted to it‖. Secondly, it is in the interest of each party 
that an issue which has already been adjudicated in favour of that party be 
not argued again. Article 60 of the Statute articulates this finality of 
judgments.
102
  
  
The Court further held, citing article 59 of the Statute, that res judicata signifies that once a 
Court has made a determination, that determination is definitive both for the parties, in 
respect of the case; and for the Court itself in the context of that case.
103
  
Nonetheless, a finding of res judicata does not preclude a party to the case from advancing a 
legally distinct claim arising from the same facts; neither does it completely remove the 
subject-matter from the examination of the Court. In other words, the fact that a State had 
made a claim on one legal basis does not deprive it of the right to assert another claim on a 
separate legal basis regarding the subject-matter. The question will then arise whether the 
issue raised in the latter claim was finally determined by the earlier decision
104
 – res judicata 
feeds on finality. 
For the Court to be entitled to make a finding of res judicata in the context of its Statute and 
the submissions of the parties, the Court follows the practice of national courts: there must be 
an identity of parties;
105 
identity of cause; and identity of subject-matter between the earlier 
and the subsequent proceedings.
 106   
In his analysis of article 59 in the Interpretation of 
Judgments no. 7 and 8, Judge Anzilloti stated that the aforementioned requirements of res 
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106Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ranjava, Shi and Koroma, note 104  
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judicata are encapsulated in article 59. He saw article 59 as clearly an expression of res 
judicata.
107
   
Article 59 confines the res judicata effect of the decision of the Court to the actual parties 
and to finality of decisions. However, a party which had the opportunity to defend a suit 
against it but yet refused to participate in the proceedings will be precluded from reopening 
the case, except within the context of article 61 of the Statute.
108
 This point was made in 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.
109
 Here, after the Court 
dismissed her preliminary objections, the United States refused to participate further in the 
proceedings. While delivering judgment on the merit, the Court made it clear, relying on 
article 59, that:  
A State which decides not to appear must accept the consequences of its 
decision, the first of which is that the case will continue without its 
participation; the State which has chosen not to appear remains a party to the 
case, and is bound by the eventual judgment in accordance with Article 59 of 
the Statute.
 110
 
 
This view should however be situated within the context of a respondent, which had refused 
to appear or decided to boycott a case after an initial appearance, notwithstanding that the 
Court was properly seised of jurisdiction. The statement does not apply to a State which had 
not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court; or one which had accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court but not a party to a particular case before the Court.  
The extensive discussion of the principle in the first Genocide case by Judge ad hoc Kreca, is 
particularly illuminating and worth summarising. According to Judge Kreca, the expression, 
res judicata, has more than one meaning: it means an issue decided by a court of law; a 
judgment which cannot be refuted by ordinary legal vehicles; and, also, a decision which is 
                                                             
107 Note 7, p. 27 
108 Article 61 allows a State to apply for revision of a judgment 
109 (Nicaragua v. the United States), Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 24 Para 28 
110Ibid  
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immutable and irrevocable. To him, two components may be discerned in the substance of 
res judicata as provided in the Statute of the Court: (i) procedural, which implies that: ―[t]he 
judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of a dispute as to the meaning or scope of 
the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party (Art. 60)‖; and (ii) 
substantive, according to which: ―The decision of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case (Art. 59)‖. The Judge opined that the 
primary effect of res judicata in the procedural sense is to preclude a future lawsuit on the 
same cause of action, whereas the effect of res judicata in the substantive sense is mainly 
related to the legal validity of the Court‘s decision as an individualization of objective law in 
the concrete matter and also, to the exclusion of the application of stare decisis.
111
 
On the exclusion of stare decisis as a substantive meaning of res judicata, however, not even 
on the facts of the case, could the Judge sustain his view. Hence he quickly realised that it is 
clearly established in the case-law of the Court that the effects of a decision of the Court are 
not necessarily limited to the case decided, and that depending on circumstances, it 
occasionally extends beyond it.
112
 On this basis, the Judge concluded that a ―[n]arrow 
interpretation of Article 59 simply does not fit into the corpus of the Court‘s law‖.113  
It was only logical that the Judge accepted that article 59 should not be narrowly interpreted, 
as he soon came to a point in his Opinion that would shred his earlier view. This was when he 
came to the main consideration before the Court – the effect of two existing earlier judgments 
of the Court. The one made at the preliminary stage of the first Genocide case and the one 
made in a set of different cases entirely – the Legality of the Use of Force cases. The kernel 
of the Judge‘s concern was the effect of the judgments of the Court in the cases on the United 
                                                             
111 Separate Opinion of Judge Kreca in first Genocide case, note 97, p. 1, para 1-3 
112 Ibid, p. 26, para 49;   In the Aerial Incident of August 10 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction, ICJ Reps 2000, 12, 24 
para 26, the Court adopted this passage from the Aegean Sea (Greece v. Turkey) ICJ Rep 1978, 3, stating that it would 
proceed on a similar course adopted by the Court in that case, where having noted that the decision may have implications 
for other cases, refused to decide on whether the General Act was still in force.  
113 Separate Opinion of Judge Kreca in first  Genocide case, note 97, p. 493, para 50 
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Nations, and by extension, its members at large, given that the vital issues in the cases 
revolved around the United Nations, which was not a party to the case. If the Judge took the 
view that the precedential value of the decisions of the Court had been excluded by the res 
judicata effect of article 59, it would mean that the approach adopted by the Court previously 
on the same issue of the status of FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) in the United Nations would 
have no application in any other case between FRY and another member of the United 
Nations. This would mean that the Court is at liberty to hold that FRY is a member of the UN 
in one case, but not in another. The wider implication may even be that FRY would relate 
with some States as a member of the United Nations and with some other States as a non-
member. Accordingly, each member of the United Nations would have to individually 
approach the Court to determine its relationship with FRY vis a vis the United Nations. This 
would greatly be at the expense of judicial economy and a massive waste of time and 
resources. In any case, where would that leave the Court and the parties appearing before it? 
If the Court took the view that the precedential force of a judgment was not precluded by 
article 59, the Court would allow the United Nations to take cognisance of the judgment 
which would in turn produce the desired judicial force between Yugoslavia, on one side, and 
the UN and its members on the other. The Judge rightly preferred the latter view, which is a 
prudent use of judicial resources. In his words:           
...the Judgment cannot, in that part, be treated as a judgment in personam, 
having conclusive effects only between the parties to the case, because its 
subject matter is the status of Serbia and Montenegro both in relation to the 
United Nations itself and in relation to the Members of the United Nations....
114
  
 
The Judge then concluded: 
  
                                                             
114Ibid, p. 494, para 51 
  
240 
Judgments of the Court on the status issue, in their effect ratione personae, 
cannot, unlike other judgments, be limited to the Parties to a dispute. Their 
material effects surpass the effects of the judgment defined in Article 60 of 
the Statute. By the very nature of their object, judgments on status issues, 
which do not allow for uncertainty and insecurity, act intra parties. ... 
However, this is not a question of the technical effect, under Article 59 of 
the Statute, of judgments on status issues intra partes but a question of the 
material, reflective effect of such judgments on third States. It is binding 
erga omnes not as a judicial act in the formal sense, but as a result of its 
intrinsic persuasive force, in parallel with the mandatory force of the 
judgment in the technical sense, based on the presumption of 
truthfulness....
115
  
 
The distinction of status and non-status judgments sought to be introduced into article 59, is 
with respect, unpersuasive. The Judge was embarking on an unwarranted legislative trip by 
attempting to write into the Statute of the Court a clause that is not there. Nonetheless, the 
reasoning of the learned Judge does show the complexities that would arise should article 59 
admit of such technical restriction. 
It should be clear from the discussion above that res judicata only applies to the actual 
decisions of the Court between the parties and not the reasoning of the Court leading to that 
decision. In Barcelona Traction case, Judge Gros thought that the force of res judicata does 
not extend to the reasoning of a judgment, and that it is the practice of the Court, as of arbitral 
tribunals, to stand by the reasoning set forth in previous decisions.
116
 Accordingly, res 
judicata is not synonymous with the doctrine of judicial precedent. For a claim to be res 
judicata, it must have been previously determined with finality between the same parties. 
Precedent on the other hand, only requires similarity of facts; it neither requires similarity of 
subject-matter nor similarity of parties.   
                                                             
115 Ibid, p. 497, para 58 
116Separate Opinion, note 33, p. 267, para 1. Also see Ernest A. Young, ‗Supranational Rulings as Judgments and 
Precedents‘18 DJCIL 476, 500-502 (2008) (arguing that ―Just as courts exercise both dispute settlement and law-declaring 
functions, their decisions can be authoritative in two corresponding ways: as judgments and as precedents. Within the 
domestic legal system, the judgment force of a court‘s prior decision is expressed through the rules of ... res judicata. ... The 
precedential force of a ruling ... refers to the ruling‘s authoritative force in a new proceeding not encompassed by the prior 
judgment.‖); lain Scobbie, ―Res Judicata, Precedent and the International Court of Justice: A Preliminary Sketch‖, 20 Aust. 
YBIL 229, 303 (1999) (stating that res judicata refers to the terms of the definitive disposition of a specific case as between 
the parties, as stated in the operative clause. While the doctrine of precedent concerns relatively abstract proposition which 
may be used in future cases, which need not involve the same parties.)  
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In the first Genocide case, Judge Owade, in effect, reasoned that though a judgment does not 
technically constitute res judicata for other cases to which article 59 of the Statute applies, it 
is relevant for the Court to consider whether and to what extent the legal reasoning 
enunciated by the Court in arriving at its conclusion in that judgment is applicable to those 
other cases
117
 This was also the view of the Court in the Legality of the Use of Force,
 118
 
where, referring to the judgment in first Genocide case, the Court declared: 
There is no question of that Judgment possessing any force of res judicata in 
relation to the present case. Nevertheless, the relevance of that judgment to 
the present case has to be examined, inasmuch as Serbia and Montenegro 
raised, in connection with its Application for revision, the same issue of its 
access to the Court under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Statute....
119
 
 
Therefore, it is the live issues decided in a case that could be res judicata and not the 
rule/principle arising from the case.  Thus, issues raised by the parties and decided by the 
Court are res judicata between the parties, but a rule/principle arising from the case has a life 
of its own. Such a rule/principle could subsequently be questioned by the parties to the case 
in which it was adopted (or by a different party) in an entirely different case. The fact that the 
rule/principle could be successfully revised in another case has no relevance to the earlier 
case where the rule/principle was used to decide with finality. That earlier case cannot be 
reopened simply because the Court decided to take a different view of the law in a different 
case, since the issues decided in the previous case are, by articles 59 and 60, final between the 
parties and, therefore, res judicata. 
So far, the writer has discussed the various aspects of article 59 in the case-law of the Court. 
It has been shown that article 59 has no real bearing with article 38(1)(d). This being the case, 
to what end is the latter article subject to the former. It is to this, that the writer shall now 
turn.    
                                                             
117 Separate Opinion, note 97, p. 8, para, 287. 
118 Note 104, p. 1307.  
119 Ibid, p. 1338, para 78  
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6.3 The Purport of Subjecting Article 38(1)(d) to Article 59 
It is an incontrovertible rule of interpretation that a provision made subject to another is 
intended to be read alongside whatever limitation is placed on it by that other provision. It 
thus follows that article 38(1)(d), having been made subject to article 59, must be read 
together with the latter for the purpose of observing the limits placed thereon by the latter. 
The mere fact that article 59 is inherently ambiguous makes it impossible for paragraph (d) to 
escape ambiguity. Accordingly, no conclusive statement can be made on paragraph (d) 
without observing the limits, if any, placed thereon by article 59. 
 It would be incontrovertible that if article 59 prohibited the Court from adopting and 
applying legal rules/principles developed in previous decisions, article 38, being so subject, 
would be construed accordingly.  But if as has been shown above, article 59 is not so 
construed in the case-law of the Court, it would follow that the authority of judicial decisions 
is unaffected by the provisions of article 59 in the manner in which the provisions have been 
generally construed by writers.
 120
  
The first point to note is that paragraph (d) contains two items– judicial decisions and 
teachings – but only judicial decision is mentioned in article 59. The first difficulty is whether 
the phrase, ―subject to‖, governs only judicial decisions or the entire paragraph, including 
teachings of Publicists. If it governs the entire paragraph, which is the only plausible view, 
because of the conjunctive ―and‖ between decisions and doctrines, one would be left 
wondering what doctrine has to do with an article 59 provision. If this view is given, it would 
rob article 59 of its acclaimed essence, if its purpose is actually to prohibit the accumulation 
of case-law. Hence, we cannot talk of the application of a particular teaching of publicists, 
                                                             
120 See, for instance, Maurice Mendelson, ―The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law‖ in 
Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice ed. Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice 63, 81 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). (Arguing that the effect of subjecting article 38(1)(d) to article 59 is that there is no doctrine of judicial 
precedent in the ICJ). 
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―between the parties and only in respect of that particular case‖. The simpler view, on the 
face of it, is to hold that the phrase governs only judicial decisions. This view is also not free 
from complications. 
The major complication arising from this is the general belief that article 38(1)(d) 
encompasses decisions of other international courts and tribunals, as well as municipal courts. 
If the term ―subject to article 59‖, is the decisive factor, it would then follow that the 
decisions of these other courts and tribunals which are not made subject to article 59, are not 
affected by article 59. The effect of this would be that the precedents of these other courts 
would have greater force in the ICJ than its own precedents. According to Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen,  
Article 38 paragraph (1)(d) refers to ―judicial decisions in general and 
unqualified terms. This must include decisions of tribunals other than the 
International Court of Justice. It is equally clear that the provisions article 59 
relate only to the International Court of Justice... if the purpose of article 59 
were ―to prevent decisions of the court from exerting precedential effect with 
binding force‖, it would follow that ―the decisions of other courts and 
tribunals presumably stand on higher ground, not being caught by the article 
59 limitation. The consequence of this is so improbable as to suggest that the 
interpretation on which it rests cannot be correct.
121
 
 It is difficult to see how the Statute of the Court would require the Court to accord greater 
authority to decisions of other courts than its own decisions.  
The second complication relates to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. Article 59 is clearly 
attached to paragraph (d) in article 38(1). Article 38(1) expressly mandates the Court to 
                                                             
121 Cited in R.Y Jennings, ―The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law‖ 45, Int‘l & 
comp. L.Q 1, 6 (1996). Whether formally required or not, the case-law of the Court must carry the highest weight in matters 
specifically assigned to it. This point was indirectly made by the Court in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. DRC), Judgment 
of November 30, 2010, p. 14, para 66, where, considering the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 1966, the Court had to rely on the case-law of the Human Rights Committee set up under the Covenant, the Court 
stated that, though it was not obliged to model its view on that of the Committee, ―it believed it should ascribe great weight 
to the interpretation adopted by this independent body established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty. The 
point here is to achieve ... clarity and the essential consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both 
the individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with treaty obligations are entitled‖. By the same 
token, it should be supposed that the Court is bound to attach the greatest weight to its precedent in matters within its 
competence.  
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decide; and ―decisions‖ as used in article 59 and the opening paragraph of article 38(1) and in 
its paragraph (d), relates to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court under article 36. In 
contradistinction to this, the Court is not required to ―decide‖ in its advisory jurisdiction. 
Also, there are no parties to be bound by advisory opinions within the language of article 59 
and no res judicata can result from the issues upon which the Court has pronounced an 
opinion in its advisory capacity.  
Furthermore, article 65 is not made subject to article 59, and it cannot be rightly argued that 
article 59 has any nexus with article 65. From the language of article 59, it can be gathered 
that the article is concerned with the jurisdiction of the Court in contentious cases – brought 
by disputant State parties who are bound by article 94 of the Charter of the UN – and not 
advisory opinions, to which there are no contentious parties, and thus not binding on any 
State.  Article 59, therefore, has no bearing with article 65.  
Notwithstanding, when searching for previously determined rules/principles, the Court does 
not draw any distinction between decisions rendered under each form of jurisdictions, neither 
does the Court attach lesser authority to rules/principles arising from its advisory jurisdiction. 
According to Judge De Castro, advisory opinions, 
...do not carry less authority than its judgments. There is ... a difference, 
stemming from the vis res judicata of the judgments, but this is limited to 
the parties to the dispute (vis relativa: Statute, Art. 59 On the other hand, 
the reasons on which judgments are based (Statute, Art. 56) are considered 
to constitute dicta prudentium, and their force as a source of law (Statute, 
Art. 38) derives not from any hierarchic power (tantum valet auctoritas 
quantum valet ratio) but from the validity of the reasoning (non ratione 
imperio, sed rafionis imperio). The essential differences between judgments 
and advisory opinions lies in the binding force of the former (Charter, Art. 
94) and it is on that account that the Court's jurisdiction was established on 
a voluntary basis (Statute, Art. 36) and the effect of judgments limited to the 
parties and the particular case (Statute, Art. 59). However, like the reasons 
on which a judgment is based, the reasoning and operative part of an 
advisory opinion are, at least potentially clothed with a general authority, 
even vis-à-vis States which have not participated in the proceedings, and 
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may therefore contribute to the formation of new rules of international law 
(Statute, Art. 38, para. 1 (d)).
 122
  
This point has also been made by Judge Tanaka. In his words: 
...concerning the Advisory Opinion of 1950, it has no binding force upon 
those concerned, namely no res judicata results from an advisory opinion for 
the purposes of subsequent litigation, even if the issue is identical. This point 
constitutes a difference between advisory and contentious proceedings. The 
structure of the proceedings is not the same, and the concept of parties in the 
same sense as in the latter does not exist in the former. This legal nature of an 
advisory opinion does not prevent that, as an authoritative pronouncement of 
what the law is, its content will have an influence upon the Court's decision 
on the same legal issue, irrespective of whether or not this issue constitutes a 
part of a subsequent stage of the same affairs.
123
 
The fact that the Court has exercised its advisory jurisdiction to develop international law as 
much as it has used its contentious jurisdiction is incontrovertible,
124
 as some of the far-
reaching rules/principles handed down by the Court have been in advisory opinions. For 
instance, the possibility of international organisations possessing the personality to bring 
international claims was first recognised in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations.
125
  
If article 59 was to prohibit precedent, it would have also been directed towards advisory 
opinions, except it could be argued that the Court is only precluded from judicial legislation 
in contentious cases. Since the Court attaches the same weight to rules/principles arising from 
both forms of jurisdiction, it would have been expected that article 59 would target judicial 
precedent irrespective of jurisdictions. The unspoken implication of arguing that article 59 
prohibits the application of rules/principles arising from judicial decisions is to place the 
                                                             
122 Separate Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa), ICJ Rep 1971, 16, 173-174, para 4 
123 Dissenting, South West Africa cases, note 99, p. 260. In the same vein, Judge Winiarski declared in Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1950, 65, 91,  that although advisory 
opinions are not legally binding, the Court must attribute to them great legal value. 
124 See Edvard Hambro, ―The Authority of the Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice‖, 3 Int‘l & Comp. 
L.Q, 2 (1954) (noting that the legal reasons behind advisory opinions carry the same weight and are invested with the same 
high authority as judgments).   
125 ICJ Rep 1949, 174    
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authority of rules/principles in advisory opinions over and above rules/principles in 
contentious cases. This result is untenable.  
 The situation becomes more complicated when it is considered that the advisory jurisdiction 
of the Court is, in some cases, binding on parties as would contentious jurisdiction.  Such 
provisions are numerously contained in treaties
126
 and have been construed and applied in 
several cases.
127
  In totality, it would thus hardly be true that article 38(1)(d) is made subject 
to article 59 for the purpose of preventing binding rules/principles adopted in the Court‘s 
decided cases.  
With these complexities, it is difficult to state, with precision, for what reason paragraph (d) 
was made subject to article 59. This is particularly due to the fact, as we have already seen, in 
chapter two, that article 59 was discussed in its drafting stages only in the context of 
intervention. No doubt, the nebulous language of article 38(1)(d) accounts for the perennial 
controversy trailing the authority of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d).  
In totality, it is really difficult to see where the argument that article 59 prohibits the 
application of rules/principles adopted in one case to another, can be anchored. Such a view 
neither finds support in the preparatory work nor in the Court‘s interpretation and application 
of article 59.  Considering the fact that the tenacity of the tentative conclusion reached in 
chapters three and four is dependent on the conclusion to be reached in this chapter, it is only 
prudent to say that the purpose of subjecting article 38(1)(d) to article 59 has remained 
largely unexplained both in the case-law of the Court and in the preparatory work of the 
                                                             
126 See article 66 para 2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or 
between International Organisations, ILM 543 (1986); article 32 para 3, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 28 ILM 493 (1989). See Generally, Roberto Ago, ―‗Binding Advisory 
Opinions of the International Court of Justice‖ 55 Am. J. Int‘l L. 439 (1991) 
127 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, ICJ 
Rep 1999, 62 
  
247 
provisions. This is particularly more intriguing when it is discovered that article 59 has been 
used more in conjunction with articles 60, 62, and 63 than with article 38(1)(d).  
It may be that those who inserted the provision were worried over the use of the word 
―decision‖ in the draft presented to the League Council by the Advisory Committee of Jurists. 
Their concern may be that article 38 could be used to smuggle a decision against third party if 
the word, ―decision,‖ was not further restricted to the actual parties by article 59. It may also 
be that article 38(1)(d) was subjected to article 59 in response to the view of Mr. Balfour, the 
British Representative, in his submission to the League Council. He had submitted: 
It seems to me that the decision of the permanent court cannot but have the 
effects of gradually moulding and modifying international law. This may be 
good or bad ...there ought to be some provision by which a state can enter a 
protest, not against any particular decision arrived at by the court, but 
against any ulterior conclusions to which that decision may seem to point.
128
 
    
Perhaps, article 59 was the provision envisaged by Balfour; perhaps, one of the unsolved 
mysteries of the Statute of the Court;
 perhaps, and according to James Brown, ―one of the 
imperfections of the Court's Statute‖. 129 Though difficult to ascertain the real purpose of 
subjecting article 38(1)(d) to 59, it is, as the writer has shown in this chapter, not so difficult 
to understand the working of article 59 and its relationship with article 38(1)(d) in practice.  
In the final analysis, this writer is unable to conclude upon a detailed examination of the 
practice of the Court that article 59 negates the normative character of rules/principles 
previously adopted by the Court. Those rules/principles are rules/principles of international 
law until overruled by the Court or expressly excluded by bilateral or multilateral treaties or 
by an adverse custom.  
                                                             
128 Note on the Permanent Court of International Justice, submitted by Mr. Balfour to the Council of the League of Nations, 
Brussels, October 1920, process verbal, p. 38. He also expressed the fear that States such as the United States, Russia and 
Germany, which were not members of the League of Nations, cannot be expected to take their views of international law 
from the Court‘s decision.  
129 Introduction to Manley Hudson‘s World Court Reports vol. 1, p. Xiv, (1934) cited in John C. Gardner, ―Judicial Precedent 
in the Making of International Law‖, 17 J Comp. Legis. & Int‘l L. 3d ser., 251, 254.   
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The good news, however, is that whatever theoretical void exists on the issue, that void is 
cured by the robust practice of the Court, which clearly points article 59 away from the view 
that its object is to prevent binding rules/principles. The writer is relieved to close this chapter 
with the sagacious observation of Lauterpacht, that:  
the practice of the court shows that if article 59 was intended to stultify the task 
of the court of developing international law by its own decisions and to prevent 
it from availing itself of the fruits of such development, then, with the 
concurrence of all the judges representing various systems of municipal 
jurisprudence, it has remained a dead letter. 
130
 
 
This is indeed a true representation of the findings made above regarding the practice relating 
to article 59. 
                                                             
130 H. Lauterpacht, ―The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of Thought in International Law‖, 12 Brit Y.B 
Int‘l. L, 31, 60-61 (1931) 
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Chapter Seven  
Occasions for, and Patterns of Judicial Legislation by the International Court of Justice 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The main trust of the writer‘s work in the previous chapters has been to ascertain the 
relevance of rules/principles in judicial decisions to the functions of the Court; a function it 
must perform in accordance with international law. His focus has been on the question 
whether rules/principles adopted in previous decisions form part of the body of international 
law which the Court is bound to apply. This is particularly in view of article 59 by which 
decisions are stated to be binding only on the parties to the case in which they were given.  
The writer had firmly argued in the previous chapters that rules/principles in judicial 
decisions are part of the body of international law in accordance to which the Court is 
mandated to perform its functions. The writer found no indication to the contrary in the plain 
language of the Statute of the Court; the preparatory work of the Statute; the practice of the 
Court and of the States that appear before it. Consequently, the writer trenchantly argued that 
the language of article 59 has no relevance to the authority of rules/principles adopted in the 
decisions of the Court.   
The main focus of this chapter is on the actuality of the Court developing and creating rules 
of international law as envisaged in article 38(1)(d) of its Statute. In furtherance of this, the 
chapter shall discuss the practice of the Court revealing law-creation in the interpretation of 
treaties; the application of customary laws; and in first impression cases. 
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7.2 Occasions for Judicial Legislation 
The term, ―judicial legislation‖, is cautiously used by the writer for want of a term that so 
best describes a function which the Court most often performs: the creation and development 
of international law.
1
 The Court performs this function whenever it adopts new legal 
solutions to deal with exigencies which are either not expressly provided for in existing rules 
of international law or are yet to be covered by law at all. For this purpose, the writer sees no 
real distinction between rules made through the modification and development of existing 
law to suit novel situations (not hitherto contemplated) and rules created by the Court from 
the corollaries of general rules/principles or through modification of analogous 
rules/principles of private law to create rules that are compatible with the international 
system. The rules emanating through the former are no less judicial creations than the rules 
emanating from the latter. The bottom-line, however, is that whenever the Court reads into a 
treaty a new provision under the guise of interpretation, or adopts a legal solution to a novel 
problem under the guise of finding the law, the Court actually creates a new rule of law. The 
writer would not share in the ―conspiracy to represent it as something less‖.2  
The writer is well aware of the opposition the term, ―judicial legislation‖, naturally attracts, 
when used in relation to a court like the ICJ which operates on the international sphere.
3
 As 
discussed in chapter one, aside the famous concept of separation of powers, the traditional 
                                                             
1 Some writers see it as the exercise of judicial discretion – Christopher A. Ford, ―Judicial Discretion in International 
Jurisprudence: Article 38(1)(c) and General Principles of Law‖ 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int‘l L. 35, 35 (1994-1995)    
2 Hersch Lauterpacht and C.H.M Waldock, The Basis of Obligation in International Law and other Papers of Late James 
Leslie Brierly 98 (Oxford, 1958). (Asserting that the act of a court is law-creating when it ascribes a meaning to a legislative 
instrument, ―in spite of our conspiracy to represent it as something else‖.) This conspiracy very much features in the work of 
many scholars: see for instance, Prosper Weil ―The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively ...‖Non Liquet Revisited‖, 36 
Colum. J. Transnat‘l L.  109,117 (1998), though insisting that the Court does not legislate but only develops the law 
(assuming that there is a real difference between lawmaking and developing), he was however willing to admit that the Court 
is bound to settle disputes for which there are no directly applicable laws, even at ―the cost of a liberal approach to the 
development of law‖. Weil however failed to define what he meant by liberal development of law. Neither did he specify its 
scope. But if taken within the context of his discussion, it would be abundantly clear that he was only trying to disguise 
judicial legislation.        
3 This should be expected. As noted by Christopher Ford, note 1, p. 36, ―tension between judges‘ creative function and the 
doctrinal legitimacy of legal rules is a characteristic of any legal system in which norms generally rely for their legitimacy 
upon institutions or processes that lie outside ... its highest court‖.   
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doctrine that States are the only makers of international law elevates the term ―judicial 
legislation‖ to a particularly sentimental height sustained by the dogma of State consent. The 
writer is nonetheless firm in his belief that the dogmatic attachment to the traditional view, 
even in the face of the constant making and development of law by international judges has 
made it impossible for full expression to be given to this aspect of the Court‘s function in the  
existing literature. This has also created a general academic apathy towards engaging the 
literature as an influential corrective framework on the decisions of the Court through 
constructive evaluation and re-evaluation. In reality, ICJ Judges make laws and would 
continue to do so as the inseparable incidence of applying law and doing justice. The 
doctrinal obstacles on the path of a general acceptance of the creation and development of 
law, in the light of what they really are, has for so long denied, not only the Court, but the 
international community the invaluable role Scholars should play in guiding the Court and 
helping it refine its previous decisions and define their scope ahead of the occurrence of 
analogous situations.     
It is conceded, though, that if consent is required for the existence of the rules to be applied 
by a court, it might follow, as a corollary, that the parties to a controversy would prescribe to 
the court the rules to be applied. It is also conceded that pieces of judicial legislation are not 
expressly consented to by States as they would to every piece of treaty to which they are 
bound. What is not conceded is that rules/principles in judicial decisions are not part of the 
law prescribed for the Court by States in article 38(1); neither is it conceded that principles 
adopted in judicial decisions are lacking in State consent, for reasons already explained in 
chapter two.   
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It is, for the above reason, less fruitful and less in tune with the practice of the Court to 
pursue the argument that the ICJ is doctrinally prohibited from exercising the residual 
lawmaking power that resides in all courts of justice. The inclusion of article 38(1)(c) and (d) 
in the Statute of the Court is a clear indication that the Court is able to make international law 
when none exists, and adapt existing rules to changed circumstances. To borrow the words of 
T.O. Elias, the items contained in article 38(1)(a) and (d) are ―useful devices‘ to assist if there 
are difficulties in applying the traditional sources of international law‖. 4  
Another crucial factor is the fact that, in practice, States and international lawyers habitually 
take their view of international law from decisions of the Court. Yet no opposition has been 
raised in practice about the power of the Court to take a novel and independent view of 
international law. Be it in the field of treaties and customs, or in areas not previously 
governed by international law, it is impossible to sustain the argument that the Court is not 
constantly moulding the law into relevance in the dynamic and progressively sophisticated 
international environment.  In Judge Alverez‘s view, it is the province of the Court to 
progressively apply international law in a manner that truly captures the essence of the 
present requirements and conditions of the life of peoples.
 5
 Given that in the progressive 
application of international law, the Court creates new law by modifying classical law,
 6 
the 
fact that the Court makes law when it applies a rule to a different context to that which it was 
made, is a practical reality which cannot seriously be denied.   
Judicial legislation is far from being a reflection of the Judges‘ subjective ideas of what 
society should be. It is a reflection of what society is or has become in the light of the 
development of the law. As rightly stated by Lauterpacht, the creativity of the judge is not 
                                                             
4 T.O Elias, The International Court of Justice and Some Contemporary Problems, 1983 p 14 cited in the Dissenting Opinion 
of Rosalyn Higgins in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion  ICJ Rep 1996,  226, 592 para 38  
5 Dissenting, Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, ICJ Rep. 1950, 128, 177 
6 Ibid. It thus follows that certain amount of authority in the field of lawmaking inherently comes with a court. 
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necessarily the result of the purely subjective discretion and individual idiosyncrasy. Rather, 
it may be described as fulfilling what the legislator would have intended if he could foresee 
the changes occurring in the life of the community.
7
 Perhaps, the reason Bin Cheng sees the 
judge as ―an intelligent collaborator of the legislator in the application of the living law‖.8  
It could be garnered from the view of Judge Ammoun in the Legal Consequences for States 
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa),
9
 that though the 
Court does not legislate but declares the law, the Court must not necessarily declare the law 
as it was made by the law-giver, but it must declare it in line with contemporary trends. In his 
words, ―the Court is not a law-making body. It declares the law. But it is a law discernible 
from the progress of humanity, not an obsolete law‖.10 This point has also been strenuously 
made by Judge Alverez in Competence of Assembly regarding Admission to the United 
Nations,
 11
 where the Judge reasoned that the progressive tendencies of international life 
beckons on the Court to interpret international law in such a way as to ensure that institutions 
and rules of law shall continue to be in harmony with the new conditions in the life of the 
peoples.
 12
 
Admittedly, it is not conducive to the functions of the Court as a judicial organ to develop 
and apply rules which do not yet exist in the public conscience of the international 
community or in the conscience of civilised nations. Reasoning in the same direction, Judge 
Tanaka declared:  
Undoubtedly a court of law declares what is the law, but does not legislate. In 
reality, however, where the borderline can be drawn is a very delicate and 
                                                             
7 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, 80 (London Stevens & Sons Ltd, 
1958).   
8 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 17 (Cambridge: Grotius 
Publications Ltd, 1987).  
9 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1971, 16. 
10 Ibid, p.  72.  
11 Dissenting, ICJ Rep 1950, 4,    
12 Ibid, p. 16.  Also see his Dissenting Opinion in the International Status of South West Africa, note 5, p. 177.   
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difficult matter.... We cannot deny the possibility of some degree of creative 
element in their judicial activities. What is not permitted to judges, is to 
establish law independently of an existing legal system, institution or norm. 
What is permitted to them is to declare what can be logically inferred from the 
raison d'être of a legal system, legal institution or norm. In the latter case the 
lacuna in the intent of legislation or parties can be filled.
13
  
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations
14
 would buttress this 
point. In this opinion, one of the questions the Court was asked was whether the United 
Nations could bring an international claim against a State for injuries suffered by employees 
in the service of the United Nations. Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court 
relied on the fact that international law already recognised instances of actions in the 
international sphere by the United Nations.
15
 It is apparent from the reasoning of the Court 
that the legal foothold of that opinion was on its finding that the instances of entities other 
than States having capacity to act on the international plane were already established in the 
consciousness of the international community.  
With this finding, it was possible for the Court to come to the conclusion that the existence of 
such organisations exercising some of the rights (including the right to bring international 
claims), which were hitherto exclusive to States, was an indication of a principle upon which 
the right of the organisations to exercise certain international law rights (which hitherto also 
exclusively belonged to States) could be legally constructed.  The Court reasoned that the 
attribution of international personality to the United Nations was crucial to the performance 
of its international functions. But the Court also understood that the United Nations could not 
exercise the rights on the same basis as States. Hence, the Court enunciated the ―purpose and 
functions‖ principle, as a new and different basis on which an international claim, and in 
particular, a claim of diplomatic protection could be sustained. Accordingly, the United 
                                                             
13Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka in South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Rep, 1966, 6, 277. Indeed the Court 
cannot remedy a gap in the law, if in order to do so, it would exceed the bounds of normal judicial actions (id, p. 48, para 91)   
14 1949: ICJ Rep 1949, 174. The recondite question asked the Court related to the capacity of the United Nations to bring 
international claims. The Court acknowledged that this capacity belonged to States on the basis of sovereign equality. The 
question then was, whether an international organisation possessed that attribute – international legal personality?   
15  Ibid, p 178 
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Nations is entitled to bring international claims, not on the basis of sovereignty but on the 
basis of its purpose and functions. It could exercise a diplomatic protection claim on behalf of 
its employee, not on the basis of nationality of the injured individual, but on the basis of the 
contractual link between that individual and the international organisation.
16
 
The point being made was also affirmed by the Court in Legal Consequences of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia.
17
 Here, the Court declared that it cannot 
ignore parallel developments in other areas of the law ―if it is faithfully to discharge its 
functions‖.18 Indeed the corollary of taking matters extraneous to a law into consideration in 
applying that law is the creation and development of law to cover areas in which the law had 
lagged within the general sphere of its application. 
It is, therefore, not to be expected that the Court would go all out to fish for rules independent 
of the immediate needs of the case before it in order to fill a gap and do justice. The necessity 
of judicial invention is occasioned only by the failure of the legislature to address the 
immediate needs of the community which is mirrored by the parties before the Court. Indeed 
as has been rightly noted:   
 
                                                             
16 Ibid. This was in contradistinction to the prevailing rule of customary international law which was variously affirmed in 
the case-law of the Court pre the Reparation case. The prevailing rule as first stated in Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 1939, 
series A/B, No. 76, 16 was that ―in the absence of a special agreement, it is bond of nationality between the State and the 
individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection‖. The case also established that, ―by taking 
up the claim of one of its subjects ... a state is in reality asserting its own rights....‖ (p. 17) This was followed by the ICJ in 
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), (Second Phase) ICJ Rep 1955, 4, 13 and 24. It is certainty in this realisation that it 
is undeniable that the Court made a new law in the Reparation case. See The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alverez in the 
Competence of Assembly, note 11, p. 18 , where the Judge stated:  
 
it is possible, by way of interpretation, to attribute to an institution, rights which it does not possess 
according to the provisions by which it was created, provided that these rights are in harmony with the 
nature and objects of the said institution. Thus, for instance, in ... the Reparation for Injuries suffered by 
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice declared that, having in view the nature and objects 
of that institution, it was entitled to claim damages suffered not only by itself but by its agents in the 
performance of their duties. This Court has therefore attributed to the United Nations a right which was 
not expressly conferred on that Organization by the Charter and which, according to traditional 
international law, appertains solely to States. The Court, in so doing, created a right and, as I have already 
shown, it was entitled to do so. 
17Note 9  
18 Ibid,  p. 31-32, para 53  
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The role of any judicial tribunal in the development of law must of necessity 
be a limited one. Much of the law developing function is performed 
indirectly when the results of the proceedings before it make manifest the 
inadequacies of the existing legal standards which it is powerless to 
disregard.
19
  
This limitation precludes the ICJ from acting in the purely legislative capacity of conceiving 
and enunciating new rules to govern situations that had not arisen. It is possible for a court to 
formulate new rules, only when confronted with a practical reality not yet covered by the 
legislating authority. The writer is mindful of the fact that the ICJ is generally guided by the 
reluctance of encroaching into the province of the legislature; a reluctance characteristic of all 
courts.  Nonetheless, as Judge Lauterpacht pointed out in the Admissibility of Hearings of 
Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa,
20
 the  
Reluctance to encroach upon the province of the legislature is a proper 
manifestation of judicial caution. If exaggerated, it may amount to 
unwillingness to fulfil a task which is within the orbit of the functions of the 
Court as defined by its Statute.  
In essence, though the Court exercises reluctance, it has not been to the extent of abdicating 
its duty to decide in any particular case.     
The point made above is that judicial legislation does not presuppose a situation where the 
judge imposes her subjective notion of right and wrong on the international community. And 
as the cases show, judicial legislation occurs when the Court enunciates or develops legal 
rules already influenced by the requirements of international life.
21
 This is an aspect of 
judicial caution which no court, more importantly, international courts, can afford to ignore. 
It remains to be said that the fear that it is dangerous for the Court to make law in the absence 
of a central legislature to correct its errors, is more apparent than real. It was pointed out by 
Julius Stone that one of the problems of judicial legislation on the international sphere is the 
                                                             
19 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The International Court of Justice. Its role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 16, 
(Greenwood Press, Publishers; Connecticut 1978)   
20 Separate Opinion, ICJ Rep 1956, 23, 57 
21 See Reparation case, note 14  
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absence of international legislature capable of correcting pronouncements of the Court as to 
the applicable law.
22
 This concern, which was no doubt vital when Stone wrote, has become 
less significant with the passage of time. It can now be seen that the problem is curable by 
States acting individually or collectively. If there was a rule emanating from a decision of the 
Court which did not appeal to a State or group of States, there are a variety of ways of 
circumscribing the rule from applying to them: a State could circumscribe the rule by 
persistently opposing the application of the rule to it. In the Fisheries case, the Court held that 
the ten mile rule was not applicable to Norway inasmuch as Norway had always opposed any 
attempt to apply it to her coast.
23  
 This is valid for a rule of custom as it is for a rule in the 
case-law of the Court. 
A more practical example of how States could correct an erroneous principle arising from the 
decision of the Court is manifest in the manner in which a number of States responded to the 
ruling of the Court in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory.
24
 In the case, the Court 
established that it is not mandatory for the declaration of the acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction by a new declarant to be transmitted to existing declarants under the optional 
clause system, for the new declarant to be capable to seise the Court against an existing 
declarant. The Court gave this interpretation while interpreting article 36(4) of its Statute. 
Following this decision, States which were unhappy with the interpretation
25
 amended their 
declaration to the Optional Clause System to tactically overrule the Court by requiring a 
timeframe that must lapse before the Court can exercise its compulsory jurisdiction over them 
in relation to a new declarant. This is to guard against a situation where a new declarant takes 
                                                             
22 Julius Stone, ―Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community‖ 35 Brit Y.B Int‘l Law, 124, 127  
(1959)  
23 (United Kingdom and Norway), ICJ Rep 1951, 116, 132  
24 Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1957, 125   
25 Paragraph 1(iii) of the July 5, 2004 declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland excludes States which 
deposited their declarations less than 12 months prior to filling an application bringing a dispute. This allows ample time for 
the Secretary General to transmit the Declaration. The same clause is in the Australian declaration of March 22, 2002, the 
Nigerian declaration of April 30 1998, the Indian declaration of September 18, 1974, to mention a few.   
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advantage of the Right of Passage precedent (as done by Cameroon against Nigeria) to spring 
a surprise suit upon the respondent, which being unaware that the applicant had joined the 
optional clause system, had not contemplated judicial settlement as one of the options open to 
the applicant. In Cameroon v Nigeria,
26
 Judge Koroma took judicial notice of the fact that the 
Right of Passage judgment prompted some States which had previously made a declaration 
under Article 36(2) of the Statute to take measures to protect themselves against the 
institution of surprise proceedings by introducing further reservations into their declarations, 
in addition to reciprocity. 
27
  
The same result could be brought about through a resolution of the General Assembly or the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Though resolutions are not a law for the Court within 
the ambit of article 38(1), they may well reflect the opinio juris of States, capable of defusing 
the potency of a rule adopted by the Court. Such a contrary resolution is a strong indication 
that the rule has not been well received by States. This can be seen in the light of the role 
being played by Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) in relation to the 
exercise of the right to self-defence (article 51 of the Charter) in response to attacks carried 
out by non-state actors. 
 Following the September 1, 2001 terrorists attack on the United States, the Security Council 
adopted Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), in which it recognised the inherent right 
of individual or collective self defence, without making any reference to armed attack by a 
State. These Resolutions have become one of the strongest bases for the argument urging the 
Court to overrule its current position which restrictively interprets article 51 to exclude 
attacks by non-state actors. These Resolutions were put forward by States and in the 
individual opinions of some Judges in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
                                                             
26 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objection, CJ Rep, 1998,  271 
27 Dissenting, Ibid, p 388 
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in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
28
 and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.
29
 
They have been relied upon to urge the Court to reconsider its case-law on the point, 
notwithstanding that the Resolutions did not directly address the case-law of the Court.      
Having made the above points, the writer shall now discuss two broad occasions in which the 
ICJ exercises its lawmaking faculty in the performance of its functions. The Court does this: 
(a) in the course of the interpretation and application of existing law; (b) when there is a gap 
in the law. The former is less obvious though it is an element in every decided case 
interpreting an instrument. The latter is much more obvious; it is a more controversial 
transgression to theoretical argument that judges should apply the law and not make it.   
7.3   Lawmaking through the Interpretation and Application of Existing Law 
It is often the case in practice that in addition to the task of interpreting and applying the law 
to concrete cases, courts often share lawmaking functions with lawmaking organs. The real 
difficulty is to actually identify to what extent it can be said to a judge: ―you must only apply 
positive law as it is; there are no rooms for implications and presumptions that would 
attribute to positive law a meaning it does not originally admit‖; or that there is no room for 
recognising a legal position not expressly recognised by positive law. Of course, it is hardly 
possible for a court to apply positive law without elaborating its meaning through principles 
of general application and thereby creating new rules. It is by doing this that the Court 
supplies important details to the treaties and gives the fullest expression to their obligations. 
In consequence, although the Court is declaring the treaty law, it is actually doing a little 
more than just declaring the law as it is; it is opening the law to new situations and facts. 
This, perhaps, is why Katharina Pistor posited that:   
                                                             
28 ICJ Rep 2004, 136. Also see in the case, Separate Opinion of Judge Pieter Kooljmans, p. 230, para 35 
29 (DRC v. Uganda) ICJ Rep 2006, 168. Also see in the case, Separate Opinion of Judge Bruno Simma p. 337, para 11; 
Separate Opinion of Judge Kooljmans, p. 314 para 28  
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The line between lawmaking and interpretation ... is often difficult to draw. 
Interpretation, even if narrowly construed, involves an element of residual law 
making. It implies that the application of a law to a particular set of facts does 
not follow immediately from the working of the statute [or treaty]... in one 
sense, civil law judges may be said to be less constrained than common law 
judges. They are not subject to the rule of precedent ....yet the absence of a 
former precedent rule still may give judges more leeway in interpreting the 
law.
 30
 
This point was also made by Judge Tanaka when he acknowledged that where, in reality, the 
borderline can be drawn between when a judge declares the law and when she legislates is a 
very delicate and difficult matter.
 31
 
When States appear before the ICJ, each of the States holds a different opinion of what 
should be the law applicable to the dispute. But none of the litigating States, not even the 
individual judges of the Court is able to state precisely what manner the applicable law would 
be applied until the facts and circumstances of a case have fully unfolded and are subjected to 
legal evaluation. These only unfold with the finding of facts, the arguments of the parties and 
the reasoning of the Court.  
In the course of a case, several possible viewpoints may appear from the arguments presented 
to the Court by the parties. It may occur that:  (a) the parties agree that a treaty law governs 
the dispute but yet hold conflicting views on the correct interpretation of that treaty; (b) The 
parties may hold conflicting views on the applicable law: this may raise two additional 
scenarios. First, one of the parties may hold that a treaty governs the situation while the other 
may hold that it is governed by a general rule of custom; second, a party may claim the 
existence of a rule of law which is denied by the other party – this is mostly the case with 
international customs. In these situations it is for the Court to decide, not only on the 
applicable law, but also how it is to be applied to the facts of the case. In either case, it is the 
                                                             
30 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ―Incomplete Law‖, 35 N.Y.U. J. Int‘l Law & Pol. 931, 947 (2003) 
31 Dissenting, South-West Africa (Second Phase), note 13, p. 277 
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view of the Court that is recognised as the correct position of the law. This, in the ultimate, 
depends on the perspective that appeals to a majority of the Judges hearing the case. 
This is particularly important because the ICJ has severally affirmed that it is not bound to 
accept the law held to be applicable by the parties or the interpretations contended for by 
them.
32
 This viewpoint has been taken in a number of cases. In the Advisory Opinion on the 
Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig 
Territory, while interpreting article 33 of the Convention of Paris between Poland and the 
Free City of Danzig, in relation to Polish citizens in Danzig, the Court noted that the 
provision has received different interpretations from the respective governments. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that in giving its interpretation of the clause of the treaty sought 
to be interpreted, it is in no way bound by the views of the interested governments.
33
 In the 
case of S.S Lotus,
34
 the Court refused to confine itself to a consideration of the arguments of 
the parties in ascertaining the principle of international law governing the institution of 
criminal proceedings against an alien for crimes committed on the high sea.
35
 In the case 
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex
36
 the Court reaffirmed that its functions 
being to declare the law, it cannot lightly be admitted that it can be called upon to choose 
between two or more constructions determined beforehand by the Parties, none of which may 
correspond to the opinion at which it may arrive.
 37
 For: 
 
 
 
                                                             
32 Judge Koroma , dissenting, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, note 4, p. 558 (―The Court has always taken the view that the 
burden of establishing the law is on the Court and not on the Parties‖) 
33 Series A/B No. 44 PCIJ,  35 
34 Series A No. 10  
35 Ibid, p. 31 
36 Series A/B, No. 46    
37 Ibid, p. 138  
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Unless otherwise expressly provided, it must be presumed that the Court 
enjoys the freedom which normally appertains to it, and that it is able, if such 
is its opinion, not only to accept one or the other of the two propositions, but 
also to reject them both.
38
  
In the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,
39
 while rejecting the 
view of both parties, a Chamber of the Court expressly declared that the reasoning of each of 
them was based on a false premise because each was searching general international law for a 
set of rules which was not there. The Court has even gone as far as holding that the 
concurrence of the views of the parties on the content of an applicable customary 
international law does not dispense the Court from having itself to ascertain what rules of 
customary international law are applicable.
40 
 
The fact that the existence of a custom or content of a particular treaty may have diverse 
views is already a direct pointer to the fact that the viewpoint that has final acceptance has an 
opportunity of choosing between varied options inclusive of the power to make policy 
decisions. The organ that has that viewpoint in questions of international law submitted to it 
is the ICJ. Accordingly, the Court may uphold the argument of a party and reject that of the 
other party or it may reject the arguments of both parties and take an independent view of the 
applicable law. In respect of a custom, the Court may uphold the argument that the custom 
does exists as law or deny its existence. Concerning a treaty, the Court may apply the treaty 
as it finds it or take into account the progressive elements of time. The underlining current in 
these scenarios is the element of choice that is always at the disposal of the Court, even in 
cases where it is called upon to interpret and apply a definite treaty. 
The creative consequence in this element of choice was noted by Mohammed Shahabuddeen 
when he argued that ―in exercising this element of choice he [the judge] is inevitably 
                                                             
38 Ibid  
39 (Canada v. United States), ICJ Reps 1984, 246, 288 para 110 
40Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua v. United States) Merit, ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 97-
98, para 184  
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selecting a rule to govern the case; if no suitable rule exists, he makes one‖.41 The point is 
that there are always the chances of a treaty rule taking on a new garb from the time it is 
applied by the Court. This emphasises the fact that, the existence of a treaty or a rule of 
custom, notwithstanding, there may be the need to adapt the law to the progressive elements 
of facts as they emerge with the passage of time. The South West Africa mandate 
controversies provide a particularly useful example. In this case, the Court interpreted the 
mandate system in the light of the events contemporaneous with the time the Court was 
seised, taking account of the wellbeing and development of peoples as a strong factor. By so 
doing, the Court arguably modified the mandate system.  For the avoidance of doubt, the 
Court declared in one of its opinions on the question of the South-West African mandate that:   
All these considerations are germane to the Court's evaluation of the present 
case. Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in 
accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, the 
Court is bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in 
Article 22 of the Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and 
"the well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-were not static, 
but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 
"sacred trust". The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to 
have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the 
Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the 
supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by 
the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations 
and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument has to be 
interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system 
prevailing at the time of the interpretation. In the domain to which the present 
proceedings relate, the last fifty years, as indicated above, have brought 
important developments. These developments leave little doubt that the 
ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and 
independence of the peoples concerned. In this domain; as elsewhere, the 
corpus iuris gentium has been considerably enriched, and this, the Court, if it 
is faithfully to discharge its functions, may not ignore.
42
  
In essence, the Court was admitting that it is conducive to the fulfilment of its functions to 
apply the law in the light of developments in other areas of the law. This is invariably an 
                                                             
41 Mohammed  Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court, 89 (Grotius  Publications Cambridge University Press, 1996)  
42Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, note 9, p 31, para 53   
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admission of its power to adapt the law to the dictates of time. A clear indication that this is 
indeed an aspect of lawmaking is the fact that there is no guarantee that States would have 
consented to the legal consequences attendant upon such interpretation, was the mandate 
system presented for amendment. 
The point made in this section is that the Court exercises a residuary lawmaking power when 
interpreting a treaty and when determining the existence of a rule of custom. It is pointed out 
that judicial legislation does not equate the Court with a formal legislature: the Court‘s role is 
residuary and the rules it makes are those deducible from the consciousness of the society, 
though yet to be legal rules. On the whole, the writer argued that judicial legislation is a 
product of the element of choice at the Court‘s disposal. This is a precursor to the next 
section which discusses law-making in relation to interpretation and application of treaties.  
7.3.1 In the Interpretation of Treaties   
There is the truism that it is the province of States to make treaties and that of the Court to 
interpret. True; but this theoretical division of functions, though ideal, has never been attained 
in the making and application of the rules of international law, nor under any given legal 
system for that matter. As bluntly remarked by Judge Alverez, ―the common view that 
international law must be created solely by States is ... not valid to-day-nor indeed has it ever 
been‖.43  And as ―far as the Court is concerned, the tasks of determining, establishing and 
applying the law go hand in hand‖. 44 
The writer shall now discuss how the Court uses its element of choice to adapt law to new 
situations in interpreting and applying treaties. 
 
                                                             
43 Dissenting, in the Competence of Assembly, note 11, p. 14   
44 Ibid   
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7.3.1. (a) Judges Legislate When Choosing Interpretations     
The fact that parties are having a dispute over the application of a treaty invariably implicates 
judicial choice. This is obvious from the definition of a dispute in Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions.
45
 Here, the PCIJ defined a dispute as a ―disagreement on a point of law or fact, 
a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons‖.46 When the disputing States come 
to the Court, therefore, they are asking the Court to choose between the disputed 
interpretations to which the treaty lends itself.  
This situation abounds in the case-law of the Court. In the Right of Passage case,
47
 the parties 
disputed the interpretation of article 36(4) of the Statute of the Court. The article provides 
that declarations by which States accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof 
to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court. A view was that the 
transmission requirement is mandatory. The contrary view was that it is merely permissive. If 
the former view was followed by the Court, it would knock off every case brought by a 
declarant whose declaration had not been transmitted to other parties to the optional clause 
system, as the new declaration would remain inchoate until the transmission requirement was 
fulfilled. If the latter view was followed, the declaration of a new declarant vis a vis the 
existing parties to the optional clause system would be complete and active, once deposited, 
irrespective of non transmission. The new declarant would be able to sue any of the existing 
members upon the deposit of her declaration. It was for the Court to either choose one of the 
interpretations contended for, or take an entirely independent view.  
                                                             
45 Series A - No. 2, Judgment of August 30, 1924. In Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) ICJ Rep 1974, 457, 436, para 
58, it was stated that, ―the Court, as a court of law, is called upon to resolve existing disputes between States. Thus the 
existence of a dispute is the primary condition for the Court to exercise its judicial functions‖ . 
46 Ibid, p. 11 
47 Note 24    
  
266 
This can also be buttressed by the approach of the Court towards article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. The article made the occurrence of ―armed attack‖ crucial to the existence of 
the right to self-defence, but failed to define the term ―armed attack‖. It has been for the 
Court to supply a working definition of the term. The definition supplied by the Court has so 
far controlled the scope of application of the provision. This term has been interpreted in a 
number of cases – Nicaragua case,48  Construction of a Wall,49and DRC v Uganda.50 In all of 
these cases, the Court was faced with two conflicting views on the definition of the term. A 
view required the Court to give a wide coverage to the term to include attacks by non-state 
actors while the other view argued for a narrow interpretation that would exclude attacks by 
non-state actors. The gist is that if the Court adopted the former, the law in article 51 would 
be that States are entitled to invoke self-defence against attacks by entities other than States. 
But if the Court adopted the latter view, the law in article 51 would be that there is no right to 
self-defence for attacks carried out by entities other than States. In all the cases mentioned 
earlier, the Court has consistently maintained the latter view. This view has remained the 
prevailing law despite the disagreement of some States,
51
 Scholars
52
 and even some of the 
Judges of the Court.
53
 
The bottom-line of the exercise of its element of choice is that in choosing between the 
various options, the Court establishes rules/principles with legal consequences, not just for 
the parties but also for future cases.  In Right of Passage, it was open to the Court to hold that 
                                                             
48 Note 40 
49 Note 28  
50 Note 29 
51 Since the September 2001 terrorists attacks on the United States, the United States and its allies have openly asserted the 
right to invoke self defence against attacks by non state actors. The deployment of force in Iraq and Afghanistan are common 
testimonies to this. 
52 Andrea Bianchi, ―The International Regulation of the Use of Force: The Politics of Interpretative Method‖, 22(4) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 651, 654-655 (2009)  
53 See Separate Opinion of Rosalyn Higgins in the Construction of Wall Opinion, note 28, p. 215, para 33, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Pieter H. Kooljmans in the Construction of Wall Opinion, id, p. 230, para 35; Separate Opinion of Judge 
Kooljmans, DRC v. Uganda, note 29, p. 313 para 25 and 315 para 35; Separate Opinion of Judge Bruno Simma in DRC v. 
Uganda, id, p. 337, para 11 
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transmission was compulsory. If the Court did this, it would have had a different effect not 
only on the parties to that case, but also on the parties in the case between Cameroon and 
Nigeria, which was argued and determined upon the Right of Passage precedent;
54
 that 
choice would have governed the application of article 36(4) of the Statute of the Court.    
7.3.1. (b) The Court Supplies the Unwritten Elements in Treaties 
Facts are not stereotype. Facts do not present themselves exactly in the light in which States 
envisaged them when making or acceding to treaties. States make treaties but do not direct 
the Court on how it must apply the treaty to facts. It is the Court that determines the legal 
consequences resulting from the application of the law to facts. The written law can never be 
exhaustive of all the events that may come within its shade; there always are unwritten 
elements which the Court supplies in the course of interpretation and application of the law. 
By these elements, the Court does not only bridge the gap between facts and the law, it also 
determines the facts that are relevant to the provision. It may occur that in the course of time, 
factual exigencies expose gaps which were not obvious at the time a treaty was made. When 
this situation presents itself, the Court supplies the unwritten elements of the treaties and with 
those elements, ascribes legal consequences to the new set of facts.
55
 This is a recurrent trend 
in the field of interpretation of a written law both in domestic and international law. A few 
examples would suffice here. 
 
                                                             
54 See page 251 above 
55 Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva in the Nuclear Weapons case, note 4, p 296 (stating that ―the facts precede the law in 
the examination of the relationship between facts and the law: the analysis of the facts determines the application of the rule 
of law‖.) 
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In the Legal Consequences of the Presence of South Africa in Namibia
56
 the unwritten rule 
was the power to terminate a Mandate in consequence of a breach. The Court held that 
though the Covenant of the League of Nations did not confer on the Council of the League 
the power to terminate a mandate for misconduct of the mandatory, the Covenant cannot be 
interpreted to exclude the application of the general principle of law according to which a 
power of termination on account of breach, even if unexpressed, must be presumed to exist as 
inherent in any mandate, as indeed in any agreement. This ruling was in response to the 
argument of some States that the power to revoke the mandate on occasion of a breach was 
not possible in the absence of an express stipulation in the Covenant. The unwritten provision 
in the Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the U. N. Administrative Tribunal
57
 was the 
power of the United Nations General Assembly to establish a judicial tribunal to adjudicate 
upon disputes arising out of the contracts of service between the United Nations and its 
employee. The Court opined that this must be read into the Charter, though the Charter did 
not expressly provide for the establishment of judicial bodies or organs.
58
   
In supplying the unwritten term of a treaty, the Court is not bound to remain within the 
bounds of international law. It can, as it is well allowed to do by article 38(1)(c) of its Statute, 
resort to private law sources for general principles.  This was how Judge Weeramantry 
expressed the point in Cameroon v. Nigeria:
 59
  
It is true we are considering a question of international law, but this analysis 
shows us also that we are very much in the sphere of the law of consensual 
obligations, from which we draw our general principles and foundation 
requirements. We must not be diverted from the basic principles of this body 
of law, as universally recognized, by the circumstance that we are operating 
in the territory of international law. Where any situation in international law 
depends on consensus, the generally accepted principles relating to 
consensual obligations would apply to that situation, unless expressly varied 
                                                             
56Note 10, p. 47-48 para 96-98 
57 ICJ Rep 1954, 47, 56-57 
58 Ibid 
59 Dissenting, note 26, p. 368-369 
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or abrogated. How is a consensual obligation formed? The completed legal 
product results from the classical process of the meeting of minds which 
follows from a confluence of offer and acceptance. This is accepted by most 
legal systems, with the rarest of exceptions. This principle is accepted alike 
by the Anglo-American law and the Romanistic legal systems. There are 
indeed substantial differences among different legal systems regarding such 
matters as the status and revocability of the offer, but the basic principle that 
the minds of offeror and offeree must meet remains unaffected by these 
considerations, and belongs to the common core of legal systems. 
However the Court goes about adapting the law to new situations, is a manifestation of the 
exercise of judicial choice. It must not be forgotten that the Court could decide to interpret 
the law as it finds it and ignore all indications pointing to the possibility of adapting the law 
to new situations: this is yet an element of choice.   
The importance of the point being made lies also in the fact that the choices of the Court have 
continuous application. In Northern Cameroons case,
 60
 the Court made it clear that if its 
judgment expounds a rule of customary law or interprets a treaty, the judgment has a 
continuing applicability during the life time of the treaty.
61
 With this quality, the 
rules/principles laid down by the Court are pieces of judicial legislation providing legal bases 
for the resolution of similar conflicts in future.  
This should however not be understood to mean that an interpretation cannot outlive the 
particular treaty in which it was made. The case-law of the Court has shown that a 
rule/principle adopted in the course of interpreting a particular treaty has continuous 
applicability to all other similar treaties between completely different States.  This could be 
buttressed by the continuous application to other cases of the principle the Court adopted 
while interpreting the Treaty of Friendship and Navigation between the United States and 
                                                             
60 (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1963 
61Ibid, p. 37 
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Nicaragua in the Nicaragua case.
62
 This principle was applied to different but similar treaties 
in the Oil Platforms,
63
 and in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.
64
  
In the Nicaragua case, Nicaragua had urged the Court to hold, in respect of the 1956 Treaty 
of Friendship between her and the United States, that a State which enters into a treaty of 
friendship binds itself, for so long as the Treaty is in force, to abstain from any act toward the 
other party which could be classified as an unfriendly act, even if such act is not in itself the 
breach of an international obligation. The Court held that the unfriendly acts that would 
breach the treaty were those that affect the specific fields covered by the treaty – its object 
and purpose – and not just any form of unfriendly acts in a vague sense.  
That decision has been constructed to mean that a treaty of friendship does not warrant the 
conclusion that all unfriendly acts are in breach of its provisions. Accordingly, in the Oil 
Platforms case,
65
 the Court declined Iran‘s invitation to interpret the Treaty of Amity 
between her and the United States to cover all forms of unfriendly acts.  In Djibouti v. 
France,
66
 the Court also had to construe the Treaty of Friendship between France and 
Djibouti. France expressly argued that it was basing itself on the ―principle of interpretation 
established by the Court with regards to other friendship treaties‖ in the Nicaragua and Oil 
Platform cases. The Court maintained that this construction was equally applicable to the 
Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Djibouti and France.  
The pattern followed by the Court in the foregoing cases is germane for two reasons: (a) it 
emphasises how the Court sets the general legal rules/principles in certain areas of States 
relations to the extent that when States enter into agreements in those areas, such agreements 
                                                             
62 Note 40,, p 137, para 273 
63 (Iran v. United States) ICJ Reps 1996, 803 
64 (Djibouti v. France) ICJ Rep 2008, 177 
65 Note 63 
66 Note 64 
  
271 
would operate in line with the general rule/principles set by the Court, unless the parties 
expressly provide otherwise. For instance, when entering into treaties of friendship and 
navigation, States would bear in mind that the treaties have to be specific in the areas to 
which the friendship extends. This would be necessitated by the general rule set by the Court 
that such treaties do not cover friendship at large. (b) The cases also emphasise the argument 
that a rule/principle adopted in the course of construing a treaty does not only have 
continuous applicability but that its application is wider than, and is separable from the treaty 
in which it was adopted. The Court expressly showed that it was conscious of this when 
applying the rule in Djibouti v. France. Here, the Court acknowledged that it had dealt with 
similar situation in the past and expressly stated that the case was being decided, ―[I]n the 
light of the case law of the court mentioned above‖.67 Of course, it is self-evident that the 
contrary interpretation would have held sway, if chosen by the Court.  
The point being made is that the Court exercises its residual lawmaking power even when 
interpreting treaties and that the Court could redefine the scope of a treaty through 
interpretation. The consequence is that a different regime of law from the one being 
interpreted may come to life from the choices the Court makes. This point has also been well 
made by Judge Shahabuddeen in his Separate Opinion in Maritime Delimitation in the Area 
between Greenland and Jan Mayan.
68
 In determining whether article 6 paragraph 1 of the 
Geneva Convention 1958 was applicable to the delimitation of a single boundary for the 
continental shelf and the fishery zone, the Judge found it ―necessary to consult a body of 
case-law‖ 69 with a view to establishing the interpretation previously placed on it by the 
Court. After examining a number of cases on the point, the Judge remarked:  
                                                             
67 Djibouti v. France, note 64, p. 218, para. 111 
68  (Denmark v Norway),  ICJ Rep 1993, 38   
69 Ibid, p. 132 
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The literature is heavy with a view that the jurisprudence has placed a certain 
interpretation on Article 6 of the 1958 Convention ... that interpretation varies 
from the terms of the provision and indeed substantially alters its intent; but 
that the variation so effected is now an established part of the living law; and 
that it is therefore a futile effort of revisionism, if not simply impermissible, to 
trouble over the original meaning of the provision. Respecting that view, a 
lawyer who goes to work on the problem would still like to know the precise 
legal route through which so remarkable a change has come about. Something 
more than impressions is required; it is not enough to be told, however 
confidently, that, whatever the provision meant in 1958, it now has to be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the jurisprudence as it has since 
developed. Yes; but how? And to what extent? The change could not have 
occurred through osmosis. If the provision is now to be understood differently 
from the way it would have been understood when made, is this the result of 
subsequent developments in the law operating to modify the provision in a 
legislative sense? If, as it seems, there has not been any such modification, is 
the different reading which the provision must now receive the result of 
judicial interpretation which the Court considers that it should follow, even 
though it is not bound by any doctrine of binding precedent? If not, how has 
the transformation of the original meaning of so important a treaty provision 
been managed?
 70
 
Judge Alverez expressed the same view in the Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission 
to the United Nations. According to him: 
First, we observe that national courts, in their interpretation of private law, seek to 
adapt it to the exigencies of contemporary life, with the result that they have 
modified the law, sometimes swiftly and profoundly, even in countries where law 
is codified to such an extent that it is necessary to-day to take into consideration 
not only legal texts, but also case-law. It is the same, a fortiori, in the 
interpretation of international matter, because international life is much more 
dynamic than national life
71
  
To a very large extent, the opinions of the Judges Shahabuddeen and Alvarez strengthen the 
view that the Court does not approach its task of interpretation and application of treaties 
with a belief that treaties are iron cast. In the course of interpretation and application, the 
Court develops and, sometimes, modifies express provisions of treaties.  
As earlier stated in chapter one and maintained through this work, the Court cannot amend a 
treaty in the manner of the legislature amending laws; the Court is not an international 
                                                             
70 Ibid, p.,133-134  
71 Dissenting, Competence of Assembly, note 11, p. 16   
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legislature. Therefore, it cannot expressly state that it is making a new rule from a treaty. The 
Court thus legislates under different guises while interpreting and applying treaty provisions 
without actually appearing to be doing so. We shall now discuss some of these guises.  
 
7.4 Guises for Judicial Legislation in the Interpretation and Application of Treaties  
7.4.1.(a) The Notion of Implied Terms 
Courts, both municipal and international, use this device to give effect to the exercise of a 
power expressly granted by a legislative instrument. In Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Judge 
Shahabuddeen explained the notion of implied terms in the light of the maxim: ―when the law 
gives a man anything, it gives him that also without which the thing itself cannot exist‖. 72 
The practice of implying powers not expressly granted by legislative instruments is a useful 
interpretative device and an acceptable practice in the ICJ. This is justified by the fact that 
foresight is always too short and words too limited to envisage and expressly provide for all 
possible eventualities and contingencies which might require the application of a written 
instrument. To bridge the gap between a legal instrument and the succession of events that 
may in future require the application of the instrument, the Court has in the past resorted to 
the use of implied terms.  
For a term to be implied there must be a parent provision enabling the implied term. When 
there is no parenting provision for a term being implied, the Court is acting neck-deep in the 
realm of lawmaking; it thus becomes a guise for judicial lawmaking.  This point was made by 
Judge Green Hackworth in the Reparation case. Here, the Judge reasoned that ―powers 
                                                             
72 Separate Opinion, ICJ Rep 1989 177, 220   
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cannot freely be implied. Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are 
limited to those that are "necessary" to the exercise of powers expressly granted‖. 73  
The interpretation of treaties by necessary implication is unavoidable considering the 
inconveniences that may occur if States would have to return to the negotiating table to 
provide for every term, which though was not contemplated when the treaty was made had, 
with the passage of time, become crucial to the exercise of the express grant in the treaty. 
This does not detract from the fact that whenever the implied term does not flow from an 
express grant, the Court could clearly be said to use implied powers as a convenient disguise 
for lawmaking.  Again, this was the basis upon which Judge Hackworth dissented in the 
Reparation case. The Judge argued that it cannot be safely said that the power implied by the 
Court flowed from an express grant in the Charter.
74
 The
 
Reparation case testifies to how far-
reaching the Court could affect the tenor of a treaty through the use of implied terms.
 
 Indeed, 
it is difficult to see the provision of the Charter or the Statute of the Court from which the 
powers which the Court deemed to be exercisable by the United Nations can rightly be 
implied. This is particularly so in view of article 34 of the Statute of the Court, which limits 
the Court‘s competence to States. It explains why it is generally agreed that the Court did 
clearly exercise its residual lawmaking power in that case.  
Obviously not concerned about being accused of usurping the power of States to modify such 
an important treaty as the United Nations Charter, five years later, the Court based itself on 
the Reparation case as its authority for implying that the General Assembly has power to 
establish tribunals, in the Effect of Awards of Compensation.
75
 Here the Court cited the 
Reparation case for the legal proposition that: 
                                                             
73 Note 14, p 197-198  
74 Ibid  
75 Note 57,  p. 56-57 
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Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred 
upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its 
duties.
 76
 
 
Accordingly, but absent a parenting provision, the Court implied that the General Assembly 
has power to establish tribunals, not from a provision of the Charter but from the absence of 
any provision authorising any of the principal organs of the United Nations to adjudicate 
upon such disputes between it and its employees, as well as the fact that the United Nations 
enjoys jurisdictional immunities in national courts.
 
In clear terms, the Court said: 
 
It would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed 
aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals and with the 
constant preoccupation of the United Nations Organization to promote this 
aim that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the 
settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them. In these 
circumstances, the Court finds that the power to establish a tribunal, to do 
justice as between the Organization and the staff members, was essential to 
ensure the efficient working of the Secretariat.... Capacity to do this arises by 
necessary intendment out of the Charter.
 77
  
 
 
These are two instances where the Court legislated though disguising the new rules in implied 
terms.
78
 The Court did not identify in the Charter, the express grants from which it implied 
the powers it vested on the United Nations in both cases. Judge Hackworth emphasised this 
point in the Reparation case, when he argued that there was no specific provision in the 
Charter from which the power of the United Nations to espouse diplomatic claims on behalf 
of its agents could be implied and that there was no implied power to be drawn upon for that 
                                                             
76 Ibid, p. 56 
77 Ibid, p. 56 
78  There is also the Dispute Regarding Navigational and other Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ Rep, 2009, 
213, 248, Para 84.  Here the Court was construing article VI of the 1858 Treaty of Limits between the parties. The article 
granted limited navigational rights to Costa Rica in the San Juan River for the purpose of commerce. Notwithstanding that 
the right was limited to navigations relating to commerce, the Court held that though the right of navigation for basic 
necessities of life by Costa Ricans on the bank of the river and for the purpose of certain Costa Rican official vessels were 
not expressly granted, they could be inferred from the provision of the treaty as a whole. 
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purpose.
79
 How then could the Court possibly be certain that the parties would have accepted 
the treaty had the term being implied by the Court been included, ab initio? 
7.4.1 (b) Implied Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the Court 
Article 36 of the Statute of the Court adopts the general rule of international law that the 
Court‘s jurisdiction depends on the will of the parties.80 As a corollary, the Court cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over a State without its consent. The article makes provisions for three 
instances of consent that could ground jurisdiction.
81
 They are: 
1. Cases which the parties refer to it; 
2. Matters specially provided for in treaties in force; 
3. Declarations by States that they ‗recognize as compulsory ... without special 
agreement ... the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes ....  
There is nowhere in the Statute of the Court or the Charter of the United Nations where 
implied consent or forum prorogatum is provided for.
82
 Nonetheless, the Court has 
established forum prorogatum as, arguably, the fourth basis of jurisdiction, and had on that 
basis assumed jurisdiction over States in a number of cases. The Court implies this basis of 
jurisdiction from article 36(1) of its Statute. The ICJ confirmed, while discussing the different 
modes of consent under article 36, in Djibouti v. France, that: 
The Statute of the Court does explicitly mention the different ways by which 
States may express their consent to the Court‘s jurisdiction.... The Court has 
also interpreted Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Statute as enabling consent to 
be deduced from certain acts, thus accepting the possibility of forum 
prorogatum.
83
 
 
                                                             
79 Dissenting, note 14, p. 197-198  
80 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 15, p. 24. 
81 Article 36(1) and (2) of its Statute 
82 The closest to forum prorogatum is the deferred consent of a State under article 38(5) of the Rules the ICJ of July, 1 1978. 
Under this article, an applicant can file a case ahead of the consent of the respondent. If the respondent consents, a forum 
prorogatum is created as the consent has a retrospective effect to validate the case from the date it was filed. The Court 
followed this pattern in Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania) , Preliminary  ICJ Rep 1948, 56, 27-28.  
83 Note 64, p. 203, para 60-61. It remains to be seen, how forum prorogatum meets the requirement of voluntary and 
unqualified consent under article 36(1). 
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Under the rule as developed by the Court, a respondent State can be held to have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court respecting a case, if the State engages in conducts sufficient to be 
regarded as an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court, notwithstanding that the State did 
not make any express declaration of consent to that effect. As explained by Judge ad hoc, 
Lauterpacht in the first Genocide case:  
if State A commences proceedings against State B on a non-existent or 
defective jurisdictional basis, State B can remedy the situation by conduct 
amounting to an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.
84
  
  
 
The rule was first adopted by the PCIJ in the Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority 
Schools),
85
 In this case, though challenging the jurisdiction of the Court, Poland yet submitted 
arguments on the merit and filed a counter-claim. The Court noted that the Rules of Court, 
dealing with preliminary objections, did not cover a situation where an objection is not 
submitted as a preliminary question. Judging from the submission of a counterclaim aimed at 
a decision on the merit, the Court held that Poland‘s attitude reflected an unequivocal 
indication of her desire to obtain a decision on the merit of the suit.
86
 The Court established 
that: 
there seems to be no doubt that the consent of a State to the submission of a 
dispute to the Court may not only result from an express declaration, but may 
also be inferred from acts conclusively establishing it.
87
  
 
 
Forum prorogatum is based on some conduct or statement which involves an element of 
consent regarding the jurisdiction of the Court.
88
 It follows, therefore, and as elaborately 
                                                             
84 Separate Opinion, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, I.C.J. Reps 1993,  
416, para 24. 
85P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 15, p. 1. Writers are agreeing that forum prorogatum was transferred into international law by the 
PCIJ –   Vincent Pouliot, ―Forum Prorogatum before the International Court of Justice. The Djibouti v. France Case‖, 3(3) 
Hague Justice Journal 28, 33 (2008)  
86 Ibid, p. 24 
87 Ibid  
88 Anglo Iranian Oil Co (United Kingdom v. Iran) Jurisdiction,  ICJ Reps 1952, 92, 113- 114. 
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explained by the Court in Djibouti v. France,
89
 that a respondent State must have acted in a 
way that consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in a certain and unequivocal manner can be 
implied. Such a conduct towards the proceedings must be capable of being regarded as, ―an 
unequivocal indication‖ of the desire of that State to accept the Court‘s jurisdiction in a 
―voluntary and indisputable‖ manner. In the Corfu Channel case,90 forum prorogatum was 
based on a letter written to the Court by Albania. In the letter, Albania had stated that it was 
irregular for the United Kingdom to unilaterally refer the dispute to the Court in the absence 
of an acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by Albania under article 36 of 
the Court's Statute or of any other instrument of international law. Nonetheless, Albania 
stated that it was ―prepared, notwithstanding the irregularity, to appear before the Court‖.91  
On the contrary, in DRC v. Rwanda,
92
 the Court refused to apply forum prorogatum to hold 
that a party which had fully participated in different procedures of the Court, for the purpose 
of challenging jurisdiction, had impliedly accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
93
 In the first 
Genocide case,
94
 the Court refused to apply forum prorogatum to hold that a party, which had 
requested for provisional order, impliedly accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
95
     
From Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, where forum prorogatum was first applied by the 
PCIJ through the recently decided Djibouti v. France, the Court has crystallised it into a well 
developed branch of jurisdiction, creating an alternative strand of jurisdiction to those 
expressly provided in article 36 of its Statute. In DRC v. Rwanda, the Court emphasised the 
established state of the rule when it affirmed that the rule was fully settled both in its case-
                                                             
89 Note 64 
90 Note 82, 15 
91 Ibid, p.18; also see Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, note 85. 
92 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reps 2006, 18 
93 Ibid, p. 19   
94 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reps 1996, 595 
95 Ibid,  p. 620-621 
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law and that of the PCIJ.
96
 The rule is well supported by the practice of States which have 
also accepted the juridical status of the rule in their conducts and arguments before the Court. 
7.4.2 Presumptions 
Presumption is another means by which the Court disguises judicial legislation. There have 
been a number of cases where the Court altered the tenor of a treaty while claiming to be 
presuming the intention of the parties. Unlike the use of implied terms, presumption is not 
contingent upon the existence of a parenting provision. The Court could well take cognisance 
of matters extraneous to a treaty as a ground for the presumption to be made. In Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua,
97
 the Court was requested to settle the dispute concerning the extent of Costa 
Rica‘s right of navigation on San Juan River. To decide the case the Court had to construe 
article VI of the 1858 Treaty of Limits (drafted in Spanish). The Treaty recognised the 
sovereignty of Nicaragua over the River and granted Costa Rica limited rights of navigation.  
The areas in which Costa Rica was to have navigational rights was defined by the Spanish 
expression ―con objetos de comercio‖. It was the interpretation of this expression the Court 
was particularly engaged, as both parties were disagreeing on the English translation of the 
expression. For Nicaragua, the English translation was as, ―with articles of trade‖. This would 
mean that the freedom of navigation guaranteed to Costa Rica by Article VI related only to 
the transport of goods intended to be sold in a commercial exchange. For Costa Rica, the 
expression means ―for the purposes of commerce‖, in English. Consequently, Costa Rica, 
argued that the freedom of navigation given to it by the Treaty must be attributed the broadest 
possible scope encompassing not only the transport of goods but also the transport of 
passengers, including tourists.
98
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Deciding the dispute, the Court declared that it would subscribe to neither the particularly 
broad interpretation advocated by Costa Rica nor the excessively narrow one put forward by 
Nicaragua. Rather, the Court declared that the term ―comercio‖ must be understood to have 
the meaning they bear on each occasion on which the Treaty is to be applied, and not 
necessarily their original meaning.
99
 Following this approach, the Court extended the 
expression to cover the transport of persons (including tourists) and of goods, so long as the 
activity was carried out for a price. 
As to whether the same expression granted navigational rights to the inhabitants of the 
villages on the Costa Rican bank of the River in order to meet the basic requirements of 
everyday life, which was carried out without a fee, Nicaragua urged the Court to answer the 
question in the negative. Nicaragua contended that the expression, ―comercio‖, delimiting the 
navigational rights of Costa Rica could not be so construed. To Costa Rica the answer was in 
the affirmative, following the broad definition of ―commerce‖, it had earlier advocated.  
Rejecting the view of both parties, the Court affirmed that the carriage of passengers free of 
charge, or the movement of persons on their own vessels, for purposes other than the conduct 
of commercial transactions, could not fall within the scope of ―navigation for the purposes of 
commerce‖ within the meaning of Article VI of the 1858 Treaty. Yet the Court opined that 
the existence of navigational rights for the purpose of meeting basic necessities could be 
presumed, though such a right was not derivable from the express language of the treaty.
 100
 
The Court justified its position by stating that it could not have been the intention of the 
authors of the 1858 Treaty to deprive the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the river, 
where that bank constitutes the boundary between the two States, of the right to use the river 
to the extent necessary to meet their essential requirements, even for activities of a non-
commercial nature, given the geography of the area.  
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While disagreeing with this aspect of the judgment, Judge Leonid Skotnikov highlighted the 
ingredients of lawmaking in the presumption made by the Court. The Judge was of the firm 
view that the presumption was not based on any evidence before the Court, contending that 
the Court ignored, if not overruled the customary practice of the Parties.
101
 He argued that the 
Court was wrong to have presumed that the use of official vessels for the purpose of 
providing services to riparian communities was within the rights granted Costa Rica by the 
treaty, as such a practice could not have been contemplated by the parties at the time the 
treaty was concluded.
102
 
It is clear from the totality of the case and the argument of the parties that the Court indirectly 
rewrote the terms of the treaty. This was not a case of a mere interpretation of treaty terms, it 
basically concerned rights granted by the treaty on the basis of agreement between the 
parties. By rejecting the arguments of the parties and presuming that the treaty granted rights 
to riparian communities without express grant in the treaty and without a provision enabling 
any implication to be made, the Court expressly made a law for the parties.    
7.4.3 Generic Terms 
Another guise for lawmaking in the application of treaties is the construction of generic 
terms. Where generic terms are used in a treaty, the Court considers itself at liberty to 
progressively interpret the treaty as the generic terms evolve. The Court has premised this 
rule on three factors: (a) where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties 
necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time; 
(b) where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period; and (c) where the treaty is 
―of continuing duration‖. The Court follows the practice that where these factors are present, 
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the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an 
evolving meaning.
103
  
Though this appears in form of presumption, it is not actually presumption that leads to the 
expansion of the scope of the treaty; the expansion lies in the limit to which the Court is 
willing to stretch the treaty through the evolution of the generic terms used in the treaty. The 
presumption that the parties intend generic terms to have an evolving meaning is only a 
means to an end.  The most comprehensive statement of the use of generic terms was made in 
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case.
104
 In this Case, while interpreting a clause in the 
General Act of 1928, the Court declared:  
  
Once it is established that the expression ‗the territorial status of Greece‘ was 
used in Greece‘s instrument of accession [to the General Act of 1928] as a 
generic term denoting any matters comprised within the concept of territorial 
status under general international law, the presumption necessarily arises that 
its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and to correspond 
with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at any given 
time. This presumption, in the view of the Court, is even more compelling 
when it is recalled that the 1928 Act was a convention for the pacific 
settlement of disputes designed to be of the most general kind and of 
continuing duration, for it hardly seems conceivable that in such a convention 
terms like ‗domestic jurisdiction‘ and ‗territorial status‘ were intended to have 
a fixed content regardless of the subsequent evolution of international law. 
 
The far-reaching effect of the use of presumption could be seen in Costa Rica v Nicaragua.
105
 
Here, the term, ―for the purpose of commerce‖ was extended to cover the transfer of persons 
and tourists for commercial purposes, though the transfer of persons (such as tourists) was 
not a commercial venture and thus not contemplated by the parties when the Treaty was made 
in 1858. The Court declared that even assuming that the notion of ―commerce‖ does not have 
the same meaning today, as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, it is the present meaning 
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which must be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty.
106
 A meaning, which as could be 
gathered from her argument before the Court, Nicaragua would not have accepted if the 
treaty was made contemporaneously with the decision of the Court.   
The approach of the Court in the foregoing cases corresponds to the view of Rosalyn Higgins 
that judges have a law-creating function because adjudication is not a mere automatic 
application of existing rules to particular situations.
 107
 She further argued that the 
interpretative function of judges may do much to fill alleged gaps.
108
  In agreement with this 
view, Lauterpacht argued that as inadequacies in the international legal system stem from 
imperfections in the lawmaking process, there is particularly wide scope for judicial 
interpretations.
109
 Lauterpacht further agreed with the view that every application of a legal 
rule constitutes a degree of the creation of a rule for the individual case, and that although the 
nature of the law creating activity of courts is different from that of the legislature, it is 
nevertheless constant in operation.
110
 
No doubt, there may be disputes as to the extent each writer is willing to admit that the Court 
makes law in the course of interpretation and application of treaties. But in reality it can 
hardly be disputable that the Court does actually make law in the process. This is even more 
telling by the fact that the law between the parties regarding the treaties construed by the 
Court in the foregoing cases can no longer be ascertained on the bare language of the treaty 
but from the decisions of the Court relating to the treaties.    
Before proceeding to the next section, it is worth remembering that the writer is discussing 
two broad occasions for judicial legislation. These are: (a) cases where the Court is engaged 
with the interpretation and application of existing law; and (b) cases where no rule of treaty 
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or custom applies. The writer has just discussed judicial legislation regarding treaties. In 
doing this, the writer has argued that lawmaking by the Court does not reveal itself only in 
the event of the absence of positive law, but also in the interpretation and application of 
positive law. The writer particularly identified some guises by which the Court legislates in 
the course of applying positive law. The relationship between judicial lawmaking and 
customary international law, having been discussed in chapter IV, the writer sees no need 
belabouring the discussion here.   
7.5 Absence of Treaty or Customary Law 
A major feature of international law is the absence of a central legislature to compulsorily 
make laws to govern the behaviour of States and regulate their conducts. This is a problem 
for international law which is in constant need of expansion to cover  the challenges brought 
about by ―the great shades of nuance that permeate international law‖,111 as it expands 
through globalisation, scientific discoveries, environmental degradation, terrorism, human 
rights etc. The absence of a legislative body with power to make international law, which is 
binding upon all States, makes it impossible for the law to continually develop in order to 
effectively meet the points of friction in the relations of States.  
When conflicts arising from areas not yet covered by international law are submitted to the 
Court, should the Court declare that it is impossible for it to decide due to absence of 
applicable law or should it yet decide the matter despite the absence of a pre-existing rule of 
international law? The absence of international law governing a conflict between States is 
much more a problem for the Court than for any other organ of the United Nations. The other 
principal organs of the UN can adopt political solutions to disputes brought before them; they 
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could also out rightly refuse to discuss a question submitted to them; or refer the matter to the 
Court for an opinion. The Court does not have such wide options. The only option opened to 
the Court (once properly seised), albeit in its contentious jurisdiction, is to decide the dispute 
in accordance with international law.
112
  
If it was open to the Court to declare impossibility of deciding due to absence of law in its 
contentious jurisdiction, the Court would have been completely disabled in the performance 
of its judicial functions. It would have been practically impossible for the Court to sustain the 
idea of having an independent permanent judicial institution, insofar as there is no legislative 
organ under international law. Thinking along this line in 1967, Friedmann was of the view 
that:  
Even at this day, international law, while aspiring to be a comprehensive 
system governing the conduct of nations in international relations, is a loose 
collection of customs, treaties, and some judicial decisions, supplemented, in 
the language of the statute of the international court, by ‗general principles of 
law recognised by civilized nations‘, most of them still inarticulate. It can 
only survive by constantly expanding to meet new conditions, by a 
continuous interaction of law-finding and law-making, for there is no neat 
division between legislative, executive and judicial organs. The Nuremberg 
judgments are a conspicuous example of the making of new international law 
in form of judicial fiat.
113
 
Although international law has made some remarkable progress since 1967 when Friedmann 
wrote, his view is still as relevant in contemporary times as it was at that time. This is 
remarkably so because the progress recorded by international law has mainly been brought 
about through the activities of international courts and tribunals. The major plank for the 
expansion of international law was laid when international Courts started recognising that 
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international law could directly confer rights on individuals as well as hold individuals 
directly accountable.  
Given that the discussion about to begin proceeds on the acceptance of the possibility of the 
existence of gaps in the law, it is important, as a prelude to the discussion, to examine the 
thought that the international law is logically complete and preclusive of gaps.  This thought 
is principally based on the lotus case presumption of, ―what is not prohibited is permitted‖. 
The writer shall now make some remarks on this before continuing with the discussion on 
judicial legislation in the event of a gap in the international law. 
7.5.1 The Lotus Case Presumption 
The so-called Lotus case presumption of what is not prohibited is permitted was adopted by 
the PCIJ in the case of S.S. Lotus.
114
 In the case, the Court was requested, in proceedings 
brought by France to determine whether Turkey had acted contrary to international law, for 
subjecting the French captain of the SS Lotus to criminal proceedings in pursuance of 
Turkish laws over a collision that occurred on the High Sea in which eight Turkish citizens 
died. The Court declared that in the absence of any principle of law precluding Turkey from 
instituting the proceedings, it must be concluded, by virtue of the discretion which 
international law leaves to every sovereign State that Turkey did not act in a manner contrary 
to the principles of international law.  
Since the PCIJ applied the principle in the Lotus case, the ICJ has applied it in two cases. The 
first is Nicaragua v. United States,
115
 and the second is Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo.
116
 In Nicaragua v. United States,
 117
 the Court held that 
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international law contains no rules other than such rules as may be accepted by the State 
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can 
be limited. This was in response to the argument of the United States that the excessive 
militarization of Nicaragua was a demonstration of its aggressive intent towards her 
neighbours.  In Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo,
118
  the Court 
was requested to determine whether the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo 
was in accordance with international law. In giving its opinion, the Court opined that the 
declaration of independence was not in violation of international law because international 
law contains no prohibition on the unilateral declaration of independence. The Court reached 
this conclusion on the premise that State practice points to the conclusion that international 
law contained no prohibition of declarations of independence.
 119 
 According to the Court:  
 
... For the reasons already given, the Court considers that general international 
law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence. 
Accordingly, it concludes that the declaration of independence of 17 February 
2008 did not violate general international law.
120
 
 
The idea is that there cannot be a gap in international law as the Lotus case presumption 
resolves every gap in favour of permission for the subject to act as it pleases. In effect, the 
Court should give judgment for the respondent whenever the conduct called in question is not 
directly regulated by international law. Writing in favour of this presumption, Han Kelsen 
suggested that what is regarded as a gap in the law by some writers is a situation where the 
law permits its subjects to act as they pleased concerning a particular subject. In his view:  
That neither conventional nor customary international law is applicable to a 
concrete case is logically not possible. Existing international law can always be 
applied to a concrete case, that is to say, to the question as to whether a state ...  
is or is not obliged to behave in a certain way. If there is no norm of 
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conventional and customary international law imposing upon the state the 
obligation to behave in a certain way, the subject is under international law 
legally free to behave as it pleases.
121
 
In consequence,  
The assumption that the law-applying organs are authorized to fill such gaps, by 
applying to the particular case norms other than those of existing conventional 
or customary international law, implies that the law-applying organs have the 
power to create new law for a concrete case if they consider the application of 
existing law as unsatisfactory. From this point of view of legal positivism, such 
a law-creating power must be based on a rule of positive international law. 
Whether there exists such a rule of general international law is doubtful, 
although many writers take it for granted that there are gaps in existing 
international law, and that the states or international agencies competent to 
apply international law are authorized to fill these gaps.
 122
   
This writer does not share Kelsen‘s view. The Lotus case presumption tends to ignore the fact 
that though a particular act is not prohibited, by engaging in the act, a State may yet cause 
consequences forbidden by law. Lack of express prohibition does not always translate to legal 
permission, as the act may yet offend the law when it brings about consequences forbidden 
by law. For instance, by the decision of the Court in the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence,
123
 a unilateral declaration of independence is permitted insofar as it is not 
expressly prohibited by law. The Court would certainly take a different view if in the 
execution of unilateral declaration of independence, genocide or other crimes against 
humanity were committed. This was the dilemma the Court faced in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
124
 Here, the Court found that there was no law expressly 
prohibiting the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Court could not conclude 
that States were at liberty to use the weapon as they pleased. This was because the Court 
found that the use of the weapons would offend legal prohibitions in other areas. 
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Accordingly, the absence of legal prohibition of an act capable of provoking consequences 
prohibited by law is a gap waiting to be filled.    
Also, the Lotus case presumption is an evasive approach to legal questions. Taking the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence,
125
 for instance, the answer given by the Court fell 
short of affirming whether the act of unilateral declaration of independence was actually 
lawful or not; i.e., whether an entity was legally permitted to unilaterally declare 
independence. The absence of prohibition, per se, would not mean that there are no 
associated rules from which the Court could determine the legality of the declaration of 
independence. Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged the progress that had occurred from the 
second half of the twentieth century as a result of the development of the international law of 
self-determination which the Court observed had been developed in such a way as to create a 
right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.
126
  
The Court also acknowledged the existence of the territorial integrity principle as a 
conflicting rule (a Charter rule in article 2(4)) to the right to self determination; yet it failed to 
rationalise how the former could be displaced by the latter. This is in spite of the attention of 
the Court being called to the fact that the unilateral declaration of independence was unlawful 
because it violated the territorial integrity principle by dismembering a sovereign State.
127
  
But for the evasive outlet presented by the Lotus case presumption, it would have been 
interesting to see how the Court would resolve the conflict between the fundamental rule of 
territorial sovereignty and the equally fundamental rule of right to self-determination. The 
Court simply left this vital question hanging.  
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The Lotus case presumption does not entirely owe its origin to the decision of the PCIJ in the 
Lotus case. Ricci-Bussati first canvassed this idea during the deliberations of the 1920 
Advisory Committee of Jurists. He had argued, in effect, that there was no question of the 
Court acting as a legislator as legislation dealing with international law comes within the 
power of States. He thought the Court could always answer to the apparent lack of legal rules 
by declaring the absence of positive rule implying absence of international limitation on the 
freedom of the parties. By this he argued that a legal relation is established between the 
parties, as that which is not forbidden is allowed. He regarded this as one of the general 
principles of law which the Court shall have to apply.  In conceiving how this rule shall be 
applied, he stated that if the Court finds that no rules existed concerning a case before it, the 
Court shall declare that one party has a right against the other, that the conduct of the accused 
is not contrary to law.
128
  He gave an example with the question of the territorial sea. He 
stated that in the absence of a rule of international law which defined the limits of the 
territorial waters, if a question of this kind were brought before the Court, the Court must not 
accept one or the other of the different rules in force in the different countries; it must simply 
state that a rule generally admitted does not exist, and after this statement, that the rulings of 
different countries are equally legitimate in so far as they do not encroach on other principles, 
such as freedom of the seas.
 129
  
This view was generally opposed by members of the Committee. In response to Ricci-
Bussati‘s postulation, Hagerup had painted the following scenario: an English vessel arrives 
within three to four sea mile limit, off the Norwegian coast; Norway maintaining that her 
territorial water extends to a distance of four miles from the coast expels the English vessel; 
England brings the matter to Court in protests. He asked Ricci-Bussati whether the Court 
                                                             
128 Process-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee of Jurists June 16-July 24, 1920, p 314 
129 Ibid, p. 315 
  
291 
should declare that there was no cause of action because there existed no rules on the subject 
of territorial waters‘ extent.130 Also Descamps thought that the consequence of the rule that 
what is not prohibited is permitted would be that the law is as made by the strong.
131
   
It is, therefore, not surprising that the notion found expression in the S.S Lotus case, which 
was one of the earliest cases decided under the Statute. Perhaps, the Court was influenced by 
the same consideration as Ricci-Bussati: the consideration of the prevalence of the 
―international law of strict coexistence, itself a reflection of the vigour of the principle of 
State sovereignty‖.132 A situation far removed from the international law of today, which has 
become much less rigid. This is the ground upon which some Judges of the Court have 
challenged the presumption. According to Judge Alvarez the principle that States have the 
right to do everything which is not expressly forbidden by international law, though 
―formerly correct, in the days of absolute sovereignty, is no longer so at the present day".133 
Judge Simma sees it as the ―old, tired view‖. 134 Indeed, the new complexion of international 
law casts serious doubt on the tenacity of the argument that there can be no gap in 
international law owing to the Lotus case presumption.  
The corollary of the existence of gaps in the law manifests in two ways; when the presence of 
gaps is admitted, a court could remedy the gap or simply plead non liquet. If a non liquet, is 
declared, “the courts leave the disputed issue at large … in the sense that they neither 
recognize nor reject the contended right or the contended duty‖.135 On the other hand, the 
Court could confirm or reject the contended right or duty by filling the gap. We shall now 
discuss these alternatives.  
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7.5.2 Non Liquet  
There question whether international courts can adopt a rule to govern a claim for which 
there was no pre-existing rule of international law has been a live question since the advent of 
the institution of a permanent international court of justice. The answer to this question is 
somewhat controversial in theory, though a question with very little significance in practice. 
It usually presents itself in two folds. The first is that it is incumbent on international courts to 
decline to decide a case on the ground that rules are not available for its determination. The 
second is that a court, otherwise endowed with jurisdiction, must not refuse to give a decision 
on the ground that the law is nonexistent, or controversial, or uncertain or lacking in 
clarity.
136
 The first answer affirms the non liquet doctrine. The second affirms the direct 
opposite – the inadmissibility of non liquet. In effect the latter view affirms the power of 
international courts to fill gaps in positive law in order to render a legal decision in every case 
brought before them.  
The essence of the non liquet rule is that an international court should not give a decision if 
the law is non-existent, controversial, or uncertain, or lacking in clarity.
137
 It provides a basis 
for the view that an international court lacks the power ―to develop, adapt and create rules of 
international law of new content‖.138 As Stone observed, what is urged by those who accept 
the existence of non liquet, goes not merely to law-applying, but in a more important sense, 
also, to the law-creative competence of the Court over States.
139
 The real issue arising from 
non liquet, according to Stone, is that the Court must either declare a non liquet or necessarily 
engage in creation of law by a judicial act of choice between more or less equally available 
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legal alternatives.
140
  It thus exists to controvert the view that international judges could fill 
gaps in the law by finding legal answers to disputes submitted to them, absent pre-existing 
rules of law.  
It is pertinent to state at this point, however, that the present writer does not intend to 
embrace a general discussion on the question of non liquet in relation to international 
tribunals. This has been eminently discussed by Hersch Lauterpacht
141
 and Julius Stone.
 142
 
These eminent Scholars discussed non liquet, not just in relation to the ICJ, but in its 
application to international courts and tribunals in general. The discussion of non liquet by 
these Scholars addressed the question of whether there is a prohibition of non liquet under 
international law.  In his work Lauterpacht, argued that there is a general prohibition of non 
liquet in international law due to the completeness of the international legal order. This 
position was to some extent criticised by Stone. Though agreeing that there has never been a 
case where an international adjudicator declared non-liquet, he could not agree that a 
prohibition could arise from that fact. 
Generally speaking, the present writer does not consider it necessary to belabour the point by 
continuing the argument concerning whether or not non liquet is prohibited under general 
international law in relation to both judicial and arbitral proceedings. The writer intends to 
draw inspirations from the works of these Scholars as he now focuses on non liquet only in 
relation to the ICJ. 
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7.5.2 (a) As in the Statute of the Court 
The first point to note is that there is no room for non liquet within the ICJ Statute paradigm 
of judicial settlement of disputes. This could be gathered from the express provisions relating 
to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. There is strong support for this view in the 
wording of the opening paragraph of article 38. The paragraph provides, ―the Court, whose 
function it is to decide in accordance with international law, such disputes as are submitted to 
it...‖. There are two angles to this article: the first angle empowers the Court to decide 
disputes submitted to it; the second is that the decision must be in accordance with 
international law. The importance of these provisions would carry consideration weight when 
it is seen in the light of article 36, by which the jurisdiction of the Court is strictly voluntary.  
Cases would not come to the Court except the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Court in one way or the other. When States agree to submit their disputes to the Court, they 
do so in expectation of a decision. By necessary implication, they are submitting, not just to 
the jurisdiction of the Court as far as the existence of international law governing the dispute 
is available, but also with the belief that the Court would fashion out a legal solution, where 
none existed. This is indeed the essence of the second angle – the solution that the Court 
would adopt must be in accordance with international law.  The fundamental question is that 
of jurisdiction and competence of the claim. When the Court finds its jurisdiction to exist in 
any particular case and the claim competent, it is expected that it would render a decision in 
accordance with international law.
143
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University Press, 1975) (stating that ―It is only the refusal to give a decision after the Court had assumed jurisdiction is based 
  
295 
This view seems to enjoy the support of Publicists that command respect in matters of 
international law. Prosper Weil sees the avoidance of non liquet in international adjudication 
as an integral part of the consent-based character of the judicial settlement of international 
disputes.
144
 He further argued that non liquet frustrates the will of the parties to have their 
disputes settled judicially because: 
The principle of freedom to choose the means of settlement of international 
disputes, as well as the prominence given by the parties in a specific case to 
judicial settlement, would be defeated if an international tribunal were to 
pronounce a non liquet when it cannot find in the law a solution to the problem 
before it.
145
 
It has equally been argued that it is open to the Court to decide any case over which it has 
jurisdiction regardless of any gap in the applicable content of law as it stood immediately 
prior to the decision.
146
  
The Statute did not just make room for the avoidance of non liquet, it also provides the Court 
with the necessary tools that would enable the Court get out of a situation indicative of non 
liquet. By these tools – general principles of law (article 38(1)(c) and judicial decisions 
(article 38(1)(d) – the Court creates and develops the law to meet new situations. The 
fundamental role played by these tools had engaged the attention of several writers.  
It has accordingly been observed that the view that article 38(1)(c) helps to remove the 
possibility of non liquet is by now widely accepted.
 147
  This view is corroborated by Judge 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
on absence or insufficiency of the applicable substantive law that the question of non liquet may properly be deemed to 
arise‖.) Cf. Separate Opinion of Judge Petran in Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) ICJ Rep 1974, 457 , (treating 
absence of law as a question of admissibility).     
144 Prosper Weil, note 140, p. 115 
145 Ibid, p. 115-116 
146 Julius Stone, note 22, p. 143 
147 Rosalyn Higgins, note 104, p. 67; Christopher A. Ford, ―Judicial Discretion in International Jurisprudence: Article 
38(1)(c) and General Principles of Law‖ 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int‘l L. 35, 64 (1994-1995)  (arguing that article 38 provided 
the Court with authority to invoke general principles in order to prevent non liquet). Ibid; lain Scobbie, ―Res Judicata, 
Precedent and the International Court of Justice: A Preliminary Sketch,‖  20 Aust. YBIL 229, 300 (1999) (stating that the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists agreed on the inclusion of article 38(1)(c) in order to provide a guarantee against the Court 
declaring a non liquet); Georg Schwarzenberger, Forward to Cheng , xi cited in  Ford Christopher, note 147, p 65,  ( arguing 
that general principles enables the Court to replenish the rules of international law by principles tested within the shelter of 
more mature and closely integrated legal system.)     
  
296 
Schwebel, who admitted that the inclusion of "the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations" in article 38 of  the Statute of the Court by the Advisory Committee of 
Jurist was specifically devised to avoid what Descamps had termed ―the blind alley of non 
liquet".
148
  
Concerning paragraph (d) of article 38(1), the writer is confident that its place has been very 
well established in this thesis and, therefore, needs no further elaboration at this moment. 
Save to say that the importance attached to article 38 (1)(c) does not depreciate the value of 
paragraph (d). Article 38 (1)(c) may well be the route through which general principles of 
private law are incorporated into international law. But once they have been applied by the 
Court they loss their identities to the case-law of the Court within the province of paragraph 
(d). Soon the principles/rules arising from the application of the general principles will be 
applied not as principles/rules of private law but as settled rules in the case-law of the Court. 
This view is ably supported by Judge McNair, who rightly declared that the Court does not 
apply private law sources, stock, lock and barrel, but modifies them to suit the international 
environment.
149
 If the modified rule has no equivalent in customs or treaties, it would not be 
long before the rule is applied as a rule emanating from the case-law of the Court. It is from 
the case-law of the Court that the possibility of the rule becoming assimilated into customary 
international law arises. 
As for advisory jurisdiction, a different consideration may apply. But the Court has been 
steadfast to its practice of creating and developing international law even in its advisory 
jurisdiction. Unlike its contentious jurisdiction, there is no provision in chapter IV (article 65-
68)
150
 imposing a duty to decide in accordance with international law. Rather, article 65 gives 
                                                             
148 Dissenting, Nuclear Weapons case, note 124, p. 322 
149 Separate Opinion in International Status of South West African, note 5, p., 148   
150 This governs the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. The provisions of chapter IV is repeated in article 102 of the Rules of 
Court. (adopted on April 14 1978). 
  
297 
the Court discretion on whether to answer a question referred to it for an advisory opinion or 
to refuse to give an answer. However, article 68 allows the Court to be guided by the 
provisions of the Statute applicable in contentious cases, to the extent to which it recognizes 
them to be applicable. The relationship between non liquet and the practice of the Court is 
discussed in some details later.   
7.5.2. (b) As in the Practice of the Court 
It is refreshing to begin this discussion with the assertion of Gerald Fitzmaurice, who once 
declared:  
It is axiomatic that courts of law must not legislate: nor do they overtly purport 
to do so. Yet it is truism that a constant process of development of the law goes 
on through the courts, a process which includes a considerable element of 
innovation ... in practice, courts hardly ever admit a non liquet. As is well 
known, they adapt existing principles to new facts or situations. If none serves, 
they in effect propound new ones by appealing to some antecedent or more 
fundamental concept, or by invoking doctrines in the light of which an 
essentially innovatory process can be carried out against a background of 
received legal precept. 
151
    
Gerald Fitzmaurice‘s opinion perfectly depicts the practice of the ICJ in relation to the 
development of international law. Indeed as generally observed by Fitzmaurice, from the 
PCIJ till date, there is no reported contentious case in which the Court declared non liquet. 
Neither is there any case in which States requested the Court to do so. This view has also 
been expressed by some Judges of the Court. In the Nuclear Weapons Opinion, Judge 
Higgins declared the ―important and well-established principle that the concept of non liquet 
... is no part of the Court's jurisprudence‖.152 In his Dissenting Opinion in the same case, 
                                                             
151 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ―Judicial Innovation – Its Uses and its Peril‖ in Cambridge Essays in International Law (Essays in 
Honour of Lord McNair) pp 24-25 cited in Rosalyn Higgins, note 107, p. 68 
152 Dissenting, note 124, p. 592 para 36 
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Judge Stephen M. Schwebel categorically stated that: ―Neither predominant legal theory ... 
nor the precedent of this Court admits a holding of non liquet”.153 
The writer shall now consider non liquet in relation to the practice of the Court in its 
contentious and advisory jurisdictions.  
7.5.2(b) (i). In the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court 
There is the argument that the Court declared non liquet in Haya de la Torre.
154
 This writer 
disagrees with this argument.
155
  
Haya de la Torre case was a sequel to the Colombian-Peruvian Asylum case.
156
 In the former 
case, the Court was called upon to specify which of the several means of terminating asylum 
was conducive to the implementation of the judgment of the Court in the Asylum case. In the 
Asylum case, the Court had declared that the diplomatic asylum granted to Haya de la Torre 
by Columbia in her Embassy in Lima was illegal, but the Court did not make a consequential 
order on how the asylum should be terminated.  This was what prompted the Haya de la 
Torre case. The aim of the case was to obtain the interpretation of the Asylum case. The 
precise question was whether the Asylum case could be interpreted to mean that Columbia 
should terminate the asylum by surrendering Haya de la Torre to the Peruvian authorities, or 
whether Columbia could terminate the asylum in any other way.  
In answering the question, the Court made it clear that the question concerning the 
surrendering of the refugee was not decided in the Asylum case because the question was not 
submitted to the Court. The Court held that it was not in a position to declare, merely on the 
basis of the Asylum case, whether Colombia is or is not bound to surrender the refugee to the 
                                                             
153 Ibid, p 322  
154ICJ Rep 1951, 71 
155 Siorat, ―Le Probleme des Lacunes en droit International‖ (1959) cited in Julius Stone,  note 22, p. 140-144. 
156 ICJ Rep 1950, 266 
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Peruvian authorities.
157
 Also, the Court found that there were several modes of terminating 
asylum but that the Havana Convention operative between the parties, and upon which the 
Asylum case had been decided, was silent on the mode of terminating a political asylum, 
which had been irregularly granted.  
The Court viewed the silence of the Convention as implying that it was intended to leave the 
adjustment of the consequences of the situation to decisions inspired by considerations of 
convenience or of simple political expediency.
158
 Accordingly, while reiterating that 
Columbia should terminate the asylum in accordance with the judgment in the Asylum case, 
the Court declared by thirteen votes to one that Columbia was under no obligation to 
surrender the refugee to the Peruvian authorities.  
It is on the refusal of the Court to specify a mode for the termination of the asylum that the 
argument that the Court indicated non liquet is based. However the hesitation of the Court to 
make a choice for the parties on the best way to terminate the asylum may be viewed, it does 
not, by the widest interpretation amount to non liquet. What the Court did in that case was 
simply to refuse to make a consequential order requesting Columbia to deliver Haya de la 
Torre to the Peruvian authorities.
159
 Indeed, throughout the Haya de la Torre judgment, the 
Court made it clear that the question submitted to it in the Haya de la Torre case had not been 
decided in the Asylum case, which was the substantive case.  In effect the Court was not in 
the position to reopen the Asylum case to determine the best means by which the asylum 
should be terminated.  
 Besides, it cannot even be said with certainty that there was a lacuna on the question before 
the Court. Granted that the Court admitted that the Havana Convention was silent on the 
                                                             
157Haya de la Torre, note 172,  p. 79 
158 Ibid, p. 81 
159 Ibid. p. 75  
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point, the silence of the Convention on the point cannot be read to mean that there was no 
rule of customary international law on which the Court could have relied to answer the 
question. The Court even went as far as giving an indication to the existence of a Latin 
American tradition touching on the issue. Indeed the Court affirmed that there was a ―Latin-
American tradition in regard to asylum, a tradition in accordance with which political 
refugees should not be surrendered‖. 160  The Court also found that ―[t]here is nothing in that 
tradition to indicate that an exception should be made where asylum has been irregularly 
granted [as was the Asylum case]‖.161  
If the Court was minded on deciding the issue, assuming it arose in the Asylum case, it would 
not be too far-fetched to assume that the Court would have applied the said Latin American 
tradition as a rule of customary international law prevailing between the parties, which are 
Latin American States.
162
 Given that it cannot certainly be said that the Court was faced with 
a gap in the law, it is wrong to argue that the Court declared non liquet, which can only arise 
when there is a gap in the law. 
This view is in consonance with the view of Julius Stone. Stone observed, and importantly 
too, that since the Haya de la Torre case was not the real judgment submitted to the Court, 
but a request to seek the means for the execution of the judgment in the Asylum case, the 
Court did not refuse to decide the precise issue. He remarked that the case is not relevant to 
the non liquet question,
163
 and that the approach of the Court in the case is more easily 
explained without reference to non liquet doctrine at all.
 164
  
                                                             
160 Ibid, p. 81 
161 Ibid 
162 This view is not affected by the fact that the Court rejected the argument of Columbia in the Asylum case, note 174, pp 
276 -278, on the existence of a custom regarding the unilateral qualification of asylum. The Court did not deny the existence 
of customary law of asylum, as a whole. What the Court found, not to have been established as a custom worthy of 
application between the parties, was the aspect relating to the unilateral and definitive qualification of asylum. 
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In view of the above, the argument that the Court declared non liquet in this case, strongly 
stands to be disputed. 
7.5.2 (b)(ii) In the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court  
How does the point made above concerning the contentious jurisdiction of the Court fit into 
its advisory jurisdiction? To some extent, it may be argued that the Court may declare non 
liquet in its advisory jurisdiction. This, as hinted earlier, is because the Court is not under any 
obligation to render an opinion on questions of law submitted to it in its advisory jurisdiction. 
Whether or not to render an opinion is a discretionary matter for the Court. In addition, the 
Statute does not contemplate the submission of a dispute between States in advisory opinions: 
a dispute that would require resolution in accordance with international law. This point 
appears to have been taken into account in the Declaration of Judge Vladlen Vereshchetin, 
where he stated that the debate on non liquet has been predominant in respect of the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Court in which the Court is required to pronounce a binding, 
definite decision settling the dispute between the parties.
165
 While appearing to argue that the 
Court could declare non liquet in its advisory opinion, Judge Vereshchetin pointed out that 
the Court is not requested to resolve an actual dispute between actual parties, but to state the 
law as it finds it at the present stage of its development.
166
 On the other hand, Mohammed 
Shahabuddeen is unwilling to draw a distinction between advisory and contentious 
jurisdictions for the purpose of non liquet. He reasoned that the law to be applied was the 
same whether a Court is operating within its advisory or contentious jurisdiction.
167
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It appears to this writer, from the point just made, that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court 
does not provide an appropriate forum for determining the existence of non liquet. This is 
because questions seeking the Courts attention are usually couched in abstract terms. An act 
may be legal or illegal in its abstract and general term but may be otherwise when it is 
considered in relation to a concrete case. For instance, a court, when faced with a legal 
question whether the killing of a man is murder, may simple return an answer saying that it is 
murder. But the Court would certainly take a different view if presented with a concrete case 
where the killing was carried out in self-defence or where it occurred by accident. In what 
appears to be a confirmation of this, it was wondered in the advisory opinion in the Western 
Sahara case: 
whether the Court has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable 
it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questions of fact the 
determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions 
compatible with its judicial character.
168
 
This abstract attribute of advisory opinions was the difficulty of the Court in the Nuclear 
Weapons case.
169
 It was in consequence of this that the Court reached its conclusion in 
paragraph 2E of its Opinion. In this paragraph the Court opined that,  
in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at 
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
170
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This was regarded as an indication of non liquet by a number of the Judges who heard the 
case,
 171
 just as some writers also believe. Nonetheless, if the language of the paragraph was 
allowed to speak for itself, it would be clear that the Court adopted the paragraph in view of 
the abstract ―elements of facts at its disposal‖.172 Indications that the situation would have 
been different, if the Court was deciding a case in which nuclear weapons had been 
threatened or used are numerous in the judgment. Indeed the Court would have been able to 
rely on the various rules (such as the law and custom of war, the rule of proportionality etc), 
which the Court had found to be applicable to the use of nuclear weapons, to determine 
whether the threat or use was lawful or unlawful. This case is discussed in more detail below.   
Despite the general problem of the abstract formulation of legal questions in advisory 
jurisdiction, in practice, article 68 of its Statute allows the Court to be guided by the 
provisions of the Statute, as it applies in contentious cases, to the extent to which it 
recognizes them to be applicable. Accordingly, the Court has, as close as practicable, 
recognised and applied rules applicable in contentious jurisdiction to advisory jurisdiction.
173
 
The Court has persistently maintained that though its advisory jurisdiction ―represents its 
participation in the activities of the [UN] Organization",
174
 it participates in the activities of 
the organisation ―as a court of justice‖.175 The Court has also been quick to point out that it is 
a judicial body and that in the exercise of its advisory functions, it is bound to remain faithful 
                                                             
171 Declaration of the President, Mohammed Bedjaoui (p. 269, para 8) (stating that there was no immediate and clear answer 
to the question); Declaration of Judge Vladlen Vereshchet (p. 279) (stating that paragraph 2E ―admits the existence of a 
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304 
to the requirements of its judicial character.
176
 Also, that being a Court of justice, the Court 
cannot depart from the essential rules guiding its activity;
177
 it exercises its advisory 
jurisdiction as a judicial function.
178
  
This, perhaps, explains the reason the Court has strived to provide legal answers to questions 
referred to it in its advisory jurisdiction, notwithstanding the problem arising from the 
abstract nature of the questions formulated for opinions. The Court has thus assimilated its 
advisory jurisdiction as closely as possible to its contentious jurisdiction. As far as the Court 
remains faithful to the application of international law, the Court does not bother itself with 
whether it is dealing with a ―dispute submitted to it‖179 or ―a legal question‖,180 the Court 
attaches the same consideration to both – the consideration of application of appropriate rules 
of international law. By the deliberate choice of the Court, therefore, and through the power 
granted it by article 68, the Court has established a practice of not declaring non liquet in its 
advisory jurisdiction when confronted with questions not covered by international law, albeit 
how unsatisfactory the answer given by the Court may be.  
This is even so, as the Court sometimes renders decisions within a purely advisory 
jurisdiction. Such a decision was rendered by the Court in the Eastern Carelia case.
 181
 In that 
case, the refusal of the Court to render an opinion and the grounds upon which that refusal 
was based was itself a decision which had to be considered in subsequent cases.    In the 
Nuclear Weapons case,
182
 the legal question presented to the Court was whether the use or 
threat of nuclear weapons under any circumstances was lawful. In answering this question, 
                                                             
176 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the I.L.O. Upon Complaints Made Against the U.NE.S.C.O., Advisory 
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178Northern Cameroons case (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1963, 15,  30.  
179 Article 38 of the Statute of the Court 
180 Ibid, Article 65  
181 Note 195.; also see pp. 150-152 of this work 
182 Note 124 
  
305 
the Court analysed the existing conventional and customary law on the use of force as they 
relate to the laws and customs of war,
183
 neutrality, territorial integrity, self-defence as well 
as laws governing the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. In all of these laws, 
however, the Court could not find, and rightly too, any law specifically authorising or 
prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. But through analogies from the general principles 
arising from the laws, the Court found the use of nuclear weapons to be within the prohibition 
in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. The Court also found that the use of nuclear 
weapons in self-defence was conditioned by the rules of proportionality and humanitarian 
international law.
 184
   
The sore point of the depositif of the Court was paragraph E. For its relevance to this 
discussion, the writer feels inclined to quote this paragraph again, though at the risk of 
repetition.  In it, the Court opined: 
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; However, in view of the current state of international law, 
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or 
unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake.
185
 
It could actually be argued, though not with absolute certainty, that the Court declared non 
liquet in the second limb of paragraph E. But from the totality of the case and the reasoning 
of the Court and of the individual Judges, it is the argument of this writer that the Court did 
not really declare non liquet.
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In furtherance of this viewpoint, it is important to note at the outset that paragraph 2E was 
adopted as a majority opinion with great hesitation on the part of the Judges. The very 
obvious part of this hesitation is the fact that the depositif was adopted by the casting vote of 
the President of the Court: a very slim majority. What is not so obvious to many writers is 
that a number of Judges did not actually vote for the controversial second limb. They actually 
voted for the first. Also, a number of the Judges did not vote in favour of the paragraph to 
declare non liquet, because (as shown below) a good majority of the Judges were firmly of 
the view that, though the threat or use of nuclear weapons was not prohibited, per se, its 
prohibition was inferable from existing rules of international law.   
Let us take a quick look at the reasons some of the Judges voted in favour of paragraph 2E. In 
his Declaration, Judge Herczegh voted for paragraph 2E though he thought it had not 
―summarized more accurately the current state of international law regarding the question of 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons ‗in any circumstance", because to have voted against this 
paragraph would have meant adopting a negative stance on certain essential conclusions 
alluded to in the first limb of the paragraph.
186
 It is worth stating that the same Judge was of 
the firm view that:  
The fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, rightly 
emphasized in the reasons of the Advisory Opinion, categorically and 
unequivocally prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction, including 
nuclear weapons. International humanitarian law does not recognize any 
exceptions to these principles.
 187
 
In effect, it cannot be said from the totality of the declaration of the Judge that non liquet was 
within his reasoning when he voted for that article. This is obvious from his finding that 
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law categorically and unequivocally 
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the Judge was more concerned with 
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preserving the first limb of the paragraph. Judge Bedjaoui (the President of the Court), though 
voted in favour of paragraph 2E, also explained that the survival of a State, though equally a 
fundamental norm as humanitarian law cannot be placed above, ―the ‗intransgressible‘ norms 
of international humanitarian law‖.188 Also, while voting in favour of the paragraph, Judge 
Ferrari Bravo said he was deeply dissatisfied with certain crucial passages of the decision, 
which he described as ―not very courageous‖. 189 He opined that the use of nuclear weapons 
being contrary to rules of humanitarian international law, it ―becomes automatically unlawful 
as being quite out of keeping with the majority of the rules of international law‖.190 In his 
Separate Opinion, Judge Ranjeval made it very clear that he actually intended voting in 
favour of only the first limb of paragraph 2E, but that he had to vote for the whole paragraph 
because the rules of Court would not allow him vote for the first and not the second limb.
191
 
To confirm this view he actually discredited the second limb by declaring that the use of 
nuclear weapons in extreme case of self defence was illegal.
192
 
This is why the writer has contended that the majority did not actually vote for the second 
limb suggestive of non liquet. It thus appears that a number of the Judges were ambushed by 
the merger of the first limb (which would have had a unanimous vote) with the second limb 
(which would have been voted against by a near unanimity). It is also clear that the 
declaration of non liquet was not operating in the reasoning of most of the Judges who voted 
for paragraph 2E.  
Viewed from this perspective, the writer is inclined towards the view variously made by 
some of the Judges in the case that there was indeed no ground for the declaration of non 
                                                             
188 Declaration of the President, Mohammed Bedjaoui, ibid, p. 273, para 22 
189 Declaration of Judge Ferrari Bravo, ibid, p. 273, 282 
190 Ibid, p. 285 
191 Ibid, p. 304  
192 Ibid, p. 303 
  
308 
liquet, since the Court had, by its own showing, proved that there were laws suited for the 
regulation of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, albeit indirectly or by analogy.   
The view that there was no occasion for non liquet in the questions presented to the Court 
was shared by Judges Schwebel, Higgins, Koroma and Shahabuddeen.  Judge Koroma 
specifically stated that a finding of non liquet was wholly unfounded in the case on the 
ground that, contrary to the suggestion that may flow from the opinion of the Court that there 
was a gap in the law, the opinion did not call for the application of new principles, as there 
were existing laws for the Court to apply.
193
  Judge Shahabuddeen declared that there was no 
gap calling for the declaration of non liquet.
194
  He argued that ―to attract the idea of a non 
liquet in this case, it would have to be shown that there is a gap in the applicability of 
whatever may be the correct principles regulating the question as to the circumstances in 
which a State may be considered as having or as not having a right to act‖. 195   The same view 
resonated throughout the opinions of Judges Higgins and Schwebel. In Rosalyn Higgins‘ 
view, the Court simply failed to ―take principles of general application, to elaborate their 
meaning and to apply them to specific situations‖.196   
If Higgins‘ view could be taken further, the question the writer may ask is whether the 
―extremity‖ with which the Court amplified the Charter-right to self-defence removed self-
defence from the general rule of proportionality, discrimination and unnecessary suffering of 
civilian populations and enemy combatants? Interestingly, the Court had stated from the 
outset that its functions required it to adapt the law to new situations by specifying its scope 
and noting its general trend. According to the Court: 
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The contention that the giving of an answer to the question posed would 
require the Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the present 
corpus juris is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could not 
accede to this argument; it states the existing law and does not legislate. 
This is so even if, in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily 
has to specify its scope and sometimes note its general trend.
197
 
Clearly, this was exactly the duty the Court refused to perform in paragraph 2E. This point 
was well made by Judge Vereshchetin, who incidentally voted for paragraph 2E. In his 
words:   
It is plausible that by inference, implication or analogy, the Court (and this 
is what some States in their written and oral statements had exhorted it to 
do) could have deduced from the aforesaid a general rule comprehensively 
proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons, without leaving room for 
any "grey area", even an exceptional one.
 198
 
While laying so much emphasis on the seeming non liquet in the Nuclear Weapons case, it 
makes for a balance argument to also recall that before and after the above advisory opinion, 
the Court had severally developed the law to fill gaps rather than plead non liquet, even in 
advisory opinions.
199
 The general approach of the Court outweighs the uncertainty in the 
approach of the Court in the isolated Nuclear Weapons case.    
In summing up the points made above, the writer wishes to emphasise that the Statute of the 
Court did not expressly prohibit non liquet. Nonetheless, it made it impossible for the Court 
to declare non liquet in contentious proceedings and created room for the same approach in 
its advisory jurisdiction. The Statute achieved this by including general principles of law 
(paragraph c) and judicial decisions (paragraph d) of article 38(1) as sources of laws to be 
applied by the Court. These sources have been the pretty handmaids assisting the Courts to 
reach decisions ―in accordance with international law‖, even in first impression cases.  
                                                             
197 Nuclear Weapons case, ibid, p 237 para 18 
198 Declaration of Vladlen Vereshchetin in Nuclear Weapons case, ibid, p. 280 
199 Find instances of this in pages 310-319 below 
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Having said that, it is pertinent to recall the point made at the beginning of this section that 
the absence of positive law leaves the Court with two possibilities in the alternative – it could 
declare non liquet; or it could fill the gap and render a decision. Given that the Statute of the 
Court prevents it from declaring non liquet, the only option open to the Court in cases 
submitted to it is that of rendering decisions. The writer shall now examine how the Court 
goes about this alternative. 
7.5.3 The Court Fills Gaps in Existing Law   
In the course of this part, the writer has made two important findings. The first is that 
international law is not logically complete and is thus not preclusive of gaps; the second is 
that there is no room for the declaration of non liquet, albeit, in the contentious jurisdiction of 
the Court. These two findings point to one predictable conclusion – that gaps do inevitably 
arise in the Course of the Court‘s functions, but that the Court is entitled, as it has always 
done, to fill the gaps and do justice.  
The practice of filling gaps in the law in the course of settling a dispute is not peculiar to the 
ICJ. This power was already being exercised by arbitral tribunals even before the PCIJ was 
established. It should be recalled that Descamps, the President of the 1920 Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, alluded to the 1902 California Pious Arbitration,
200
 in which the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) affirmed its power to seek and apply just principles in 
international settlement of dispute. In the arbitration, the Arbitrators acknowledged that the 
controversy, being between States, shall have to be determined on the basis of treaties and 
principles of international law. Nonetheless, the arbitrators resorted to the private law concept 
of res judicata to fill gaps in the law.  
                                                             
200The Pious Fund of Californias (United States of America v. The United Mexican States). The Award of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in the Matter of the Pious Fund of the Californias, rendered October 14, 1902     
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The fact that international tribunals fill gaps in positive law was also noted in the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Koroma in the Nuclear Weapons case.
.201
In the case, the Judge called to 
mind the British-American Claims Arbitral Tribunal in the Eastern Extension, Australia and 
China Telegraph Company, where it was declared:  
International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and generally 
does not contain, express rules decisive of particular cases; but the function 
of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing rights and interests by 
applying, in default of any specific provision of law, the corollaries of 
general principles, and so to find - exactly as in the mathematical sciences - 
the solution of the problem. This is the method of jurisprudence; it is the 
method by which the law has been gradually evolved in every country, 
resulting in the definition and settlement of legal relations as well between 
States as between private individuals. 
In agreement with the approach of the Arbitrators in the above arbitral award, Judge Koroma 
admitted that the practice espoused by the arbitral tribunal has been the jurisprudential 
approach to issues before the ICJ. The Judge further admitted that the Court had in the past 
applied legal principles and rules to resolve the conflict of opposing rights and interests 
where no specific provision of the law existed, and had relied on the corollaries of general 
principles in order to find solutions to problems. The Judge admitted that the approach of the 
Court has not been to restrict itself to a search for a specific treaty or rule of customary law 
specifically regulating or applying to a matter before it, but that the Court had referred to the 
principles of international law, to equity and to its own jurisprudence in order to define and 
settle the legal issues referred to it.
202
 
To bring this to light, the writer shall in addition to the guises employed for judicial 
legislation earlier discussed, now discuss some other guises employed by the Court to make 
law while maintaining its deniability. It is important to state that the earlier discussion was 
focused on lawmaking in the application of positive law. The writer‘s focus here is on the 
                                                             
201 Note 124, Judge Koroma, dissenting, at 575, citing the United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VI, 
pp. 114-115. 
202 Ibid, p. 576   
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common guises which the Court employs when resolving disputes in areas not previously 
covered by law. 
7.6 Other Guises for Judicial Legislation by the ICJ    
7.6.1 Law Making Through General Principles of Law  
By article 38(1)(c), the Court is permitted to draw analogies from general principles of 
private law recognised by civilised nations. Giving that international law is a less mature 
system than municipal law, the Court has developed several areas of international law 
through principles adopted from private law sources. The Court has found this avenue quite 
useful in a number of cases. In the Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal,
203
 the Court answered to the objection that the General 
Assembly was inherently incapable of creating a subordinate body competent to make 
decisions binding its creator, by drawing analogy from national laws, under which national 
legislatures create courts with the capacity to render decisions legally binding on the 
legislature which brought them into being.
 204
 
The creativity of the Court in relation to the application of private law sources markedly lies 
in the fact that when the Court has recourse to private law, it does not just apply it hook-line 
and sinker. It inevitably modifies the private law principle to suit States as against the very 
different entity – individuals – to whom private law applies. The view expressed by McNair 
in the International Status of South West African is very instructive to the point being made. 
In his words:  
What is the duty of an international tribunal when confronted with a new 
legal institution the object and terminology of which are reminiscent of the 
rules and institutions of private law? To what extent is it useful or necessary 
                                                             
203  Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1954, 47, 621  
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to examine what may at first sight appear to be relevant analogies in private 
law systems and draw help and inspiration from them? International law has 
recruited and continues to recruit many of its rules and institutions from 
private systems of law. Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the Court bears 
witness that this process is still active, and it will be noted that this article 
authorizes the Court to "apply .... (c) the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations". The way in which international law borrows from this 
source is not by means of importing private law institutions "lock, stock and 
barrel", ready-made and fully equipped with a set of rules. It would be 
difficult to reconcile such a process with the application of "the general 
principles of law". In my opinion, the true view of the duty of international 
tribunals in this matter is to regard any features or terminology which are 
reminiscent of the rules and institutions of private law as an indication of 
policy and principles rather than as directly importing these rules and 
institutions.
205
 
The Court has also shown that it approaches the application of private law rules in analogous 
areas with great care. The Court is particularly careful where a particular concept may carry 
different factual and legal elements in international law to its content in municipal law. The 
Court found itself in this situation in the International Status of South West Africa.
 206
 Here 
the Court found that international "Mandate" had only the name in common
 
with the several 
notions of mandate in national law. The Court found the differences to be that the object of 
the Mandate regulated by international rules far exceeded that of contractual relations 
regulated by national law. Also, that as against the notion of mandate in municipal law, the 
mandatory power, the Union of South Africa, being a member of the League of Nations was a 
joint principal
207
 and not just a trustee. Accordingly, the Court opined that it was not possible 
to draw any conclusion by analogy from the notions of mandate in national law or from any 
other legal conception of that law.
208    
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7.6.2 Lawmaking Through Corollaries of General Principles    
It may happen that a claim before the Court is not directly governed by any rule/principle of 
international law.  There may, nonetheless, be general rule/principles, the existence of which 
would make it impossible for the law to develop in a direction which conflicts with that 
rule/principle. From the existence of a general rule/principle the Court is able to glean a new 
law to govern a novel area interrelated to the area regulated by the general principle.  
In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd, in discussing the obligations of States 
in the field of human rights, the Court stated that all States have a legal interest in their 
protection because the obligations are held towards the international community, erga omnes. 
The reasoning of the Court shows that the Court accepted this legal obligation as a corollary 
of the importance modern international law attaches to human rights as evidenced by the 
robust body of international law in that field. Hence, the Court stated that the rule it was 
stating, ―derive[s] ... from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from 
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination‖. 209 In what clearly showed that the Court was stating 
the obligation that all States have a legal interest in the protection of human rights, as a 
corollary of the corpus of human rights law, the Court emphasised that ―some of the 
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law 
...".
210
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7.6.3 Law by Reference to General Principles of International Law 
The Court has often developed rules of international law by reference to ―general principles 
of international law‖. This is different from what is contained in article 38(1)(c) which is 
basically understood to refer to private law principles recognised by civilised nations. In the 
frequency of occasions in which the Court had referred to rules contained in general 
principles of international law, the Court takes it for granted that such principles already 
existed as principles of international law even when it should be obvious that there is no 
ground for justifying the prior existence of such principles.  
In Competence of the ILO to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer,
211
 
the PCIJ was asked to answer the question whether it was within the competence of the ILO 
to propose labour legislations which, while protecting certain classes of workers, incidentally 
regulates the same work when carried out by an employer himself. The Court declared that 
though the enabling Treaty of Versailles did not expressly grant the ILO the power to 
regulate work carried out by an employer, the power could be inferred from the broad powers 
given to the organisation to propose the legislation for the protection of wage earners.  
When, subsequently, the ICJ was asked to answer the question whether the UN can bring an 
international claim, the Court reformulated the decision in the Competence of the ILO, to the 
effect that under international law, an organisation:  
must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication 
as being essential to the performance of its duties.
 212
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In other words, the Court was content to apply the presumption as a general rule of 
international law, without justifying the prior existence of the rule before it was applied by 
the PCIJ.  
Lawmaking by reference to general principles of international law has proved to be a very 
useful device in the practice of the Court. In Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, the Court established that the South-West African 
Mandate was susceptible to termination for the misconduct of the mandatory power, as a 
―general principle of law‖.213 In Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish 
Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory,
214
 the Court established the supremacy of 
international law over national law before international courts as a ―generally accepted 
principle‖. In Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the principle of respect for 
vested rights formed part of ―generally accepted international law‖.215   In Corfu Channel,216 
the Court referred to "certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary 
considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war", as the basis of the 
obligation of Albania to notify other States of the presence of minefield in her territorial 
waters. In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,
217
 the Court relied on the Factory at Chorzow 
case
218
 to the effect that:  
[tlhe essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a 
principle which seems to be estab1ished by international practice and in 
particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far 
as possible, wipe out al1 the consequences of the illegal act and  re-establish 
the situation which would, in al1 probability have existed if that act had not 
been committed. 
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In all of the cases referred to above, the principles referred to as ―general principles‖ owe 
their origin to neither treaties nor customs. The term is mostly employed to disguise judicial 
legislation.   
7.7 Some Aspects of the Development of International Law by the ICJ   
7.7.1 Reservations  
In the Reservations to the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
219
 the 
main legal question referred to the Court was whether a reserving State can be regarded as a 
party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation if' the reservation is objected to 
by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others. Absent any rule of 
conventional law on the point, as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was yet to be 
made, this question required the Court to examine the existing rules of customary 
international law.  
In the course of examining the rules, the Court admitted the existence of ―the absolute 
integrity of the treaty rule‖. Under this rule, a reservation must receive the express or tacit 
approval of all the parties to a convention for it to be valid. The Court denied that this rule 
existed as rule of customary international law, declaring that: 
On the other hand, it has been argued that there exists a rule of international 
law subjecting the effect of a reservation to the express or tacit assent of all the 
contracting parties. This theory rests essentially on a contractual conception of 
the absolute integrity of the convention as adopted. This view, however, 
cannot prevail if, having regard to the character of the convention, its purpose 
and its mode of adoption, it can be established that the parties intended to 
derogate from that rule by admitting the faculty to make reservations thereto. It 
does not appear, moreover, that the conception of the absolute integrity of a 
convention has been transformed into a rule of international law. The 
considerable part which tacit assent has always played in estimating the effect 
which is to be given to reservations scarcely permits one to state that such a 
rule exists, determining with sufficient precision the effect of objections made 
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to reservations. In fact, the examples of objections made to reservations appear 
to be too rare in international practice to have given rise to such a rule.
220
  
The Court further opined that a reservation needs not to be accepted by all the parties to a 
multilateral Convention. It stated that insofar as the reservation is accepted by some parties to 
the Convention, the reserving State becomes a party to the Convention vis a vis the accepting 
States, provided the reservation does not affect the object and purpose of the Convention.
221
 
In formulating the object and purpose of the convention rule, the Court declared that the 
object and purpose of the Convention limits both the freedom of making reservations and that 
of objecting to them. The Court further declared that it is the compatibility of a reservation 
with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude 
of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in 
objecting to the reservation.
 222
 
As rightly observed by the dissenting judges, beyond claiming that the object and purpose 
rule was the prevailing rule of custom, the judgment of the Court fell short of justifying the 
existence of the rule as a pre-existing rule of customary law, both in the practice and opinio 
juris of States. All the Court was able to lay claim on was that there was in existence among 
American States, a practice which permitted reserving States to be parties to a treaty, 
irrespective of the nature of the reservations or of the objection raised by the other parties.
223
 
On the other hand, it was clearly shown by the dissenting judges that the prevailing practice 
was actually the absolute integrity of the convention rule. In the joint dissenting opinion of 
Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Judge Read, Judge Hsu Mo,
224
 the Judges gave a long 
and convincing history of the existence of the absolute integrity of the convention rule. They 
relied on the practice of States respecting certain conventions and the opinion of writers. 
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They also showed that the rule had also been followed by the League of Nations and the 
United Nations.
225
 The joint dissenting Judges emphatically declared that the judgment of the 
Court:   
propounds a new rule for which we can find no legal basis. We can discover 
no trace of any authority in any decision of this Court or of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice or any other international tribunal, or in any 
text-book, in support of the existence of such a distinction between the 
provisions of a treaty for the purpose of making reservations, or of a power 
being conferred upon a state to make such a distinction and base a 
reservation upon it. Nor can we find any evidence, in the law and practice 
of the United Nations, of any such distinction or power.
226
 
Whatever the status of the absolute integrity rule before the Reservations case, it can only 
exist as an exception to the object and purpose rule which was formulated by the Court in that 
opinion. The object and purpose rule was incorporated into article 19(c) and 20 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a general rule governing reservations made by 
parties to the Convention.  
However, the application of the rule as a rule of law in the case-law of the Court has a wider 
scope than its application in the Vienna Convention. That is because a number of States to 
which the rule now applies as a rule of customary international law are not parties to the 
Vienna Convention. Thus from a humble beginning in the case-law of the Court, the rule has 
metamorphosed into a rule of treaty and customary law. Of course, it is clear from the totality 
of the argument and the reasoning of the Court in the Reservations opinion that prior to the 
opinion the rule was not in existence. The practice among American States to which the 
Court alluded was different to the object and purpose rule enunciated by the Court and could, 
therefore, not be the legal basis for the object and purpose rule.  
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7.7.2. The Legal Nature of Unilateral Undertaking  
The rules relating to the obligatory nature of unilateral statements are not contained in any 
convention or customary international law. The nature of unilateral statements, as 
constituting a binding obligation towards the whole world by a party making same was first 
considered by the ICJ in the Nuclear Test cases,
227
 in a manner and reasoning reminiscent of 
the English Court in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
228
 In the Nuclear Test cases, 
Australia and New Zealand had brought two separate actions before the ICJ to request the 
Court to order France to stop its atmospheric nuclear tests in the South Pacific Ocean, given 
the adverse environmental effects of the tests on the Australian Continent. In the course of the 
separate actions, France, which had refused to participate in the proceedings, made several 
public statements in which it assured that it will no longer perform atmospheric nuclear tests. 
The Court relied on these statements, particularly that made by the President of France. 
Without citing any authority, the Court reasoned that:      
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, 
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal 
obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. 
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should 
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the 
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth 
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the 
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an 
intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international 
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a 
quid pro quo, nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even 
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any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to 
take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly 
unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the 
State was made.
229
 
Based on this reasoning, the Court declared that the claims of the respective Applicant had 
been rendered moot by the said statements and thus refused to make any pronouncement on 
the claims of the parties. By this decision, the Court, like the English Court in the Carlill v. 
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,
230
 established the binding nature of unilateral statements, as an 
obligation to the whole world.  
After the Nuclear Tests cases, there have been instances where litigating States requested the 
Court to apply the rule to their cases. In the Nicaragua case,
231
 the Court was urged to apply 
the rule to a statement the Junta of National Reconstruction transmitted to the Organization of 
American States to hold that Nicaragua was legally bound by the statement. The court 
declined to so hold.
232
 In Frontier Dispute,
233
 the Court declined the request to apply the rule 
to hold Mali bound by the declaration made by Mali's Head of State on 11 April 1975. 
The Court used the opportunity provided by the latter cases to restate the essential ingredients 
of the rule. The Court made it clear that the acceptable form of unilateral statements must 
comprise a ―formal offer which if accepted would constitute a promise in law, and hence a 
legal obligation‖. Also that the commitment contained in the statement must be of a legal 
nature.
234
 The Court has also been emphatic in stating that though unilateral declarations may 
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be treated as an undertaking erga omnes, such declarations must be regarded with ―greater 
caution‖ when the declaration is not directed at any particular recipient.235 
7.7.3 The Liability of States for the Activities of Armed Militias 
States are abstract entities: they have neither souls to be damned nor bodies to be kicked;
236
 
the liability of States must be sought in the directing minds and will of States, which are then 
fictionally transplanted to the State as acts of the State.  The act of state doctrine attributes to 
a State only the activities of individuals and or organs which authorities are recognised by the 
internal law of the State. Such officers have been narrowly defined by international law for 
the purpose of holding the State liable for their acts.
237
 
The ICJ has sought to extend the act of state doctrine beyond its traditional frontiers. This 
reformation began in the Nicaragua case, where Nicaragua urged the Court to hold the 
United States directly responsible for the activities of the anti-Nicaraguan government group 
(the Contras), in the territory of Nicaragua. Nicaragua had argued that:  
The contras are no more than bands of mercenaries which have been 
recruited, organized, paid and commanded by the Government of the United 
States. This would mean that they have no real autonomy in relation to that 
Government. Consequently, any offences which they have committed would 
be imputable to the Government of the United States, like those of any other 
forces placed under the latter's command. In the view of Nicaragua, "stricto 
sensu, the military and paramilitary attacks launched by the United States 
against Nicaragua do not constitute a case of civil strife. They are essentially 
the acts of the United States." If such a finding of the imputability of the acts 
of the contras to the United States were to be made, no question would arise 
of mere complicity in those acts, or of incitement of the contras to commit 
them.
238
 
 
The difficulty with Nicaragua‘s contention was that the Contras was an armed opposition 
group which was neither an organ of the U.S nor based in the U.S, and for which conduct the 
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United States could not be held responsible under existing rules of international law. To 
resolve the difficulty, the Court formulated the control and dependent test as a new basis for 
state responsibility for the activities of non-state actors within the borders of another State. 
The Court has, however, said that there must be ―complete dependence‖239on the State for the 
activities called in question for that State to be internationally responsible.  
When the question arose again in the first Genocide case,
240
 the Court simply resorted to the 
rule it adopted in the Nicaragua case,
241
 declaring that: 
according to the Court‘s jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or 
entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with 
State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided 
that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in ―complete dependence‖ on 
the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument. In such a case, 
it is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the 
reality of the relationship between the person taking action, and the State to 
which he is so closely attached as to appear to be nothing more than its 
agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their international 
responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose 
supposed independence would be purely fictitious.
242
 
 
Through these cases the Court established a rule to deal with situations where the 
international liability of a State cannot be directly implicated in armed intervention for which 
it has complicity.  
In this chapter, the writer has so far argued, not only that the Court engages in judicial 
lawmaking, but also discussed guises employed by the Court for judicial lawmaking while 
still maintaining the convenience of stating that judges do not make law. In the course of the 
discussion, the writer has touched on several vital areas connected to judicial lawmaking. 
These include non liquet and the Lotus presumption. The writer also mentioned specific legal 
concepts which have been developed by the Court.       
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In concluding this chapter, the writer wishes to restate his view that the Court exercises a 
residual lawmaking function wherever the resolution of a legal question before it necessitates 
the creation or development of a new rule/principle of international law. The writer is not 
under any illusion that this view will have a general appeal in view of the entrenched view 
that the Court cannot make laws. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the views 
expressed above, no matter how liberal they seem, are backed by the actual practice of the 
Court, the writer is hopeful that the views would have considerable academic appeal.  
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                     Chapter Eight 
     Conclusion 
 
Through the foundation established in chapters one and two, the writer was able to establish 
by an extensive discussion of the text of articles 38 and 59, particularly as espoused in the 
case-law of the Court in chapters three to six, that rules/principles in judicial decisions are 
applied by the Court as rules/principles of international law. The writer found this approach 
to be in consonance with the intentions garnered from the preparatory work. To further 
strengthen the tenability of the views expressed in chapter two to six, the writer dedicated 
chapter seven to specific aspects of judicial legislation by the Court. The writer extensively 
discussed the case-law of the Court as it relates to non-liquet and judicial lawmaking.  
From the writer‘s analyses, the following conclusions, which reinforce themselves in the 
preparatory work of the Statute and the practice of the Court, are evident: 
1.  That judicial decisions are a source of international law, not only for the Court but 
also for States that appear before it;  
2. That judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) was intended to be used as a source of law, 
failing all the other sources. And that the importance of judicial decisions in this 
regards reveals itself in decided cases of the Court; 
3. That the real question is not whether the Court has adopted stare decisis, it is whether 
rules/principles enunciated in the decisions of the Court have continuously been 
applied to States and accepted as rules/principles of international law; 
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4. That the making of article 59 and its application by the Court does not reveal it as 
preclusive of judicial decisions as a source of law. Its real connection being with third 
party intervention and the protection of third party rights from decisions and not 
principles underpinning the decision in individual cases.  
5. That there is no room for non liquet in the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, and 
no less so in its advisory jurisdiction. 
6. That the incompleteness of international law does not result in non liquet, because the 
sources open to the application of the Court are complete in virtue of articles 38(1)(c) 
and (d).      
7. That while arguing that it is difficult to precisely say whether the Court regards itself 
bound by its precedent, it is indisputable that the Court does not ignore 
rules/principles enunciated in its precedent. Principles, which the Court indisputably 
regards as binding on it and on litigating States, so long as the ground upon which 
they were based have not lost legal credibility. It must, however, be admitted that 
there have been the situations, where the coherency of the case-law of the Court was 
disrupted by some extra-legal factors mentioned in the body of this work. 
8. In consequence of the foregoing, the Court makes a law for the parties in every case it 
decides. And each decided case has legal implications for other States, as the law they 
contain establishes a situation at law; a situation which neither the Court nor States 
are not in the habit of ignoring.   
In the final analysis, while the writer cannot claim to have exhausted all the aspects of the 
debate, the writer is, however, confident that the much he has done would render articles 38 
and 59 much more amenable to the proper understanding of the role of the ICJ in the making 
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of international law.  Indeed this work stands out as one of the few English works that fully 
dedicates to understanding the authority of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) and their 
relationship to article 59, from the making of the provisions through the practice of the Court 
and of States relating to them.  The writer‘s extensive discussion of the preparatory work of 
the provisions in chapter two challenges some factual inaccuracies in some texts as well as 
gives the reader a more conducive platform for assessing the relevance of article 38(1)(d) in 
the formation and development of international law. On the whole, not unmindful of the fact 
that text writers generally express the contrary view, the writer is justified in the view taken 
in this thesis by the robust case-law of the Court; the revelation from the preparatory work of 
the Statute and, of course, the works of the few text writers sharing the same view.  
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